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ABSTRACT 
International experience shows that achieving universal coverage has been an 
important way to ensure equity of access to health care and to protect people from 
bankruptcy due to severe illness. One common approach to universal coverage has 
been to expand public health insurance to cover all people in a country. In Thailand, 
universal coverage of health care in Thailand was achieved by expanding public 
insurance to the uninsured. Before universal coverage, there were two main public 
insurance schemes, the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) and the 
Social Security Scheme (SSS). Merging two other schemes targeted at lower income 
groups, (the low income card scheme and health card scheme), and adding the 
uninsured population, produced the Universal Coverage Scheme (UC), a third and 
much larger scheme. The three schemes differ in a number of ways including funding, 
payment of provider and benefit package. There has been considerable concern that 
these characteristics might affect the performance of the insurance schemes. 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the three public health insurance schemes in 
terms of their performance in selected areas. The first objective was to assess and 
explain variation in performance in terms of utilization, length of stay (LOS), and 
~arly readmission. The second was to identify the quality of care provided in each 
Insurance scheme using Diabetes Mellitus (OM) as a tracer of performance and 
examining LOS, early readmission, and various other indicators of quality of care. To 
answer the first objective, the Health and Welfare Survey 2005 was used to analyse 
utilization by scheme and national claims data were used to analyse LOS and early 
readmission of OM patients. To assess quality of care in detail, primary quantitative 
and qualitative data were collected on OM patients and providers in Samutsakhon 
province. 
The study indicates that the type of insurance scheme influences performance. The 
utilization review found that SSS members had a higher probability of using 
ambulatory services but a lower probability of being hospitalized. CSMBS members 
had a higher probability of being hospitalized. Members of the VC scheme had 
shorter LOS than CSMBS members and a higher probability of readmission relative 
to both SSS and CSMBS members. 
The empirical study found that CSMBS members were more likely to receive care 
consistent with standard guidelines. However, intermediate outcomes such as fasting 
plasma glucose, and Haemoglobin Ale level, were not as good as might be expected 
possibly due to the effects of other factors such as body mass index and patient 
behaviour. The qualitative study found that different patient groups had different 
expectations and perceptions of quality of service and that the insurance scheme and 
hospital policy influenced provider behaviour. 
The study demonstrates that, despite universal coverage, patients covered by different 
insurance schemes experienced variation in quantity and quality of care. Countries 
moving toward universal coverage should pay particular attention to the features of 
the insurance scheme design, especially with respect to management, organization, 
provider payment and the benefit package, as these features influence the performance 
of the scheme and the ability to achieve health system goals. 
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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Public health insurance plays a major role in protecting people from the financial 
consequences of illness and providing access to health care. There are three major 
functions within health insurance: collection of revenues (sources of funds), pooling 
of funds and spreading risk across the population, and purchasing services from 
providers (Preker et al. 2001). 
To achieve the public health insurance role, most countries have tended to expand 
public health insurance to cover the entire population. However, the degree of 
achievement of this expansion varies from country to country (Mills 1998). Because 
of market failure of insurance, it is generally considered that insurance should be 
compulsory because coverage less than 100% leaves some people uninsured and leads 
in turn to equity problems (Halvorson 2007). However, insurance coverage can create 
a problem of moral hazard which means an increase demand for medical care in 
response to insurance coverage (Zweifel and Manning 2000). One approach to reduce 
moral hazard is to include cost sharing from beneficiaries. 
Universal coverage of health insurance can be viewed from two perspectives; breadth 
of coverage, determining the proportion of the population covered by insurance, and 
depth of coverage, which is the range of services available to people without out-of-
pocket payment. The definition of depth of coverage is more controversial as it 
requires specification of the range of service packages which diffes from country to 
country, and regarding which there are many variations (Kutzin, 1998). 
Most countries use a mix of sources to finance their public health insurance system. 
The most common sources are payroll tax and general tax. The progressivity of 
premiums or contributions collected by each source will inevitably determine the 
fairness of fmancial contributions. How providers are reimbursed is another major 
issue in designing health insurance. Several mechanisms can be used to pay service 
providers such as capitation, fee-for-service (FFS), per diem, global budget, salary, 
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bonus, and line item budget. Each payment method reqmres different levels of 
information and management capacity, with advantages and disadvantages III 
motivating service providers, and different implications for health care costs. Health 
insurance systems and their management also vary from country to country. Some 
countries have a single system with a single fund or multiple funds, while others have 
more than one system for different segments of their populations, for example for the 
formal and informal sectors. 
1.2 Health insurance performance 
Variations in system design and institutional arrangements inevitably affect the 
performance of health insurance. Performance of public health insurance can be 
measured in terms of achieving universal coverage and health system performance 
(Carrin and James 2005; Kutzin 2001). Performance of the health system can be 
assessed by multiple criteria such as population health outcomes, protection from 
financial risk, and satisfaction with process and result of care (Berman 2000). Scope 
of performance includes health gain, cost containment, health outcome, efficiency, 
quality, equity, access, choice, transparency, accountability, citizen participation, and 
provider satisfaction (Figueras et al. 2005). Some criteria are interrelated with others, 
for example, accessibility is related to both equity of service and related to utilization. 
Another example is that efficiency of resource use might relate to cost containment. 
There are several indicators used to evaluate health system performance. this study 
focuses on access to care in terms of utilization, efficient use of resources, and quality 
of service. 
In terms of access, many countries have made a commitment to improve access to 
care especially for the poor, but evidence shows that there are inequalities in access to 
services in different dimensions such as income and geographical factors (palmer 
2007, Goddard and Smith 2001). 
In terms of quality of care, although it varies enormously, it can be measured 
(McGlynn 2007). A common quality-oriented framework to evaluate performance is 
Donabedian's approach to quality measurement, consisting of structure, process, and 
outcome (Donabedian 1988; Handler et al. 2001). To assess quality of care, it is 
normal to use a disease or condition to be a tracer for study. This thesis used Diabetes 
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Mellitus (OM) as a tracer for three reasons: it is a chronic disease for which patients 
require regular follow up; it has clear criteria for diagnosis, which makes it easier to 
identify patients to be included in the study; and it is a common chronic disease for 
which all hospitals in the study provide services. 
1.3 Public health insurance in Thailand 
In Thailand, universal coverage was achieved in 2001 by expanding public insurance 
through the UC scheme to cover the uninsured group. There are now three major 
health insurance schemes covering almost the entire population: the Social Security 
Scheme (SSS), Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), and Universal 
Coverage Scheme (UC). There are considerable differences between the schemes, for 
example, in system design, institutional arrangements, and population characteristics. 
SSS is a scheme for the formal sector; companies with more than one employee are 
required to participate in this scheme. About 13.5% of the population is enrolled in 
the scheme. CSMBS is a scheme for government officers and dependants, covering 
6.7% of the population (Mills et al. 2005). The remaining population is eligible for the 
UC scheme. The main payment mechanisms differ between the three insurance 
schemes: CSMBS uses fee-for-service (FFS) for hospitals: SSS uses capitation for 
ambulatory and inpatient services: and the UC scheme uses capitation for prevention, 
promotion and ambulatory services with prospective payment by diagnosis related 
groups (DRGs) within a global budget for hospital inpatient services. An important 
political issue is whether ultimately there should be a single scheme or multiple 
schemes. The National Health Security Act of 2002 set the target to be a single 
scheme but in practice, there is resistance to merging all these three schemes into one. 
A less ambitious goal, to harmonize the design of the multiple schemes, is another 
political issue given the current differences between the schemes. 
There is little evidence to show the effects of these differences. Some limited research 
has compared differences in provider behaviour, for example, scheme effects on the 
use of expensive drugs (Limwattananon et al. 2004), different prescription behaviour 
between schemes for chronic diseases (Chansung et al. 2003), and equality of access 
to health services (Chariyalerdsak et al. 2004). However, the impact of health 
insurance variations on scheme performance is not clearly understood, presenting a 
need for further study in this area. 
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1.4 What is known? 
Health insurance performance has been widely researched in developed countries. 
There is substantial evidence relating to health insurance functions and the 
performance of health insurance schemes, for example, studies in Taiwan which 
found that health disparity is narrowed after 10 years of universal coverage 
implementation (Wen et a1. 2008), and the US which found that public insurance 
coverage provides better financial protection than private insurance (Yu et a1. 2008). 
However, there are few comprehensive performance studies related to a health 
insurance system in low and middle income countries. Most low and middle income 
countries, including Mexico and Colombia have used a strategy of expanding 
insurance to move toward universal coverage and improve health system performance 
(Knaul and Frenk 2005). Studies on scheme performance are mainly limited to a 
specific disease or characteristic. For example, there is evidence that expanding health 
insurance improved medical access and use in Lao PDR and Rwanda (Vialle-Valentin 
et a1. 2008). There are few comprehensive studies of scheme performance 
encompassing different models of health insurance, and there are relatively few 
studies complying with standard methods to study the quality of the process of care 
for specific diseases. 
The Thai context provides lessons in how to achieve universal coverage for other 
countries. First, Thailand has undertaken big bang reforms of the health care system, 
for example, refonning the financing system by allocating funds by capitation to a 
registered population, and introducing a purchaser and provider split. However, this 
runs the risk of being challenged by the old system which is administered by the 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), and cultural resistance to the new concept 
(Hughes and Leethongdee 2007). Second, universal coverage in Thailand was 
implemented in a period of economic crisis which demanded strong leadership from 
politicians and other stakeholders such as civic groups and academics (Pannarunothai 
2007). 
There has been little exploration of the performance of the Thai public health 
insurance schemes in terms of quality of care, patient satisfaction, accessibility, and 
efficiency of health services. There have been some studies of scheme perfonnance, 
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but most have studied only specific aspects and have not compared comprehensively 
the effect of the variations in health insurance schemes. There is a lack of evidence on 
the influence of variations in public health insurance scheme characteristics on 
scheme performance. 
How health insurance affects health outcome is still an unknown in achieving 
universal coverage (Levy and Meltzer 2008). Differences in culture, socioeconomic 
status, attitudes, social networks etc. might be expected to produce differences in 
insurance systems. These result in variation of health outcomes. Questions of 
achieving universal coverage with a mix of different existing insurance schemes are 
whether it is possible to narrow the gap of performance or not. 
1.5 Contents of the thesis 
The aim and objectives of this thesis are to identify and assess the performance of 
three public insurance schemes in Thailand in respect of two main themes, overall use 
and Diabetes Mellitus (DM) analysis. In terms of DM analysis, there are two 
performance issues including length of stay and early readmission in DM, and quality 
of service for DM patients. The thesis is comprised of ten chapters including 
background information, literature review, purpose, scope and methodology of the 
study, results of the study, discussion, summary, and recommendations. The details of 
each chapter are shown below. 
~ Chapter 2 provides the framework and contents of the literature review. The aim is 
to elicit a theoretical perspective on insurance and the effect of insurance on 
performance, to highlight key issues concerning health insurance and the 
interaction of health insurance functions, and to relate the performance issues to 
health insurance functions. This review covers international experiences in both 
developed and developing countries. 
~ Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature on Thailand's experience. It provides 
a perspective on Thailand and its health insurance system. Furthermore, related 
research in Thailand on insurance schemes and health system performance is 
reviewed and appraised. 
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~ Chapter 4 provides information on the objectives and methodologies of this thesis. 
It presents the conceptual framework, methods of study, and data collection. This 
study used both primary and secondary data with quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. The chapter also presents information on the quality of data, any 
possible biases of the study and what was done to control for these biases. 
~ Chapter 5 provides the results of the analysis of national survey data (Health and 
Welfare Survey 2005) to show the macro picture of utilization between health 
insurance schemes. The chapter also identifies the effect of the different insurance 
schemes on utilization of both ambulatory and inpatient services. 
~ Chapter 6 provides details of the efficiency of hospital resource use and quality of 
service in terms of length of stay (LOS) and readmission within 30 days after 
discharge. This study used Diabetes Mellitus (DM) as a tracer condition. Data 
used in this chapter are from claims data of the three insurance schemes. 
~ Chapter 7 provides a picture of the quality of care by looking at the process and 
intermediate outcome of care for DM patients in hospitals in Samutsakhon 
province by reviewing medical records for one year. The aim of this chapter is to 
identify any differences in the quality of care within the three public insurance 
schemes provided by different hospitals. 
~ Chapter 8 provides more in-depth data on the quality of treatment of patients and 
on policy affecting provider practice by using a qualitative approach .. Data were 
collected from both the patient and the provider side to explore attitudes and 
practices related to DM treatment. 
~ Chapter 9 discusses the overall methodology and study findings in terms of the 
effects of insurance scheme using selected performance indicators. This chapter 
also indicates the limitations of the study. 
~ Chapter 10 presents the overall conclusions of the study and identifies the 
additional knowledge provided by the study. The study contributes additional 
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knowledge for the policy of the Thai health insurance system and the other 
developing countries. Furthermore, recommendations are made for further 
research. 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The study has significance to Thailand and other countries in that it explores the range 
of performance from the different health insurance schemes and advances knowledge 
of universal coverage implementation that is relevant in Thailand and other countries. 
It provides policy recommendations, as a starting point for further rigorous analysis 
and assessment in the future. Furthermore, it provides additional valuable information 
for policy makers in Thailand and other developing countries on the effect of different 
insurance scheme characteristics on health system performance. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aim of this chapter is to review the role of health insurance in relation to health 
system performance. There are two main sections in this literature review. The first 
section focuses on health insurance functions and roles. The second section focuses 
on the links between health insurance and specific measures of health system 
performance. 
2.1 Key areas to be examined and review sources 
Typically, achieving universal coverage through the expansion of health insurance is 
done through two approaches, expanding social insurance (the Bismarck model) or 
expanding tax based insurance (the Beveridge model) (Mills 1998). An example of 
the Bismarck model is the German system, while a good example of the Beveridge 
model is the UK system. Most low and middle income countries moving toward 
universal coverage have tried to expand coverage through social insurance, as taxation 
poses challenges due to limited government budgets (Preker et al. 2007). Thailand 
achieved universal coverage in 2001 by using funding from general taxation to 
expand public insurance coverage to include the uninsured; the existing contribution-
based low income card scheme, and the health card scheme for the poor, were merged 
into this new scheme which together with the social insurance scheme for the fonnal 
sector and civil servant scheme ensured universal coverage. As more countries have 
implemented insurance schemes, of various kinds, so knowledge on implementation 
and on different characteristics of perfonnance has increased. 
This chapter examines in detail from international experience both conceptual and 
empirical analyses of health insurance and the effect of health insurance on system 
perfonnance. It provides insight into policy concerns about performance. 
The review discussion is organized into the following themes: 
» Health insurance 
» The role, function, and operation of health insurance 
» Linking health insurance with system performance 
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The main online databases searched were composed of international and Thai sources. 
International sources: 
>- PUBMED- the United States National Library of Medicine provides access to the 
MED LINE database in biomedical and health science research. It provides a 
database from 1951 with abstracts and some full text. The website is 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/. 
>- LSHTM database- produced by London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
and covering publications in public health, health management, health policy etc. 
It can be accessed at http://www.lshtm.ac.ukllibrary/ or from Google Scholar with 
attached mark "LSHTM eText" at the end of an article. Those with this mark can 
be accessed as full text from the LSHTM library. 
>- GOOGLE SCHOLAR - produced by Google Inc. It provides both full text and 
abstract and links with the LSHTM library full text catalogue. The website is 
http://scholar.google.co.uk . 
Thai sources: 
>- HSRI- produced by Health System Research Institute of Thailand. It focuses on 
health system research of Thailand. Currently, there are more than 1,000 research 
documents on the Thai health care system. The website is 
http://librarv.hsri.or . th/th/index. php. 
>- NHSO research library- produced by the National Health Security Office with 
their own research after VC implementation. There are more than 100 research 
documents from 2001 onwards related to health insurance in Thailand. 
;.. MOPH - produced by Ministry of Public Health with 15 Thai journals. There are 
more than 1,000 articles on both public health and clinical research in this source 
at the website http://pubnet.moph.go.th/techjrn.php. 
In addition, other sources of material such as proceedings, books, or research papers 
came from online sources such as World Bank, WHO, WHO Euro 
(http://www.euro.who.int), the Milbank Quarterly 
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(http://www.milbank.org/quarterly.htm). and the Social Security Office website 
(http://www.sso.go.th). 
The search strategy identified relevant material on health insurance and system 
performance using as key words such as health insurance, performance, utilization, 
quality of care, access, length of stay, readmission etc. The materials were mainly 
from the LSHTM library and internet full text sources. Review of references from 
articles was also used to find other relevant articles. 
2.2 Health insurance 
Kutzin (1998) proposed that health insurance consists of two basic functions. First, 
health insurance provides access to effective health care services when needed. 
Second, it provides effective protection of family income and assets from the financial 
cost of expensive medical care. Thus in theory, expanding the breadth and depth of 
coverage of health insurance schemes will enhance the performance of these two 
basic insurance functions. 
Insurance can reduce financial risk in the presence of uncertainty. In economic theory, 
to reduce the risk of uncertainty individuals will make a choice on whether or not to 
insure by choosing the option that maximizes the expected value of their utility 
function (Jack 1999). In a situation where an individual has the opportunity to choose 
an insurer, an insurance company may not be able to differentiate individuals 
according to their risk. This effect leads to adverse selection, where low risk 
individuals tend to leave the market if the premium is too high. Adverse selection can 
result in two problems (Hurley 2000) . First, the insurer lacks information on who are 
high risks or low risks. This leads to over-reimbursement. One common strategy to 
tackle this problem is to set up compulsory insurance. The second problem is where 
the insurer has better information than the insured person, which leads to cream 
skimming by the insurer to cover expected losses (Belli 2001). Cutler (2004) stated 
that all health insurance systems where individuals are allowed choice of insurance 
have experienced adverse selection. One approach to tackle this is to set a risk-
adjusted premium. 
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A second problem of the insurance market is moral hazard where insurance leads to 
overuse of services. Moral hazard is a tendency of insured persons to take less care of 
themselves because they will not bear the financial consequences of illness and 
demand more services than persons without insurance (Hurley 2000). This affects the 
behaviour of both the insured and the provider. The insured might demand high cost 
care while the provider might increase the quantity of treatment if they can earn more 
money from providing more services. One strategy to tackle this problem is to set up 
cost sharing for the insured or to limit the supply of services from the provider. 
Another example is that some insurers use a gatekeeper system to prevent the insured 
from passing straight to specialists. 
2.3 The role, function, and operation of health insurance 
Kutzin (1998) proposed a conceptual framework to describe health insurance, as 
shown in Figure 2.1. This conceptual framework links seven insurance elements; each 
is described separately but it is important to note the interdependency between each 
element. 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework of health insurance functions 
Financial Allocating Allocation to 
resources Allocation to institutions provider Service 
(sources of purchasers (purchasers, (provider providers 
funds) insurers) payment) 
Health system support 
Benefit package (Covered services & method of access) 
2.3.1 Financial resources (sources of funds) 
The range of financial resources in a system can be categorized by initial source of 
funding and contribution mechanism, as shown in Table 2.1. Most countries use a mix 
of sources of funding rather than only one source. Some health insurance schemes 
require compulsory contributions from the formal sector (employees, employers), 
while others rely on voluntary prepaid contributions or co-payments as an additional 
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source of funds since both can exist in one country. A key attraction of the co-
payment is that it may limit non-essential use of health care (Mills 1998). 
Table 2.1 Financial sources and contribution mechanisms 
Initial fundin~ sources Contribution mechanisms 
Ind ividuallfami lies Direct tax 
Indirect tax 
Voluntary prepaid contributions 
Co-payment 
Employers/corporate entities/employees Payroll tax 
Other compulsory contributions (mandates) 
Foreign and domestic NGOs and charities Grants 
Foreign governments and multilateral agencies Grants and Loans 
Adapted from: Kutzm 200 I 
Taxes play an important role in redistribution of funds amongst the population. The 
study of O'Donnell (2005) in 13 Asian countries including Thailand found that all 
countries had progressive direct taxes. The redistribution effect was strongest in 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Thailand (O'Donnell 2005). 
Compulsory contributions are an important source of funds in many developed 
countries, while developing countries have tended to extend compulsory contributions 
and payroll tax to the formal sector only (Hsiao et al. 2007). Vietnam, for example, 
introduced a pilot project of two schemes, a compulsory scheme for the formal sector, 
and a voluntary scheme for the informal one in 1993. The majority of its population, 
however, are still not covered in these schemes and are liable for user charges (Ensor 
1999, Sepehri et al. 2006). 
2.3.2 Allocation to purchasers (insurer, payer) 
The allocation of funds usually takes one of two forms: direct or indirect provision 
(Hsiao 2007). Direct provision is a common model for developing countries and 
involves using managed and integrated provision in the same organization, for 
example, the Ministry of Health manages the hospital and transfers the budget from 
the government to providers. Indirect provision separates provider and purchaser into 
two different organizations by using either public or private intermediary. An example 
of a public intermediary is Thailand after UC implementation in 2001. The NHSO 
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were set up to purchase serVices for population under VC scheme. The private 
intermediaries can be divided into competitive bodies and local community 
management bodies. Colombia uses a competitive private intermediary (Hsiao et al. 
2007), while the UK uses a local community model. A diagram of the allocation of 
funds is shown in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 Allocation fund model 
Allocation fund 
Direct provision 
Public intermediary 
Competitive body Local community body 
Adapted from: Hsiao 2007 
The allocation of general revenues is typically made by using either a historical 
pattern of the previous year plus or minus some percentage, or various weighted 
averages of need and cost per capita. The latter method tends to result in greater 
equity of public subsidies for health. Thus, some countries such as Thailand and the 
Philippines have shifted allocation from historical patterns to population-based 
allocation (Kongtawon et al. 2007, Obermann et al. 2006). 
Compulsory and voluntary contributions come from premiums which are commonly 
calculated as a percentage of salary or income of employers and employees. It may be 
calculated by experience-rated, flat-rated, or calculated according to number of people 
in household (Hsiao et al. 2007). The main advantage of compulsory premiums is that 
individuals with higher risk cannot self-select into the scheme, preventing adverse 
selection, and the purchaser cannot select only people who have lower risk. 
Recognising that all individuals have different risks, some countries use a risk 
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adjustment mechanism or reinsurance fund to compensate purchasers for high risk 
populations. In Germany ,for example, the risk adjustment formula using income, age, 
sex, and pension status led to increased payments for insurance funds which served 
high risk populations (Exter 2005). 
2.3.3 Allocating institution (purchaser, insurer, payer) 
The insurer's role either can be limited to management of fund transfers for the 
purchasing of health care, or can include active purchasing. Active purchasing aims to 
promote the quality and efficiency of the health care system by providing financial 
incentives through provider payment, maintaining a provider profile to monitor 
provider treatment, undertaking utilization review and quality assurance activity in 
order to reduce inappropriate care, and promoting standard treatment protocols 
(Cutler 2004). 
Kutzin (2001) categorizes market structure into three models: single payer, multiple 
payers with competition, and multiple payers without competition (Figure 2.3). The 
single payer is generally responsible_ for the whole country population, as in New 
Zealand. A system with multiple payers creates competition across several 
organizations performing the insurance function for specific populations. They can 
compete to be selected by consumers, as in, for example, the U.S. health insurance 
system (Anderson and Hussey 2004), or the Netherlands (Enthoven and van de Ven 
2007). Multiple payers without competition are responsible for specific groups of the 
popUlation, as in the Thai and Mexican insurance systems. 
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Figure 2.3 The model of single and multiple payers 
Compete 
, , 
Single payer Payer 1 j:ompete Payer 2 19>mpet~ Payer 3 Payer 1 Payer 2 Payer 3 
I I 
Population Population Population 1 Population 2 Population 3 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 
The four characteristics of single payer and multiple payer systems include revenue 
collection, risk pooling, purchasing, and social solidarity (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 The characteristics of single and multiple payer systems 
Characteristic Single payer Multiple payer 
Revenue collection Usually existing tax Multiple sources e.g.· from payroll tax, 
contributions 
Lower collection cost Higher collection cost 
Risk pooling A voids risk selection and reduces Can design appropriate insurance 
use of individual data package for specific groups 
Purchasing Greater purchasing power and can Insurer more responsive to people's 
control technology use preferences, can selectively contract 
with provider 
Social solidarity Spreads financial burden more Increase solidarity in specific groups 
equitably and finance is more 
progressive. 
From: Anderson and Hussey 2004 
Korea and the Czech Republic are examples of countries that restructured the market 
to change the health insurance system. Korea moved from a system of multiple payers 
without competition to a single payer system for two reasons (Yang 2002). First, the 
existence of multiple payers meant that economies of scale could not be exploited, 
since each insurance arrangement covered about 30,000-200,000 people. Second, the 
proportion of administrative cost to expenditure was high, on average 8.5%. After the 
merger into a single payer arrangement, there were improved economies of scale, as 
demonstrated by the fact that 62.2% of households paid less in contributions (Kwon 
2003a). There was also reduced administrative cost though there was still evidence of 
inefficient management. However, the government has failed to control total 
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expenditure, and especially to regulate the supply-side use of high technology and 
pharmaceutical equipment (Lee 2003, Kwon 2009). 
In the Czech Republic in 2004, the social health insurance system failed to reform 
after the fall of Communism due to inadequate institutional support. Subsequently, the 
system was changed to allow competition between insurance institutions (Figueras et 
al. 2005). However, there is no empirical evidence on the outcome of this change 
(Rokosova and Hava 2005). 
There is no clear indication as to which insurance structure is likely to be most 
effective and empirical evidence of performance is required to support the decision to 
promote either one. 
2.3.4 Allocation of funds from insurer to provider (provider payment) 
Types of payment can be categorized in different ways. They can be classified into 
prospective payment and retrospective payment. Payment can be made to either 
hospitals or physicians. Common payment methods include line item budget, global 
budget, capitation, case-based payment, per diem, fee-for-service (FFS), salary, and 
bonus (Maynard and Bloor 2000; Maceira 1998). A breakdown of payment methods 
is shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 The characteristics of different payment methods 
Payment method Unit of service Type of payment Target 
Line item budget Functional budget Prospective and Hospital 
categories retrospective 
Global budget Health facility Prospective Hospital 
Capitation Per person to a health Prospective Hospital, 
care provider who acts Physician 
as fund holder 
Case-based payment Per case or episode Prospective Hospital 
Per diem Per day Prospective Hospital 
Fee-for-service Per unit of service Retrospective Hospital, 
Physician 
Salary Physician or health Prospective Physician 
care employee 
Bonus Per case, per person Prospective Hospital, 
Physician 
Adapted from: Macelra 1998 
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The aims of the payment method, as proposed by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), are to improve efficiency and quality, increase accessibility, pennit patients 
to choose the physician, and be easy to implement (WHO cited in Maceira 1998). 
Each payment method has different impacts on quality, efficiency, equity, and patient 
satisfaction, and each method has its own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, 
linking payment with performance is a crucial issue. There are a considerable number 
of studies about the effect of payment method on system performance. This review 
examines evidence on payment method in terms of the advantages and disadvantages 
of each method, as summarized in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Advantages and disadvantages of different payment methods 
Payment Method Main Advantages Main Disadvantages 
Line Item Budget 
- Allows strong central - No direct incentives for 
control, desirable where efficiency 
local management is very - Provider may under-provide 
weak: services 
- Predictable expenses for - Imposes fixed resource use, 
fund holder (unless directly impeding efficiency 
supplemental budgets 
provided) 
Global Budget 
- Predictable expenses for - No direct incentives for 
fund holder, low efficiency 
administrative costs - Provider may under-provide 
- Unified budget permits services 
resources to be used 
efficiently 
Capitation 
- Predictable expenses for - Financial risk may bankrupt 
the fund holder provider. Provider may seek to 
- Provider has incentive to minimize risk by "cream 
operate efficiently skimming" - enrolling low-risk 
- Eliminates supplier- patients 
induced demand - Provider may under-provide 
services 
Case-based 
- Strong incentives to - Unpredictable expenses for fund 
operate efficiently holder, high administrative costs 
(but less than fee for service) 
- Provider has incentives to select 
low-risks within case categories 
- Case-based payment less suitable 
for outpatient care (difficult to 
define case) 
Per diem 
- Incentives to reduce - Incentives to increase length of 
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Payment Method Main Advantages Main Disadvantages 
services per day stay and increase admission rate 
Fee for Service - Incentives to provide - Unpredictable expenses for fund 
(no fee schedule) serVIces holder 
- Cost escalating: strong incentives 
for supplier-induced demand 
Fee for Service 
- Incentives to operate - Unpredictable expenses for fund 
with Fixed Fee efficiently holder 
Schedules 
- Efficiency is greatly - Cost escalating: incentives for 
enhanced when combined supplier-induced dem,and 
with a global budget cap - Higher administrative costs (price 
controls must be established, 
revised periodically_and enforced) 
Salary 
- No incentive to provide - May contribute less effort in 
excessive treatment and patient care 
deny access of patient - Less incentive to pay attention to 
quality of care 
Bonus 
- Increase motivation for - Can mislead if only use outcome 
specific objectives measurement 
- Can take account of - More factors motivate 
quality, quantity, and performance 
outcome 
Adapted from: Barnum et al. 1995 
A line item budget typically includes specific line items such as salary, drugs, 
equipment etc. Efficient use of the budget is reduced because of tight controls on 
using the bUdget. For example, line managers have an incentive to spend money 
rapidly without regard for efficiency because unspent money is an indicator of an 
excessive budget (Bamum et a1. 1995). However, line item budgets are common in 
developing countries because they are easy to implement in a context with lack of 
data, shortage of resources, and changing health needs (Maceira 1998). Furthermore, 
some managers lack training in management, making the line item budget easy for 
central government to oversee, especially in rural areas. 
A global budget is a fixed budget for a certain period. It is not linked to budget line 
items so managers are allowed to reallocate budgets within the global amount. Fund 
holders can reduce administrative costs in the control process. A global budget can be 
a powerful tool to control hospital costs by fixing the maximum amount of budget. 
However, it can create a financial risk for providers when the budgets are not 
sufficient to cover hospital costs (Bamum et al. 1995). 
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Under capitation, a periodic fixed amount is paid per insured person. It promotes 
equitable allocation of resources. The significant advantage of this type of payment is 
to remove overprovision of services. Providers have incentives to minimize cost. 
However, there may be an incentive to cut essential care, and encourage cream 
skimming. In addition, referrals may increase to other providers to reduce the risk of 
cost of care if the contracted providers do not have to pay for the referred cases 
(Langenbrunner and Liu 2004). Van Horn et al. (1997) studied the impact of hospital 
use of resources under capitation payment and fee for service (FFS) payment in the 
US. They found that hospitals which had a high volume of capitation patients tended 
to use resources more efficiently than hospital with high volume of FFS patients (Van 
Horn et al. 1997). They also found the evidence of greater resource use in FFS 
patients in some conditions such as vaginal deliveries. This implied cross-
subsidization from FFS patients. Furthermore, the study showed that physicians who 
had a low percentage of capitated patients were likely to be less efficient than 
physicians who had more capitated patients. 
Case-based payment involves fixing the amount per patient case or episode of illness. 
The most common form of case-based payment is Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). 
A major advantage of this payment method is that it provides incentives for providers 
to control costs by reducing the cost per case and improving technical efficiency. 
Disadvantages of case-based payment are code creep, cost shifting, increase in 
unnecessary admissions, under-provision of services, and early discharge of patients. 
Consequently, case-based payment raises concerns about quality of care. 
Administrative costs are also likely to be high for either the fund holder or provider 
because of the data requirements needed to reimburse and monitor a system that is 
technically complicated and requires individual patient data. There are no empirical 
data comparing administrative costs between case-based payment and other payment 
types. However, it is presumed that administrative costs of case-based payment are 
higher than for capitation and FFS payment (Bamum et al. 1995). 
Manning et at (1984) studied the effects of case-based payment and FFS on number of 
visits and hospitalization rates. They found that case-based payment could lower the 
hospitalization rate compared to FFS. However, there was no supporting evidence that 
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prepayment led to provision of more preventive care or treating more outpatients to 
avoid hospitalization (Manning et al. 1984). Vip et al. (2004) evaluated the effect of 
case-based payment and FFS payment in Hainan province on drug expenditure and 
high technology procedures. They found that average expenditures per admission in 
case-based patient groups decreased compared to the previous period which was paid 
by FFS. The number of high technology procedures reduced by 9% after the reform. 
The results of the study support the theory that prepayment can slow the rate of 
growth of expenditure especially compared to FFS payment (Yip and Eggleston 
2001). In Europe, a number of countries have experience of using DRGs for 
reimbursement such as Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, and England (Schreyogg et al. 2006, Ettelt et a1. 2006). There is 
evidence of the benefit of DRGs payment, for example, Hensen et a1. (2007) found 
that DRGs implementation in Germany associated with reduction of LOS in 
dermatological admissions, despite increasing number of admissions (Hensen et a1. 
2007). 
Per diem payment is a payment of a fixed amount for reimbursement for each 
inpatient day. The advantage of this type is that it is easy to calculate. However, the 
disadvantage is that it provides incentives for the hospital to increase patient days by 
increasing length of stay and the number of admissions (Langenbrunner and Liu 
2004). 
Fee-for-service is paid directly to the provider by the patient or a third party. It can be 
based on a set fee schedule before treatment, or reimbursing the total charge after 
treatment. Fee-for-service has three main advantages: it is easy to develop and 
implement, relates to work and effort, and encourages cost-effective service provision 
if the schedule creates incentive for this. However, there is the disadvantage of 
supplier-induced demand which can lead to over-provision of services. FFS may 
satisfy consumers who believe that provision of more services means higher quality. 
There is evidence that FFS is associated with using unnecessary and potentially 
harmful services (Bamum et a1. 1995). In addition, FFS payment may have high 
administrative costs because every service and procedure has to be billed. 
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Ireland is a good example for comparing capitation and FFS payments to general 
practitioners (GP). Ireland had two major groups of patients: medical card or free 
service patients, and private patients. The number of GP visits was high amongst 
medical card patients even though they made a co-payment for GP services. The 
poorest quintile shared 34% of all GP visits compared to 14.5% for the richest quintile 
(Layte and Nolan 2004). The medical card patients' scheme changed payment from 
FFS to capitation while private patients still had to pay for each visit. This change 
affected provider behaviour . Madden et al (2005) found that visit rates fell amongst 
those under capitation payment because providers sought to control costs for capitated 
patients, and were unchanged in private patients (Madden et al. 2005). Pantilat et al. 
(1999) used a randomized control trial to compare the effects of payment type on 
utilization of investigations and referral rates between capitation and FFS patients. 
They found that there were fewer medical investigations and lower referral rates in 
patients in the capitation payment group (Pantilat et al. 1999), and concluded that the 
financial incentives affected the utilization of health services. This finding was the 
same as in a study by Leibowitz et al., who found that the rate of medical care use was 
less in patients with capitation payment compared to FFS patients (Leibowitz et al. 
1992). 
Salary is the most common form of physician remuneration. Physicians are paid a 
fixed amount for predetermined work hours. The advantage of a salary payment 
system is that physicians have no incentive to provide excessive treatment (Chawla et 
al. 1997). In addition, patients are likely to receive the necessary intervention. If the 
salary is enough to motivate physicians, the mobility of physicians will be low. 
However, there are considerable disadvantages to salary payment. Physicians may not 
have incentives to work hard in providing services to patients, which may affect the 
quality of care. Furthermore, patients may receive inadequate attention from 
physicians and may receive less optimal care. Hickson et al. (1987) used paediatric 
residents as the model to prove the differential effects of payment by salary or FFS in 
terms of patient visits, unnecessary visits, and patient satisfaction. They found that 
FFS payment could motivate paediatric physicians to increase well-child visits but 
could not demonstrate whether they were unnecessary visits or not. However, there 
was no difference in patient satisfaction between FFS and salaried physicians 
(Hickson et al. 1987). In the UK, given the problem of retention and recruitment of 
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GPs in sparsely populated areas and the administrative responsibilities of physicians 
under capitation payment, England introduced an experiment with salary payment in 
pilot areas after the NHS Act of 1997. Gosden et al. (2003) studied this experiment by 
using a controlled before and after study design. The outputs of the pilot were 
improving accessibility, quality of care, and efficiency. The finding was that salaried 
physicians provided more consultations and conducted out-of-hours work but spent 
less time on practice administration (Gosden et al. 2003). There were no differences 
in quality of care and provision of target services. Gosden et al. (2003) concluded that 
switching to salary payment may not affect GP productivity or quality of care 
compared to capitation-paid physicians. 
Bonus or performance-related pay directly links a payment with the performance of 
health care providers (Langenbrunner and Liu 2004). The payment is based on preset 
performance indicators. It aims to increase the effort of health care providers in 
specific outcomes. Bonus payments encourage health care providers to allocate time 
to the target activity. There is no uniform system so it can be adapted to suit the 
specific context of each country (Liu and 0' Dougherty 2004). Although performance 
measurement may vary in its objectives, it generally consists of quality, quantity, and 
health outcome measures. However, the disadvantages of performance-related pay are 
that money alone cannot motivate individual or organizational performance because 
other factors such as satisfaction and pride in one's job affect the result. Moreover, 
performance-related payment may be misleading if it uses only outcome 
measurement. It should be combined with a process progression checklist (The U.S. 
Merit Systems Protection Board 2006). Beaulieu and Horrigan (2005) studied the 
effect of pay for performance on quality improvement in Diabetes care. A bonus was 
added to traditional capitation payment for physicians in managed care organizations 
in New York. They found that outcomes of Diabetes care were improved in five of 
six process outcomes and two of three output outcomes (Beaulieu and Horrigan 
2005). Kouides et al. (1998) studied the impact of performance-based reimbursement 
on the influenza immunization rate in the elderly between physicians who received 
payment with and without additional payment. The study found that the immunization 
rate increased significantly in the additional payment group (Kouides et al. 1998). 
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Recently, pay for perfonnance has been widely used in European countries, for 
example, the UK (Galvin 2006), and Spain (Benavent et al. 2009). In the UK, for 
example, where financial incentives have been introduced for GPs to encourage 
greater provision of preventive care, a study in the Wandsworth primary care trust 
showed that the provision of advice on smoking cessation to OM patients increased 
from 48% to 83.5% of patients and the prevalence of smoking showed a significant 
decrease, from 20.0% to 16.2% (Millett et al. 2007). 
2.3.5 Service providers 
The function of service providers in a health insurance system is to provide services to 
the target population. The important issues concerning service providers are the 
market structure of the providers and their distribution. Distribution of providers is 
important because it affects access to health care. Insurance systems need to protect 
people from problems of accessibility to health care by providing reasonable access to 
services such as primary care, emergency care, and an effective referral system. 
2.3.6 Health system support functions 
Kutzin (1998) defined the health support system as part of the health system that 
contributes to the depth and breadth of the insurance function. Examples are 
prescribing and treatment protocols, licensing and accreditation of providers, essential 
drug lists, technology assessment etc. These support functions help to enhance health 
care efficiency. 
2.3.7 The benefit package 
The benefit package consists of three elements: entitlement to benefit, services in the 
benefit package, and payment by patients. 
Entitlement to benefit is generally linked to the financing of the health care system. In 
general, contributions by individuals or families determine the entitlement to benefit. 
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Some countries expand coverage to the entire population while only some parts of the 
population pay contributions (Kutzin 1998). 
The benefit packages can be divided into two types: essential packages and 
catastrophic packages. The essential package includes services with documented cost 
effectiveness, while a catastrophic package is a package of relatively low frequency 
use and high cost interventions. Implementation can be categorized into three models: 
comprehensive benefit package, two-tier benefit package, and three-tier benefit 
package. A comprehensive benefit package is a package covering extensive benefits 
with a very limited exclusion list (Pannarunothai et al. 2004). Both Taiwan and 
Thailand use a comprehensive benefit package with benefits covering preventive to 
curative care (Lu and Hsiao 2003, Jongudomsuk 2005). Most preventive services are 
free, as are maternal care and childcare, while there is a small co-payment for hospital 
services. A two-tier benefit package separates basic ambulatory services from 
inpatient services. Examples of countries using this model are the Netherlands and 
Germany which have a co-payment only for patient services but no charge for 
ambulatory services (Robinson 2002). 
A three-tier benefit package separates benefit into three schemes. An example of this 
model is Singapore which has three funding schemes: Medisave, Medishield, and 
Medifund. Medisave is a fund for an individual saving account with compulsory 
contributions. Medishield is an insurance fund for catastrophic health expenditure and 
Medifund is a fund for the poor covered by the government (Hanvoravongchai 2002). 
The main issue of services in the benefit package is cost effectiveness. However, the 
effectiveness of a policy involving an essential or a catastrophic package depends on 
other insurance functions; for example, active purchasing will control the wmecessary 
use of specialized care in a catastrophic package. 
Payment by patients is another element directly linked to the benefit package. Fully 
covered finance means there is no requirement for patients to pay at the time of use, 
while partial cover requires patients to pay something at time of use (cost sharing). 
Results of the RAND health insurance experiment study in the US showed that an 
increase in cost sharing resulted in a reduction in use of treatment in chronic disease 
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and preventive care, for example Diabetes Mellitus (DM) and hypertension (HT) 
(Chemew et al. 2008). Services not covered were completely financed by users. The 
important issue here is how access to services is influenced by charges. While these 
fees can result in more efficient use of care, user fees can limit access to health 
services, especially for the poor. In China, for example, the National Health Services 
Survey in 1993 found that 58.8% of patients in rural areas who refused a 
hospitalization recommendation reported inability to pay hospital charges (Liu et al. 
1999). Bitran and Giedion (2003) suggested a mechanism to boost equity of access to 
health care which included a waiver and exemption for poor people. However, there is 
still no clear evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of this mechanism in 
developing countries (Bitran and Giedion 2003). 
2.3.8 Country experience in health insurance reform 
There is considerable knowledge regarding the effect of health insurance on some 
aspects of performance, especially its payment mechanism. This review examines the 
overall experience of various countries in order to draw lessons on the development of 
health insurance in each country and the impact on health services. Korea, China, and 
Taiwan are the countries discussed because they share some characteristics of health 
insurance systems and some functions such as payment mechanism. These countries 
introduced goals of health insurance and scheme performance in cost reduction and 
increase access to care. They have experience of reform in health insurance over a 
short time period. They are also East Asian countries that have similar geographic 
characteristics, societal values, and health care development to Thailand. The results 
of health insurance studies in these countries might therefore be relevant to and can 
provide lessons for studies in Thailand. 
South Korea 
South Korea established a national health insurance scheme in 1977 and achieved 
universal coverage in 1989. The main provider payment mechanism was FFS 
according to a national fee schedule. Households incurred co-payments and 
deductibles for all covered services. However, there were free markets for uncovered 
services. Providers could make profits from drugs and medical supplies, so they had 
incentives to increase the volume of drugs and services provided. Therefore, the cost 
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of care escalated. The mam providers in Korea are private for-profit facilities, 
comprising 50% of acute care hospitals, while 40% are not-for-profit, and only 7% 
are publicly provided (Kwon 2003b). Stimulated by private provider incentives, drug 
consumption continued to increase. From 1990 to 1998, the average annual rates of 
increase in expenditure for medical supplies and drugs per claim were 13.6% and 
11.4%, respectively, both of which are greater than the average annual rate of increase 
in total medical expenditure per claim, which was only 8.2% (Kwon 2003b). 
In 1994, the government decided to reform payment to providers in two ways: 
through diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) for inpatient services and resource-based 
relative value (RBRV) for ambulatory care (Bitran and Yip 1998). The government 
planned to gradually replace the current payment method with DRGs and RBRV, but 
due to political resistance, so they were introduced as an experiment on a voluntary 
basis CBitran and Yip 1998). RBRV implementation did not achieve the objective of 
correcting the distortion in the structure of the medical fee system because the 
government, for political reasons, increased price of both under-priced and over-
priced services. Therefore, the RBRV system still faced the risk of failing to control 
the over-provision of services. 
The DRGs experiment showed good signs of improved system efficiency, for 
example LOS decreased. Antibiotic use in inpatient care was reduced by 29.6% on 
average. However, there was concern about quality of care after DRG 
implementation. Although the pilot programme showed that there was no negative 
effect on quality of care, as measured by complications and re-operations, there was 
no definitive conclusion on quality of care since the DRG pilot project used surgical 
procedures with low complications, so the rates of adverse outcomes were generally 
low (Kwon 2003b). 
In 2001, fee negotiation between provider and insurer replaced the unilateral fee 
schedule originally set by the government. A plan is underway to introduce global 
budgeting in the near future. However, a certain period of time will be allowed to 
build the partnership between the insurer and the medical association to set the global 
budget based on expenditure because of a severe conflict over pharmaceutical reform 
(Kwon 2003b). 
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China 
China has considerable experience with health insurance and offers valuable lessons 
regarding development and implementation of health insurance. 
Before 1978, public hospitals in China were financed by government using a fixed 
budget. Almost all physicians were paid by salary. Following economic reform in 
1978, the government reduced the budget and decentralized financial management to 
local government. Public hospitals had to generate more money by charging fees for 
some services such as high technology procedures. Physicians were invited to join in 
the investment in high technology in their hospitals. At the same time, bonus 
payments were introduced as part of compensation to physicians. The effect of this 
policy was an escalation of health care expenditure. Between 1978 and 1993, average 
health care expenditure increased at an annual rate of 11 % (Bitran and Vip 1998). 
There were two major insurance schemes: the Government insurance scheme (GIS), 
and Labour insurance scheme (LIS). In 1993, GIS covered 9% and LIS covered 40% 
of the urban population. In rural areas, more than 90% of the population were 
uninsured (Bitran and Vip 1998). 
Services were organized in three tiers to provide services for both urban and rural 
populations. In rural areas, services were provided at village stations, township health 
centres, and county hospitals. In urban areas, the tiers were street health stations, 
community health centres, and district hospitals provided services. The seriously ill 
could be referred from county or district hospitals to city or to regional hospitals 
(Hsiao 1995). 
Hsiao (1995) summarized some of the health insurance problems in China. First, there 
was evidence of inequity of access to health care between rural and urban areas. 
Health resources were chiefly allocated by patient ability to pay. Furthermore, the 
government had a policy to modernize tertiary care which shifted more resources 
from primary care to tertiary care and let to increased disparity between primary and 
tertiary levels. Second, there were inefficiencies in the health system such as long 
LOS, excessive use of high technology, and overuse of expensive drugs. Third, 
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quality of care was affected by over-prescription of drugs. There was no system to 
monitor the quality of patient care. 
To reform the health financing system in China, substantial initiatives were 
introduced. To contain costs, for example, China experimented with a prospective 
fixed payment system in four provinces in 1994. The evidence showed the success of 
cost containment. There were reductions in length of stay, prescription of high cost 
drugs, and high technology procedures (Bitran and Yip 1998). 
Taiwan 
Taiwan has implemented universal coverage under a single payer system since 1995. 
Before full implementation, there were three ·major social insurance schemes. These 
were labour insurance (Ll) which was chiefly for private workers, government 
employees insurance (GEl) which was mainly for government employees and retirees, 
and farmers' insurance (FI) for all farmers. These social insurance schemes covered 
50% of the population in 1990 (Cheng and Chiang 1998). The uninsured were 
discouraged from seeking essential medical services because of the cost of services. 
This created unequal access to health care, especially between different 
socioeconomic classes (Lu and Hsiao 2003). Providers were reimbursed by FFS 
according to a fee schedule. Physicians made profits from pharmaceuticals because 
they were allowed to prescribe freely. Consequently, health expenditure increased 
rapidly. From 1960, the average increase in health spending per person was about 6-
8% per annum in real terms. This was about 2-3% above the rise in real annual 
income per person (Lu and Hsiao 2003). 
To control health care costs and provide equal access to health care for all citizens, 
Taiwan proposed a new strategy for implementation in 1995: National Health 
Insurance (NHI). The NHI offered comprehensive health care for all citizens with 
financial protection from catastrophic expenses and gave patients free choice of 
providers. The NHI incorporated a co-payment of $5 for each visit to an outpatient 
clinic and $8 for hospital outpatient clinics. Physicians were mainly paid on a FFS 
basis (Lu and Hsiao 2003). The NHI programme was mainly financed by payroll tax 
plus premiums from other groups. The government subsidized the premium for 
different groups of people at different rates (Lin et al. 2005). 
28 
An evaluation of the effects of health insurance on scheme perfOlmance produced 
some interesting results (Lu and Hsiao 2003). With respect to access, statistics 
showed that the hospitalization rate increased from 110 per 1,000 in 1994 to 120 per 
1,000 in 1996. However, there was no comprehensive evaluation on the effect of 
access to health care. With respect to quality, a crude indicator of clinical quality 
neither declined nor improved after the NHI's implementation. To improve quality, 
the government tried to initiate a voluntary hospital accreditation programme in 1998. 
However, the NHI did not make a serious effort to prevent widespread use of high-
technology medicine (Lu and Hsiao 2003). Consequently, the major problem of the 
health insurance system in Taiwan has been cost escalation: in 1998, the NHI's 
expenditure exceeded its revenue. Between 1995 and 2001, the NHI revenues 
increased at 4.26% p.a., while expenditures increased at 6.26% p.a. 
Concerning health care cost inflation, the Department of Health initiated an 
experiment to reform the financing system in 1997. The plan included developing a 
case payment system, revising current fee schedules along with a resource-based 
relative value scale (RBRVS), introducing an essential drug list, and introducing a 
global budget in the short run and capitation in the long run (Bitran and Vip 1998). To 
prevent premature discharge because of case payment, hospitals are not paid if they 
have a readmission within 14 days (Lin et al. 2004). 
From these examples, there were three key points from the reform. First, cost 
escalation pressured government to reform the health care system. Second, related to 
cost escalation, example countries tried to reform payment from retrospective to 
prospective payment. Third, to reduce inequity of access to care, Korea and Taiwan 
reformed their insurance schemes to provide universal coverage. Details of 
experiences from these three countries are summarized in Table 2.5. 
Experience of these countries in terms of controlling cost escalation and addressing 
inequity of access could be relevant to the development of VC policy in Thailand, in 
terms of using payment reform to control the long term cost escalation of health care 
(National Health Security Office 2001). 
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Table 2.5 Summary of experience of South Korea, Taiwan, and China 
Countries Reasons to Payment Scale Results 
reform before reform after reform 
South Korea - National - FFS according - Case-based - Piloted in - Results from 
health to national for inpatients some areas 3 year pilot 
insurance had schedule - RBRV for programme 
financial outpatients indicate that 
deficit during LOS, medical 
economic expense, 
crisis in 1997 number of 
tests and use 
of antibiotics 
reduced 
Taiwan - After 3 years - FFS with - Case-based - Piloted in - No 
of the VC, thousands offee for inpatients some areas difference in 
total health items 
- Capitation quality of care 
expenditures for primary 
exceeded the care 
budgets 
China - Experiences - FFS& - Medical - 4 provinces - Slower 
of cost historical global Savings increase in 
escalation budget from Account and spending on 
from FFS government prospective expensive 
combined with drugs and high 
fixed system technology 
- Hospitals - Global - Prospective 
had incentives budget and payment could 
to generate cost volume control rapid 
revenue contract cost escalation 
through 
providing 
unnecessary 
care 
Adapted from: Pokpenndee 2005 
2.4 Linking health insurance with scheme performance 
There are two approaches to measure health insurance performance. The first 
approach measures the achievement of universal coverage (Carrin and James 2005) 
and use a framework of analysis consisting of three parts: revenue collection, risk 
pooling, and purchasing mechanism, as shown in Figure 2.4. Carrin and James (2005) 
proposed eight indicators of achieving universal coverage covering the three parts of 
the framework, including population coverage, method of finance, composition of risk 
pools, fragmentation of risk pools, management of risk pools, benefit package, 
provider payment mechanisms, and administrative efficiency. This set of indicators 
can help policy makers to monitor development and demonstrate better performance 
in relation to defined key issues. The indicators may not ensure an ideal design, since 
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some indicators may improve faster than others, but it can reflect policy-maker 
decisions, in particular regarding equity-efficiency trade-offs. 
The second approach is to measure the performance of the health system that the 
insurance finances. There is a wide range of objectives of the health system, including 
health gain, cost containment, health outcome, efficiency, quality, equity, access, 
choice, transparency, accountability, citizen participation, and provider satisfaction 
(Figueras et a1. 2005). To select issues to measure is not easy and depends on 
philosophical, technical, and operational possibilities. Differences in objectives and 
outcomes linked to insurance characteristics can suggest policy adjustments which 
will improve health system performance. 
The approaches to health insurance performance measurement are shown in Figure 
2.4. There are substantial debates about what constitutes health system performance 
and how to measure it (Figueras et a1. 2005). However, some empirical studies show 
that aspects of health system performance can be influenced by health insurance such 
as cost containment (Jowett et a1. 2004), efficiency (Soderlund and Hansl 2000), 
quality (Ranson and John), accessibility (Yip and Berman 2001), health outcome 
(McGlynn 1998), and other factors. 
Figure 2.4 Approaches to health insurance performance measurement 
Public health 
Insurance 
performance . 
1 1 
Achieving universal Health system 
coverage performance 
achievement 
I I 
+ + + 
Revenue collection Pooling risk Purchasing Cost Health Efficiency mechanism containment outcome 
T 
Quality Equity Accessibility 
Adapted from: Figueras et al. 2005, Carrin and James 2005 
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The international literature includes a considerable number of studies on health 
insurance scheme performance. Most of these focus on a characteristic of the health 
insurance system or a specific aspect of scheme performance. However, there are 
limited measurements of performance covering multiple issues. Large scale 
evaluations of the effect of alternative financing schemes on performance are few and 
not well designed (Palmer et al. 2004). 
As mentioned above, health insurance aims to provide access to health care services 
when needed and to protect people from the financial cost of expensive medical care. 
Some key issues and means to measure scheme performance are utilization and 
accessibility to health care, efficiency of service in term of LOS and readmission, and 
quality of care. These are reviewed in detail below. 
2.4.1 Utilization and accessibility 
There are several terms related to access to servlces such as access to care, 
accessibility, health need, utilization. These terms have interrelated and some 
different meanings depending on the context of the study (Ricketts and Goldsmith 
2005). This review does not delve deeply into the terminology but aims to review the 
scope of utilization related to accessibility. 
Accessibility is suggested as an indicator of the equity of the health system (Waters 
2000). It links to equality of access for equal need and equality of utilization for equal 
need. However, accessibility and utilization have different meanings since 
accessibility is a function of supply while utilization is a function of both supply and 
demand (Smith 2005). Equality of access can be achieved by providing services to 
patients without barriers due to geographical area. Utilization of health care depends 
not only on accessibility but also on patients' perceptions of the benefit of care (Aday 
and Andersen 1974). Although individuals may have equal access to health care, this 
does not mean that they will have equal utilization (Smith 2005). The popular 
framework of health service use proposed by Andersen is helpful in describing 
utilization as shown in Figure 2.5 (Andersen 1995). The framework shows that each 
factor has different importance in explaining use, for example, need might be more 
important in use of hospitalization than social structure in dental service use 
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(Andersen 1995). Although this framework is helpful in understanding utilization, it is 
less precise in explaining use of health insurance benefits (Andersen 1995) 
Figure 2.5 The health service utilization framework 
Demographic PersonallFamily Perceived 
Social strucure Community (Evaluated) 
Health beliefs 
From: Andersen 1995 
Use of health 
services 
One challenge that policy makers face is knowing how best to provide equality of 
access to services for the population (Palmer 2007). Three issues are related to this 
question, availability of services, utilization of services, and timeliness of services 
(Kruk and Freedman 2008). Ensuring availability of services requires adequate 
provision of health personnel, funding, and geographically accessible health service 
delivery point. Utilization is used in both developed and developing countries to 
reflect equality of access to health services. Utilization could be for a specific 
condition such as utilization in cancer services or TB drugs, or general utilization 
which might be measured by health service visits such as for preventive or hospital 
services. Timeliness relates to access for emergency and essential services such as 
immunization. Currently, there is more concern about this issue in developed 
countries rather than about service availability and utilization (Kruk and Freedman 
2008). 
Health insurance scheme effects on health service utilization can be grouped into two 
categories: first, the different use of services between the insured and the uninsured: 
second, the effect of different insurance types on health service utilization. 
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Lack of health insurance or incomplete insurance coverage creates barriers to access 
to preventive care and prompt treatment. For example, a study on cancer treatment in 
the U.S. showed that lack of health insurance increased barriers to early detection and 
prompt treatment (Ward et al. 2008). Another study from the U.S. showed that 
uninsured people are less likely to use the emergency department compared to those 
with private or public insurance (Zuckerman and Shen 2004). Uninsured people are 
also less likely to receive medical care, prescriptions and treatment for chronic 
conditions than insured people (Kennedy and Morgan 2006, Wilper et al. 2008). 
Freeman et al. (2008) reviewed articles on the effects of health insurance on 
utilization in the U.S. between 1991 and 2008. The data confirmed that health 
insurance increased utilization and improve health outcomes compared to uninsured 
people. Moreover, insured persons were more likely to use preventive care, promotion 
services, and medical services than uninsured (Freeman et al. 2008). This result 
corresponds with a study in Australia which found that privately insured people were 
more likely to use medical and surgical services than uninsured people (Brameld et al. 
2006). Regarding developing countries, several articles confirmed the increase in 
utilization by insured people compared to uninsured groups (Yip and Berman 2001, 
Hidayat et al. 2004, Jutting 2004, Liu et al. 2002). 
Differences in type of insurance can affect differences in utilization of emergency or 
preventive services. For example, the U.S. government expanded a public insurance 
scheme called the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to uninsured 
children in 1997. The finding after implementation was that there was no significant 
difference in utilization of emergency department services between insured and 
uninsured (Luo et al. 2003). However, preventive care utilization increased after 
implementation of the SCHIP project (Szilagyi et al. 2004). Another study by 
Reschovsky et al. (2000) demonstrated that across four types of insurance (Indemnity, 
PPO, open HMO, closed HMO), there were differences in utilization of ambulatory, 
inpatient, and preventive care (Reschovsky et al. 2000). In New Zealand, people who 
bought additional private insurance were more likely to visit a GP and specialist (by 
3.4% and 7.9% respectively) compared to people with only public health insurance 
(Blumberg 2006). From low and middle-income countries, there are few documents 
comparing utilization between different health insurance schemes. In one example 
comparing public and private insurance in Argentina, private insurance was 
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associated with an increase in use of health services in all income groups compared to 
those with public insurance (Cavagnero et al. 2006). 
2.4.2 Efficiency 
In relation to disease and health insurance, length of stay (LOS) is commonly used to 
evaluate efficiency. It is used widely as a process measure of efficiency (Ray et al. 
1990; Palmer et al. 1989; Brizioli et al. 1996; Kahn et al. 1990; Manton et al. 1993). 
Readmission has also been used as an indicator of efficiency (Ross J. et al. 2008, 
Heggestad T. 2002) since it implies waste of resources. 
Length of stay 
With respect to LOS, Eamtrakul et al. (2004) surveyed patients who were admitted at 
Lerdsin Hospital Bangkok in 2003. They found that being female, elderly, with high 
severity of the condition, and having chronic disease were related to LOS. They also 
found that insurance status affected LOS (Eamtrakul et al. 2004). Omachonu et al. 
(2004) studied factors related to LOS for five conditions - craniotomy, heart failure 
and shock, psychosis, rehabilitation, and HIV major related condition - in VS 
Medicare patients. The factors affecting LOS could be categorized into two groups: 
patient factors, and clinical factors. The patient factors comprised age, sex, and 
marital status, while clinical factors were severity of patient condition, admission 
type, admission source, and mortality index (Omachonu et al. 2004). 
Regarding patient characteristics, several other studies have found that the age and 
sex of the patient affects LOS. Brasel et al. (2007) studied factors affecting LOS in 
trauma patients in the V.S. They found that age, sex and insurance status affected 
LOS (Brasel et al. 2007). However, the effect of gender varied by disease and culture. 
In a study of patients with chronic health failure in Spain, females had significantly 
longer LOS than males (Formiga et al. 2008), while a study in the V.S. found males 
had significantly longer LOS than females for chronic heart failure and shock 
(Omachonu et al. 2004). 
Regarding type of hospital, Mawajdej et al. (1997) found that hospital type affected 
LOS in Jordan. LOS in public hospitals was significantly longer than in private 
hospitals (Mawajdeh et al. 1997). Other studies also found type of hospital affected 
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LOS; for example, community hospitaL and university hospital in the US (Samuels et 
al. 1998), and hospitals in rural areas and urban areas in the US (Yang et al. 2007). 
Sepehri et al. (2006) studied the influence of health insurance on LOS in Vietnam by 
surveying a population for any admissions in 2002. They found that there were 
different LOS between the insured and the uninsured. Furthermore, people covered by 
different insurance schemes also had different LOS (Sepehri et al. 2006, Mawajdeh et 
al. 1997). 
Severity of the patient's condition before admission has been found to be related to 
longer length of stay. A study from the U.S. showed that the patients with co-
morbidity and high severity scores had significantly longer LOS (Brasel et al. 2007, 
Stoskopf and Horn 1992). 
Insurance schemes normally manage efficiency through the payment system. A 
change in the payment method can affect LOS because of provider behaviour. For 
example, in the US, Ellis and McGuire (1996) studied the effect of reimbursement on 
average resource use at a system-wide level and a provider level. They found that the 
payment system, and especially prospective payment, appeared to contribute to a 
reduction of LOS (Ellis and McGuire 1996). Again, in the US, Norton et al (2002) 
found that the real influence on LOS was the average cost of admission per day: data 
from Medicaid in Massachusetts between 1991 and 1993 showed that an increase in 
average price by $2300 led to an increase of one day in LOS (Norton et al. 2002). 
Murkofsky et al. (2003) studied LOS in home care after changing from FFS to 
prospective payment between 1996 and 1998. They found that LOS declined 22%-
51% in not-for profit and for-profit home health agencies (Murkofsky et al. 2003). 
In Belgium after the reimbursement method was changed from per diem to case based 
in 1995, LOS was reduced. Furthermore, patients with a higher co-payment scheme 
had shorter LOS compared to lower co-payment groups (Perelman et al. 2008). In 
another example from Austria, after changing the financial system from per diem to 
case-based in 1997, average LOS was shortened by 4.6-4.9% from 9.36 days before 
implementation (Theurl and Winner 2007). 
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Readmission 
The readmission rate is usually used in combination with LOS to refine the 
measurement of the result of care (Lave et al. 1988). Further details on quality of care 
will be described in the next section. 
Readmission shortly after discharge from hospital is assumed to be related to 
substandard care and can be used as an indicator not just of efficiency but also of 
quality of care (Ashton and Wray 1996). Compared to LOS, readmission relating to 
quality of care is more difficult to define. There are several confounders, especially 
factors external to the hospital such as compliance of the patient or co-morbidity 
(Halfon et al. 2006). The important readmission which might relate to quality of 
service is avoidable readmission, defined as a readmission related to a previous 
hospitalization for a condition not expected to be readmitted within a certain period 
such as 30 days (Halfon et al. 2006). Figure 2.6 shows the diagram of readmission 
classification. Some patients, such as cancer patients, have appointments to be 
readmitted for further treatment, while other patients are readmitted with other 
conditions not related to their previous hospitalization. In situation where 
readmissions are related to the previous hospitalization, some readmissions may be 
due to the patients not complying with the doctor's advice. The remainder are 
avoidable conditions which might be related to quality of service in the previous 
hospitalization. 
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Figure 2.6 Diagram of readmission 
Readmission 
Planned Unplanned 
Adapted from: Maurer and Ballmer 2004, Ludke et al. 1990 
To explore the effect of quality of care on the early readmission rate, Ashton and 
Wray (1996) performed a meta-analysis of 42 studies of readmission rates between 
1966 and 1996. They found that many studies produced conflicting results. The odds 
ratio for readmission in patients who received substandard care was 1.24 (0.99-1.57), 
which meant the increased risk was as low as 0 or as high as 57%. Jimonez-Puente et 
al (2004) found that validity of the readmission indicator might be higher in the 
surgical specialty. One difficulty in using readmission is the absence of a unified 
definition. Evidence from the meta-analysis showed that readmission within 30 days 
of hospital discharge was related to quality of process of care from prior 
hospitalization (Heggestad 2002, Milne 1998). Despite the challenges, readmission 
rate is still used as an indicator because (1) it plausibly relates to quality of care, (2) it 
is easy to obtain from a hospital database, and (3) readmission appears more 
frequently than other adverse outcomes such as mortality rate (Jim~~nez-Puente et al. 
2004) and (4) it represents wasted resources. 
Readmission rates have also been found to be affected by patient characteristics and 
clinical characteristics. Demographic status, insurance status, and co-morbidity 
affected readmission of patients with congestive heart failure (Hamner and Ellison 
2005, Philbin and DiSalvo 1999, Benbassat and Taragin 2000). Furthermore, LOS can 
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be associated with readmission. William et al. (2005) demonstrated that longer LOS 
after surgical operations in the U.K. were associated with a higher readmission rate 
(Williams et al. 2005). 
Insurance effect on readmission 
Insurance status has been found to affect readmission for various conditions, for 
example, acute and chronic conditions. For example in a study of patients with 
chronic conditions in Philadelphia, U.S. between 1994 and 2001, Robbins and Webb 
(2006) found that patients with Medicaid, private insurance or noinsurance were less 
likely to be readmitted compared to Medicare patients (Robbins and Webb 2006). 
Another common chronic condition used as a tracer of readmission was congestive 
heart failure (CHF). Several studies show that different insurance schemes had 
different effects on probability of readmission (Philbin and DiSalvo 1999, Kosecoff et 
al. 1990, Ross et al. 2008). Philbin and DiSalvo (1999) found that Medicaid and 
Medicare patients with CHF had a 92% and 66% higher risk of readmission compared 
to Health Maintenance Organisation (HMO) patients. 
For acute conditions, Bloomberg et al. (2003) studied asthma in children in St. Louis, 
U.S., between 1990 and 1999. They found that asthma patients with Medicaid or no 
insurance had a 28% higher risk of readmission than those with commercial insurance 
(Bloomberg et at. 2003). A study by Smith et al. (2005) of acute stroke readmission 
compared HMO and FFS patients between 1998 and 2000 in the V.S. They found that 
HMO patients had higher chance of readmission within 30 days, relative to FFS 
patients (Smith et al. 2005). 
2.4.3 Quality 
Quality of care has been identified as an important issue in the health care system for 
many years (Blumenthal 1996).As such, it is a widely used indicator of performance. 
2.4.3.1 Definition of quality of care 
There is no clear definition of quality of care because many dimensions are used 
depending on the perspective of the user and the values of each group (Donabedian 
1988). Donabedian defined care of high quality as "that kind of care which is 
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expected to maximize an inclusive measure of patient welfare, after one has taken 
account of the balance of expected gains and losses that attend the process of care in 
all its parts. " (Blumenthal 1996). According to the Institute of Medicine, quality of 
care means "the degree to which health services for individuals and populations 
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current 
professional knowledge" (AHRQ 2004). Another approach to define quality of care 
uses dimensions or components of quality. Furthennore, from the definition above, 
dimensions of quality of care can be categorized into individual level and population 
level (Campbell et al. 2000). 
At the individual level, Campbell et al. (2000) proposed dividing dimensions of 
quality of care into two categories, accessibility and effectiveness. At the population 
level, the proposed three additional components are equity, efficiency, and cost. The 
dimensions of quality of care are shown in Figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7 Quality of care dimensions 
I Quality of care I 
I 
• 
Individual level Population level 
~ ~ 
Access Access 
Effectiveness Effectiveness 
Equity 
Efficiency 
Cost 
Adapted from: Campbell et al. 2000 
2.4.3.2 Measuring quality of care 
How to measure and what to measure are important in assessing quality of care. 
Donabedian (1966) proposed three major components of measurement: structure 
(characteristics of health personnel and system), process (what health professionals 
do), and outcome (what happens to people's health) (Donabedian 1966). This 
approach is commonly used to measure quality of care for both the individual and the 
population level. McGlynn (2007) proposes a conceptual framework for measuring 
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quality of care derived from the IOM quality of care definition, as shown in Figure 
2.8. 
Figure 2.8 Conceptual framework for quality measurement 
L-_____ s_tr_uc_t_ur_e ____ ~~L _______ pr_o_ce_s_s ____ ~~L ______ O_U_tc_o_m_es ____ ~ 
Health care characteristics 
Provider characteristics 
Population characteristics 
Community characteristics 
Technical excellence 
Interpersonal excellence 
Distributional excellence 
Production excellence 
Adapted from: McGlynn 2007, Campbell et al. 2000 
Health status 
Patient experience 
Health selVice spending 
Structure, the first component in the model above refers to elements of health care 
which facilitate access to care. It comprises four sub-components: community, health 
care, provider, and population characteristics. Structure may refer to the basic 
elements between needs of people and capacity of health service. Community and 
population characteristics represent the need for health service, for example, a 
community with a high prevalence of DM will demand more services to cope with 
chronic disease, or a population with a high number of uninsured people creates a 
barrier to access to care. Health care and provider characteristics usually reflect 
capacity provided by policy around access to health care, for example ratio of 
physicians per popUlation and number of beds per head of population. 
Process of care at the individual level involves technical and interpersonal excellence, 
while at the population level it also involves distribution and production excellence, in 
particular equity and efficiency. Technical excellence is judged by comparison with 
best practice. An example of technical performance is the use of appropriate and 
necessary drugs for the illness. Interpersonal excellence needs to meet individual and 
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social expectations such as privacy, confidentiality, informed choice, concern, 
empathy, and honesty (Donabedian 1988). 
At the population level, equity and efficiency are added to reflect the prioritization of 
resources by society (Campbell et al. 2000). Equity can be categorized into horizontal 
equity, which is the equal treatment of individuals or groups in the same 
circumstances, and vertical equity, which is that individuals who are unequal should 
be treated differently according to their level of need (Smith 2005). An example of 
distributional problem of insulin access is in Mozambique and Zambia which have 
problems of equity to access especially in rural areas because of lacking plan of 
insulin distribution (Beran et al. 2005). It is still controversial for efficiency to be 
defined as a dimension of quality of care because cost to benefit may relatively 
increase as health care is ineffective (Campbell et al. 2000, McGlynn 2007). 
Outcome of care is relevant to quality of care (Donabedian 1966). However, there are 
still limitations and concern when using outcome as a tracer for quality of care. First, 
there may be several factors influencing outcome. There is no definite conclusion that 
good process leads to a better outcome, although a good outcome usually comes from 
a better process. For example, the use of advanced technology or efficient drugs for a 
patient might not assure a good result since the patient may not comply with the drug 
regimen or new technology instrument. Second, outcome of care may not be easy to 
measure. Apart from death, other outcomes may need a long period to follow up or 
the outcome may be a subjective result such as patient satisfaction. 
The structure, process, and outcome approach is commonly used to measure quality of 
care. However, there are some problems in its use (Brook et al. 2000). There are 
numerous methodologies available for studying quality of care. For example, 
structured implicit chart review is a tool for assessing quality of care especially in 
chronic care (Hofer et al. 2004). Hofer et al (2004) found that chart review for 
Diabetes Mellitus and hypertension patients, conditions that have a well-developed 
evidence base for care, is more reliable than for COPD, which has a less well-
developed evidence base. Some instruments require follow up of patients for a period 
of time. For instance, a health outcome survey by the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) used a prospective cohort study to follow up patients. 
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2.4.3.3 Insurance scheme effect on quality of care 
Quality of care is still an important issue even in developed countries which have 
universal coverage. The effect of insurance scheme on quality of care is not simple 
because there are intervening factors (Levy and Meltzer 2008). Two intermediate 
factors affecting quality of care are insurance scheme design such as funding sources, 
benefit package, payment system etc, and provider behaviour. In tenus of insurance 
design, several studies showed that different funding sources, payment mechanisms, 
and benefit package affected quality of care (Bennett 2004, Tsai et al. 2005, Roland 
2004). In terms of provider behaviour, quality of care associated with insurance 
scheme has been found to be related to provider behaviour such as that of physicians 
(Landon et al. 1998, Grimshaw et al. 2001). For example, the study of Meyer et al. 
(2006) showed that 88% of physicians in the study changed clinical management as a 
result of patient insurance status (Meyers et al. 2006). 
2.4.3.4 Factors affecting provider behaviour regarding quality of care 
Based on review of the literature, there are a number of factors influencing quality of 
care such as type of physician (Kerr et al. 1997; Grumbach et al. 1998), type of 
hospital, i.e. whether it is public or private (Lin et al. 2004), and level of provider 
(Safran et al. 1994; Shmueli et al. 2002). However, payment would be one important 
factor affecting quality of care. To explore the effect of payment on quality of care, 
this study conducted a systematic review for quality of care to identify articles 
involving payment for both physician and institution with different methods of study. 
Searching was done using the electronic MEDLINE database from 1975 to 2006. The 
search strategy and results are shown in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Search strategy of literature on quality of care and payment 
mechanisms 
Key words for search system Citation reviewed Article retrieved 
Quality AND care AND payment 785 14 
Quality AND care AND payment AND case 20 4 
control 
Quality AND care AND payment AND cohort 13 4 
Quality AND care AND payment AND 1 0 
randomized controlled trial 
Quality AND care AND Fee-for-service 397 28 
Quality AND care AND capitation 229 7 
Final article 
5 
1 
2 
II 
2 
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Key words for search system Citation reviewed Article retrieved Final article 
Quality AND care AND case base payment 2 2 
Quality AND care AND global budget 18 0 
Quality AND care AND prospective payment 217 31 8 
Quality AND care AND retrospective payment 25 3 I 
Total 1,707 93 30 
The search results can be categorized to institution and physician as shown in Figure 
2.9. Details of searched articles and key findings are shown in Appendix 7. 
Figure 2.9 Articles identified by systematic searches 
FFS - Foe-for-service 
ORG - Diaanosis related aroup 
Prospectivo (ORG) 
N-B 
Excluded by review 
~----I a""tract 
N-I.641 
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N=2 
In tenns of payment mechanism, there have been some systematic reviews related to 
payment and quality of care. Cangialose et a1. (1997) reviewed the research on quality 
of care in three dimensions: patient satisfaction, clinical processes and outcome of 
care, and resource utilization. From the review, no difference in patient satisfaction, 
process and outcome quality between fee-for-service (FFS) payment and capitation 
payment under managed care was observed, whereas resource utilization decreased in 
capitation payment compared to FFS payment (Cangialose et a1. 1997). Miller and 
Luft (1997) found that there were no definite conclusions on quality of care between 
capitation payment under HMO and FFS plans. Furthennore, the pattern of resources 
used did not differ between hospitals paid by FFS or those paid by capitation (Miller 
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and Luft 1997). Gosden et al. (1999) reviewed the effect of payment on quality of 
care in many topics and many times (Gosden et al. 1999, Gosden et al. 2001, Gosden 
et al. 2000,Giuffrida et al. 1999). They found that salary payment was associated with 
lower use of tests and procedures, higher referral rate, and longer consultations 
compared with FFS and capitation payment system. In a review of payment methods 
and behaviour of primary physicians, some evidence suggested that how a primary 
physician was paid affected the behaviour of the physician. Yet, the generalizability 
of the studies has not been established. 
Insurance affects physician behaviour. Physicians have been found to change clinical 
management according to patient insurance status. Meyer et al. (2006) studied the 
effect of insurance status on clinical decision making in Georgetown, U.S., finding 
that physicians changed clinical decision, such as changing from original drug to 
generic drug, according to insurance status). Patients with insurance had a higher 
probability of receiving treatment and a better outcome. A study by Bleich et al. 
(2007) on health insurance and hypertension (HT) treatment in Mexico found that 
insured patients were more likely to receive HT drugs and have a good outcome. 
Apart from financial incentive, nonfinancial incentive is another important factor 
affecting quality of care. However, there are relatively few articles about nonfinancial 
incentives compared to financial incentives and quality of care. One example of 
nonfinancial incentives studied is the achievable benchmark method which uses peer 
review and feedback mechanisms to improve performance (Kiefe et al. 2001). 
Another example is pay-for-performance which uses nonfinancial motivation 
combined with financial incentive (Liu and Mills 2003; Beaulieu and Horrigan 2005). 
The American Heart Association encourages further research on nonfinancial 
incentives to improve quality of care to understand the benefits and risks of 
nonfinancial effects (Bufalino et al. 2007). Town et al. (2004) summarized three 
approaches: economical, organizational, and psychological aspects to answer the 
question what is the effect of incentives on the performance of physicians in medical 
groups. 
45 
2.5 Diabetes Mellitus as a tracer for quality 
Using the tracer method means using a specific disease, condition, or health problem 
to analyse or explain the system. The tracer concept came from science, for example, 
endocrinologists used isotoped iodine to trace thyroid function. Tracers have been 
used to analyse health services for more than 50 years either as a single condition or 
combined in sets (Kessner et al. 1973). A good tracer should be a well defined 
condition, representative, and with appropriate cost (Neuhauser 2004). 
There is some empirical evidence on the use of specific diseases as a tracer measuring 
quality of care, for example, Diabetes Mellitus (OM), hypertension (HT), chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) (Hofer et al. 2004), acute myocardial 
infarction (Soumerai et al. 1999), ischemic heart disease (Mushlin et al. 1988), hip 
fracture (Fitzgerald et al. 1987; Ray et al. 1990; Palmer et al. 1989; Coleman et al. 
2000; Draper et al. 1990), congestive heart failure, pneumonia, cardiovascular 
accident (CVA), depression (Draper et al. 1990; Wells et al. 1994). Surgical 
procedures are also commonly used as a tracer to measure quality of care, such as 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) (Erickson et al. 2000), haemorrhoidectomy 
(Tsai et al. 200~), and radiology (Kangarloo et al. 1996). This study used DM as a 
tracer for quality measurement. 
Diabetes Mellitus (DM) is one of the most common chronic diseases in the world and 
is one of the common tracers for health system performance (Nolte et al. 2006). 
Using DM as a tracer has been done by several studies, for example, Hopkinson et al. 
(2004), Beran et al. (2005), Nolte et al. (2006) and others. There are two main types 
of DM, Insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus (IDDM) and Non Insulin Dependent 
Diabetes Mellitus (NIDDM). Until now, the quality of care in DM was the most 
important factor for late complications (Schiel et al. 1997). In the US, more than 16 
million people have been diagnosed causing a morbidity and mortality cost of almost 
$100 billion per year (Saaddine et al. 2002). The worldwide prevalence of DM in 
adults aged over 20 years in 1995 was about 4%. Prevalence of OM in Nordic 
countries is about 3% of the population (Wandell 2005). To prevent complications 
and prolong life, it is necessary to control plasma glucose, lipid profile, and 
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hypertension. Robert et al (1998) found that tight control of hypertension in DM 
patients can reduce deaths related to DM complications by 32% (Robert et al. 1998). 
Quality of care in OM patients is one of the major concerns in the management of DM 
patients in both developed and developing countries (Saaddine et al. 2002). Evidence 
on quality of care in DM patients is reviewed below. 
2.5.1 Quality of care 
The greatest concern in DM is vascular complications. The goal of treatment is to 
prevent complications of the disease. Complications can be categorized into two 
types. The first concerns the time span of the complication, divided into short-term 
and long-term complications. Examples of short-term complications are 
hypoglycaemia, hyperglycaemia, and Diabetes ketoacidosis. Long-term complications 
consist of coronary heart disease, stroke, chronic renal failure etc. The second 
concerns pathology and IS divided into microvascular and macrovascular 
complications. Examples of microvascular complications are retinopathy and 
nephropathy. Examples of macrovascular complications are coronary artery disease 
and stroke. 
To evaluate the quality management of DM care at community level, Chin et al 
(2000) studied quality of DM care in community health centres in the V.S. They 
found that there was inadequate provider education to manage the quality of DM care 
because of the turnover rate of staff. They recommended enhancing and widening 
total quality management especially at community health centres. 
There is evidence that management of DM patients might be done not only by 
specialists but also by other trained personnel. In Germany, there was a project to 
follow up patients over 5 years to compare the quality of care of IDDM and NIDDM 
under specialized and non-specialized physicians. For short term complications such 
as hypoglycaemia and ketoacidosis, there were no significant differences between the 
groups (Schiel et al. 1997). For long-term complications, such as retinopathy and 
nephropathy, there were also no significant differences between the two groups. 
Schiel suggested that a quality improvement model for DM patients should be 
implemented with monitoring and management at all levels of care. 
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Another issue of quality of care in DM is data for evaluation and measuring quality of 
care. There are many sources of data to use to study quality of care in DM. Keating et 
al (2003) reviewed the possibility of using administrative data. Their methodology 
was to compare the use of administrative data alone with hospital data to detect 
compliance with accepted standards of OM care in certain groups (Keating et al. 
2003). They found that administrative data alone was not sufficient to detect 
processes of care in OM patients; additional supplementation by medical recordsata 
was crucial for identifying good quality of care. 
Before 1995, many organizations in the US developed indicators to measure quality 
of care in DM but most of them required providers to collect additional data. In 1995, 
the Center for Medicare and Medical Services (CMS), the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance (NCQA), and the American Diabetes Association (ADA) 
committed to create a set of indicators for measurement of quality of care in DM 
under the Diabetes Quality Improvement Project (OQIP) (Fleming et al. 2001). The 
set of indicators has changed from 1995 to 2000. The final version has two major 
elements of data collection: from medical records or electronic data to measure 
accountability and quality improvement, and from a patient survey to measure quality 
improvement. The details of the measurement indicators are shown in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 DQIP 1.0 measure set 
Accountability 
From medical records or electronic data 
HbAlc tested (annually) 
Poor HbAlc control (HbAlc >9.5%) 
Eye examination performed (high-risk annually, low-risk biennially) 
Lipid profile performed (biennially) 
Lipids controlled (LDL <130 mg/dl) 
Monitoring for diabetic nephropathy (high-risk annually, low-risk 
biennially) 
Blood pressure controlled «140/90 mmHg) 
Foot examination (annually) 
From patient survey 
Smoking cessation counselling (annually) 
Quality indicators (QI) 
From medical records or electronic data 
Distribution of values for HbA1c (<7.0, 7.0-7.9, 8.0-8.9, 9.0-9.9, >10.0%, 
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or undocumented) 
Distribution of values for LDL cholesterol «100, 100-129, 130-159, 
>160 mg/dl, or undocumented) 
Distribution of values for blood pressure «140, 141-159, 160-179, 180-
209, ~21O mmHg systolic; <90, 90-99, 100-109, 110-119, ~120 mmHg 
diastolic, or no value documented) 
From patient survey 
Diabetes self-management and nutrition education 
Interpersonal care 
From: Flemmg et al. 2001 
Because of the huge cooperation in developing the quality indicators in the DQIP, 
most stakeholders in the American health care system use DQIP as the tool for 
evaluation of DM quality management, such as the NCQA, and the health plan 
employer data and information set (HEDIS). However, it is rarely appropriate for 
administrators to use guidelines as a quality instrument to monitor past performance 
(Hayward et a1. 2004). 
The continuum of care in DM patients is very important. Monitoring of tests is 
important to follow the level of care and prevent complications. Gill et al (2003) 
studied the impact of continuity of provider on the results of care in DM patients. 
Continuity of care has benefits for quality of care in the provider-patient relationship, 
reduced rate of admission, and increased correct prescriptions (Gill et a1. 2003). The 
negative consequences may include poor monitoring of DM if physicians lack 
knowledge to monitor and comply poorly with the recommended guidelines. Gill et al 
(2003) found that continuity is not associated with frequency of tests for monitoring 
DM. 
Since data could be collected from various sources, comparing the validity and 
reliability of data sources is important. Fowles et al (1999) compared the validity and 
reliability of three major sources of data to study results of quality of care in DM 
patients. The three sources were self-report, primary care medical and eye records, 
and administrative claims. The finding was that data from medical records and 
administrative claims were complementary and not overlapping. The most reliable 
was microalbumin testing and the least was eye examination. Self-reported data put 
more emphasis on eye examinations and HbA 1 C reports. The overall result was that 
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self-reported data could mislead in overestimating the significance of such reports 
(Fowles et at. 1999). Fowles et al (1999) concluded that self-reported rates of quality 
of care data should be evaluated carefully. 
Factors affecting quality of care in Diabetes MeW/us 
There have been several empirical studies on factors affecting quality of care in other 
countries. Factors can be summarized into three main components including systemic 
components, patient components, and provider components (Pringle et al. 1993). In 
tenns of systemic components, health insurance has been found to affect quality of 
care in primary care, ambulatory care, and hospitalization. An example of a study of 
insurance and quality of primary care is by Shi (2000), who compared those with 
public insurance, with no insurance, and with private insurance. The study found that 
the insured had better opportunity to access better quality of care (Shi 2000). Another 
example is a study of the State Children's Health Insurance Programme regarding 
access to care, utilization, and quality of care in the V.S. Kempe et al. (2005) found 
that quality of care of children in ambulatory and hospitalization services in the newly 
enrolled group was improved after one year's implementation (Kempe et al. 2005). 
Another study from the US showed that having health insurance meant that DM 
patients had a higher chance of receiving an eye examination compared to those 
without insurance (Beckles et al. 1998, Keating et al. 2003). Porterfield et al (2002) 
compared quality of care in DM for the uninsured, who mostly lived in underserved 
areas, between uninsured patients in community centres and uninsured patients in 
physician offices in North Carolina. The findings were interesting that there was no 
difference in quality of care between service received from community centres and 
physician offices (porterfield and Kinsinger 2002). 
In tenns of patient factors, several studies showed that different socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics affected outcome of DM care such as age, sex, marital 
status, income, deprivation of area (Hippisley-Cox 2004, Nagpal and Bhartia 2006). 
However, the result of each factor varied by country, and context etc (Gray et al. 
2006). For example, Gray et at. (2006) studied delivery of DM care in England and 
found that there was no difference by gender in HbAIC testing while the study of 
Fenton et at. (2006) found that females had lower probablity of receiving the HbAI C 
test. In deprived areas, patients were less likely to receive services compared to 
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affluent areas (Hippisley-Cox 2004). Furthermore, comorbidity and health status 
affected achieving process or outcome of care (Saaddine et al. 2002). Several studies 
also found that longer duration of OM, and having comorbidity was associated with 
receiving services and affected the result of OM care, for example, Renders et al. 
(2001), Helmer et al. (2003), Roubideaux et al. (2004). 
In terms of provider factors, having specialized physicians, and hospital type are 
factors affecting achieving process and outcome of OM care. For example, the study 
ofSuwattee et al. (2003) showed that physician type affected the outcome of OM care 
(Suwattee et al. 2003). Furthermore, different hospital types also affected OM care. 
For example, Kerr et al. (2004) compared the result of OM care between veteran 
hospitals and hospitals which were commercialy managed care and found that veteran 
hospitals provided better quality of OM care compared to commercially manged 
hospitals (Kerr et al. 2004). 
Assessment of quality of care in Diabetes MeWtus 
Quality of care can be assessed in terms of process of care using targets in guidelines 
as the gold standard, and in terms of intermediate outcomes. For achieving targets on 
process of care, Roubideux et al. (2004) studied the quality of care of OM in elderly 
American Indians. They found that education, duration of OM, and older age were the 
factors affecting having met the standard of care in OM (Roubideaux et al. 2004). For 
other demographic factors, several studies have shown the effect of age, sex, and 
marital status affecting quality of OM care in both process of care and intermediate 
outcomes (Goyder et al. 2000, Hippisley-Cox 2004, Gray et al. 2006). 
Socioeconomic factors, i.e. income and insurance status, also affect whether the 
targets in the process of care are achieved (Keating et al. 2003, Beckles et al. 1998). 
Other studies have found that clinical status affects achievement of standard DM care, 
such as time to diagnosis of DM, co-morbidity, DM complications, smoking (Fenton 
et al. 2006, Benoit et al. 2005). In terms of physicians' behaviour, physicians tended 
to differentiate prescriptions by insurance scheme. A study of prescriptions by 
physician for two chronic diseases (DM, HT) in the U .S. showed that physicians 
prescribed drug differently between insurance schemes (Huttin 2007). 
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For intermediate outcomes, Gray et al. (2006) studied the relationship of the 
demographic factors age and sex, and deprivation, to intermediate outcomes HbAI e, 
BP, and serum cholesterol. They found that younger age groups were less likely to 
achieve treatment targets compared to older age groups. Women were significantly 
less likely to achieve the cholesterol target (Gray et al. 2006). For socioeconomic 
factors, Saaddine et al. (2002) studied quality of care in the US between 1988 and 
1995. They found that factors affecting process and outcome of DM care included 
insurance status, and ethnicity. Furthermore, regarding clinical factors, they found that 
duration of DM and using insurance also affected quality of DM care (Saaddine et a1. 
2002). Zhang et al. (2008) demonstrated the effect of different insurance schemes on 
quality of DM care in the US. They found that uninsured and Medicaid patients were 
less likely to achieve the standard quality of DM care compared to the insured group. 
(Zhang et a1. 2008). This finding corresponds to the situation in developing countries. 
Pagan and Puig (2005) studied differential access to DM services in Mexico. They 
found that having insurance increased the use ofDM care (Pagan and Puig 2005). 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature relating to health insurance and performance 
indicators. The review reveals that the insurance system can differ in seven 
components, which are source of funds, allocation to purchaser, allocation 
institutions, provider payment, service providers, health system support, and benefit 
package. The achievements of an insurance scheme can be measured in two 
dimensions: achieving universal coverage and improving health system performance. 
Achievement of universal coverage aims to increase access to effective health 
services and protect families from bankruptcy through catastrophic illness. Health 
system performance can be measured using health system indicators such as access, 
efficiency, quality etc. 
The review provides the picture of the theoretical framework of the health insurance 
schemes and their performance. Figures 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 can serve as the theoretical 
framework for this study. The empirical findings show that there are differences in 
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utilization, efficiency, and quality of care between the insured and the uninsured, and 
between different insurance groups. 
In terms of utilization, several empirical studies show that insured people had higher 
utilization than uninsured. However, utilization from different insurances has various 
results. It seems that there is less difference in the way patients use emergency 
services but more variation in utilization of non-emergency services. 
In terms of efficient use of resources, LOS is a common indicator for hospital 
services. Evidence shows that insurance with different payment systems affects LOS 
in hospital. However, readmission seems to be more complicated than LOS if one sets 
out to evaluate different effects of insurance characteristics. It depends on the 
definition used, patient condition, and the disease examined in a study. 
Quality of care is another issue in health insurance performance. Dimension of quality 
can range from the individual to the population level. A common approach in 
measuring quality of care is to assess quality in terms of structure, process, and 
outcomes. Several studies demonstrate a relationship between quality and different 
insurance characteristics. Several factors affect quality of care such as insurance 
status, payment system, provider behaviour, provider level, provider type etc. In terms 
of insurance, various studies show that uninsured people tend to receive lower quality 
care compare to insured people. Different insurances can affect both provider 
behaviour and patient outcome regarding quality of care. Because of the extensive 
scope of quality of care, using some condition or disease as a tracer for measuring 
quality of care is common. Several studies show that a chronic disease such as 
Diabetes Mellitus can be used as a tracer for quality of care. 
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CHAPTER 3: HEALTH INSURANCE IN THAILAND 
This chapter aims to provide the context of Thailand and its health insurance system. 
The chapter first details the background of the country, followed by the history of the 
insurance system. Then, the different characteristics of the three main public health 
insurances schemes are described. Finally, empirical evidence regarding the effects of 
the insurance schemes on selected aspects of perfonnance in the Thai health care 
system is reviewed. 
3.1 Background of Thailand 
Thailand is a developing country with an average GDP of 123,673 Bahtlcapita 
(£1,741 /capita)(Bank of Thailand 2009b). It is situated in the Southeast Asia region, 
surrounded by Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), and Cambodia. 
It covers an area of 514,000 square kilometres (2.5 times bigger than Great Britain). 
The population was approximately 63 million in 2007 (Bank of Thailand 2009a). The 
population growth rate was 0.41 % in 2006. The trend in the population structure is for 
a decline in the 0-14 year group and an increase in the elderly group. The elderly ratio 
increased from 9.5% in 2000 to 10.9% in 2005, while the 0-14 year group decreased 
from 24.3% to 23.1% (Wibulpolprasert 2008). Regarding the economic status of 
Thailand, GDP per capita has grown steadily while economic growth has averaged 
about 5%, after a remarkable drop in 1997 due to the Asian economic crisis as shown 
in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Economic growth and GDP/capita of Thailand between 1994 and 2007 
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Health status in Thailand has improved III recent decades. Life expectancy has 
increased from 68.9 in 1998 to 70.3 in 2004. Maternal mortality decreased from 34.7 
per 100,000 live births in 1986 to 9.8 in 2006 and the infant mortality rate has 
declined from 49 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 18 in 2004. The major cause of 
mortality has changed from communicable disease to non-communicable disease. The 
top three causes of death in 2006 were circulatory system, cancer, and infectious 
disease (mainly HIV infection) (Wibulpolprasert 2008). 
The health service system includes personnel and health facilities. In Thailand, there 
is both a shortage of health personnel, and inequality in their distribution, especially 
for physicians in the public sector. Data from the MOPH show that average 
population per doctor in the last decade improved slightly from 3,400 to 3,200, but the 
distribution is still unequal, especially in the Northeast region. While Bangkok had 
one doctor per 867 population in 2005, the Northeast region had one doctor per 7,000 
population as shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Population per doctor of Thailand by region between 1998 and 2005 
Region Population/doctor 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bangkok 762 760 793 760 952 924 879 867 
Central 3,614 3,653 3,576 3,375 3,566 3,301 3,134 3,124 
North 5,050 4,869 4,501 4,488 4,499 4,766 4,534 3,724 
South 4,814 4,888 5,194 5,127 4,984 4,609 3,982 4,306 
Northeast 8,218 8,116 8,311 7,614 7,251 7,409 7,466 7,015 
Total 3,406 3,395 3,427 3,277 3,569 3,476 3,305 3,182 
Adapted from: Wtbulpolprasert 2008 
However, the distribution of health facilities is better. This is because in the last two 
decades, it was government policy to expand community hospitals ~o all districts and 
health centres to all sub districts. Population per bed data show that between Bangkok 
and Northeast region the difference in ratio was about 3.5 times (223 vs. 740), 
compared to the ratio for personnel where the difference was nearly 10-fold. Details 
of bed distribution are shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Population per bed by region of Thailand between 1998 and 2005 
Region Populationlbed 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bangkok 199 199 202 205 213 210 224 223 
Central 377 376 369 368 391 401 390 388 
North 475 478 493 474 496 501 503 498 
South 507 509 494 492 496 499 501 498 
Northeast 790 780 766 771 759 752 747 740 
Total 456 455 454 451 465 467 469 468 
Adapted from: Wlbulpolprasert 2008 
3.2 Development of health insurance in Thailand 
Thailand has had a long experience of health insurance since 1929, as shown in Table 
3.3. The period between 1991 and 2000 can be viewed as the time of the development 
of universal coverage (VC), spearheaded by the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) 
with support from western countries (Jongudomsuk 2005). CSMBS has begun since 
1980 covering civil servant and their dependants including father, mother, and two 
children under 20 years (Sriratanaban 2002). The SSS was launched in 1990, covering 
employees of the fonnal sector for sickness not related to work and maternity care 
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(Tangcharoensathien et al. 1999b). After the economic crisis in 1997, the Thai Rak 
Thai party proposed the policy of universal coverage as a safety net for the poor and 
the party won the 2001 election in a landslide victory (Jindawatana and 
Pipatrarojkomol 2003). The new National Health Security Act was passed by 
parliament in 2002. 
Table 3.3 Important events of health insurance in Thailand 
Year Important event 
1929 Private insurance business 
1954 First Social Security Act (but not implemented) 
1974 Workmen Compensation Fund 
1975 Free medical care for the poor 
1978 First private health insurance company 
1980 Royal Decree on CSMBS 
1981 First issuance of Low Income Card 
1983 Maternal and Child Health Fund (phase I) 
1984 Health Card Project (phase 11) 
1990 Social Security Act covered enterprises with 20 and more employees 
1991 Health Card Project - insurance based pilot (phase Ill) 
1992 Free medical care for elderly 
1993 Traffic Accident Victim Protection Insurance 
1994 Social Security Act, extension to enterprises with 10 or more employees 
1994 Health Card Scheme (phase IV), equal matching funds provided by government reinsurance 
policy and cross-boundary card provided b~ government 
1994 Health Card extension to community leader and health volunteer, full government subsidy 
1994 Medical Welfare Scheme, expansion of free medical care for the poor to cover other indigent 
groups, elderly and children up to 12 years 
1998 New financial regulation for the Medical Welfare Scheme: management by national and 
provincial committees, per capita budget allocation to provinces, introduced reinsurance policy for 
high cost care by using diagnosis related group and global budget. 
1998 CSMBS: introduced co-payments by CSMBS beneficiaries, only drugs quoted as essential drugs 
are reimbursed, limited hospital stays in private room and board 
2000 The Social Security Scheme expanded to cover old age pension and child benefits 
2001 Implementation of universal coverage 
2002 National Health Security Act 
Established National Health Security Office 
Adapted From: Tangchareonsathlen et al. 2002 
3.3 Public health insurance schemes in Thailand in 2006 
Universal coverage (UC) was effected in 2001. Before 2001, Thailand had four major 
schemes: the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), Social Security 
Scheme (SSS), Low Income Card Scheme, and Voluntary Health Card. In 1998, 
coverage was 80.3% of the population (Wibulpolprasert 2002). Universal coverage 
was implemented by entitling all uninsured people to the new scheme, known as the 
"30 Baht cures all diseases" scheme or the 30 Baht scheme (Towse et al. 2004). The 
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terms universal coverage scheme (VC scheme) and 30 Baht scheme are used 
interchangeably. The uninsured people were mainly poorer and less educated than the 
rest of population. 86% were in the low income group (Tangcharoensathien et al. 
2002). The UC scheme tried to reduce the gap in the benefit package by using 
abenefit package based on the existing SSS. After VC was implemented, health 
insurance in Thailand consisted of three main systems: the VC scheme, CSMBS, and 
SSS. The main characteristics of the three public insurance schemes are summarized 
in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Different characteristics of the three major public insurance schemes 
in Thailand 
Characteristics UC scheme Civil Servant Medical Social Security Scheme 
Benefit Schemel (SSS) 
(CSMBS) 
Scheme nature Citizen entitlement Fringe benefit Mandatory 
Model' Public contracted model Public reimbursement Public contracted model 
model 
Population The rest of population Government employees, Formal-sector private 
coverage, 20043 who are not covered by pensioners and their employees, 
SSS and CSMBS dependants (parents, establishments/ firms of 
spouse, children under 18) more than one worker 
since 2002 
population4 47.2 4.2 8.5 
(millions) 
% of total 75.2%j 6.7% 13.5% 
population 
Financial General taxation General taxation Tripartite (Government, 
resources employers and 
employees each 
contribute 1.5% of 
payroll) 
-Co-payment At the beginning of -Co-payment for non- Co-payment for 
project, nominal payment essential drugs, and for expenditure beyond the 
of 30 Baht per visit or inpatients in private reimbursement level for 
admission for UC Pay hospitals maternity, emergency 
members and exemptions - Advance payment for OP services 
for the poor previously reimbursed from 
covered by the Low government {This 
Income Card regulation was changed in 
-Co-payment removed in 2007 (Sakunphanit et aI. 
20066 2009)7 
I Including state enterprises employees and their dependents 
2 Based on OECD 1994 classification of relationship between insurance purchasers, healthcare providers and users 
of services 
) Source: National Statistical Office, Health and Welfare Survey 2004. 
4 Source: National Health Security Office (http://library.nhso.go.th/pagelnhsodoc/nhsodoc8ann.html access date: 6 
September 2006), excludes other groups of insurance, e.g. Thai people living in a foreign country, and those not 
registered for any insurance. 
5 There were 2.9 million or 4.6% of the total populati0!l not registered with the 30 Baht scheme, despite the efforts 
of the National Health Security Office. These are mobile populations, mostly resident in Bangkok Metropolitan 
Area. They should be entitled to free care, as an entitlement of all citizens. 
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Characteristics VC scheme Civil Servant Medical Social Security Scheme 
Benefit Scheme l (SSS) 
(CSMBS) 
Allocation to Population based Historically based Population based 
purchaser 
Allocation National Health Security Ministry of Finance Social Security Office 
institutions Office (NHSO) (Comptroller General (SSO), Ministry of 
Department) Labour and Social 
Welfare 
Allocation to Capitation for F ee-for-service Capitation inclusive of 
provider ambulatory care and reimbursement for ambulatory and 
prevention promotion ambulatory care, DRG for admission services 
services, Global budget inpatient care since 2007 
and DRG for inpatient 
care 
Service Public contracted model Public contracted model Public and private 
providers contracted model 
Health system No No Hospital accreditation or 
support SSS standard 
Benefit 
package 
Ambulatory Designated providers, Free choice public only Public and private 
services mostly primary care unit contractors 
Inpatient Designated providers, Free choice public Public and private 
services mostly starting flfst with contractors 
District Hospital with 
referral 
Choice of Primary care contractor Free choice Contracted hospital or its 
provider services, plus referral network 
Cash benefit for No No Yes 
sickness and 
maternity leaves 
Conditions All All Non-work-related 
included illness, injuries 
Conditions 12 conditions, e.g. organ No explicit exclusions Small number of limited 
excluded transplant, non-essential conditions, e.g. non 
care, aesthetic services medical plastic surgery 
Maternity Yes Yes Yes, with a separate 
benefits package, lump sum 
payment 
Annual physical Yes Yes No 
check-up 
Prevention, The UCI scheme requests budget for prevention and health promotion for the whole 
health population. 
promotion 
Services not Private bed, special nurse Special nurse Private bed, special 
covered nurse 
Adapted from: Mills et a1. 2005 
6 Source: National Health Security Office (2007a) Manual of national health security (in Thai). Nonthaburi, 
NHSO 
7 CSMBS patients with chronic disease and registered with a hospital do not have to pay in advance for 
OPD services 
830 Baht = 0.44 Pound (1 Pound = 71 Baht). 
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3.3.1 Problems and reform of the Social Security Scheme 
The SSS was set up in 1991 to provide financial security to formal sector workers for 
sickness, maternity, invalidity, and death (Tangcharoensathien et at. 1999b). At first, 
firms with more than 20 workers were required to participate and coverage was then 
expanded to firms with more than 10 workers in 1994. Since 2002, firms with more 
than one worker have to participate in the scheme9 • This policy has led to an increase 
in the number of beneficiaries ofSSS as shown in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 Number of registered beneficiaries of Social Security Scheme between 
1997 and 2006 
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The SSO enters agreements with hospitals of more than 100 beds, which meet certain 
requirements regarding infrastructure and personnel, as its main contractors. Each 
main contractor receives a capitation budget for ambulatory and inpatient services. 
They can contract with a higher level hospital as a supra contractor for referral of 
severe cases and with a lower level as a subcontractor. They are responsible for 
paying for services when beneficiaries receive services from both levels. The main 
contractor hospitals are both public and private hospitals with more than 100 beds 
(Jongudomsuk 2005). Private main contractors have increased consistently since the 
beginning of the SSS because the capitation rate was sufficient to generate profit. The 
SSS can attract hospitals into the market and expand subcontractors to attract 
beneficiaries (Yip et al. 2001). Private main contractors have formed nearly half of 
the total of main contractors since 2001 (ltivaleekul 2002). However, currently, the 
9 Social Security Royal Decree 2002 
60 
number of private hospitals has decreased as a result of two major problems. First 
there has been slow growth in the capitation rate since 2000 (Srithamrongsawat 
2007). Second, the policy of promoting Thailand as a medical hub has led private 
hospitals to change strategy to provide services for foreign patients 
(Srithamrongsawat 2007). The numbers of hospitals under the SSS from 1999 to 2006 
are shown in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3 Number of hospitals under Social Security Scheme between 1991 and 
2006 
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There were several problems with the implementation of the SSS. First, the 
contributions were inequitable, since the contribution by employees was limited to a 
maximum salary of 15,000 Bahtlmonth; therefore, employees with a higher salary 
were paying relatively less contribution than the low salary group. Second, the SSS 
scheme has focused on curative services, with no budget for preventive and promotive 
care (Tangcharoensathien et aI. 1999b). By law, the SSO cannot provide resources for 
prevention and promotion activities; but now the NHSO is responsible for setting the 
budget for prevention and promotion for the SSS and CSMBS. Third, the SSO 
monitored hospital quality of care only by structural components. There was no 
monitoring of process or outcome of care at contracted hospitals. Fourth is the limit 
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on the number of beneficiaries. There were suggestions from academics to expand 
coverage to dependants of beneficiaries or to the informal sector; but the SSS still 
focuses on employees in the formal group (Charoenparij et al. 1999). Article 40 of the 
Social Security Act permits the self-employed or informal workers to participate in 
the SSS. However, few do so. 
3.3.2 Problems and reform of the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme 
There are three main problems of the CSMBS scheme: inefficiency, inequity, and cost 
escalation (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2003). Inefficiency and inequity are evident in 
the longer LOS. Table 3.5 shows the LOS ratio of various diagnoses for CSMBS 
patients in public hospitals compared with LOS for private hospital patients. The 
results imply inefficiency of service in CSMBS patients in public hospitals. 
Furthermore, the scheme's use of expensive brand name drugs is also inefficient. 
Limwattananon et al. (2004) studied drug use between health insurance schemes 
between 2000 and 2002 and found that CSMBS patients were 9.7-13.2 and 15.6-23.1 
times more likely to receive COX2 inhibitors in a year than Social Security Scheme 
(SSS) and UC beneficiaries, respectively (Limwattananon et al. 2004). During the 
economic crisis in 1999, it was government policy to use only the essential drug list, 
and there was a decrease in expenditure in the CSMBS as shown in Figure 3.4 
(Ratanavijitrasin 2005). However, after that, total expenditure increased again 
especially during the 2004-2005 period. This was the effect of FFS payment under the 
CSMBS. Although there was a regulation requiring physicians wishing to prescribe 
drugs not on the essential drug list to seek approval from the hospital pharmaceutical 
committee, in practice there was evidence that most hospitals approved those drugs 
without full consideration (Sriratanaban 2002). Furthermore, shortage of funding put 
pressure on providers to make more income from the CSMBS, as shown from 
evidence of CSMBS expenditure (Srianand 2002). 
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Table 3.5 Average length of stay by different diagnosis of Civil Servant Medical 
Benefit Scheme patients in public hospitals and private hospital 
patients 
Diagnosis Public hospital Private hospital CSMBS: private ratio 
Mean days SD Mean days SD 
Diarrhoea 6.42 6.11 2.33 2.65 2.9 
Cataract 7.56 6.01 3.36 3.37 2.2 
Normal childbirth 4.75 2.82 5.49 2.98 0.9 
Diabetes 19.71 20.93 5.75 5.65 3.4 
Pneumonia 17.78 26.75 5.16 4.68 3.4 
Hypertension 17.44 20.03 5.21 7.22 3.3 
Heart disease . 14.93 17.39 4.82 6.96 3.1 
From: Tangcharoensathten et al. 2003 
Another problem of the CSBMS scheme is rising expenditure despite falling numbers 
of beneficiaries due to civil service reform (Sriratanaban 2002). From 1990, growth of 
CSMBS expenditure was higher than 10% p.a., except in 1999 and 2002 as shown in 
Figure 3.4. The problems of high expenditure and regulation led to a proposal to 
reform the CSMBS scheme. The reform proposal included changing the benefit 
package, the payments to hospital, and setting up an independent organization to' 
manage the scheme (Sriratanaban 2002). However, the reform processes are still 
ongoing. 
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Figure 3.4 Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme expenditure and percent 
growth between 1990 and 2008 
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3.3.3 Problems and reform of the Universal Coverage Scheme 
UC scheme implementation used experience from the SSS and CSMBS in relation to 
five issues (Tangcharoensathien et a1. 2007). First, the UC scheme used a contract 
model with arrangements for private and public competition, although in the early 
phase few private hospitals joined the scheme. The contracting unit of the UC scheme 
was called the contracting unit for primary care (CUP). These were mainly 
community hospitals acting as main contractor. The CUP is a fund holder providing 
comprehensive care to the population in its catchment area (Hughes and Leethongdee 
2007). Second, a capitation payment system was used since Thailand had favourable 
experience of using capitation in the SSS to control cost and increase efficiency. 
However, the UC scheme used capitation for preventive and promotive care and 
ambulatory care, while using prospective payment with global budget by diagnosis 
related groups (DRGs) for inpatient services. With respect to the payment system, in 
the first year of implementation, there were two major dimensions governing the 
allocation of the budget; the treatment of payment for inpatients and the handling of 
payment of salary. With regard to inpatients, there were two approaches to payment, 
inclusive capitation and exclusive capitation. Inclusive payment meant that the CUP 
received the entire budget, for OP, PP, and lP, and the CUP had to pay for the 
inpatient expenses at other hospitals when their patients were referred. Exclusive 
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capitation meant that the CUP received the OP and PP budget and the JP budget was 
pooled at the provincial level and inpatient expenses reimbursed from the provincial 
pool using the DRG system. If the CUP referred patients to other CUPs in the 
province, they did not pay directly since receiving CUPs were reimbursed from the 
provincial pool (Pokpernldee 2005). As regards salary, there were two alternatives 
also. Salary deduction at CUP level meant that the CUP received a budget which 
included staff salaries. Salary deduction at provincial level meant that salaries of staff 
in all CUPs of the province were deducted (and paid) at this level and each CUP 
received the non salary budget. Each province could decide whether or not to use 
inclusive or exclusive payment and on the level of salary deduction so it was possible 
across the country to have four different payment methods in existence: inclusive or 
. . 
exclusive and with or without salary subtraction as shown in table 3.6. In the second 
year of UC implementation, the policy was adopted of exclusive payment and salary 
subtraction at provincial level. By 2009, the policy was exclusive payment at national 
level and salary subtraction at provincial level (National Health Security Office 
2007a). 
Table 3.6 Payment alternatives in the first year of VC implementation 
Inclusive Exclusive 
Salary subtraction at CUP level 1 2 
Salary subtraction at provincial level 3 4 
Third, the VC scheme tried to split the provider and purchaser roles by setting up a 
new organization (the National Health Security Office) to be the purchaser and design 
the benefit package. Fourth, the UC scheme provided a comprehensive package, from 
preventive and promotive care to ambulatory and hospitalization care. Fifth, to 
improve access to care, the scheme used neither co-payment nor deductibles for those 
of low income, the elderly, and children while the co-payment was only 30 Baht for 
members who were not in the exempt group. However, in 2006, all members were 
exempted, followed a change of government which led to a new government pOlicylO. 
ID http://law.nhso.go.th/ 
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After implementation of DC, there were four major problems. First, there was the 
discrepancy between proposed and received capitation (Tangcharoensathien et a1. 
2007). This led to constraints for hospitals and to cross-subsidization from other 
schemes especially CSMBS. Figure 3.5 shows the trend of capitation and discrepancy 
of proposed and approved capitation from the government. 
Figure 3.5 Discrepancy of proposed and received capitation between 2002 and 
2007 
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A second issue was an increasing utilization rate. Data from HWS showed that the 
number of patients in OP at all levels of the health service increased after DC 
implementation in 2001 and decreased after full implementation of the system in 2006 
as shown in Table 3.6. This might come from three reasons. First, at the beginning of 
DC, people believed there were fewer barriers to access services so that these were 
over utilized. Second, DC implementation resulted in an overload on staff and 
physicians during this period and in turn led to a problem of brain drain as 
disillusioned staff moved to the private sector, leaving inadequate staff to provide the 
public service. Third, there were alleged problems of data collection in the HWS 2006 
because the data collection method has been changed when HWS was merged with 
the Socioeconomic Status Survey. This led to a problem of quality control of data 
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collection and data accuracy. Regarding inpatient (IP) admissions, there was marked 
increase in community hospitals between 2001 and 2006 while other hospitals seemed 
to be stable. This might be explained by the investment in community hospitals during 
this period because most of the UC scheme funds were paid directly to the CUP. Their 
budgets included funds for investment in equipment or buildings. Hospitals were able 
to invest in expanding services, especially in expanding the number of beds. 
Table 3.6 Utilization by UC members from Health and Welfare Survey 2001 to 
2006 
Level of care OP (million visit) JP (million visit) 
2001 2004 2006 2001 2004 2006 
Health centre 36.8 36.8 19.2 
Community hospital 24.2 27.7 20.9 1.0 2.0 l.8 
Other public hospital 26.2 11.7 8.7 1.7 1.7 l.6 
From: Health and welfare survey 2001, 2004, 2006 
The third problem was the financial source supporting the UC scheme. Because the 
financial source was from general taxation, the budget received from the government 
could vary from that proposed, as mentioned above. There were some proposals to 
change the source of finance from general tax to other sources such as alcohol or 
cigarette taxes (sin tax) (Patcharanarumol et aI. 2006). 
The fourth problem was equity of distribution of personnel. At first, the use of 
capitation payment in the UC scheme, especially inclusive capitation and 
incorporation of payment for salaries, had a strong effect on redistribution of 
personnel because CUPs in rural areas had a high catchment population but relatively 
few personnel while large hospitals with small catchment areas did not receive 
sufficient funds to cover the salary of all their staff. Therefore, they allowed some 
staff to transfer to help small hospitals to service patients in their catchment area. 
However, when the policy was changed to hold the salary budget at the national level, 
this reduced the effect of capitation on redistributing personnel to understaffed areas 
(Hughes and Leethongdee 2007). 
3.4 Evidence of insurance scheme performance in Thailand 
There is some empirical evidence from studies in Thailand about linkages between 
health insurance attributes and scheme perfonnance. In this review the magnitude of 
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variation in scheme performance from different characteristics of public health 
insurance were investigated in terms of quality of care and utilization. 
Because of the variation in the insurance system in Thailand, the outcome of health 
services including quality, efficiency, accessibility, cost, and responsiveness between 
different public health insurance schemes has been of concern. By reviewing the 
literature, the study can draw on current knowledge and expose gaps requiring further 
research. This part of the literature review examines articles on public health 
insurance in Thailand related to the outcome of health services. 
Methods 
The objective of the search strategy was to identify all relevant articles using selected 
text words and MeSH words. Searching was done exhaustively of both Thai and 
English articles in Pubmed, and some relevant journals on Thailand health policy. The 
search was done between 4 and 7 February 2009, with the search period being 
between 1990 and 2009. The inclusion criteria were Thai people, hospital, health 
personnel and interventions on the different public insurance schemes under different 
payment types (fee-for-service, capitation, and prospective payment). Within 
prospective payment, both DRG and case based payment were included. Text was 
searched used both key words and MeSH words as shown in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7 Details of text search of Thai health insurance articles 
Step Word list Literature search 
Thai * and (payment OR fee-for-service OR capitation 
OR prospective payment OR DRG* OR social insurance 
#1 OR universal coverage) 102 
Thai· and ("Physician Payment Review 
Cornmission"[MeSH] OR "Insurance, Health, 
Reimbursement" [MeSH] OR "Risk Sharing, 
Financial" [MeSH] OR "Fee-for-Service Plans"[MeSH] 
OR "Outliers, DRG"[MeSH] OR "Diagnosis-Related 
#2 Groups"[MeSH]) OR "Capitation Fee"[MeSH] OR 41 
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Step Word list Literature search 
"Social Security" [MeSH] OR "Universal 
Coverage" [MeSH]) 
--_._ ... _._ .. _ .. _ ..... _ .............. __ ...... _ .... _-_ ...... _ .... _-_. __ ....... _ ..... __ ... _ .. _ .. _---_ ... _._._._._ ......... _ ....... _ .......... _ .. _ ..... _._-~._._ ..... _ .... _ .... _ .............. _._ ....... - .. -. 
#3 #1 or #2 112 
Search results 
The search of Pubmed resulted in 112 articles. On reviewing the titles and abstracts, 
26 articles fitted the inclusion criteria relevant to the search objective, 9 Thai articles 
and 17 international articles. 
Thai articles were searched from three main sources: Journal of Health Science, 
Health System Research Institute (HSRI), and National Health Security Office 
Library. There were four articles from the first source and four from HSRI. The text 
searches in both sources were health insurance, social insurance, civil servant, and 
payment. Total number of articles was nine, as shown in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 Total number of search articles in each source 
Article Thai International 
Medline and Embase 17 
Journal of Health Science 4 
Health System Research Institute 4 
National Health Security Office Library 1 
Total 9 17 
Findings 
The discussion of this section can be summarized into two periods, before UC 
implementation and after UC implementation. As mentioned above, before UC 
implementation, health insurance in Thailand comprised four major schemes: 
CSMBS, SSS, low income card scheme, and health card scheme. The framework of 
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articles related to performance of health insurance differed between those periods. 
Figure 3.6 presents a diagram of articles related to health insurance in the periods 
before and after UC implementation. The dotted lines are issues of study which can be 
divided into three main groups; articles on issues between uninsured and insured 
groups; articles on the four main schemes before UC implementation; and articles on 
the three main insurance schemes after UC implementation. 
Figure 3.6 Diagram of articles related to insurance schemes in Thailand 
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Before universal coverage implementation 
Studies that compared the uninsured and insured groups covered several topics such 
as equity, efficiency, quality of care. First, there were problems of inequity of access 
to care. The study of Pannarunothai and Mills (1997) demonstrated that the poor paid 
more for health care than the wealthy. Furthermore, the poor usually were not covered 
by government insurance. The first income quintile spent 21.2% of household income 
on health care while the fifth income quintile spent only 2.1 %. Furthermore, 
uninsured patients seemed to report lower morbidity and had lower utilization than 
insured people (pannarunothai and Mills 1997). 
The studies comparing the four schemes examined issues such as effect of payment 
on utilization and quality of care. Tangcharoensathien et al. (1999) studied 
perceptions of quality and satisfaction between patients in SSS and the other schemes. 
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The main comparison was the effect of payment by capitation and by FFS. The study 
found that patients in the SSS perceived lower quality in process of care than CSMBS 
patients (Tangcharoensathien et al. 1999a). The utilization rate of health cardholders 
was higher than SSS. For example, OP/person/year of card holders was 2.04 in 1995, 
while for SSS it was 1.23 and lP/person/year of card holders was 0.09 while for SSS it 
was 0.02 (Pannarunothai et al. 2000). 
A study of the implementation of the capitation payment for employees in the SSS 
shows that it created competition between public and private hospitals. The method of 
expanding market share used by hospitals was to create a network of hospitals to 
improve access to care for beneficiaries. However, private hospitals had greater 
competitive advantage than public hospitals because of their flexibility of 
management and incentives to staff (Mills et al. 2000). 
Even in drug policy, Pitaknetinan et al. (1999) found that control of the costs of care 
influenced hospital policy on prescription; for example, private for-profit hospitals 
used essential drug lists more than non-profit private hospitals. However, different 
payment types affected provider behaviour. For example, Bryant and Prohrnmo 
(2005) studied the prescribing behaviour of physicians in four community hospitals. 
They found that the method of hospital payment influenced physicians' prescribing 
behaviour, though it was not directly related to physician income. FFS patient 
received more expensive drugs than capitation patients (Bryant and Prohmmo 2005). 
Regarding the cost of services, Yip et al. (200 I) compared differences in average 
LOS, average charge per admission, average drug and iaboratory charge per 
admission between CSMBS paying FFS and of SSS paying capitation. The results 
confirmed that average LOS, charge per admission, drug cost per case, and laboratory 
cost per case for SSS patients was shorter than for CSMBS patients. For example, in 
acute appendicitis cases, the average LOS of CSMBS patients were 4.6 days 
compared to 2.3 days for SSS patients. Total charges for CSMBS patients were 4.5 
times higher while drug cost per case was 2 times and lab cost per case was 4 times 
higher than for SSS patients (Yip et al. 2001). However, some confounders such as 
age and sex might affect this result. 
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Since the health card scheme was a voluntary scheme, the main problem was adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Pannarunothai et a1. (2000) found that there was evidence 
of adverse selection and moral hazard of voluntary health cardholders. 
In 1997, Thailand had faced an economic crisis leading to increased unemployment 
and poverty. Although the public budget was increased to lessen the social impact of 
the crisis, the uninsured group had a higher rate of low birth weight 
(Tangcharoensathien et al. 2000). This situation led to calls for the reform of health 
insurance from academics, civic groups and politicians to introduce Universal' 
Coverage, which became an important policy of the Thai Rak Thai party in the 2001 
election (lindawatana and Pipatrarojkomol 2003). 
After universal coverage implementation 
After UC implementation, Thailand had three major public health insurance schemes 
to cover the whole population but the details of each scheme were different as 
mentioned above. Articles in this period demonstrated the problems of the different 
schemes such as utilization, accessibility, quality of care. These groups of articles can 
be summarized into three indicator approaches, utilization, efficiency, and quality. 
3.4.1 Utilization 
Utilization depends on both patient demand and provider service. From the demand 
side, universal coverage led to an increase in demand by the population by reducing 
the barrier of cost to 30 Baht for people who had no insurance coverage. On the 
supply side, providers have tended to alter their service provision according to 
different insurance schemes. For example, in DM drug prescription, CSMBS patients 
receive a more expensive drug than UC scheme and SSS patients (Chariyalerdsak et 
a1. 2004). 
Universal coverage achieved the objective of increasing access by expanding 
coverage to the uninsured who were mainly the poor. Coronini-Cronberg et a1. (2007) 
conducted a survey amongst the poor population of a slum in the northeastern region. 
They found that 52% of UC scheme respondents had increased use of services since 
UC implementation (Coronini-Cronberg et al. 2007). Another survey in three poor 
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provinces in Thailand found that coverage of UC insurance in those provinces was 
74%. The study found that insured groups had more likely to seek care than the 
uninsured group (Suraratdecha et al. 2005). Somkotra and Detsorriboonrat (2009) 
demonstrated that dental services under UC scheme, SSS, and CSMBS were pro rich. 
Utilization of dental services in the fifth income quintile was four times higher than in 
the first income quintile (Somkotra and Detsomboonrat 2009). Kitajima et al. (2005) 
found that CSMBS patients were more likely to receive antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) 
than UC scheme patients (Kitajima et al. 2005). 
Vasavid et al (2004) analysed Health and Welfare Survey data for the years 2001 and 
2003 to explore utilization before and after the full effect of universal coverage. They 
found that, for all three schemes, average utilization by ill patients of health facility 
based services in 2003 was 70.8%. There were differences in using health facilities 
between schemes. UC scheme patients mostly used health centres and community 
hospitals. CSMBS patients generally used community hospitals and provincial or 
regional hospitals. SSS patients usually used private hospitals. CSMBS and SSS used 
private clinics at nearly the same rate. The details are in Figure 3.7. 
Figure 3.7 Distribution of health facility utilization by scheme in 2003 
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The outpatient utilization rate increased in all insurance schemes between 2001 and 
2003 as shown in Table 3.9. The admission rate increased in the UC scheme by about 
8.8%, from 0.076 episode/person/year in 2001 to 0.083 episode/person/year in 2003, 
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while the admission rate decreased in the other insurance schemes. This might be due 
to the increase in access to health care for UC scheme patients while the number of 
beds was limited. In effect the hospitals had to squeeze out other insurance patients. 
The admission rate of CSMBS patients was higher than the SSS and UC scheme, 
probably because the age structure was older (Chariyalerdsak et al. 2004). 
Table 3.9 Outpatient and admission rates between 2001 and 2003 
Outpatient/admission rate UC CSMBS SSS 
(episode/person/year) scheme 
Outpatient 
2001 4.10 3.77 2.44 
2003 4.93 4.90 2.98 
Rate of change (%) 20.1 30.l 22.4 
Inpatient 
2001 0.076 0.104 0.070 
2003 0.083 0.l02 0.060 
Rate of change (%) 8.8 -2.3 -0.3 
* Outpatient and admISSIon rate Includes unmsured 10 thIS group 
From: Vasavid et a1. 2004 
3.4.2 Efficiency 
Private 
insurance 
2.99 
3.53 
18.0 
0.153 
0.099 
-34.8 
Total 
3.94 
4.71 
19.7 
0.080 
0.080 
5.6 
Universal coverage incorporated various features to promote efficiency of health care 
such as using capitation payment to promote efficient use of resources, and employing 
the CUP as a gatekeeper. As mentioned above, there were four alternative payment 
options in the first year of implementation. Provinces which selected inclusive 
payment and salary subtraction at CUP level had difficulties controlling costs. This 
forced providers to reallocate staff from areas with low capitation income and high 
salary bills (mostly where there were large hospitals) to areas with high capitation 
income (mostly rural areas) (Srithamrongsawat and Lapying 2003). However, this 
choice lasted only one year and there was no clear evidence on which model was 
more efficient. Even now, when payment to CUPs is exclusive capitation, DRGs for 
IP are managed at national level, and salary subtraction is at provincial level, more 
infonnation is needed to evaluate the efficiency of this model. 
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The variations and changes in capitation policy in the early years of VC brought a loss 
of cash flow for some hospitals, especially hospitals with small catchment areas. 
These hospitals had to request contingency funds from the government to balance 
their cash flow and they had to submit proposals to improve the efficiency of the 
CUPs. In the first year of implementation, 70% of public hospitals encountered cash 
flow problems (Ngorsuraches and Sornlertlumvanich 2006). However, recently 
Puenpatom and Rosenman (2008) analysed hospital efficiency by using bootstrap 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). They found that large public hospitals which 
used to have problems of shortage of cash flow had increased their efficiency in use 
of resources (Puenpatom and Rosenman 2008). 
3.4.3 Quality 
Articles related to quality of care after UC implementation can be categorized into 
two themes. The first concerns the satisfaction of patients and providers. The NHSO 
has surveyed the satisfaction of UC patients and providers especially physicians since 
2002 by using a rating scale (0-10) to assess satisfaction level. The results of this 
exercise show that Thai people are more satisfied with universal coverage than are 
providers, as shown in Table 3.10 (National Health Security Office 2007c). 
Table 3.10Satisfaction score of providers and Thai people 
Average score ofsatisfaction (score 1-10) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Thai people satisfaction 8.01 7.88 7.83 8.08 7.73 
Provider satisfaction 4.96 NA 5.42 5.58 5.56 
Adapted from: NatlOnal Health Secunty Office 2007c 
Table 3.l1 shows the percentage ofUe patients satisfied with different elements from 
the survey. Although these results are descriptive, not controlling for confounding 
factors, ue scheme patients seem to be satisfied with physicians and the outcome of 
care, but are less satisfied with drugs and equipment. 
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Table 3.11 Details of satisfaction of patients 
Percent of satisfaction of patients 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Physician 92.9 92.9 93.3 92.2 90.9 
Nurse 89.4 91.2 92.0 90.5 87.6 
Drugs 83.3 86.6 91.1 89.8 85.9 
Equipment 85.8 90.4 92.9 90.2 88.5 
Outcome of care 90.2 91.8 94.4 91.7 90.0 
Adapted from: NatIOnal Health Security Office 2007c 
The second theme is the quality of received services. Most of articles in this theme 
related to hospital services. There were possible two issues in these research including 
drug quality and result of treatment. 
On drug quality, Laosee et al. (2005) studied the prescribing of haemorrhoid drugs in 
community hospitals. They found that use of an expensive drug (proctosedyl) was in 
decline, while use of a cheap traditional drug (Petch Sang Kart) for haemorrhoids did 
not differ between pre and post VC policy periods (Laosee et al. 2005). The reason 
given for this was the budget constraints under the VC scheme. This finding was the 
same as in research by Chariyalerdsak et al. (2004) and Panpanich et al. (2003). They 
found that the use of antibiotics for viral VRI reduced significantly in patients who 
were exempt from co-payment compared to the period before implementation. This 
research concluded that patients who were exempt from co-payments were prescribed 
fewer antibiotics after VC implementation. Chansung et a1. (2003) show that DM 
patients under the 30 Baht scheme received a lower priced drug than those under 
CSMBS, for which payment was fee-for-service, but Chansung et al. (2003) could not 
demonstrated the outcome of care in these groups (Chansung et at. 2003). 
Bryant and Prohmmo (2005) studied the effect of payment mechanisms and 
prescriptions in four community hospitals. They found that comparing between fee-
for-service in CSMBS patients and capitation payments witholder people, physicians 
prescribed more expensive drugs for fee-for-service patients than for capitated 
patients (Bryant and Prohmrno 2005). 
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Limwattananon et al (2004) studied prescription data of specific drugs in hospitals 
before and after UC implementation. They found that the overall rate of increase of 
drug expenditure was lower than that before VC implementation. For specific drug 
usage, they found that prescription of NSAIO, ACE inhibitors and A2 receptor 
antagonist depended on type of insurance coverage. CSMBS patients received more 
new and high cost drugs than patients with other insurance. However, the factor that 
affected prescription was not only different payment types but also physician 
behaviour and hospital policy. Some hospitals restricted use of drugs in patients 
making capitation payments, such as UC scheme and SSS patients, but allowed free 
choice for physicians to prescribe drugs for CSMBS patients who paid fee-for-service 
(Limwattananon et al. 2004). 
In terms of treatment results, Chanjar (2004) studied the outcomes of service in the 
CSMBS, SSSand Health Card Scheme (the latter later replaced by an expanded UC 
scheme also covering the uninsured group). She used the outcomes of Caesarean 
section and Asthma as tracers for non acute and acute conditions. The study found 
that results of treatment in Caesarean section and Asthma patients were better in the 
CSMBS group compared to the SSS and Health Card Scheme (Santayakom 
2004).Another example is a study of mortality of patients with acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) in Buddhachinaraj hospital. The study found that insurance had no 
effect on mortality after controlling for confounding factors. Only severity of disease 
was significantly related to mortality from AMI (Kongtawon et a1. 2007). 
3.5 Thai experience of Diabetes Mellitus care 
In Thailand, Aekplakom et al. (2003) undertook a study of the prevalence and 
management of DM in adult patients. The aim of the study was to find the prevalence 
of DM in people ~35 year old. The study showed that prevalence of OM was 9.6 ± 
0.7% (known DM 4.8 ± 0.5%, newly diagnosed 4.8 ± 0.5%) (Aekplakom et a1. 2003). 
This data on the newly diagnosed is important, being equal to known OM cases. 
Chetthakul et a1. (2006) found the prevalence of type II Thai OM patients to be 31.4% 
of DM patients between 35 and 60 years (Chetthakul et a1. 2006a). Patients are prone 
to develop vascular complications if they do not have early diagnosis and prompt 
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treatment. Diabetic retinopathy (DR) is one of the most common microvascular 
complications of DM patients. The factors associated with DR were duration of OM 
of more than 5 years, systolic blood pressure, and HbAl C more than 7%, 
3.5.1 Standard treatment of Diabetes Mellitus 
Thailand has developed a standard treatment for OM recently. The National Health 
Security Office supports the use of standard DM care as one of the quality of care 
indicators. The endocrinology society of Thailand has published standard practice 
guidelines for OM (Health Service Guidelines Development Project Office 2006). 
The details of this treatment standard are: 
1. Check body weight at least 4 times a year 
2. Physical examination once a year 
3. Eye examination by ophthalmologist once a year (if possible) 
4. Check blood pressure at least 4 times a year 
5. Check FPG at least 4 times a year 
6. Check HBA)cat least once a year 
7. Check microalbumiuria once a year 
8. Check lipid profile once a year 
9. Educate patient to check blood sugar or plasma glucose 
10. Educate to control body weight and food control 
11. Stop smoking and limit alcohol consumption 
12. Evaluate quality of life of patients 
The laboratory targets for management ofDM are given in Table 3.12. 
Table 3.12 Laboratory targets of Diabetes Mellitus quality indicators 
Laboratory test Target 
Fasting plasma glucose (mg/dl) 90-130 
Postprandial glucose (mg/dl) <180 
HbA1C (%) <7 
Total cholesterol (mg/dl) <200 
LDL-cholesterol (mg/dl) <100 
HDL- cholesterol (mg/dl) >40 
Fastin.g triglyceride (mg/dl) <150 
Body mass index (kg/M2) male (20-25) 
female (19-24) 
78 
Laboratory test Target 
Waist circumference male 90 cm 
female 80 cm 
Blood pressure <130/80 
From: Health ServIce GUldelmes Development Project Office 2006 
There are studies on various outcomes of DM patients. Rawdaree et al (2006) studied 
the Thailand Diabetes registry project in 11 tertiary centres. The finding was that 
nephropathy was the most common complication in DM patients and had a prevalence 
rate of 43.9% followed by retinopathy at 30.7% (Rawdaree et al. 2006). This 
complication is related to dyslipidemia, hypertension, and long duration of Diabetes 
Mellitus. 
Pannarunothai (2000) studied the knowledge and practice of DM patients at the OPD 
of Buddhachinaraj Phitsanulok hospital. From interviews with 124 patients, the 
finding was that most patients (97%) had not understood the process of drug 
administration. On knowledge of self-care, a significant number of patients (38.7%) 
had less knowledge on foot care compared to regular exercise (83.9%) 
(Pannarunothai 2000). 
3.5.2 Studies of outcome of care in Diabetes Mellitus and health insurance 
in Thai experience 
There have been a number of studies about DM patients in Thailand. However, few 
studies have followed the outcome of care in DM. 
There are some empirical studies on DM management in Thailand. Chetthakul et al 
(2006) studied the process of Diabetes care in tertiary hospitals in 1997, 1998, and 
2003. They found that the number of patients checked for HbAlc, serum creatinine, 
urine albumin, lipid profile, retinal examination, and foot examination, increased over 
the years. In 2003, more than 90% of patients received measurement of FPG, HbAlc, 
lipid profile, serum creatinine, urinalysis, foot examination. Achievement of the 
targets for HbAlc and FPG improved significantly. Patients who reached the target of 
HbAlc «7%) were 7.7% in 1997 and 38% in 2003. The target for FPG of <130 
mgldL was met for 30% of patient in 1997 to 40.2% in 2003 (Chetthakul et al. 
2006b). 
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Pratipanawatr et al (2006) followed up the mortality rate of DM patients over 3 years 
between 2003 and 2005 in a cohort study of the Thai Diabetes Register project. The 
death rate of DM patients was 2.02% per year (Pratipanawatr et al. 2006). The 
common causes of death were infection, cardiovascular disease, cancer, and chronic 
kidney disease. The study also found that UC scheme membership, previous history 
of cardiovascular disease, smoking, insulin treatment, low education level, renal 
insufficiency, low plasma HDL, and systolic blood pressure were the major mortality 
risk factors. Possible reasons for UC scheme membership increasing the risk of 
mortality were that most UC patients have low education, low access to services, and 
low opportunities to obtain appropriate health care. 
Since Thailand implemented universal coverage in 2001, there have been studies of 
various diseases. DM is one of the chronic diseases that has been used as a tracer for 
quality of care between major public health insurance schemes. Chariyalerdsak et al 
(2004) summarized that there is inequity in access to expensive drugs by payment 
mechanism. Patients under the fee-for-service scheme (CSMBS) tended to receive 
more expensive drugs than patients under SSS and the 30 baht scheme. 
3.6 Summary 
The review of the Thai literature has discussed the development of universal health 
insurance in Thailand. Currently, Thailand has three public insurance schemes. The 
review highlighted the development of each insurance scheme, with their different 
objectives when they were established. Each insurance scheme had its own limitations 
and gaps to reform. After universal coverage implementation in 200 I, this changed 
the health insurance system in Thailand, expanding public health insurance to cover 
the whole population. Consistent with Kutzin's insurance framework, there are 
different characteristics of those insurance schemes. However, the challenge is 
whether the universal coverage can improve the health system performance equally 
between schemes or not. 
In terms of performance, the literature reveals that scheme characteristics affect 
performance in areas such as utilization, efficiency, and quality of service. Schemes 
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can affect both beneficiaries and providers. For patients, universal coverage seemed to 
reduce barriers to access to health services. However, for providers, the insurance 
schemes seemed to affect hospital policy and provider behaviour, as several studies 
showed different patterns of drug prescription between different health insurance 
schemes. 
This review of the literature on health insurance and its performance in Thailand has 
identified a number of gaps in current knowledge. Few empirical studies are available 
regarding the consequences of scheme performance on the health system. Most of the 
studies are limited in scope to one particular topic. Therefore, studying the 
performance of the three public insurance schemes on some selected issues from both 
the provider and the patient side will make an original contribution and fill a gap in 
knowledge. 
Using DM as a tracer for quality of care in Thailand is possible; there is standard 
practice guideline for DM management. These standards were used to study process 
and outcome of DM treatment for patients. However, most of research related to DM 
in Thailand relates to clinical and patient outcomes. Few researchers have studied 
insurance scheme and DM service quality, although some research has found that 
insurance status relates to outcomes for DM patients. 
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CHAPTER 4: OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the research aim, objectives, and the study methodology. There 
are seven sections in the chapter. The first section presents the aim, objectives, and 
development of methodology. The second section describes the study setting in 
Samutsakhon province, Thailand. The methodology is described in the third section, 
followed by methodological details for each of the study's objectives in sections four 
and five. Section six presents a summary of the study methodology. The final two 
sections then describe the possible biases of the researcher and the study limitations. 
4.1 Aim and objectives 
4.1.1 Aim 
The study aims to evaluate three public health insurance schemes in terms of their 
performance in selected areas. The results of this study can help policy makers both in 
Thailand and in other countries to identify appropriate approaches for public health 
insurance schemes. 
4.1.2 Objectives 
1. To assess and explain the performance of the three public health insurance 
schemes in terms of overall use of ambulatory and inpatient care, and 
efficiency and quality in use of resources for Diabetes Mellitus (DM) patients. 
2. To identify the quality of care provided for Diabetes Mellitus (DM) within 
each insurance scheme, and then explore how quality of care might be affected 
both by the insurance scheme design and by other factors. 
4.1.3 Development of methodology 
Based on the literature review, a research framework was developed as shown in 
Figure 4.1. The framework was developed by integrating the Kutzin model of 
insurance functions, Carrin and James' framework on achieving universal coverage, 
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and Figueras et al.'s model of health system performance (Kutzin 1998, Carrin and 
lames 2005, Figueras et al. 2005). Insurance in this context can be defined as 
coverage that provides for the payments of benefits as a result of sickness or injury 
and includes insurance for losses from accidents, medical expenses, disability, or 
accidental death and dismemberment (Marcinko 2006). Within this, the specific 
concern of this thesis is coverage of the costs of medical care. 
Insurance elements can be divided into stakeholder or system components shown as 
boxes and activities shown as arrows. Different countries have different types of 
stakeholder and system components. The main stakeholders in health insurance 
systems comprise purchasers, service providers, and the insured population. The 
concept of purchaser mechanism can be divided into three models, single purchaser, 
multiple purchasers without competition, and multiple purchasers with competition. 
This concern of this study was the model of multiple purchasers without competition, 
as this is the current situation in Thailand. For service providers, this study included 
not only institutions such as hospitals but also personnel such as physicians, nurses, 
and other personnel in the study. Providers also included private hospitals that were 
main contractors of the SSS. The insured population was different between schemes 
and providers might provide different services to serve the different needs and 
demands of the insured populations. 
Performance is defined as attainment in the light of what systems should be able to 
accomplish with given resources (Figueras et al. 2005). The concept of insurance 
performance was composed of two elements, achieving universal coverage and 
improving health system performance (dotted boxes in Figure 4.1). 
The main concern of this study relates to the grey boxes and dotted-line arrows in the 
framework. The elements of the insurance system in this study (shown in grey boxes) 
are composed of a multiple payer system, service providers, and insured population. 
These elements differ from scheme to scheme. The activities in the different insurance 
schemes (shown with line arrows) are allocation to insurer, provider payment, service 
provided by provider, and benefit package. All of these components affect scheme 
performance. This study focuses on some selected issues of scheme performance. 
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From figure 4.1, the study has three major elements. The first is overall utilization 
which, according to the Andersen model, is influenced by predisposing factors (age, 
sex, marital status, income, education, and socioeconomic status of beneficiaries), 
enabling resources (insurance status, income), and need (e.g. having chronic disease). 
Utilization can be defined as patterns or rate of use of single or types of services 
(Marcinko 2006). In this framework, utilization was defined as visiting health care 
services for both formal and informal care, and ambulatory or hospitalization service 
use. Utilization can be viewed as an individual behaviour (Andersen and Newman 
1973). Therefore, the scope of the utilization concept is broader and deeper than 
access to care (Smith 2005). 
The second element is analysis at the system level of efficient use of resources, 
explored in terms of LOS, and early readmission of DM patients. Unlike Donabedian, 
this study examines efficiency as a factor separate from quality of care per se. 
Efficiency can be defined as the best use of resources in production (Hollingsworth 
and Peacock 2008), and the concern of the study was with an aspect of technical 
efficiency, defined as the relationship between output and costs. LOS sheds light on 
the efficient use of resources, and was defined as the period from admission to 
discharge for the episode of hospitalization. Early readmission can be used as an 
indicator of efficiency and was selected in part because it could be an adverse effect 
of too early discharge from hospital and hence too short a LOS. This study defined 
readmission as a readmission with the same primary diagnosis within 30 days after 
discharge. 
The third element is quality of care which can be measured from provider and patient 
side. Quality of service can be measured from the patient's side by their perceptions 
and the outcome of treatment, while from the provider's side by input and process of 
service delivered. In this study, providers are both public and private providers. 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of the study 
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4.2 Study setting 
This study used Samutsakhon province as the study site for various reasons. First, it 
has both public and private hospitals. The public hospitals have patients across all 
three schemes and all are main contractors of SSS. Second, the province has a 
mixture of urban and rural characteristics, with areas which are agricultural and 
similar to rural areas, while the urban area is congested with factories and 
commercial businesses. Third, patient data were easy to access. Hospitals in 
Samutsakhon have good infonnation technology systems. Patient data were recorded 
both electronically and on paper, and were therefore easy to access. 
Samutsakhon is located in the central area of Thailand. 30 kilometres from Bangkok 
(Figure 4.2), and has three districts: Muang, Banpaw, and Kratumban. 
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Figure 4.2 Map of Samutsakhon province with three districts 
Nakonpratom Province 
Gulf of Thailand 
T 
• Factory 
Table 4.1 shows . details of the population and social indicators of Samutsakhon 
province. The economic status of Samutsakhon in terms of Gross Provincial Product 
per capita is very high. It is the second highest in the country, 2.5 times higher than 
the country average. The main income of the province is from manufacturing 
business. Population density is three times higher than the country average. 
However, in terms of health index, the crude birth rate is higher than average, while 
the crude death rate is similar to the country value. The average number of people 
per household size is lower than average for the central region. The ratio of elderly is 
slightly lower than that for the region, at 10% and the ratio of population under five 
years old is slightly higher than the regional average. 
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Table 4.1 Selected social indicators in Samutsakhon 2007 
Characteristics Samutsakhon Central re2ion 
Population 469,934 3,008,000 
Average household size (person per household) 2.2 3.2--
Population density (person per square km) 539 178'-
Gross Provincial Product per capita in 2007 539,346 197,963 
Distribution of Gross Provincial Product by 
sector (%) 84 64 
- Manufacturing 3 0.2 
- Fishing 0.6 6 
- Agriculture 12.4 29.8 
- Others 
% population under 5 8 6---
% population over 60 10 14--
Crude birth rate in 2007 (per 1,000 population) 22.31 10.13--'-
Crude death rate in 2007 (per 1,000 5.80 5.57"-
population) 
Souree:http://www.samutsakhon.go.thlaecessed on 26/1112008 
http://www.dopa.go.th/hpstat9/people2.htm accessed on 26/11/2008 
http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=96 accessed on 2611112008 
http://66.102.9.132/ aeeessed on 26/1112008 
http://bps.ops.moph.go.th/index.php?mod=bps&doc=5 1 accessed on 26/1112008 
* data 2006 
Health resources in Samutsakhon overall are better than for the central region as a 
whole. The average number of population per physician is half of the central region, 
while other human resource ratios are higher than regional average (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Ratio of population per health resource 
Health personnel resource Samutsakhon Central re2ion 
Physician 1,857 3,124 
Dentist . 13,215 15,176 
Phannacist 6,703 6,852 
Profession nurse 524 562 
Adapted from: http://www.samutsakhon.go.thl 
There are three public hospitals in Samutsakhon. Practically, they are all general hospital 
with more than 150 beds. Furthermore, Banpaw is the first autonomous hospital under 
MOPH. 
4.3 Methodology 
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were employed in the study. The 
quantitative approach aimed to compare scheme performance, while the qualitative 
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approach aimed to provide an in-depth explanation of scheme effects through the 
perceptions of stakeholders. For objective 1, secondary data were used to evaluate 
scheme performance. For objective 2, retrospective medical record data and patient 
interviews were used to trace the scheme effect on quality of care of DM. A standard 
set of service indicators applying to DM were used to judge quality of care. Focus 
group discussions with DM patients were employed to confirm perceptions of care in 
DM patients. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with hospital directors 
and providers were employed to find perceptions, motivations, and practices relating 
to DM patients in different schemes and to 'understand other factors that might affect 
perfonnance. 
4.4 Method of objective 1: To assess and explain the performance 
of the three public health insurance schemes in terms of 
overall use of ambulatory and inpatient care, and efficiency 
and quality in use of resources for Diabetes Mellitus patients. 
The methodology here is used to address the question of what the differences in 
scheme performance are. Some selected indicators were used - overall utilization, 
LOS and early readmission rate within 30 days of DM patients - to assess the 
schemes' performance. 
This study uses Diabetes Mellitus as the tracer because (1) it is a common disease so 
there are data available for analysis; (2) it has a clear cut diagnosis so the sample is 
homogeneous; (3) there is a definite standard of treatment, reducing uncertainty 
about variation in treatment. 
The data come from two sources. The first is the Health and Welfare Survey (HWS) 
2005, from which data were used to analyse the overall utilization rate of each 
scheme. The second is claims data which hospitals use to obtain reimbursement for 
hospitalized patients. Claims data were used to analyse LOS and early readmission 
within 30 days from previous admission in DM patients because the accuracy of the 
data improves every year (pannarunothai 2002a). Hospitals which provide 
admissions for CSMBS and UC scheme patients are required to send claims data for 
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reimbursement while hospitals with SSS patient admissions are required to send 
claims data for adjusting capitation at the end of fiscal year. 
4.4.1 Method for sub-study 1.1: To explore the magnitude of variation in 
overall utilization between the three insurance schemes 
To assess service utilization, a framework of health service utilization was used 
(Andersen and Newman 1973). The factors determining service utilization were 
divided into three main types: predisposing, enabling, and illness level. Predisposing 
factors included demographic structure, social structure, and beliefs. Enabling factors 
included household income, level of insurance coverage, and living area. Illness level 
factors included perceived health status and evaluated severity of illness. 
1. Source of data 
This sub-study addresses the question of overall utilization by households, giving a 
national picture. HWS data were used to analyse overall utilization rates. The 
National Statistical Office (NSO) conducts this survey every year. This study uses 
HWS data from 2005 because this is the most up-to-date survey and has not so far 
been analysed. The timeframe of data collection is usually between 1-12 April each 
year (National Statistical Office 2004).The objectives of the HWS are basically to 
provide: 
• Information about morbidity, accessibility to health services, and accessibility to 
health insurance. 
• The coverage of health services in relation to universal coverage aims. 
• Information about health care expenditure. 
2. Variables 
Unit of analysis of health care services (the first objective of the HWS) was the 
individual household member. Analysis was disaggregated by insurance scheme and 
quintile of household consumption. The variables in this part drew on the Andersen 
& Newman framework reviewed in chapter 2. Although there are several 
behavioural models that can help to specify variables, the Andersen & Newman 
framework is appropriate for explaining utilization in both ambulatory care and 
hospitalization. The summary of variables used in the study, definit~ons, and 
justification and hypotheses are shown in Table 4.3. 
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The predisposing variables in the analyses consist of age, sex, education, and marital 
status. Age was categorized into 20 year groups to accommodate the youngest SSS 
members (at 15 years) in the lowest group. Working age groups were categorized 
into two groups: an early working group (21-40 years) and a late working group (41-
60 years). The retired age group was set at more than 60 years. The predisposing 
factors are based on the concept that some individuals tend to utilize services more 
than others. The elderly normally have more health problems than younger people. 
Higher education and marital status both tend to increase an individual's likelihood of 
seeking care. 
The enabling variables are income, health insurance status, and living location of 
residence. Enabling factors are defined as conditions that make resources, such as 
health care, available and accessible to an individual (Andersen and Newman 1973). 
Those of higher income have greater opportunity to access health services than the 
poor do. Having health insurance can reduce the burden of expenditure for health, 
depending on the conditions on benefits. Area and region of residence affect 
utilization in two ways, through the norms of utilization and the availability of 
resources. Different areas not only have differing incidence of illness, but also 
different access to providers (Phananiramai and Suksiriserekul 1996). 
Illness type or severity is also a factor. Individuals who have a chronic disease tend 
to use more services than others do. 
Self-reports by respondents in interviews were used by HWS to assess servIce 
utilization. A one-month recall was employed for ambulatory services. Ambulatory 
care was divided into two major parts, formal care and informal care. Informal care 
comprised self-prescribing, alternative care, and no treatment, while formal care 
included health centre, private clinic, and hospital care. A one-year recall of 
admission was used by HWS for hospitalization Care. The probability of visiting, 
number of ambulatory care visits, probability of hospitalization, and number of 
hospitalizations were employed as indicators to assess access variations in health 
insurance schemes. 
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Table 4.3 Justification and definitions of independent variables used in the 
utilization study 
Variable Explanation Justification & hypothesis 
_.f~~di~P'9.~!~g_~~l_~le~_l _________ ._._._ ... ____ .. _______ . _________ 
._._ .. _._--
----.--_._---_._-_ .. _._--------
• Age group i 0-20 Older people tend to need health 
! 21-40 care services more than younger 
I 41-60 people. 
>60 
' __ "'M" __ "'_"'_ ...... __ ....... _ ... _ .. _ ... _-_. __ .... _ ... _ ... _. __ . 
• Sex Male There are biological factors 
Female j~termining nee~_!or ~~~lth care. 
._._ .. _._-_. __ . __ ._-_._._._--_._ .. _--- ----_. __ ._ .. __ ....... _ .. _-_._._-------_._--_. 
• Education • No education Different levels of education 
• <primary school affect knowledge and 
• Primary-Bachelor understanding of service use 
.~ Bachelor 1-----------. -_._-----
• Marital status Married Married people are more 
Unmarried concerned to utilize health care 
than unmarried people 
Enabling variables 
• Income Represented by household High income groups have greater 
income quintile opportunity to access health 
services than lower income 
groups 
--_.-------
• Insurance schemes Categorized by three main public The study aims to explore the 
health insurance, UC scheme, effect of different insurance status 
SSS, and CSMBS on service utilization 
Health insurance helps people use 
services. 
eRegions Different regions have different Availability of health facilities 
health facilities categorized as: affects utilization by individuals 
Bangkok, Central, North, 
Northeast, and South 
• Area Rural People living in urban areas tend 
Urban to use more services than those in 
rural areas 
Illness variable 
• Having chronic There are two categories, having People with chronic disease tend 
disease and not having chronic disease to utilize more services than those 
without chronic disease 
3. Data analysis 
Since the data of HWS are weighted to represent the Thai population, complete 
weighted data were used as input data The HWS coded data was analysed using 
various statistical methods which are explained in detail in chapter 5. Descriptive and 
inferential statistics were employed to describe variables and to analyse factors 
influencing the utilization of the three schemes. The statistics used in this study 
include frequencies and cross tabulations. The effect of scheme characteristics and 
other influences on utilization are estimated using logistic regression and a count 
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data model. These various analytical methods are employed using standard software 
STATA version 10. 
4.4.2 Method for sub-study 1.2: To explore the magnitude of variation of 
length of stay and readmission of Diabetes Mellitus patients between 
insurance schemes. 
A detailed analysis was conducted of the pattern of admissions and readmissions for 
DM in Thailand using claims data. This analysis provides background data on the 
efficiency of DM services and quality of care. 
1. Source of data 
The data were collected from inpatient claims data in the year 2005. Currently, all 
hospitals in the three schemes - SSS, UC scheme and CSMBS - have to send 
inpatient data to SSO and the Central Office for Healthcare Information (CHI). The 
SSO needs this data to adjust the capitation allocation at the end of each year, while 
NHSO and the comptroller general need this data in the reimbursement process. 
However, the details of the data sets differ from each other. To analyse these data, all 
data were combined in the same structure. After data were combined, some detail 
could not be retained. For example, hospital type could be grouped into private and 
public hospitals, whereas the original structure of UC scheme claims data divides 
hospitals by size. The structure of data consists of three parts: patient data, hospital 
data, and clinical data. The details of the structure of combin~d data are shown in 
Table A2.1 (Appendix 2). 
2. Data collection 
UC scheme and CSMBS data were collected from the Central Office for Health Care 
(CHI). SSS data were collected from the SSO. Both sources were combined by using 
the software application Microsoft Access 2003. 
3. Variables 
The unit of analysis in this claims data is the DM patient, categorized by health 
insurance scheme and other influences on LOS and readmission. There are few 
studies of DM using LOS as a dependent variable compared to other chronic 
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conditions such as congestive heart failure etc. Therefore, this study reviewed factors 
affecting LOS for several conditions to evaluate which factors should be included 
(see section 2.4.2). 
The choice of explanatory variables in this study was also guided by Lave and Frank 
(1990)'s model of LOS. That model proposed four factors affecting LOS including 
patient characteristics, hospital characteristics, health care delivery system, and 
payment structure (Lave and Frank 1990) as shown in figure 4.3. Examples of patient 
characteristics are demographic factors, health status, and severity of disease (Leung 
et al. 1998). 
Examples of hospital characteristics are type of hospital etc (Mawajdeh et al. 1997, 
Rosenthal et al. 2003). Examples of system characteristics are population density 
(Daniel et al. 1968). Examples of payment system are prospective payment and per 
diem payment (Lutjens and Louette 1994, Theurl and Winner 2007), 
Figure 4.3 Factors affecting length of stay model 
Patient characteristics 
- Heal th status 
- Age. race, sex 
- Severity of illness etc. 
Hospital characteristics 
- Bed size 
- Type of hospital etc. 
r--
LOS 
System characteristics 
- Regions '---
_ Physician/population etc. 
Payment structure 
Adapted from: Lave and Frank 1990 
Drawing on the literature review in section 2.4.2, the above framework and reflecting 
the availability of infonnation from claims data, this study separated factors affecting 
LOS into three components including patient characteristics, hospital characteristics, 
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and payment structure .. The details of the independent variables are shown in Table 
4.4. 
Table 4.4 Definition and justification of independent variables used in the 
length of stay and readmission study 
Variable Explanation Justification & hypothesis: Justification & 
LOS Hypothesis: 
Readmission 
Patient 
characteristics 
Age group 0-40 Elderly group usually has 
41-60 Longer LOS. 
>60 
Sex Male Gender affects LOS. 
Female 
Severity 0= no co- More severe cases tend 
(calculated by morbidity to have longer LOS. 
programme l=minor 
DRG grouper 2=moderate 
into five 3=severe 
levels) 4=catastrophic 
LOS (in 0-3 Not applicable Shorter LOS tend 
readmission 4-7 to have higher 
analysis only) >7 readmission rate 
. 
Hospital 
characteristics 
Hospital type Community Public hospitals tend to 
General have longer LOS than 
Regional private hospitals. Bigger 
University hospitals tend to 
Private have longer LOS than 
Military smaller. 
Payment 
structure 
Insurance UCscheme UC scheme and SSS tend 
scheme SSS to have shorter LOS than 
CSMBS CSMBS 
4. Data analysis 
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyse the LOS and early 
readmission rate by public health insurance scheme and other influencing factors for 
three different conditions: DM with acute complication, DM with chronic 
complication, and DM without complication. For LOS analysis, data was analysed 
using both univariate and multivariate techniques. The effects of scheme 
characteristics and other influencing factors including age, sex, insurance status, 
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severity, and hospital type on LOS were analysed by a count data model and logistic 
regresslOn. 
For readmission, the unit of analysis is the DM patient. Admissions were organized 
chronologically. The first admission of each patient was regarded as the index 
admission. Time interval between admissions was calculated. The inclusion criteria 
for readmission were readmission within 30 days from the index admission, 
excluding discharge type as dead. The descriptive statistics used rates of readmission 
between schemes. The chi-square test was used to compare scheme readmission 
rates. Insurance scheme and factors influencing readmission including age, sex, 
insurance status, severity, hospital type, and LOS were analysed using logistic 
regression. Data were analysed by software STAT A version 10. Further details are 
given in chapter 6. 
4.5 Method for objective 2: To identify the quality of care 
provided for Diabetes Mellitus within each insurance scheme, 
and to explore how quality of care might be affected both by 
the insurance scheme design and by other factors. 
This method addressed the variations in scheme performance in greater depth 
regarding process of care and intermediate outcome in Non Insulin Dependent 
Diabetes Mellitus (NIDDM) patients. 
4.5.1 Method for sub-study 2.1: To explore the magnitude of variation of 
quality of care in Diabetes Mellitus between three insurance schemes. 
This study used retrospective data to evaluate scheme effect on the quality of care of 
DM patients and two sources of secondary data which were the Health and 
Examination Survey 2004, and Claims data of these DM patients. The justification 
for using this methodology was that it took less time to collect data. Furthermore, it 
was easy to follow up patients because most DM patients needed to receive services 
from the hospital. The study used DM patients within public and private hospitals to 
cover all schemes and types of hospital. Private hospitals play a major role in the 
SSS scheme since they cover most of the SSS beneficiaries. Furthermore, the SSS 
has an incentive system for chronic disease treatment through an enhanced financial 
96 
incentive. The SSO has provided an additional budget of about 10% of capitation in 
each year for hospitals that provide services in 25 chronic conditions (DM is one of 
the list) after hospitals are audited for perfonnance and a report produced at the end 
of each year. 
A cross-sectional interview and a retrospective medical record review of DM patients 
in Samutsakhon province were employed to analyse the quality of the care process 
and outcome. Samples were collected from both private and public hospitals. A 
proportionate to size sample of DM patients was obtained from all three public 
hospitals. Two out of nine private hospitals which were the main contractors of SSS 
were willing to join the study and were included as study sites. 
1. Sources of data 
Three sources of data were used in this study. The first source was secondary data 
from the National Health Examination Survey 2004. These data were analysed for 
the degree of diagnosis and the level of controlled DM of DM patients in different 
insurance schemes. The second source was primary data collection of outpatient 
(OP) medical records data and patient interviews to trace the standard of DM care. 
The period of study was 12 months, retrospectively traced back. The third source was 
claims data for these DM patients. Claims data were used to follow the 
hospitalization and short-tenn complications of patients, because if patients were 
admitted to other hospitals they could be tracked from these data. The short-tenn 
complications consist of hypoglycaemia, hyperglycaemia, and ketoacidosis. 
2. Sample 
Patients were identified from hospitals in Samutsakhon proVInce including 
community, general, provincial and private hospitals. The details of hospitals are 
shown in Table 4.6. 
The inclusion criteria of patients in this study are: 
• Diagnosis DM by lab criteria ofFPG > 126mgldl 
• Diagnosis of NI DD M 
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• Receive treatment in the hospital at least once between 1 October 2006 and 
30 September 2007, 
• Visit hospital at least once during the period of study 
• Exclude IDDM, gestational DM 
• Exclude severe chronic complications such as severe renal failure, blindness 
etc. 
This study also excluded patients who came to hospital with other diseases who were 
found to have DM, because these groups of patient might not follow up with the 
same hospital and might not have a retrospective history. 
For the sample size of patients, since this study seeks to compare the results of the 
process of care between three insurance schemes, the proportions of patients 
receiving care in each scheme were used. The formula is shown below. 
(u.J Jrt(1-Jrt)+X2(l-X2) +v~ 2 ;z.(l-;z.) J 
n= (7r2-7l'IJ 
n 
u 
v 
= Sample size per group 
= Proportion 
= One-sided percentage point of the distribution 
corresponding to 100% - the power e.g. if power =90% 
U = 1.28 
= Percentage point of the nonnal distribution 
Corresponding to the (two-sided) significance level, 
e.g. if significance level =5% V = 1.96 
From: Kirkwood 1988 
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Puapankitcharoen (2005) compared treatment of DM patients between the Health 
Card Scheme (after universal coverage these patients were included in the UC 
scheme) and CSMBS in Nakhonayok provincial hospital. He found that the 
proportion receiving HbA 1 c measurement at least once a year in the Health Card 
Scheme was 6.4% compared to 11.6% in CSMBS (Puapankitcharoen 2005). Since 
that study did not have SSS data, data from CSMBS and VC scheme were used to 
calculate the sample size. The calculation set the power at 90% and significance level 
at 5%. In addition, a proportionate to size sample of DM patients under the SSS and 
registered in the two private hospitals was collected. Details of hospitals and sample 
sizes in the study are shown in Table 4.5. The sample size of each arm of the study is 
634. 
Table 4.5 Details of hospitals in the study 
Number of registered DM patients 
Hospital Type of hospital Bed (number in sam I)le) 
VC SSS CSMBS 
Samutsakhon Provincial 509 4,719 (241) 1,127 (46) 1,660 (243) 
Kratumban Community 182 3,938 (306) 206 (202) 872 (309) 
Banpaw General 177 1,775 (117) 101 (14) 307 (80) 
Srivichai 3 Private 200 975(247) 
Mahachai2 Private 120 960(134) 
Total 10,432 (664) 3,369 (643) 2,839 (632) 
Patients were recruited by consecutive sampling until the target samples of each 
hospital were achieved. Every patient was interviewed using a questionnaire 
developed by the researcher and their medical records were reviewed for the 
preceding 12 months (1 October 2006 - 30 September 2007). The questionnaire and 
data collection fonn had been piloted in a community hospital outside Samutsakhon 
and revised before being used in the study. Two staff from each hospital were 
recruited and trained as data collectors and supervised by the researcher and a 
research assistant on a weekly basis. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee in LSHTM and by the MOPH, Thailand. The hospital director had to sign 
to give his consent to allow the researcher to access the medical records and all 
patients needed to sign a consent fonn before participating in the study. 
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3. Data collection 
The samples were collected in two steps. The first step was to include all DM 
patients in each scheme who complied with the inclusion criteria. The second step 
was to select the sample by consecutive sampling until the target number was met. 
The measurement of quality of care of DM used indicators from the standards for 
process of care and intermediate outcome of DM in Thailand, which the NHSO has 
adopted as indicators for monitoring the quality of DM treatment from registered 
providers. These indicators consist of: 
Process measures 
1. Fasting plasma glucose (FPG) at least 4 times a year 
11. Blood pressure (BP) test at least 4 times a year 
111. Urine analysis (UA) for micro albuminuria once a year 
IV. HbAI C measurement at least once in the past year 
v. Lipid profile once a year 
VI. Eye examination once a year 
Outcome measures 
1. FPG < 130 mg/dl 
11. HbAIC < 7 % 
Ill. Total cholesterol < 200 mg/dl 
iv. LDL-cholesterol <100 mg/dl 
v. HDL-cholesterol >40 mg/dl 
VI. Fasting triglyceride <150 mg/dl 
vu. BP < 130/80 
From: Guidelines for treatment of DM, The Endocrine Society of Thailand (Health 
Service Guidelines Development Project Office 2006) 
A form to collect data was developed and tested for validity and reliability using 
records of 30 DM patient cases in one hospital outside Samutsakhon. The details on 
the form are composed of five main parts including patient socioeconomic and 
demographic status, knowledge, attitude and practice of DM patient, clinician detail, 
process of care, and result of care. The details of the data collection form are shown 
in Appendix 6. 
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To assure the reliability and validity of the gathering process, medical records and 
patient interview were collected by two research assistants. These assistants were 
trained for two days on the data collection form, procedures, how to collect data, and 
possible problems. The researcher and these assistants followed up the progress of 
the data collection process, answered questions, and supervised at least once a week 
per hospital site. The assistants and the researcher met each week to discuss progress 
in data collection. 
The researcher developed a data-coding programme using Microsoft Access. The 
data were coded by two staff from the IT department at Kasetsart University. Data 
were cleaned by the researcher using STATA version 10. 
4. Variables 
To identify independent variables, this study applied a patient, provider, and 
systemic factors model to analyse the process of care and intermediate outcomes for 
DM patients as shown in Figure 4.4 (Alberti et al. 2007, Khunti 1999, Pringle et al. 
1993, Brown et al. 2002). 
Figure 4.4 Patient, provider, and systemic model for quality of DM care 
lPatient factors 
- Health status 
- Age, race! sex 
- Comorbidity etc. 
Provider factors 
- Trained physicians :~uality of diabetes care 
- Type of hospital etc. 
Systemic factors 
- Insurance status 
- Education programme etc 
Adapted from: Alberti et al. 2007, Pringle et al. 1993 
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Because this study aimed to explore variation in DM process and outcomes between 
health insurance schemes, the key independent variable of interest was insurance 
scheme. Potential confounding variables considered fell into three groups; 1) patient 
factors including income, age, sex, marital status, and education, duration of DM, 
and number of co-morbidities; 2) provider factors including hospital used; 3) 
systemic factors including insurance status. 
Based on the literature review in section 2.5, several factors could affect the process 
and outcome of DM care. An example which supports using area and income status 
as explanatory variables came from the studies of Hippisley-Cox 2004 and Gray et 
al. 2006 who found that patients living in deprived areas tended to rec'eive fewer 
. . 
services than those in higher income areas. Elderly patients usually had co-morbidity 
and needed services more than younger age groups (Brasel et al. 2007, Grant et al. 
2005). This was also related to having had DM for longer and needing more services 
than those with a shorter history of DM (Robbins et al. 2005). Smoking in DM 
patients also increase risk of complications and such patients needed more services 
than patients who did not smoke (Sharrett A et al. 2006). Other factors such as sex, 
education, occupation, marital status had different results in different studies (Gray et 
al. 2006) and were included in this study to control for confounders. 
Provider factors such as hospital type and use of specialists affect the result of DM 
care as demonstrated by the study of Kerr et al. 2004 and Suwatee et al. 2003. This 
study used five hospitals which included both private and public providers. 
Table 4.6 shows the variables used in the analysis, with the justification and 
hypothesis for each. The justification and hypotheses also apply to the analysis of 
secondary data from the 2004 Health Examination Survey. 
Table 4.6 Potential confounding variables and hypotheses of process and 
outcome of quality of care 
Variable Explanation Justification & hypothesis 
Patient factors 
Income No income Different income groups receive different 
1-2,000 Baht services 
2,001-10,000 Baht 
> 10000 Baht 
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Variable Explanation Justification & hypothesis 
~----~~~------~~--~---------+-~~ Age I <40 I Older age group tends to need more care 
i 40-60 + than younger age group. ! >60 
_ .... _-_._-_ .... __ ..... _ .... _- ... __ ... -._-_._._._._ .. _--_ ... _._.-;-_ ... - ..... __ ... _ ... _ ..... _ .. _--_ .... -_._. __ ._ ... _. __ .... _.... ._-----_._--_._-_._._-------------I Male=l I Gender affects DM services received Sex 
j Female=2 
·--Maritaistai~s----··-··---· ·······-····--r··si~gi~-:i--------··--··--··-·--·-rM;ritaT~tat~s-aff~ci~-DM-service;~~c~i~~d 
.. ________________ .l __ ~a.!!i~~_=2_ .. _. ______ ._. ___ .......... L ______ . _____ ._. __ ... ____ .. _ .. __ . __ ._ ... ___ . ___ .. _ .. 
-E<fucation ... . i Without education =1 I Those with higher education have greater I Primary-bachelor =2 i knowledge and capability to get services 
-A~~a --- -. --- .------- ----------+D~~~~~;r =3_._____ -- -- -- ·1.~~~;~!!~~~~~~··!;!~sO~~~~i~~<?!!:---·--··--
-Yfme-oTDM--- - ------11 ~rt~~~ ----.- ----- ------ ~~~~:~~~5~~i~; l~~;::~::~~~re---
~ 5 year services than those having DM for less 
time. 
------------------Smoking Current smoking = 1 Smokers need more services than non 
Co-morbidity 
Provider factors 
Hospital use 
Systemic factors 
Insurance status 
5. Data analysis 
No smoking =0 smokers .. ---------1 
No Having co-morbidity tends to lead to more 
Yes services than not having co-morbidity. 
1 Kratumban 
2 Samutsakhon 
3 Banpaw 
4 Mahachai2 
5 Srivichai 3 
VC scheme 
CSMBS 
SSS 
Individual hospitals affect quality of care 
Different insurance status affects DM care 
To analyse the relation between scheme variations and quality of DM care, the coded 
datawere analysed with descriptive and inferential statistics. 
The analysis of data could be divided into three parts. The first was to analyse and 
seek to explain the likelihood of detection of DM by scheme and the extent of control 
of DM by scheme. The Health Examination Survey Data 2004 were used for this 
analysis. The diagnosis in this survey employed both clinical and laboratory criteria 
and the survey also assessed the severity of DM. It at so included uptake of diagnosis 
tests in high risk groups and assessed the extent of undiagnosed DM in the 
community. 
The second part was to analyse the process of care using medical records and patient 
interview data. Each process indicator was analysed in terms of rates of receiving 
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services, comparing between schemes. The Kruskal Wallis test was used to compare 
rates of process of care. The association between scheme effect and process of care 
was analysed by logistic regression. 
The third part was to analyse the intermediate outcomes of DM patients for each care 
procedure and hospitalization during the study. Each result was analysed using 
logistic regression, with independent variables including different scheme 
characteristics, patient characteristics, and provider characteristics while the 
dependent variable was the outcome from laboratory tests and hospitalization. 
Thus, this analysis consists of three ml:\jor parts: the degree of diagnosis and the 
degree of control of DM by scheme using secondary data from the Health 
Examination Survey; bivariate analysis and multivariate analysis of process of DM 
service by using medical records data and patient interviews; and intermediate 
outcome and hospitalization by using medical records data and claims data of these 
DM patients. 
These various analytical methods were employed using standard software ST A TA 
version 10. 
4.5.2 Method of sub-study 2.2: To understand quality of service as 
perceived by Diabetes MelIitus patients and to explore perception, 
behaviour, and motivation of providers regarding quality of Diabetes 
Mellitus treatment under the different schemes. 
In order to understand the hospital policy, provider motivation. and behaviour, and 
patient perception of service, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were 
used to collect data. 
1. Tools 
An open-ended list of questions was used as a tool for the in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions. Infonnation sought included: 
Patients 
• Socio-demographic characteristics 
• Local economic and service infrastructure such as transportation 
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• Expectation of service from providers 
• Perceived quality of service received from hospital 
• Perception of differences in care received between schemes 
• Satisfaction on services received 
• Variation of practice of providers 
Providers 
• Constraint of management from msurance schemes such as budget, 
human resources, cost etc. 
• Influence of policy implementation of DM service in hospital 
• Hospital policy from insurance scheme regulation 
• Problems and constraints affecting implementation of quality of care in 
DM service 
• Different policies in different insurance schemes for DM patients and 
other influences on DM treatment 
• Positive and negative effect of implementation plan of DM service from 
insurance scheme policy 
2. Sample 
There were two sets of focus groups, patient and provider. On the patient side, four 
focus group discussions for each insurance scheme were held. By each insurance 
scheme, two or three DM patients from the patients of sub-study 2.1 in each hospital 
were invited to participate in the focus group discussions. SSS patient groups were 
separated into private and public hospital groups. The total number of patients in 
each focus group discussion was 6-9 DM patients. Sampling of participants used 
purposive sampling from patients in the primary data collection group. 
The criteria for selecting participants was that focus groups included DM patients 
with both controlled and un-controlled conditions, without severe complications, 
who could participate in the discussion. The detail of the sampling frame is shown in 
Figure 4.3. 
105 
Figure 4.5 Sampling frame for focus groups of Diabetes Mellitus patients 
Focus group I Focus group 2 Focus group 3 Focus group 4 
discussion with VC disclIssion with SSS discussion with SSS - discussion with 
scheme OM patients OM patients OM patients CSMBS DM patients 
2-3 patients from 2-3 patients from 6-9 patients from 2-3 patients from 
community hospital community hospital private hospital community hospital 
2-3 patients from 2-3 patients from 2-3 patients from 
regional hospital regional hospital regional hospital 
2-3 patients from 2-3 patients from 2-3 patients from 
university hospital university hospital university hospital 
On the provider side, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were held in 
five hospitals. The number of participants and method of study are shown in Table 
4.6. Physicians were invited purposively. In focus group discussions, between 4-6 
participants from DM clinic teams were invited to join the discussion. 
Table 4.7 Details of participants and methods in the qualitative study 
Status Position No. of Method 
Participants 
Manager Director of hospital 5 In-depth interview 
Head of insurance management section 5 In-depth interview 
Providers Physicians 5 In-depth interview 
Service team of OM clinics in hospital 1 4-6 Focus group 
Service team of OM clinics in hospital 2 4-6 Focus group 
Service team of OM clinics in hospital 3 4-6 Focus group 
Service team of DM clinics in hospital 4 4-6 Focus group 
Service team of OM clinics in hospitalS 4-6 Focus group 
3. Data collection 
To avoid bias in answers, focus group discussions for DM patients were held at a 
hotel in Muang district. For provider groups, in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions were set up at the hospital because most of these groups had to work 
every day. The researcher was the main interviewer assisted by research assistants. 
Data were recorded manually and electronically using a recorder. 
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4. Data analysis 
Electronic data was transcribed verbatim by blind people of the Thailand Association 
of the Blind. Data from the focus groups was analysed in two steps. The first step 
was to code and classify the raw data through the researcher reviewing the 
discussions. Sentences were analysed and assigned to concepts of quality of care. 
The second step was an analysis of divergent views of DM patients on quality of care 
and satisfaction on a sentence basis in Microsoft word and Atlast.ti version 4.2. 
4.6 Summary of study 
All methods used are summarized in Table 4.7. A diagram of samples and 
methods at different levels of the health system is shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Table 4.8 Summary of objectives and methodology used in the study 
Objective Sub studies Indicator and Sample Means of data collections 
information need Primary data Secondary data 
To assess and explain the To explore the magnitude Utilization rate All hospitals HWS 
performance of the three of variation in overall 
public health insurance utilization between three 
schemes in terms of overall insurance schemes 
use of ambulatory and To explore the magnitude LOS All hospitals Claims data 
inpatient care, and of variation of LOS and 
efficiency and quality in readmission of Diabetes Readmission rate within 30 
use of resources for DM Mellitus (DM) patients days patients. between insurance schemes 
To identify the quality of To explore the degree of Degree ofDM diagnosis Population Health 
care provided for Diabetes diagnosis and level of Examination 
Mellitus (DM) within each controlled DM in DM Survey 2004 
insurance scheme, and patients between three 
explore how quality of care insurance schemes 
might be affected both by To explore the magnitude DM process care quality at DM patients in community, Medical record and Claims data 
the insurance scheme of variation of quality of primary, secondary, and general, provincial and patient interview 
design and by other factors. care in DM between three tertiary level private hospitals in 
insurance schemes Samutsakhon province 
To understand quality of Response ofDM patients in 24-36 DM patients 4 Focus groups 
service perceived by DM process and result of 
patients in different treatment. 
schemes 
To explore perception, Response of provider to Managers and providers 1 SIn-depth 
behaviour, and motivation scheme and hospital policy interview 
of provider to quality of onDM care. S Focus group 
DM treatment in different 
schemes 
-- - - -- - - - -
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Figure 4.6 Diagram of samples and methods of this study 
1 
National level 
I Hospital data 
1 
1 
I 
Regional level University hospital 
I 
Regional hospital 
I ... I 
I 
I 
Private hospital c 
Ccj~aiity "".;fciu-; d;ta~oli';; -I 
~Claim data analysis' I 
,[Q,<!epthiJtterview& FocUs I group discussion ·1 _~ _________ J 
Provincial level 
1 
District level Icommunity hospital 
J I 
1 I." ~ DMpatients Household ~t 
1 1 ' 
1--7-:;:~--:-
Individual level :.' c' f~-~:~P. 
I ___ ~-:"'-
----------'c,'" . "'. I 
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4.7 Quality control of the study 
Quality control of the study was of prime importance, especially in the data collection 
process (both quantitative and qualitative). In the quantitative part, quality was 
controlled in both data collection and data coding. In the data collection process, this 
study used two assistants who had a background of qualitative and quantitative 
research. Both of them had been trained for data collection. In hospital, staffs in 
different divisions were used to collect data and were supervised by the researcher 
and assistants. Every day, assistants would check the quality of data collected from 
each hospital and discuss any problems with the researcher every week. In the data 
coding process, the researcher designed and used software for data coding which used 
the relationship database management. The reason for using the relationship database 
was that one patient could have more than one visit; therefore, the programme for 
coding was designed to code patient data and laboratory and link these together by 
patient id, hospital number (RN), and admission number (AN). The limiting range in 
data coding was used to control human error in coding, for example, age could not be 
more than 130, and duration of diagnosis of DM could not be longer than age. 
Furthermore, categorical choices were selected by drop down menu equal to the 
choices in the questionnaire. Figure 4.5 shows the programme for coding patient data 
and laboratory results each time patients were followed up for treatment. 
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Figure 4.7 Coding programme for Diabetes Mellitus patients 
r:' 
, r-
~~~==~~=r~~ !.~ I~~~I,~~~ .. ~--~---~~ ,I Bet" ~HIYII)CCI Il!fI~ . R;/I~\. i ~ 11"t~ :::::J ,.....,:.1 1&;0 ~oOI\: ~.------': 
" 
" 
" 
" .. 
u 
os 
" ,~ 
" ..
.. 
., 
" 
" 
" 
w"zj ... , 
" 
• ., 
• 
" 
• 
" • 
" 
• ., ,
•• • 
" • 
" • ,~ • ,~ • 
" 
• 
... 
, J, 
• 
.:; • ., , 
" 
, 
tl • 
l iD' I Irw~anu ru;;;.;-------:::J ~~ jlU::Uf .. 
~"- "!:'-:... ~---=- . . _. - .- ....... :.- ~--:::,-,,::, -~- - .:-~. _.. ~.. ~-.-- . 
• IrJcaor« IrIcamtF-.iIy O\n'.:onOLt a"Q;'IRx M:101 ~N.J.; C:;.""lOfewt Hypup.t H)'p~r~f ; r-~----I--- ,_._-- r-- r'b.::.:J [----- F;;;-"-.::.:J r---'::;] [--'- 1 
! l;~CnI:; HT; wrT__ HTOnow Ke.t ~T.I(:W- HNnOrw GCMGCT • .HirIt! 
' r--::::Jr---:.:Jr- r--::;] r-'7.:;]r- r--::::J r-3r-I GO:ll~ Cd,II.ct" eu....t~III"It. 
[1 "_ 31 ?~ _._ ~ __ ""_"" __ " __ ._ .~ ______ ._.'-
'~'~"'.'-~ - ... :", --,. ... - .-'~ - . .-..,......"...;, .. ,,.... ...;.;.. .:.,.., -_. I Famil)d"bl- F.MlyCM FttMrKT h!_1C\'~. F ... "ity~wt ,:' ,I L J.itl'i;':~ ,.', lr,.G\itjllj ' 0Ng ~'~2E-:'-.~;:::1I-:~V-'::' ::;:]~~":;::J~j ~ J~ ~ F3 ! 
. • . ,,""'.. I 
\
' - . ".l .. J', Drug. Cra.oi.' ONo. 0""'''01" Dr""l1. Grouj,-4 Ottl. :el"Cn.~ ..... ! ' Sfty_~ ~Smob: tkl~ T .. '!'.~.· ~:i . . . ,,' ~"'"'1 ~.~~.,,;=l.c:::: l:~-=-r=:~~".~,t,i;:,.",,1-)::"'.~ .. :¥Lt,-._--:±:,.,t:0"''"~'.l' 
,.I4c;' ~.c.,- .Ncoc_ Jk!!tM\t .f«t . QMCGI'o:t; <iuMt>OI".weCr.c!.&: -.l I ~r--r~- r,;-::;---.-3 fb-::::J filM"" .=..1 1---- i 
t .. . ... ; 
~~~J __ C.at(~~) ·1 
~~_~-=-Ir.!m!II~ __ " 
Lab Result [x l 
Vi.~IA .... 
,,,,,. 
, ,IJ~ 
TCt.d 
"""'. 
1.1; 15 
11 ,. 15 
.» .,~ 1 
s " 3 
1122/2C01! 
In the qualitative part, patient focus groups were held outside the hospital to reduce 
pressure on patients when providing uncomfortable answers. Furthermore, 
transportation expenses were paid after the focus group discussion finished. 
110 
4.8 Potential biases from the researcher 
The researcher presents one of the most important biases, especially in a qualitative 
study. The researcher has held a position as deputy director of the bureau of policy 
and planning at the NHSO and has a background as a physician. This might influence 
respondents in the data collection process in two ways. Regarding the provider 
interviews and focus group discussions, respondents may be influenced to over-state 
or under-state their views. Some respondents might think that the researcher could 
pass on their complaint to the policy level ofthe NHSO, so they might over-state their 
attitude to the UC scheme more than the CSMBS and SSS. Other respondents might 
want to conceal their negative comments from the NHSO. On the patient side, 
respondents might be reluctant to express their feelings and provide negative 
comments on a hospital or provider. 
4.9 Limitations of the study 
There are several limitations in this study. First, the SSO collects claims data in a 
different form from the standard dataset of the Central Office for Healthcare 
Information; therefore, some variables cannot be merged for comparison with the 
other schemes. Second, it might be not easy to correct errors of data recording in 
claims data; for example, some records have age as zero. Third, in primary data 
collection, data contained in medical records may be incomplete because of errors in 
data recording. Fourth, the area of study may not be totally representative of the 
country. However, it is likely to be representative of most areas. Fifth, the SSS uses 
both public and private hospitals while the other two schemes use only public 
hospitals, introducing a confounding factor that may be difficult to control for in the 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE INFLUENCE OF INSURANCE ON SERVICE 
UTILIZATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the overall utilization by the population of the three major 
. 
health insurance schemes, the Universal Coverage (UC) Scheme, the Social Security 
Scheme (SSS), and the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS). Evidence 
from other studies have shown that having insurance influences the probability of 
utilization (Jakab et al. 2004). The previous Health and Welfare Survey (HWS 2003) 
in Thailand demonstrated that there were differences in utilization rate between health 
insurance schemes (Vasavid et al. 2.004). However, few studies demonstrate the 
effects of different health insurance schemes on service utilization. 
This chapter aims to assess overall service utilization between health Insurance 
schemes in Thailand and explore the influence of other factors including 
socioeconomic status and demographic factors. The analysis used Anderson and 
Newman's framework as a conceptual framework. Service utilization would be 
explained by individual need and enabling factors focusing on health insurance status. 
The next section briefly describes the methodology of this chapter, followed by the 
results of the analysis. The results are derived from univariate and multivariate 
analyses. 
5.2 Methodology 
Dataset and analytical method 
Data were obtained from the Health and Welfare Survey of 2005, collected by the 
National Statistical Office (NSO). The HWS started in 1974 and was undertaken 
annually until 1978. Between 1981 and 2001, the HWS was conducted every five 
years (National Statistical Office 2004). After VC implementation, NSO planned to 
conduct the survey every year between 2003 and 2007. The survey was conducted 
. using face-to-face interviews during 1-12 April 2005. The total sample of households 
was approximately 27,000, in which there were 67,815 individuals (National 
Statistical Office 2005). The analysis was done using STATA 10. Sampling weights 
and survey commands in ST AT A were employed in the analysis process (svy 
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command). The details of weighting included population weights, 76 strata, and 1,518 
primary sampling units (PSUs). 
The HWS questions relevant to this study are shown in Figure 5.1. The survey began 
by asking about insurance status. Subsequent questions covered illness in the previous 
month, hospitalization in the previous year, and chronic disease co-morbidity. After 
that, the questions drilled down to how respondents treated themselves and the type of 
hospital they used. Finally, they covered reasons for not using insurance. 
Figure 5.1 Summary of questions used in the Health and Welfare Survey analysis 
Descriptive analysis 
Wbt is tbe reason for Dot 
using insu ... nce? 
What is the reaSOR for Dot 
using insurance! 
The descriptive analysis compares individual characteristics stratified by the three 
major public insurance schemes: the VC scheme, SSS, and CSMBS. The analysis 
then illustrates the care seeking pattern within each insurance scheme, with reasons 
for non-use of health insurance. Finally, the results of the analysis demonstrate illness 
and utilization rates between the insurance schemes in ambulatory care and 
hospitalization. 
Models and dependent variables for ambulatory visits 
There were two stages of analysis for ambulatory visits: the probability of a visit and 
the number of visits in ambulatory care. 
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Logistic regression was used to analyse the probability of a visit in ambulatory care as 
the outcome was dichotomous. The model is described as followed: 
Jr In(--) = a + fl\X\ + fl2X2 + ... fljX j + C 
I-Jr 
Equation 1 
Where 7r represents the probability of people using a health facility in the previous 
month, and Xi represents a set of independent variables hypothesized to affect 
utilization of ambulatory care. The results of the analysis are presented as odds ratios. 
The odds ratio of each variable refer to the odds of the variable divided by the odds of 
a reference group on the probability of the outcome occurring. An odds ratio of more 
than one suggests the variable has a positive effect on the outcome, while an odds 
ratio of less than one suggests a negative effect on outcome. 
Independent variable selection 
In addition to Andersen and Newman's framework, statistical methods were used to 
select independent variables in the model. Bivariate analysis of each factor and 
outcome was used to explore possible independent variables. For categorical 
variables, Wald's test was used to explore whether their inclusion provided a better 
model fit. 
Fitting the model 
Fitting a model in logistic regression of survey data differs from traditional logistic 
regression due to the effect of weight on samples. Goodness of fit methods is based on 
the Chi-squared test, so inflated samples in survey data influence the result of the test. 
Archer and Lemeshow (2006) developed the test -for goodness of fit in survey data 
using the Stata programme (Archer and Lemeshow 2006). The command for 
goodness of fit is svylogitgof. The results of the analysis show F-adjusted test 
statistics. The null hypothesis of logistic regression for survey data is Ho: model is a 
good fit while alternative hypothesis is Hn: model is not a good fit (Archer and 
Lemshow 2006). A p-value > (l means that the logistic model fits with the 
independent variables. 
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Post estimation diagnosis 
A post-estimation diagnosis is conducted to fit the model. The aim of the diagnosis is 
to examine whether the fitted model is supported by the entire set of covariate patterns 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Checks are made to the residuals of the logistic 
model. The primary use of residuals is to detect outliers and to check for normality 
(Christensen 1997). When the model does not fit well, outliers might be checked to 
see whether they need to be deleted or not. The assumption of residuals in logistic 
regression differs from linear regression in some issues having, for instance a mean 
of approximately 0 and a variance of 1 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Apart from 
standard residuals, other measurements include standardized deviance residuals, the 
weighted leverages, and the change in chi square when the observation is deleted 
(Chatterjee and Price 2006). 
Models and dependent variables for number of ambulatory visits 
As the number of ambulatory visits is a positive integer similar to count data, a 
Poisson or negative binomial regression model could be employed, depending on the 
data distribution. The issues concerning this analysis; therefore, are model selection, 
independent variable selection, and fitting the model. 
Model selection 
The difference between using a Poisson model or a negative binomial model is the 
distribution of count data. In the Poisson model, the mean of the distribution is equal 
to variance (~ = Var(y)) which is named equidispersion. However, if several count 
data have a variance more than the mean, this leads to overdispersion. The suitable 
model for overdispersed data is the negative binomial regression model. 
To test for overdispersion, the negative binomial regression model added a parameter 
Cl reflecting unobserved heterogeneity amongst observations (Long and Freese 2006). 
The hypothesis for overdispersion test is Ho : Cl = O. If Cl is equal to zero, the Poisson 
model is better than the negative binomial regression model. 
115 
Independent variable selection 
Variable selection is based on the approaches in the conceptual framework and 
statistical analysis. 
Poisson and negative binomial regression model 
The Poisson model is shown below. 
Mean parameter 
Pi = exp(x: /3), 
From: Cameron and Trivedi 1998 
Equation2 
Where !(Y;!XJ represents the probability of the number of visits when people were ill 
in the previous month. Pi is the exponential mean function of linear vector of 
independent variable (xl) that determine Yi by parameter p. 
The negative binomial model is a model extended from the Poisson model by adding 
the parameter u. This process begins with adding E in the model of~: 
P = exp (£/3iX;) exp(eJ 
Set exp( &i) = 8; 
Therefore, the negative binomial model is: 
Equation3 
To compute !(Yi I xJ , it is necessary to assume that o o came from a Gamma 
distribution where the model can be calculated !(Yi I xJ as a weight of !(Yi I Xi, 8J 
(Long and Freese 2006) . The model of negative binomial regression model is shown 
below. 
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( 1 )a-
I
( JY f(y+a-I ) a- Ji f(ylx)= 'f( -I) -I -I y. a a + Ji a + Ji 
Equation4 
From: Long and Freese 2006 
Where y represents the number of visits to a facility when respondents were ill in the 
previous month. f is a gamma function, and a is a parameter of dispersion. ~ is a 
function of the independent variable which is shown below. 
Jiit = exp(pXit ) EquationS 
Where Xii is a set of vector linearly independent variables hypothesized to affect the 
number of ambulatory visit in the previous month. 
Fitting the model 
F-statistics were used to test the negative binomial regression models' goodness of fit. 
Model and dependent variables for hospitalization 
The model for analyzing admission and number of admissions during one year before 
the interview date is the same as equation!. In any admission, since the outcome of 
the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression is employed. In the number 
of admissions, a Poisson or a negative binomial regression model was employed by 
using equation2,3. 
5.3 Individual and household characteristics between schemes 
The characteristics of the respondents in the HWS 2005 in the three health insurance 
schemes are shown in Table 5.1. Three-quarters of the total popUlation was covered 
by the UC scheme, while the SSS and CSMBS covered 11.9% and 10.6%, 
respectively. Females and males were in nearly equal in ratio, with females at 49.9%. 
About 10% of the total population was elderly. Most of the population were educated 
to primary school level. Education level in the UC scheme was mostly lower than 
primary school. CSMBS members were the most highly educated compared to SSS 
and UC scheme members. About 15.9% of the people had chronic disease. The 
117 
CSMBS group had more chronic disease than the UC scheme and SSS groups. Only 
9.9% of the SSS group had chronic disease while the figures for the UC scheme and 
CSMBS were 15.8% and 22.6%, respectively. The majority of the UC scheme and 
CSMBS groups were children and elderly while the SSS was mainly young adults. 
Marital status was similar in all schemes, ranging from 60.6% married in the SSS to 
69.2% in CSMBS. Regarding the income range, the majority of the UC scheme 
members were within the first and second quintiles, while the SSS and CSMBS 
members were mainly in the fourth and fifth income quintiles. The largest numbers of 
members of the UC scheme were in the North, Northeast, and central regions, while 
SSS scheme members were more likely to be in the central area. CSMBS members 
were relatively equally distributed across all regions. 
Table 5.1 Characteristics of survey population by insurance scheme 
UC SSS (%) CSMBS(%) Total (%) 
scheme(%) 
~------... ----- 47327 __ ~_J.1 ____ ·_ ~43 63,404 ---
Proportion of population 77.6 11.9 10.6 100.0 
Sex 
. __ ..... _ ... _ ..
Male 49.9 51.9 _47.7 49.9 
-----..... -- .. --
Female 50.1 48.1 52.3 2.Q_1. _____ 
-=--=_._-----_. -1-=----. .---
Age group 
0-20 38.6 5.5 .17·6 33.5 . __ ._-
--
21-40 .12.:? 76.7 .11:4 34.6 
------_. ----.--
41-60 22.4 17.1 31.5 22.7 ... 
--
>60 9.1 0.7 19.6 9.2 
Marital status 
Unmarried 36.7 39.4 30.8 36.5 
--
60.6 Married 63.3 69.2 63.6 
-
--
Income quintile 
- --r------
1 30.1 1.5 11.9 24.8 
2 24.9 7.6 6.5 20.9 
3 19.4 17.0 10.0 18.1 
4 14.7 34.0 22.8 17.9 
5 10.9 40.0 48.8 18.4 
Education 
None 4.9 0.7 1.8 4.0 
Primary 68.2 27.9 39.7 59.9 
Primary<Bachelor 25.1 
--
51.8 31.8 29.3 ~----------
~ Bachelor 1.8 19.6 26.7 6.8 
-
Chronic disease 
Chronic 15.9 9.9 22.6 15.9 
No chronic disease 84.2 ~~-- 77.4 84.1 
Region 
Bangkok 7.6 27.4 18.2 11.0 
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uc SSS (%) CSMBS (%) Total (%) 
scheme(%) 
Central 19.3 43.8 23.6 22.7 
·_· __ ·_·_·· ___ ·_._.·H.··._.H .. ___ . __ 
•••• _ ••••• H •••••• H.H •••• __ •••• 
North 19.6 10.6 17.2 18.3 
~ortheast 39.1 11.6 26.1 34.5 
South 14.3 6.7 15.0 13.5 
.. __ . ________ ....... _ .. _ .. _.····.HH ...... _ .... __ ........ _ .. _ ......•.. __ .. __ ._ .. 
... · ............... H ...... H······.···.H .•. H. 
Area 
Urban 24.0 54.6 55.2 30.9 
Rural 76.0 45.4 I 44.8 69.1 
. Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
5.4 Care seeking in the three public insurance schemes 
Services sought during sickness can be classified as either informal or formal care. 
Informal care includes traditional treatments and self-prescribing, while attending a 
health service facility is considered formal care. Care seeking patterns varied by 
public health insurance scheme, as shown in Figure 5.2. More than 93% of the 
population sought care when they were sick. However, 6.9% ofSSS, 5.2% ofCSMBS 
and 4.4% of the DC scheme group did not seek care. 20-26% of treatments were self-
prescribed drugs. The SSS group had the highest level of self-prescribed drugs, at 
26.5%, while levels in the DC scheme and CSMBS were equal at 20%. 
Of the patients that did not self-prescribe, members of the VC scheme and CSMBS 
used traditional treatments more often than SSS members, at 1.7% vs. 0.4%, 
respectively, of the overall none self-prescribed drug group. In the non-hospital 
service group, most of the SSS group used private clinics (82.2%) while health centre 
use was only 17.8%. In the CSMBS group, most individuals also used private clinics 
(70.6%) while in the DC scheme only 32.6% used private clinics. Regarding hospital 
use, nearly 90% of VC scheme and CSMBS members used public hospitals while for 
SSS the figure was only 45.5%. Within public hospitals, community hospitals were 
most commonly used under the DC scheme, while regional and university hospitals 
were commonly used by CSMBS members. 
Care seeking patterns were related to the regulations of each insurance scheme. The 
main differences in regulation between the three schemes were that the SSS allowed 
beneficiaries to choose their own hospital, including private and public hospitals with 
more than 100 beds. The DC scheme had a gatekeeper at primary care level, mainly 
the community hospital. The CSMBS allowed their beneficiaries to go to any public 
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provider. SSS members used private clinics more than UC scheme and CSMBS 
members because most of the main contractors under the SSS had private clinics as 
subcontractors, especially private hospital main contractors. 82% of SSS members 
used private clinics for non hospital care compared to 71 % for CSMBS members and 
only 33% for UC scheme members. 
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Figure 5.2 Probability pathways of health care seeking by sick people within the 
three insurance schemes 
No treatment 
UC: 0.04 
SSS: 0.07 
CSMBS:O.05 
Self prescribed 
UC: 0.20 
SSS: 0.26 
CSMBS: 0.20 
Traditional 
treatment 
UC: 0.77 
Traditional SSS: 0.69 
UC: 0.02 CSMBS:0.62 
SSS; 0.004 ~ 
CSMBS: 0.02 Traditional doctor 
UC: 0.23 
SSS: 0.31 
CSMBS:0.38 
Private clinics 
Uc: 0.33 
Non hospital SSS: 0.82 CSMBS:0.71 UC: 0.57 f& 5SS: 0.37 Health center CSMBS: 0.34 UC: 0.67 
SSS: 0.18 
CSMBS;O.29 
Treatment Non-self I Alne •• episode r UC; 0.96 prescribed ~ Community SSS; 0.93 & UC: 0.78 UC: 0.73 
CSMBS:0.95 SSS: 0.72 $SS: 0.30 CSMBS:O.76 CSMBS: 0.33 
Regional 
UC: 0.22 
SSs: MO 
PubUc hospital CSMBS:0.37 
UC: 0.92 ~ SSS: 0.45 Univenity Hospital CSMBS:0.90 UC: 0.02 UC: 0.41 ~ SSS: 0.16 SSS: 0.62 
CSMBS: 0.64 CSM8S: 0.13 
other public 
hospital 
UC: 0.03 
sss: 0.14 
CSMBS: 0.17 
Private hospital 
UC: 0.09 
SSS: 0.54 
CSMBS: 0.10 
Other 
UC: 0.02 
SSS: 0.01 
CSMBS:O.03 
Not known 
UC: 0.00 
$SS; 0.00 
CSMSS:O.OO 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
Beneficiaries were asked whether they always claimed their insurance rights 
following sickness. Two questions were asked of respondents: (1) "During your 
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illness in the past four weeks, did you use any insurance you have?"(2) "From the 
former question, what was the main reason why you did not use any insurance?" 
The data in Table 5.2 show that between approximately 20%-30% of people did not 
use insurance when they were sick. Furthermore, some people were entitled to more 
than one insurance scheme, so when they were sick they could choose to use another 
insurance scheme apart from their own registered insurance. 
75% of UC scheme members claimed their own insurance right when they were ill 
and sought formal care, while only 0.8% used another insurance system. 24.1 % of UC 
scheme members did not- use any insurance wh~n they were ill. For CSMBS, 67.3% 
claimed their own insurance, while 1.15% used another insurance and 31.3% did not 
claim their insurance right. For SSS, 72.2% claimed their insurance when they were 
sick, while 4.1 % used another insurance (public or private insurance). 21.9% of the 
SSS did not use any insurance. 
Table 5.2 Insurance use by scheme for ambulatory care 
Insurance used when sick Insurance status which people have (%) 
UC scheme SSS CSMBS Total 
UC without 30 Bahtll 44.8 0.1 0.1 36.8 
UC with 30 Baht 30.2 3.4 0.4 25.0 
SSS 0.2 72.2 0.4 5.3 
CSMBS 0.1 0.1 67.3 7.4 
Private insurance 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.5 
Employer welfare 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 
Other 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Do not exercise right 24.1 21.9 31.3 24.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 7,169 541 1,567 9,277 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
For hospital admission, people were more likely to use their own insurance as shown 
in Table 5.3. Overall, more than 80% used their own insurance, and all were less likely 
not to claim at all. In the UC scheme, 82.7% used their own insurance when they 
needed hospitalization while 13.7% did not use insurance. SSS members were the 
least likely to use their own insurance (at 80.6%). However, they were also the least 
11 Between year 2001 and 2006, people who did not have any exemption had to co-pay 30 Baht per 
episode. Since 2006, all people covered by UC scheme have been exempted from co-payment. 
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likely not to claim their right, making use of an alternative scheme. CSMBS members 
were the most likely to use their own insurance when they needed hospitalization, 
while 7.6% did not use any insurance. It is noteworthy that CSMBS members were 
more likely to use other insurance schemes for hospitalization compared to 
ambulatory care. SSS members were more likely to use different schemes (13.9%) 
compared with 3.2% and 3.6% for VC scheme and CSMBS respectively. 
Table 5.3 Insurance use by each scheme for hospitalization 
Insurance status which people have (%) Insurance use when hospitalized 1-----=:::.::::.r=:...:.::=:...:::::.;::.:::...t:.::..::.t:.:::...::~~::..L---__l 
VC scheme SSS CSMBS Total 
N 3,343 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
Table 5.4 shows insurance use by different income groups for ambulatory care. The 
low income group tended to exercise their own right when they were sick and used 
ambulatory services more than high income groups, except for SSS. In the DC 
scheme, the fifth quintile exercised their right 35.4% of the time, compared with SSS 
and CSMBS at 45% and 48% respectively. However, the difference between the first 
quintile and the fifth quintile was greater in the UC scheme group than in the SSS and 
CSMBS. 
Table 5.4 Claiming insurance right by different insurance and income groups in 
ambulatory services 
Quintile % exercise right by insurance UC scheme SSS CSMBS 
1 64.7 45.4 68.1 
~- 58.3 52.7 61.6 
3 56.0 57.9 42.2 
4 47.1 59.3 41.8 
5 35.4 45.3 48.4 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
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In the group of patients who did not use any insurance when they were sick, most of 
them (45%) used infonnal services, consisting of self-prescribed drugs and traditional 
treatments. Private clinics were the second most used source of care for this group at 
about 32%. Around 10% of them did not receive any treatment. SSS members had the 
highest percentage of self-prescribed drugs or not receiving any treatment at 67.5%, 
as compared with 54.5% for UC members. CSMBS members were less likely to self-
prescribe or opt for no treatment, and they were more likely to use private clinics as 
shown in table 5.5. 
Table S.S Details of seeking care amongst those who did not claim insurance 
right 
Seeking care method 
UC scheme(%) SSS(%) CSMBS(%) Total 
No treatment 10.3 ~~~--------·--·n~~~-----····-- 10.7 1-----------.-.. -.-.... _.--_ .. _-_ .... _--_._ .. - _. __ ... _._--_.-Traditional treat.ment . 2.2 2.0 
-Traditional doctor 0.7 0.2 __ ~O 0.7 
-_ ... _--
-----
Self-prescribed drugs __ .. _ 44.2 53.0 39.5 44.4 
---_._ .. _----
-----
1-'_. __ ._._--- --_. __ ._--. 
Health centre 0.7 0.1 1.3 0.7 
Co·mmunity hospital 
.--1--. 
1.3 1.3 0.4 1.2 
----
Regional hospital 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.5 .. _ 
--------.--.---
University hospital 0.4 1.0 
.----
~.7 10'? .. .-
Other public hospital 0.5 0.8 O.l 0.5 
Private clinics 32.0 24.7 33.6 31.6 
Private hospital 3.2 2.7 5.1 3.4 
--
Other 3.7 1.3 6.2 3.8 
Total(N~ 4,488 379 950 5,817 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
Care seeking behaviour in ambulatory care also differed by income group. 
Categorized into household quintiles, the finding was that the high income group (5th 
income quintile) usually used private services more than the low income group (1 st 
income quintile). However, there was not much difference in infonnal care use 
between insurance schemes. Details of health seeking in ambulatory care by income 
quintiIe are shown in figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 Health seeking in ambulatory care by income quintile in different 
insurance schemes 
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There were the same patterns of seeking care by income quintile in hospitalization 
levels. The high income group were also more likely to seek care in private hospitals 
while the low income group were more likely to use district hospitals as shown in 
figure 5.4. The high income group in SSS used private hospitals more than the low 
income group, presumably because they were entitled to. The high income group in 
CSMBS were less likely to use provincial and regional hospitals than the lower 
income group. 
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Figure 5.4 Health seeking in hospitalization by income quintile in different 
insurance schemes 
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5.5 Illness and service utilization 
To compare illness and service utilization between the schemes, the indicator used for 
illness was illness episodes/person/year, while servIce utilization used 
visits/person/year in ambulatory care and hospitalizations/person/year. Utilization of 
ambulatory care in this study means using formal facilities including health centres 
and PCUs, district hospitals, general and regional hospitals, university hospitals, other 
public hospitals, private clinics, and private hospitals. 
To reduce recall bias, the survey used a recall period of one month for illness and 
twelve months for hospitalization. Four questions from the questionnaire related to 
utilization: "Were you ill in the previous 1 month?" "How many episodes of illness 
did you have in the previous month? "Were you hospitalized in the last twelve 
months?" and finally, "How many periods of hospitalization in the last twelve months 
did you have?" People who had been ill or had been hospitalized would be asked 
further questions about using the health facility. 
Illness episodes and ambulatory visits are shown in Table 5.6. Within the three public 
insurance schemes, the UC without co-payment group had the highest percentage of 
illness in one month, at 28.4%, while the SSS group had the lowest illness percentage, 
at 13.1%. The CSMBS group was in between the SSS and UC scheme group, at 
20.5%. 
Members of the UC scheme without co-payment group were the most likely to use 
facilities (82.4%) and to report illness in the previous month (28.4%) compared to the 
other health insurance groups. However, only 66.4% of the UC scheme with co-
payment used a health facility at least once in the previous month. Episodes of illness 
were highest in the UC scheme without co-payment, at 6.6 episodes/person/year. This 
was two times more than the UC scheme with co-payment and nearly three times that 
of the SSS group. The SSS group had the lowest rate of visits to a health facility, at 
only 1.9 visits per person per year compared to 5.4 visits per person per year for the 
UC without co-payment. However, the UC scheme with co-payment group had a visit 
rate between UC without co-payment and CSMBS. 
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Table 5.6 Illness and ambulatory visits by insurance scheme 
% of those ill Mean Illness Facility % ill in 
using facility episode in episode/ visit/person/ 
one month in one month one monthlZ person/year13 vearl4 
Total(N) 19.7(13,28 2) 73.5 1.87 4.43 3.25 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
Hospitalization in a 12-month period under private insurance was the highest, at 
9.5%, and with mean number of episodes at 1.34. CSMBS had the highest rate of 
admission of the public schemes, at 8.5%. Admission per person per year was high in 
the CSMBS group, which was similar to the VC scheme without co-payment. The 
SSS had the lowest rate of admission, at 0.072 admissions per person per year. All 
details are shown in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 Hospitalization by insurance scheme 
%hospitalized Mean of Mean number of Hospitalizations hospitalization hospitalizations/ in 12 months per year1S episode /person/year16 
No insurance 4.2 1.23 1.2 0.061 
VC without co- 7.8 1.43 l.2 0.137 payment 
VC with co- 6.2 l.32 l.2 0.094 payment 
----.- -----.----
--
SSS 5.3 1.19 ._-- l.l 0.072 ~-~-----
CSMBS 8.5 1.41 1.3 0.152 
12 Means episode in one month means average number of illnesses in people who were ill in the 
previous month. 
13 Illness episodes/ person/year = % ill in one month x Mean episodes in one month x 12/100 
14 Facility visits/person/year = % of ill using facility in one month x illness episodes/person/year 
15 Mean ofhospitalizations per year means the average number ofhospitalizations in people who had a 
hospitalization in the last twelve months. 
16 Hospitalizations/persoolyear = % of people hospitalized in 12 months x mean of hosital izations per 
year x mean number ofhospitalizations per episode 
129 
0/ h 'I' d Mean of Mean number of ,,' 
/0 osplta Ize h 't I' t' h 't I' t' I Hospltahzatlons 
, OSpl a Iza Ion OSpl a Iza Ions I I 16 
ID 12 months .,.., "IS ,~' d person year ~ ____________ ~ __________ -+~v,er~~J,e~a~r~ __ -4~e~Vls~o~e ______ ~ ____________ ~ 
Private insurance I 9.5 I 1.34 I 1.3 - ! 0.162 ~!i.~_~<?x~i~-~If~i~ ••. :.[IQ~:::·:=:~_·:~_-'~.-~··lr:-":;QQ: __ :.----~:::-~~~=~tII--~·=-,·--=-----:=:=J~Q:~Q~Q·::.:-:=::::::. 
Others t 8.7 1.67 I 1.3 ! 0.198 
-. --.... _-._ .......... -.. --- .. --........ -... - .. --t .. ----.. -· ... ---.-.. ---.... --... _-. - ---t·· .. ---..... -.... .. ..... -----.. ---.. -,--------..... ---- .. ---------...... --------- ... j ........ ---.------ ............. -- ......... -----. 
_Tota_I _____ l..2.:L I 1.36 I 1.2 10.109 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
5.6 Factors explaining service utilization 
As Figure 5,2 shows, the three public insurance schemes had differing care seeking 
patterns, Service utilization also differed by insurance scheme, As mentioned in 
section 4.4,1, there were different characteristics between health insurance schemes 
such as population characteristics so multivariate analysis was needed to answer what 
were the factors that influenced service utilization. 
The dependent variables of the model can be categorized into four groups. First was 
use of ambulatory care. Use in this variable meant use of a health facility when people 
were sick, which includes going to a health centre, clinic, or any type of hospital. 
Second was the number of times a facility was used. This variable was related to the 
first variable, and referred to the number of times a facility was utilized when people 
were sick in the previous month. The third category was hospitalization in the 
previous year. Fourth was number ofhospitalizations in the previous year. 
A number of independent variables were included in the multivariate analysis aiming 
to assess whether public insurance scheme affected utilization in ambulatory care and 
inpatient care, Description and summary of dependent and possible independent 
variables ofmultivariate analyses are shown in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8 Dependent and independent variables in multivariate analysis of 
ambulatory care use, number of ambulatory visits, admissions, and 
number of admissions 
Variable Mean of Observations variable Std. Dev. Min Max 
Any use (I=use) 9,611! 0.14 i 0.35 ! 0 ! 1 
!r~~:;~~~jI~-==t~~~l{~I 
~::le Income qUinti~_.~ ~3 =~ ~~ 0.53 .-~~~---T--=f1::--~-
-- -~ _ I·_I __ -
±-------_ ~~:~~~-----.~-- -_ -~-~-6---tL= 
4 13,554 0.20 I 0.40 0 I 1 
~.. 13,563 0.20 -r 0.40 0 -----rl---· 
~~--- Age group _ 21,229 I -t j===-~ 
21-40___ 20,276 0.30 i 0.46 0 ___ L! __ 
.i)~------------ .-L?,878 0.26 i 0.44 0 __ LL .. __ _ 
>60 8,433 0.12 i 0.33 0 1 1----.- -----------.----r-- -.. -.----
Marital status + rl= 
Unmarried· 34,405 i -- . ----
~I!ied 33,410 0.64 ,--0:48 0 ~~=I-~ 
Insurance I 
f-U-C-s-c-he-m-e--:.----- 47,327 -.-.-----l---.-- _ .. -
------r-------+----------+---~-----
SSS ___ +..:.26,=13:......4:..........-.-_--I~--.:..:0.:..:..1 0-=---_l--_0.::.=.3..::.0_--I-0.:~ ___ 1_._ 
CSMBS 9,943 0.16 0.36 0 1 
. :..::....-------f-----=...:...:...:~I_--:...:.::...=--___1~ . ..::.....-.-.. ---
Education 1--___ -:-----------------+----------+-----1----------.-- .--.--.. -----
~P~r~im~1~ary-'*------------....-.4-2-6-'-,2-00----,--------i-.-.--___ j.... .. ____ ....... _. ______ .. __ _ 
None 3,075 0.05 0.22 0 1 I-~;r~~m~~::....~h-e----:· <1:=-/-c7h~el:--or-----·---t-;;;-;:;~i~;~! 9;;---- ~:~~.- ~:~~ =rt~---~---
._-----
Chronic disease I----~~~~~===------_r~~-----r_-----+_-----~----~---
No chronic disease* 55,633 ~~~~:::...::::::.:::.::.:::::::...--------t-~~:;----t---~;;-+---:::-::~----.-- -----.-
Chronic disease 12,182 0.18 0.38 0 1 
-------
Region ~C-en-t-ra-I*---..:..:::12.:.:::=--------t--2:-:1;-,6::0:::9---t-----+-----l----------.. -.-. 
. _-
Bangkok 4,014 0.24 0 1 
--
0.06 
North 14,218 0.21 0.41 0 1 
.. -
Northeast 16,222 0.24 0.43 0 1 
------
South 11,752 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Area 
Urban 39,508 I-R~m:~a=I~--------------~2~8~,3~0~7---+~0.-4-2---~0-.4-9------+-0----1----
* reference group 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
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5.6.1 Factors explaining ambulatory service utilization 
Two multivariate analyses were carried out for ambulatory service utilization- one for 
the probability of using a health facility and the other for the number of visits to 
facilities. 
Ambulatory care utilization 
Logistic regression was employed to analyse use of health facility, as a dichotomous 
outcome. Table 5.9 provides cross-tabulations for the use of ambulatory care by the 
population. The highest percentage users were the elderly, those with no education, 
and those with chronic disease. In terms of insurance, the VC scheme and CSMBS 
have higher utilisation of ambulatory care than the SSS. 
Table 5.9 Use of ambulatory care by different characteristics, in percentages 
Independent variable Not use (%) Use (%) P-value* 
N 85.5 14.5 
Sex <0.001 
Male 87.3 12.7 
Female 83.8 16.2 
Income quintile <0.001 
1 79.7 20.3 
2 84.0 16.0 
3 86.6 13.4 
4 89.2 10.8 
5 90.0 10.0 
Age <0.001 
0-20 84.9 15.1 
21-40 91.6 8.4 
41-60 83.8 16.2 
>60 68.8 31.2 
Marital status <0.001 
Unmarried 88.9 11.2 
Married 85.7 14.3 
Insurance <0.001 
UCscheme 84.3 15.7 
SSS 91.2 8.9 
CSMBS 85.3 14.7 
Education <0.001 
Primary school 80.3 19.7 
None 77.2 22.8 
Primary<Bachelor 91.8 8.2 
~ Bachelor 91.6 8.4 
Chronic disease <0.001 
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. 
Independent variable Not use (%) Use (%) P-value* 
No chronic disease 90.5 9.5 
Chronic disease 58.6 41.4 
Region <0.001 
Central 88.8 11.2 
Bangkok 92.2 7.8 
North 80.1 19.9 
North east 83.2 16.8 
South 86.8 13.2 
Area <0.001 
Urban 89.5 10.5 
Rural 83.6 16.4 
* Chi-square test 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
Independent variable selection 
Bivariate analyses of logistic regression for ambulatory visits were performed for a 
selection of independent variables, as shown in Table 5.10. A threshold for the level 
of association of p-value <0.25 was used for their subsequent inclusion, as suggested 
by Hosemer and Lemeshow, as use of the traditional level of 0.05 failed to identify 
important variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). All nine independent variables 
could be included in the model using this criterion. 
Table 5.10 Bivariate analysis of independent variables in ambulatory visit 
analysis 
Independent variable OR P-value 
95% Cl 
LL@ UL@@ F statistic Prob> F 
Sex 
Male· 1.00 
Female 1.33 <0.001 1.26 1.42 90.13 <0.001 
Income quintile 
--
_. 
------
1* LOO 
--
----.... -
2 0.74 <0.001 0.662 0.838 42.37 <0.001 
3 0.61 <0.001 0.536 0.691 
4 0.47 <0.001 0.409 0.546 
5 0.44 <0.001 0.378 0.502 
Age 
0-20* 1.00 245.27 <0.001 
--
21-40 0.51 <0.001 0.455 0.581 
41-60 1.09 0.112 0.981 1.204 
>60 2.55 <0.001 2.284 2.854 
Marital status 
Unmarried· 1.00 40.7 <0.001 
Married 1.33 <0.001 1.217 1.448 
Insurance 
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95% Cl 
Independent variable OR P-value LL@ UL@@ F statistic Prob> F 
VC scheme* i 1.00 i ! 25.14 <0.001 
..... -.... --.... -.-.-.. -.-... --.. -... --.--........ -.... --.... -.... -.. --.•.. ---.. --.. -..... ----.-t-... --.----··-·····--···-··----I-----·--···t·--··----·-··--··-··-+--.--.---- .--.---.-.. ---.---.. -.. -
~Bs----f--'J!~-j :~~~L~r~:~~ --r¥oiH-----·-··-·· .--.-.. --... -.-.. --.. -
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·-·--------·-------·--r---f--------·· --.------ --------
Central * I 1.00 I 34 <0.001 
__ ~an~kok-----~::--~=r=-~~~ <O::OO!~== O.5TI ~_:.~~_=~_.____.'-____ .~=~~ 
----~~~;t------·-i-·-ffi ~~6+-- ~ ::~~ +-~:-!~-:--l-----l------I 
~~~~~ ________ ._J __ 1.~~ ~~~. __ . __ .. ___ 1.040 1.397 --+-.----.-.--t-------.. -.--.-.. 
Area I 
-urban;-------------I---l.OO ----.-----.--.- -- - ·-8-6:-46--- -<0-.-00-'----· 
___ . ________ .. ----f---------- -.---+-----4-----1---.. ---
---Rural i 1.68 <0.001 1.506 
* reference group 
@ Lower limit 
@@ Upper limit 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
1.874 
In addition to the bivariate analysis, joint significance tests were done to assess 
whether the inclusion of categorical variables improved the fit of the model compared 
to their exclusion. Dummy variables which were significant in Wald's test were 
included in the multivariate model (p-value <0.05). The analysis showed that 
categorical variables in this model helped to improve the fit of the logistic model, as 
. shown in Table 5.12. 
Goodness of fit and logistic regression diagnosis 
The goodness of fit in the logistic regression used pseudo-maximum likelihood, as 
proposed by Archer and Lemeshow (2006), since the survey sampling used weighted 
data which would be a problem for using Pearson's Chi-square test (Archer and 
Lemeshow 2006). Therefore, traditional goodness of fit could not be used. The null 
hypothesis for goodness of fit was that the model fitted the data; the alternative 
hypothesis was that the model did not fit. Setting a at 0.05, if the result of goodness 
of fit is more than 0.05, the model will be accepted. This showed that the model was 
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not best fitted when it included the variables age, sex, marital status, income quintile, 
insurance status, education, having chronic disease, region, and living area (F-
adjusted test statistic = 2.64, p-value=0.005). Therefore, logistic diagnosis and 
interaction effect analysis were done to check outliers and interaction between 
variables. Since thcre was no specific command or programme for the diagnosis of 
logistic regression when data were weighted, an approach proposed by Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) was followed using a model without weights to perform other 
functions such as residual analysis (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). 
Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of standardized Pearson's residuals with predicted 
probability. The standardized residual plot is better able to explore outliers than the 
residual plot because it shows the deviation of residuals in terms of standard 
deviations. For example standardized residuals outside of 2 standard deviations could 
be considered outliers (Long 1997). Influential outlier data are those data points with 
high-standardized residuals and high leverage. Leverage is estimated when the 
observation is deleted and divided by its standard errors (Agresti 2007). However, 
there is no broadly acceptable method for the removal of outlier data (Long and 
Freese 2006). In this dataset, the standardized residuals showed that there were some 
outlier residuals exceeding three standard deviations that exhibited high leverage, as 
shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. This meant these data had an influential effect on the 
model fit. To trim outlier residuals, this study used 2.57 standard deviations as the 
cut-off point for outliers (99% Cl). Therefore, data which were outliers with high 
leverage were deleted from the analytical process. 
Figure 5.5 Distribution of standardized residuals with predicted probability 
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Figure 5.6 Distribution of standardized residuals with leverage value 
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Out of the total of 67,815 observations, 978 cases were removed from the data. Table 
5.11 shows the characteristics of these outliers, which were mainly female, from low 
income groups and of old age. 
Table 5.11 Characteristics of removed ambulatory data 
CSMBS SSS UC Total 
Sex 
Female 55% 87% 75% 73% 
Male 45% 13% 25% 27% 
Income quintile 
1 8% 3% 50% 33% 
2 6% 14% 27% 20% 
3 13% 4% 6% 7% 
4 48% 75% 5% 27% 
5 26% 4% 12% 13% 
Age group 
>60 18% 1% 28% 21% 
0-20 8% 3% 12% 9% 
21-40 61% 83% 11% 34% 
41-60 13% 13% 49% 35% 
N 194 185 599 978 
Another concern was the possible interaction between independent variables. Table 
5.12 shows that the odds ratio of having chronic disease was high (see the 'first run 
logistic regression' column). This factor might have an interaction effect with other 
independent variables. In comparing the odds ratio, chronic disease in relation to other 
variables, results show that having chronic disease was affected by gender, with the 
odds ratio increasing from 0.9 to 1.7 if female: other factors showed little difference. 
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A new variable was therefore introduced in the logistic regression model multiplying 
sex with chronic disease. After adjusting for outlier and interaction effects, the final 
result of the logistic regression analysis is shown in Table 5.12. Comparing between 
the first run and the final result, goodness of fit after removing outliers and managing 
interaction effects was fitted at F-statistic = 1.85 (p=O.055) 
Table 5.12 First run and final logistic regression and test of the model for 
ambulatory visits 
First run logistic regression Final result logistic regression 
Dependent variable Any visit =1 
N 48,721 47743 
F statistics 123.69 115.18 
Prob> F < 0.001 <0.001 
Wald's test 95% Cl 95% Cl 
Variable P-value** Odds P- Odds P-
(F -statistic) ratios value LL UL ratios value LL@ UL@@ 
Independent 
Sex 
Male* 
Female 1.38 <0.001 1.27 1.5 1.49 <0.001 1.30 1.70 
Income quintile <0.05 (2.53) 
1* 
2 0.89 0.121 0.76 1.03 0.88 0.120 0.76 1.03 
3 0.88 0.131 0.74 1.04 0.89 0.188 0.75 1.06 
4 0.76 0.002 0.63 0.9 0.74 <0.001 0.62 0.88 
5 0.84 0.082 0.68 1.02 0.84 0.109 0.69 1.04 
<0.001 
Age (19.03) 
0-20* 
21-40 0.95 0.679 0.76 1.2 0.97 0.830 0.77 1.23 
41-60 1.18 0.249 0.89 1.57 1.21 0.190 0.91 1.59 
>60 1.81 <0.001 1.36 2.43 1.76 <0.001 1.32 2.35 
Marital status 
Unmarried * 
Married 1.11 0.073 0.99 1.24 1.15 0.014 1.03 1.29 
Insurance <0.001 (8.34) 
UC scheme* 
SSS 1.47 <0.001 1.21 1.79 1.41 <0.001 1.14 1.75 
CSMBS 0.99 0.842 0.85 1.14 0.91 0.215 0.79 1.06 
Education <0.05 (3.45) 
Primary school· 
None 0.99 0.873 0.83 1.17 0.95 0.588 0.81 1.13 
Primary<Bachel 
or 0.77 0.002 0.65 0.9 0.76 <0.001 0.65 0.90 
> Bachelor 0.81 0.114 0.63 1.05 0.78 0.079 0.59 1.03 
Chronic disease 
No chronic 
disease* 
Chronic disease 7.15 <0.001 6.4 7.99 8.64 <0.001 7.33 10.18 
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<0.001 
Region (12.72) 
Central* 
Bangkok 
North 
North east 
South 
Area 
Urban* 
Rural 
Chronic disease* 
sex 
* reference group 
** Wald's test for joint significance 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
0.78 
1.68 
1.52 
1.42 
1.31 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
0.093 0.58 1.04 0.75 
<0.001 1.38 2.03 1.68 
<0.001 1.28 1.81 1.57 
<0.001 l.l7 1.72 1.42 
<0.001 1.16 1.47 1.31 
0.86 
Results of logistic regression analysis of ambulatory service use 
0.063 0.55 1.02 
<0.001 1.38 2.05 
<0.001 1.32 1.88 
<0.001 1.16 1.72 
<0.001 1.16 1.49 
0.121 0.72 1.04 
In the logistic regression analysis, after controlling for other factors, the SSS 
insurance was a significant predictor for an individual using a health care facility in 
the previous month. SSS members had a 41 % higher chance of using health care 
facilities than UC scheme members. However, there was no difference in the 
probability of using a health care facility in the CSMBS group compared to the UC 
scheme. Females were significantly more likely to use a health care facility for 
ambulatory care than males. Income was a significant factor predicting use of 
ambulatory care. The fifth income quintile was significantly less likely to use a health 
facility than the first income quintile. Age was also a significant factor predicting 
ambulatory service use. The elderly (over 60 years) were 1.76 times more likely to 
use a health care facility than the 0-20 age group. Rural people were more likely to 
visit ambulatory care than those in urban areas (31 % higher chance). People who 
lived outside the central region were between 1.4 and 1.7 times more likely to use a 
health care facility than those in the central region. The exception here was Bangkok 
area, where use did not differ from the central region. 
Number of visits to services 
Because number of ambulatory visits was indicated as count data, a count model was 
used in the analysis. There were four steps of analysis: model selection, independent 
variable selection, result of multivariate analysis, and goodness of fit. 
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Model selection 
Poisson and negative binomial regression models were tested to select a suitable 
model and a test for dispersion was used to select between them. The result of the 
dispersion test (Ho: a = 0) was that there was significant dispersion of number of 
ambulatory visits (likelihood ratio test of alpha =0: chibar2 (01) = 913.73, p-value 
=0.000). Therefore, the negative binomial regression model was more appropriate 
than the Poisson model. 
Independent variable selection 
Table 5.13 shows the bivariate analysis of independent variables and number of 
ambulatory visits. According to the. criteria of Hosmer and Lemeshow.(200~), the 
variables marital status and insurance status could be excluded from the modeL 
However, as this study aimed to compare different effects of insurance schemes, so it 
was necessary to keep the insurance status variable in the model. 
Table 5.13 Bivariate analysis of independent variables and number of 
ambulatory visits 
Independent variable Coefficient P-value 
95% Cl 
LL@ UL@@ F statistic Prob> F 
Sex 
._--- -------
Male* 1.00 
--
-----_. 
.---
Female 0.07 0.005 0.021 0.119 7.84 0.005 
Income .<It:!!!!i!~ ___ 
_____ M_._ .. _._" 
.. _-----
1* 1.00 
-
2 -0.12 0.006 -0.207 -0.034 5.06 <0.001 
---
3 -0.16 <0.001 -0.250 -0.078 
---
4 -0.14 0.005 -0.234 -0.042 
--
I--. 
5 -0.21 <0.001 -0.339 -0.088 
Age 
0-20* 1.00 75.09 <0.001 
21-40 0.26 <0.001 0.170 0.351 
-_. 
41-60 0.39 <0.001 0.319 0.467 
>60 0.54 <0.001 0.464 0.613 
Marital status 
.. _--' 
Unmarried * 1.00 0.06 0.805 
Married 0.01 0.805 -0.073 0.094 
-------
_ .. _---_. 
Insurance 
UC scheme* 1.00 0.51 0.599 
SSS -0.08 0.321 -0.234 0.077 
.. _------
---_ . 
CSMBS 0.00 0.993 -0.094 0.093 
Education 
Primary school* l.00 14.86 <0.001 
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* reference group 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
Table 5.14 shows the first run negative binomial regression model and Wald's chi-
square p-value for selected independent variables. Wald's chi square p-value was used 
to test joint significance. Wald's chi square p-value of more than 0.05 means that the 
variables are not jointly significantly associated with the outcome and can be removed 
from the model. The result of the joint significance test led to the removal of income 
quintile, marital status, education, region, and area. The final independent variables 
for number of visits were sex, age, chronic disease, and insurance scheme. 
Goodness of fit 
Assessment of goodness of fit in the negative binomial regression used the F-statistic 
with the hypothesis that Ho: ~\ = 0 while Ha: ~\* O. Table 5.14 shows the final model 
of the negative binomial regression. The result of the model fit from F-statistics (F-
statistics = 39.55, p-value = 0.000) was that this model fitted for explaining the 
number of ambulatory visits. 
Results for the number of ambulatory visits using negative binomial regression 
Using negative binomial regression analyses for the number of ambulatory visits, 
having CSMBS insurance was significantly associated with a reduced number of 
visits to a health facility. CSMBS members had 10% (1- e-O· 1) fewer visits compared 
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to DC scheme members, while for SSS there was no significant difference. 
Furthermore, higher age group was associated with a higher number of facility visits. 
The over-60 year age group had 39% (eO.33) more visits compared to the 0-20 year 
group, while the 21-40 year group had 17% (eO. 16) and the 41-60 year group had 24% 
(eO.21 ) more visits. Having chronic disease was another factor affecting the number of 
visits. Having a chronic disease increased the chances of using a health facility by 
40% (eO.34). 
Table 5.14 First run and final results of negative binomial regression for number 
of ambulatory visits 
First run negative binomial regression Final negative binomial 
Dependent variable Number of visits 
N 6,774 9,192 
F statistics 10.11 39.55 
Prob> F < 0.001 < 0.001 
Wald's test 95% Cl 95% Cl 
P-value** Coef P- Coef P-
Variable (F -statistic) ficient value LL@ UL@@ ficient Value LL 
Independent 
Sex 
Male* 
Female 0.04 0.249 -0.02 0.1 0.03 0.268 -0.021 
Income quintile 0.592 (0.70) 
1* 
2 -0.06 0.314 -0.16 0.05 
3 -0.07 0.199 -0.17 0.04 
4 -0.06 0.295 -0.18 0.05 
5 -0.11 0.129 -0.25 0.03 
Age <0.05 (4.52) 
0-20* 
21-40 0.17 0.021 0.03 0.32 0.16 <0.001 0.079 
41-60 0.19 0.015 0.04 0.35 0.21 <0.001 0.132 
:>60 0.29 <0.001 0.13 0.45 0.33 <0.001 0.247 
Marital status 
Unmarried* 
Married 0 0.975 -0.09 0.09 
Insurance 0.666 (0.41) 
UC scheme* 
SSS -0.01 0.875 -0.16 0.13 -0.09 0.27 -0.236 
CSMBS -0.05 0.367 -0.15 0.06 -0.1 0.028 -0.192 
Education 0.141(1.82) 
Primary school* 
None 0.07 0.28 -0.05 0.19 
Primary<Bachel 
or -0.06 0.205 -0.14 0.03 
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UL 
0.074 
0.247 
0.291 
0.416 
0.066 
-
0.011 
First run negative binomial regression 
> Bachelor 0.08 
Chronic disease 
No chronic 
disease· 
Chronic disease 0.35 
Region 0.113 (1.87) 
Central· 
Bangkok 0.05 
North 0.14 
North east 0.08 
South -0.01 
Area 0.241 (1.38) 
Urban· 
Rural 0.05 
Constant 0.2 
Ilnalpha -1.6 
Alpha 0.2 
• reference group 
** Wald's test for joint significance 
@ lower level 
0.402 
<0.001 
0.58 
0.012 
0.164 
0.910 
0.241 
0.108 
@@ upper level 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
-0.11 0.26 
0.26 0.44 
-0.13 0.22 
0.03 0.25 
-0.03 0.2 
-0.14 0.12 
-0.03 0.13 
Final negative binomial 
0.34 <0.001 0.269 0.416 
0.27 0.030 
-2.01 
0.13 
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5.6.2 Factors explaining hospitalization 
Table 5.15 shows the association of different characteristics with hospitalization. The 
analysis shows that elderly people and those with a chronic disease had a higher 
likelihood of hospitalization. In tenns of insurance status, the CSMBS had higher 
hospitalizations followed by the VC scheme, and the SSS had the lowest percentage 
of hospitalizations. Logistic regression and count data analysis were also used to 
analyse the probability of an individual being hospitalized and the number of 
hospitalization episodes. 
Table 5.15 Percentage of hospitalization by different characteristics 
Independent variable No hospitalization Hospitalization P-value 
Total 93.3 6.7 
Sex <0.001 
Male 94.3 5.7 
Female 92.4 7.6 
Income quintile <0.001 
1 91.6 8.4 
2 93.1 6.9 
3 93.9 6.1 
4 93.8 6.2 
5 94.6 5.4 
Age <0.001 
0-20 95.1 4.9 
21-40 93.1 6.9 
41-60 93.8 6.2 
>60 86.0 14.0 
Marital status <0.001 
Unmarried 94.4 5.6 
Married 91.7 8.3 
Insurance <0.001 
UC scheme 93.2 6.8 
SSS 94.7 5.3 
CSMBS 91.5 8.5 
Education <0.001 
Primary school 93.0 7.0 
None 91.1 8.9 
Primary<Bachelor 93.5 6.5 
~ Bachelor 95.0 5.0 
Chronic disease <0.001 
No chronic disease 95.1 4.9 
Chronic disease 83.6 16.4 
Region <0.001 
Central 94.2 5.8 
Bangkok 96.0 4.0 
North 92.0 8.0 
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Independent variable No hospitalization Hospitalization P-value 
North east 92.5 7.6 
South 93.3 6.7 
Area <0.001 
Urban 94.5 5.5 
Rural 92.7 7.3 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
Hospitalization utilization 
Hospitalization is a dichotomous variable, so a logistic regression model was used in 
the analysis. 
Selection of independent variables 
Table 5.16 shows bivariate analysis of independent variables and hospitalization. 
Independent variables would be selected in the model if p-value <0.25 (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000). From Table 5.16, all of the variable groups in the table could be 
included in the logistic regression model. 
Table 5.16Bivariate analysis of independent variables in hospitalization 
Independent variable OR P-value 
95% Cl 
LL@ UL@@ F statistic Prob> F 
Sex 
-
Male* 1.00 
Female 1.36 <0.001 1.24 1.50 39.55 <0.001 
--
Income quintile 
-
1* 1.00 
2 0.81 0.003 0.707 0.931 9.21 <0.001 
3 0.70 <0.001 0.603 0.822 
4 0.72 <0.001 0.623 0.836 
-
5 0.62 <0.001 0.520 0.736 
-- ----
Age 
0-20* 1.00 100.21 <0.001 
21-40 1.43 <0.001 1.251 1.636 
--
41-60 1.29 <0.001 1.130 1.477 
>60 3.15 <0.001 2.743 3.621 
Marital status 
Unmarried* 1.00 56.36 <0.001 
Married 1.53 <0.001 1.367 1.706 
Insurance 
--
UCscheme* 1.00 13.24 <0.001 
SSS 0.76 0.008 0.628 0.931 
CSMBS 1.28 <0.001 1.132 1.447 
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I I 95% Cl I Independent variable OR P-value LL@ UL@@ F statistic Prob> F 
______ .. ___ ._~_~~~~t~?~_.. ..... ~. __ .. .... -.1----·.-·--·---··---1·---···----· L.-.---------JJ------.. -l-.--.-.----.-.-.... 
Primary school* I 1.00 I I! 7.97 i <0.001 
·---No;e--·····--······-·--r---i-:-30-r··O.006-·-----1·]:07s-····---r·Ts6-1-- ---------r··-·----·-
--.. -----.. -.--.---.-................ -... . .................. -....... L .... _ ................... -1--..... - ....... --......... -... -.. - .. --... -.. -.-.... ---.. -... --.......... - .. -., .... -......... -.--.······-···········f·-···-·····-·········-············· ........ l ..... _ ..... _ .... _ ... _ .. · ... _._ .... __ 
Primary<Bachelor I 0.91 i 0.089 I 0.823 I 1.014 ! 
.. --.----.. - ......... - .. -.. --.......................... ····-·-·r .... ---....... - ... t·· - •.. -.-.. --.- .-.-----.----j -··----··-···---r-····---·-·---·--···[---··-··---·-·-·-........ ----.. -.-.----
> Bachelor I 0.69 I <0.001 i 0.559 l 0.853 ! ~~~.~~Er~~T?~~i.~~~~~ •• ~··.--.:·.II~ ... ~·.~·.·:.~.~ •• · .• · .• ! .• ·.~ ..•. ~ •• ==~·===~.---.~~-:~:~:::::·~~r:~.~:~--::~~==- _=~.~~:~:~.:=~t •• ::::==~·-.:.:_ 
No chronic disease* 1.00 I : 715.47 ! <0.001 ~=~~-~~-~-~d.E~:~-~-~--.·-~==--t.=)I( .. [~;~~~.==-·"jj~-~iI=='~~ ::~.:.!.99 -= -=-~ __ ~= __ ~~'.I~-=== __ = 
·--c~~tr~;s.i ...-c:.-n----1 -,ool---=i----- -- ---- -i4:5- --- -f<o-iiOt-
------------.-... - .. --... --'-- I --- .----- r-----
-~g~-=~ --~ml~~~i==~t~-= 
_______ ~!~a _______ . __ . __ ~~....J:------_-- ----.------ ---.-----I-------f-.-------
Urban * 1.00 33.75 <0.001 1---------------- - --.-----1 
Rural 1.36 <0.001 1.227 1.511 -r 
* reference group 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
Table 5.18 shows the analysis of each variable for Wald's test of joint significance 
and a test the final result of the logistic regression model. The test for joint 
significance showed that the income quintiles did not help to improve the logistic 
model, so they were removed. 
Goodness o/fit and logistic regression diagnosis 
The first run of logistic regression was tested for goodness of fit using the Archer and 
Lemshow (2006) test for goodness of fit for logistic regression of survey data. The 
result showed that the model was not fitted with an F -adjusted test statistic = 2.81, p-
value=0.003 (Ho: model is fitted, Ha: model is not fitted). Therefore, residual 
diagnosis and interaction effects were tested for outliers and interaction of 
independent variables. 
In the logistic regression diagnosis results, Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show that there were 
outliers of standardized residuals and high leverage, which meant that they might 
influence the fit of the model. To reduce influential outliers, the data which were 
outside -2.57 and 2.57 standard deviations of the standardized residuals were deleted. 
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Figure 5.7 Distribution of standardized residuals with predicted probability 
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On interaction effects, the data from the first run logistic regression showed that 
having a chronic disease might interact with other variables. The odds ratio of sex 
with chronic disease was 1.65 compared to 0.97 for without chronic disease, while 
there were no striking differences in other variables. Therefore, the analysis added the 
interaction of chronic disease and sex in the final analysis. The final result of the 
logistic regression analysis is shown in Table 5.18. The goodness of fit was F-
adjusted test statistic = 1.15, p-value=0.319 which meant that the model was fitted . 
Table 5.17 shows the characteristics of the removed data, which were female, 
predominantly in the 2nd income quintile, with age between 21 and 40. 
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Table 5.17 Characteristics of removed hospitalization data 
CSMBS SSS UC Total 
Sex 
Female 75% 75% 82% 81% 
Male 25% 25% 18% 19% 
Income quintile 
1 10% 1% 34% 29% 
2 10% 29% 40% 36% 
3 9% 43% 7% 9% 
4 10% 15% 6% 7% 
5 62% 12% 13% 18% 
Age 
>60 22% 1% 6% 7% 
0-20 2% 16% 16% 15% 
21-40 50% 65% 72% 69% 
41-60 26% 18% 6% 9% 
N 193 126 1,439 1,758 
Results of logistic regression of hospitalization 
In the hospitalization analysis, after controlling for other factors, CSMBS members 
were significantly more likely to be hospitalized than UC members, while SSS 
members did not differ significantly from UC scheme members. CSMBS members 
had a 25% higher probability of being hospitalized than members of the VC scheme. 
Furthermore, those of female gender and married status had a significant higher 
probability of hospitalization. Females had a 55% higher chance of being 
hospitalized, while married people had a 32% higher chance. Income group also 
affected hospitalization. High income groups seemed to have a lower probability of 
hospitalization. Region of residence was another factor affecting hospitalization. 
There were two different results here. Bangkok residents had a significantly lower 
probability of hospitalization, while other regions had a. higher probability compared 
to the central region. Living in Bangkok meant a 78% lower chance of hospitalization. 
Living in the North, North-east, and South meant about a 25% to 36% higher chance 
of hospitalization compared to the Central region. The details are shown in Table 
5.18. 
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Table 5.18Finallogistic regression model of a number of hospitalizations 
First run logistic regression Final result logistic regression 
Dependent variable Hospitalization = I 
N 48,721 46,963 
F statistics 39.04 43.8 
Prob> F < 0.001 < 0.001 
Wald's test** 95% Cl 95% Cl 
Variable P-value Odds p- Odds p-
(F -statistics) ratios value LL@ UL@@ ratios value LL UL 
Independent 
Sex 
Male* 
Female 1.51 <0.001 1.34 1.70 1.55 <0.001 1.32 1.83 
Income quintile 0.138(1.74) 
1* 
2 0.89 0.171 0.75 1.05 
3 0.77 0.011 0.63 0.94 
4 0.85 0.100 0.70 1.03 
5 0.79 0.060 0.62 1.01 
Age <0.001(30.19) 
0-20* 
21-40 0.99 0.916 0.77 1.27 1.39 0.023 1.05 1.85 
41-60 0.73 0.021 0.56 0.95 1.03 0.867 0.76 1.38 
>60 1.42 0.012 1.08 1.87 1.97 <0.001 1.47 2.65 
Marital status 
Unmarried· 
Married 1.55 <0.001 1.34 1.79 1.32 <0.001 1.14 1.52 
Insurance <0.05 (4.19) 
UC scheme· 
SSS 1.03 0.795 0.83 1.28 1.00 0.995 0.80 1.25 
CSMBS 1.26 0.004 I.Q8 1.48 1.25 0.006 1.07 1.46 
Education <0.01 (5.01) 
Primary school· 
None 0.96 0.707 0.78 1.18 0.90 0.328 0.73 1.11 
Primary<Bachel 
or 1.28 <0.001 1.11 1.48 1.13 0.110 0.97 1.31 
> Bachelor 0.93 0.575 0.72 1.20 0.74 0.023 0.57 0.96 
Chronic disease 
No chronic 
disease· 
Chronic disease 2.94 <0.001 2.63 3.29 3.95 <0.001 3.32 4.70 
Region <0.001 (8.20) 
Central* 
Bangkok 0.69 0.007 0.53 0.90 0.56 <0.001 0.42 0.75 
North 1.24 0.011 1.05 1.46 1.25 <0.001 1.07 1.45 
North east 1.34 <0.001 1.14 1.58 1.36 <0.001 1.16 1.59 
South 1.31 <0.001 1.13 1.54 1.27 <0.001 1.08 1.50 
Area 
Urban· 
Rural 1.06 0.305 0.95 1.20 1.06 0.367 0.94 1.19 
Chronic 
disease· sex 0.70 <0.001 0.56 0.87 
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* reference group 
** Wald's test for joint significance 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
Number of hospitalization episodes 
In the model of number of hospitalization episodes, the steps of analysis included 
model selection, independent variable selection, and testing the goodness of fit of the 
model. In model selection, a test for dispersion is done to choose between Poisson and 
negative binomial regression models. Testing a showed evidence of overdispersion 
(likelihood ratio test of alpha =0: chibar2 (01) = 3085.56, p-value =0.000); therefore, 
a negative binomial regression model was selected. 
Independent variables selection 
Table 5.19 shows the results of bivariate analysis between independent variables and 
number of hospitalization episodes. Using the criteria ofunivariate model and p-value 
<0.25, the variables included in the model were age group, insurance status, 
education, having chronic disease, and region of residence. 
Table 5.19Bivariate analysis of independent variables in number of 
hospitalizations 
Independent variable Coefficient P-value 
95% Cl 
LL@ UL@@ F statistic 
Sex 
Male* 1.00 
Female 0.03 0.805 -0.175 0.226 0.06 
Income quintile 
1* 1.00 
2 -0.19 0.196 -0.476 0.097 2.02 
3 0.03 0.837 -0.293 0.362 
4 -0.08 0.671 -0.423 0.272 
5 -0.36 0.017 -0.652 -0.065 
Age 
0-20* 1.00 25.57 
21-40 0.33 0.058 -0.011 0.672 
41-60 0.39 0.007 0.110 0.676 
>60 1.07 <0.001 0.812 1.324 
Marital status 
Unmarried* 1.00 2.28 
Married 0.16 0.132 -0.047 0.357 
Insurance 
UC scheme* 1.00 10.08 
Prob> F 
0.805 
0.090 
<0.001 
0.132 
<0.001 
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Independent variable 
SSS 
CSMBS 
Education 
Primary school* 
None 
Primary<Bachelor 
> Bachelor 
Chronic disease 
No chronic disease* 
Chronic disease 
Region 
Central* 
Bangkok 
North 
North east 
South 
Area 
Urban* 
Rural 
* reference group 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Coefficient P-value 
-0.54 0.027 
0.47 <0.001 
1.00 
0.12 0.458 
-0.31 0.035 
-0.63 <0.001 
1.00 
1.26 <0.001 
1.00 
-0.49 0.024 
-0.01 0.932 
-0.31 0.039 
0.19 0.323 
1.00 
-0.02 0.859 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
95% Cl 
LL@ UL@@ F statistic Prob> F 
-1.020 -0.060 
0.220 0.727 
6.64 <0.001 
-0.195 0.433 
-0.592 -0.021 
-0.960 -0.304 
128.25 <0.001 
1.040 1.476 
3.23 0.012 
-0.909 -0.063 
-0.286 0.262 
-0.597 -0.016 
-0.185 0.562 
0.03 0.859 
-0.215 0.179 
Table 5.20 shows the model test for negative binomial regression and Wald's test for 
joint significance. From the results in the table, variables which were not significant 
were income quintile, education, and region. Therefore, the variables to be included in 
the final model were age group, insurance status and having chronic disease. 
Goodness of fit 
The negative binomial model of number of hospitalizations showed evidence of a 
fitted model by F-statistic (F statistic=15.14, p-value=O.OOO). Therefore, the model 
can be used in explaining the number ofhospitalizations. 
Result for number of hospitalizations analysis using negative binomial regressions 
Insurance status affected the number of hospitalizations in different ways. sss 
members were hospitalized fewer times than VC members, and CSMBS were 
hospitalized more times. After controlling for other factors, SSS members were 68% 
(lIe(-O·S2») less frequently hospitalized compared with VC scheme members. CSMBS 
had 27% (eO.24) higher chance of being hospitalized compared to the VC scheme. 
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Furthermore, having a chronic disease was another factor affecting number of 
hospitalizations. People who had chronic disease were hospitalized 3.14 times more 
than people who did not have chronic disease. In addition, the elderly had 
significantly higher frequency of being hospitalized. The over 60 age group had a 
40% higher frequency of hospitalization than the 0-20 year group. 
Table S.20 First run and final negative binomial regression model of number of 
hospitalization 
First run negative binomial Final negative binomial 
Dependent variable Number of hospitalization 
N 7,989 9,192 
F statistics 15.41 28.13 
Prob > F < 0.001 < 0.001 
Wald's test Coef 95% Cl 95% Cl p-value ficient P-value Coef P-value 
Variables (F -statistics) LL@ UL@@ ficient LL UL 
Independent 
Income quintile 0.262 (1.32) 
1* 
2 -0.11 0.455 -0.02 0.10 
3 0.10 0.577 -0.26 0.46 
4 -0.04 0.871 -0.48 0.41 
5 -0.29 0.118 -0.66 0.07 
<0.001 
Age (9.44) 
0-20* 
21-40 0.58 0.003 0.20 0.96 0.13 0.472 -0.226 0.487 
41-60 0.33 0.053 0.00 0.66 -0.15 0.329 -0.442 0.148 
>60 0.80 <0.001 0.47 1.13 0.34 0.016 0.064 0.613 
<0.001 
Insurance (6.71) 
UC scheme* 
SSS -0.45 0.059 -0.91 0.02 -0.52 0.032 -0.997 -0.045 
CSMBS 0.39 0.006 0.11 0.66 0.24 0.038 0.014 0.471 
Education 0.067 (2.39) 
Primary 
school* 
None -0.11 0.546 -0.45 0.24 
Primary<Bache 
-0.03 0.798 -0.29 0.22 
10r 
~Bachelor -0.62 0.009 -1.09 -0.16 
Chronic disease 
No chronic 
disease· 
Chronic disease 0.94 <0.001 0.72 1.17 1.14 <0.001 0.895 1.393 
Region 0.188 (1.54) 
Central· 
Bangkok -0.41 0.093 -0.90 0.07 
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First run negative binomial 
North -0.03 
North east -0.21 
South 0.17 
Constant -2.37 
lInalpha 1.37 
Alpha 3.93 
* reference group 
** Wald's test for Joint significance 
@ lower level 
@@upper level 
0.837 
0.185 
0.350 
0.190 
Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2005 
5.7 Discussion 
Summary of findings 
-0.32 
-0.53 
-0.19 
Final negative binomial 
0.26 
0.10 
0.54 
-2.19 <0.001 
1.41 
4.08 
People in the different insurance schemes (the UC scheme, SSS, and CSMBS) 
showed different characteristics. The UC scheme was the main provider of insurance 
to the population, with coverage of nearly 80% of the population. The highest share of 
members in the UC scheme was in the northeastern area, of low education, and of low 
income. The SSS had the second largest coverage with about 10% of the population. 
The highest share of members was in the central area, of a young age, and with low 
co-morbidity. The CSMBS is the third scheme in terms of coverage with nearly 10% 
of the population. The highest share of members was in the northeastern area, 
working age group (41-60), and of a high-income group. 
Health seeking behaviour also varied between schemes. SSS members were more 
likely to report less serious illness, since they showed a high percentage of self-
prescribing and no treatment, while UC scheme members tended to use more 
traditional and non-hospital care. This might also be because SSS members had better 
health status than members of other schemes. The study found that in claiming the 
insurance right when they were sick, CSMBS members had the lowest rate of 
claiming insurance rights for ambulatory care but the highest for hospitalization, 
contrary to VC scheme which had the highest rate of claiming insurance rights for 
ambulatory care and the lowest claims for hospitalization. 
Illness rate was significantly higher among VC scheme members, followed by 
CSMBS and SSS members respectively. This pattern was similar to the 
hospitalization rate. For ambulatory visits, SSS membership is a predictor of 
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ambulatory visits compared to the VC scheme, while the influence of the CSMBS was 
not significant. However, none of the insurance schemes was a significant predictor of 
number of visits. For predisposing factors, being female, married, and elderly were 
significant predictors of use of ambulatory care, while enabling factors such as high 
income and region of residence significantly affected use of ambulatory care and 
number of visits. Having chronic disease was also a significant factor affecting 
ambulatory visits. 
For hospitalization, CSMBS membership was a significant predictor of admission 
compared to VC scheme membership. Other factors which affect hospitalization were 
being female, elderly, married status, income group, chronic disease co-morbidity, 
and region. 
Discussion of findings 
Bivariale analysis 
The HWS 2005 reflected the full effect of VC implementation in Thailand. The 
Coverage of population improved from 2003. The numbers uninsured fell fromabout 
5.1% in 2005 to 4.9% in 2005 (Vasavid et al. 2004). This expansion was based on 
three major health insurance schemes with the DC scheme covering the majority of 
the population. The DC scheme's main aim was to increase coverage to the poor and 
previous uninsured population (NaRanong and NaRanong 2006). There were, 
however, two challenges of this idea: there was proof that targeting the poor would 
miss the target of universal coverage, and quality of care could not be improved if 
only the poor were targeted (Siamwala 2003). Pannarunothai (2002) conducted a 
survey in 6 provinces of the initial implementation of the DC scheme. The data 
showed that only 19% of DC scheme members who had an income of more than 
15,000 Bahtlmonth (£214 /month) exercised their insurance right (Pannarunothai 
2002b). However, the HWS 2005 showed an improvement of this situation, with 
people in the 5th quintile exercising their right 35.4% of the time. 
When people were sick, they usually used their insurance right (Table 5.3). However, 
some were covered by more than one insurance scheme. This was about 0.1 to 2.2%. 
The reason for this was that someone could be a member of more than one insurance 
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scheme. For example, a doctor in a public hospital working part time in a private 
hospital would have both CSMBS and SSS insurance at the same time. 
There were some interesting findings relating to claiming insurance entitlement and 
income quintile, especially in the SSS. The first income quintile of the SSS claimed 
their insurance less than the second, third, and fourth income quintiles. This might be 
because in the lower income group, leaving work to seek care affected their income. 
Therefore, they might find other ways of treatment such as self-prescribing. 
The utilization rate in ambulatory care declined from 4.7 episodes/person/year in 2003 
(Vasavid et al. 2004) to 3.25 episodes/person/year in 2005. However, the rate of 
hospitalization increased from 0.083 admissions/person/year in 2003 to 0.108 
admissions/person/year in 2005. The reason for this might be that in 2003 the barrier 
to access to hospitalization was reduced after implementation of VC, so some people 
switched to use formal care. This pattern of utilization is the same as experienced in 
Taiwan with universal coverage where ambulatory care rates have fluctuated over the 
past ten years while the hospitalization rate has increased consistently (Wen et al. 
2008). 
Health seeking behaviour differed between health insurance schemes. SSS members 
were more likely to use self-prescribing drugs and no treatment probably because this 
group was of younger age with less severe disease. Furthermore, their income might 
be affected if care-seeking meant they were not working (Sirisinsuk et al. 2003). The 
SSS group used private clinics and private hospitals more than VC scheme and 
CSMBS members because the contracting unit of this scheme was mainly private 
hospitals. As mentioned above, this group of hospitals used private clinics as sub-
contractors. Furthermore, SSS members who had longer work experience tended to 
choose hospitals with longer service hours and easier access (Sirisinsuk et al. 2003). 
VC scheme members were more likely to use traditional treatments because they 
mostly lived in rural areas. They still believed in the use of traditional or alternative 
medicine. This finding corresponds to the study of Boonyoung (2003) which studied 
health seeking behaviour in Thai Muslim women in Yala (southern province of 
Thailand). The finding was that VC scheme patients were more likely to seek 
traditional or alternative medicine more than in other insurance schemes (Boonyoung 
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2003). Furthermore, when they were sick, the main providers they used were health 
centre and community hospital (Vasavid et a1. 2004). This was firstly because in rural 
areas where most UC members lived, health centres and community hospitals were 
the nearest providers, and transportation might be too expensive to seek care far from 
home, and secondly due to the UC regulations, which required patients to go to 
services within their CUP (in rural areas PCUs, health centres, or the community 
hospital) which acted as gatekeeper to other secondary care services. CSMBS 
members were the main users of formal care. They also used public hospitals, 
especially regional and university hospitals. This was because this group could go to 
any public hospital, and no gatekeeper role was assigned to any level. Transportation 
costs were also less of a problem for them since they were less poor. The payment 
method in the CSMBS scheme is fee-for-service, so large hospitals were more likely 
to have felt comfortable in following-up this group of patients. With these results, 
there remains· the problem of which factors influenced the utilization of both 
ambulatory care and hospitalization. 
Multivariate analysis 
To explain factors affecting utilization of both ambulatory care and hospitalization, 
this study hypothesised that there were three main set of factors affecting utilization: 
predisposing factors, enabling factors, and illness factors (Andersen 1995). The 
details of the hypotheses are shown below: 
• For enabling factors 
o Different insurance status affects service utilization. 
o Those of high-income utilize more services than those of low-income. 
o People living in remote areas use services less . 
• For predisposing factor 
o Older age groups use more services than younger groups. 
o Females tend to use more services than males. 
o People with low education use more services than those with high 
education. 
o Married people use more services than unmarried people . 
• Illness factor 
o Having chronic disease increases service utilization. 
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Both logistic regression and negative binomial regression were used as tools for the 
analysis of ambulatory visit, and hospitalization levels. 
For ambulatory visits, after controlling for demographic and other confounders such 
as age and sex, SSS insurance status increased the probability of ambulatory care 
visits by 41 % compared to UC scheme membership, while there was no significant 
difference between UC scheme and CSMBS groups. This result might be due to two 
reasons. First, the SSS allowed beneficiaries to choose their own main contractor 
hospital. Beneficiaries knew their entitlements and where to go when they were sick. 
This corresponds to a study by Vip et al. (1998) which found that utilization of service 
related to choice of health facilities chosen by beneficiaries (Yip et al. 1998). Second, 
many clinics were subcontractors which can increase access to care for this group. 
Furthermore, most providers in the SSS extended OPD hours to provide services 
outside normal working hours. 
Region of residence was also a factor in utilization. After controlling for insurance 
and other demographic factors, it was found that Bangkok residents had a 
significantly lower probability of an ambulatory visit (by 32%) compared to the 
central region, while other regions had significantly higher probability of visits. This 
can be explained by three reasons. The first is that Bangkok has the lowest illness 
rate. This was nearly two times less than northern and northeastern regions, as shown 
in Table ALL This data is confirmed by Table Al.2 and Table Al.3 which shows 
that Bangkok residence is not significant for probability of illness. Furthermore, 
Bangkok residents are least likely to have insurance cover compared to the other 
regions presumably because of the high percentage of migrant workers who are either 
registered under UC scheme with CUP in their home province (Table A1.4). This 
results in the highest level of no treatment and self-prescribing (Table AI.5). 
Furthermore, rural area residents were also significantly more likely to visit 
ambulatory care facilities than those in urban areas. This finding corresponds to a 
study by Jitatpankul (1999) which found that service utilization in rural areas was 
62% higher than in urban areas (Jitapunkul 1999). Likewise, a study by 
Srithamrongsawat (2005) found that urban residents had fewer visits to health 
facilities compared with rural residents (Srithamrongsawat 2005). 
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Regarding number of ambulatory visits, the CSMBS was associated with fewer visits 
to health facilities than the SSS or UC schemes. Three reasons were suggested for 
this. First most of the CSMBS group went to a hospital rather than to a health facility 
near to home. It might take longer time to obtain services at the health facility so 
discouraging frequent use. Secondly, most CSMBS members were government 
officers who could only attend hospital after working hours. Furthermore, they could 
only go to a public hospital otherwise they had to pay the costs themselves. Few 
public hospitals provided services out of working hours. Third, CSMBS patients had 
to pay and be reimbursed for OP services. This might have deterred OP use by 
CSMBS patients. 
It was also found that being elderly, having chronic disease, and living in the northern 
region were significantly associated with a higher number of visits. The first two 
factors, being elderly and having chronic disease, corresponded with the hypothesis 
that these groups needed more services than people who were younger or without 
chronic disease. This finding corresponds to the finding of Srithamronsawat (2005) 
that elderly people with chronic disease made more frequent use of services. The 
elderly normally have an increased level of co-morbidity (unlike those in younger 
age groups) which requires more services. 
The reason for the northern region being positively and significantly associated with 
number of ambulatory care visits could be explained from two aspects, provider and 
patient. On the patient side, this might be because of the higher incidence of certain 
diseases such as HIV, for which patients needed more frequent follow up. On the 
other hand, increased provision of services by providers could have led to an increase 
in the demand for health care. This might be the result of the policy to expand primary 
health care provision after UC implementation. After UC implementation, the 
distribution of health personnel seemed more equitable. Data from the MOPH showed 
that the ratio of nurses to population increased rapidly in remote regions such as the 
northeastern and northern areas during 2000 to 2003 (Health Policy and Strategy 
2003). The reasons why SSS members made significantly more frequent use of 
ambulatory service than CSMBS members might be the same as those for ambulatory 
visit - that members normally chose their main contractor that they would use 
when they were sick. This finding corresponded to study of Sirisinsuk et al. (2003) 
157 
which found that the VC scheme had more frequent use of ambulatory service than 
CSMBS might be explained by two reasons. First, it might be because when VC 
members are sick, they might be more severe than eSMBS members. Second, they 
could go to a pev or health centre, which were usually not far from their home so 
they could go more frequently than eSMBS members. 
For hospitalization, the results differed from ambulatory care, after controlling for 
demographic and other enabling factors, the eSMBS was found to be a significant 
predictor of probability of any hospitalization. This might be due to two reasons. First, 
CSMBS members were likely to request hospitalization more than other insurance 
scheme members since they knew that the hospital could receive complete 
reimbursement from the government and they would not be charged. Second, 
hospitals might have incentives to admit patients in this group since the 
reimbursement of eSMBS is fee-for-service. In theory, providers will provide more 
services under this payment system (Bitran and Block 1992) than alternatives such as 
payments based on capitation or DRGs. Residents of Bangkok region were less likely 
to be hospitalized than residents of all other regions. However, living in a rural area 
was not a significant predictor of probability of hospitalization. The reasons for this 
might come from two sides, demand and supply. On the demand side, people who 
lived outside the central region had higher morbidity, but they faced several 
constraints limiting hospital visits such as limited means of transportation. Some of 
them might wait until their disease got worse and required hospitalization. On the 
supply side, although Thailand had a problem of shortage of health personnel in 
remote areas, the distribution of beds was more equitable allowing for similar equity 
in admission rates in rural and urban areas. 
Regarding the number of hospitalizations, after controlling for demographic and other 
enabling factors, eSMBS members were more likely to have a higher number of 
hospital admissions compared to VC scheme members. This might be due to CSMBS 
members being able to access any public hospital. Furthermore, the regulation which 
allows CSMBS members to go to hospital directly without going to any gatekeeper 
might promote hospital use in this group. On the provider's side, FFS payment 
encourages more frequent admissions than the other insurance schemes. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter explored service utilization in the different health insurance schemes 
using the 2005 Health and Welfare Survey. The findings show that there are 
variations in utilization between health insurance schemes, after controlling for other 
confounding factors such as demographic factors. The UC scheme design was 
associated with a lower proportion of members utilizing ambulatory visits, but with 
more frequent use once members were sick, and with lower level of hospitalization. 
The SSS scheme design was associated with a higher proportion of individuals using 
ambulatory service and with higher frequency, while hospitalization levels were low. 
CSMBS scheme design was associated with lower use and frequency of ambulatory 
services but higher use and frequency of hospitalization. 
159 
CHAPTER 6: VARIATION OF LENGTH OF STAY AND 
READMISSION IN DIABETES MELLITUS PATIENTS 
BETWEEN INSURANCE SCHEMES 
6.1 Background 
This chapter examines the efficiency of resource use in the three health insurance 
schemes - Universal Coverage (UC), Social Security Scheme (SSS), and Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) - by analyzing length of stay (LOS) and early 
readmission rate in Diabetes Mellitus (DM) patients, used as the tracer for this 
analysis. LOS is a common indicator for efficient use of resource as the cost of 
resources consumed in hospital is related to the number of patient days (Martin and 
Smith 1996). However, lower resource consumption might also relate to poor quality 
of care. Readmission is a good indicator to monitor whether shorter LOS led to poor 
quality (Milne and Clarke 1990). The data come from claims that hospitals servicing 
all three major health insurance schemes have to send for reimbursement. The aim of 
the analysis is to compare the effects of insurance schemes and other factors on 
resource use, LOS as a proxy for resource use and on quality as proxied by the 
readmission rate. The analysis compares three conditions of DM requiring hospital 
admission: acute complications, chronic complications, and DM without 
complication. 
The chapter begins by discussing the reliability of the data. Then the descriptive and 
multivariate analyses of LOS are presented. The final section is an analysis of 
readmission rates using univariate and multivariate analysis. 
6.2 Reliability of data 
The validity and reliability of claims data are of major concern since these data are 
used not only to monitor healthcare performance, but also and primarily for 
reimbursement purposes. Pannarunothai (2002) reviewed the claims data of public 
health insurance for 2001 for 4.1 million cases by using software grouper version3. 
He found that the overall error rate was 8.2%. The main error was the wrong coding 
in the primary diagnosis, which occurred in 4.2% of claims. The university hospitals 
had the highest error rate, at 12.8%, followed by community hospitals, at 11.5%. 
Table 6.1 shows the details of coding errors. 
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Table 6.1 Coding errors by hospital type from claims data 2001 
f 
Codine error of claims data (%Q 
Cause 0 errors R ~.... I G I I C :...... U· . 0 h I -e>;lona. enera . ommUDllY mversl~ t er Tot~~ 
_!'!~~l.!!l~!y~}-~gn~~-~~---- .. l-:}-.--.. -.-.----... -.. ~.-Q:L- .. ---... -.---I.Q.:-?---....... ------.--.---I.-?:? ... __ . __ ._. __ . __ ._._ ... L __ !:~· _______ I--!:·l--...... --.... -.... -... ---.--.. . 
~.ode n~t for primary I 1.1 I 0.7 I 8.4 I 0.2 I 5.6 14.2 ~~~~---------------!----------- .. ---f----------··---··j--·----·-----------------I------------------·----·~-------------r·--------------
~iag~osis not for I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.7 0.4 0.3 I 0.5 
_lnpa~!~!1.!. ______________________ l-.--... -- .. ----- .. - . ________ .. _. ____ { _____ ._ ..... ____ __ .____ -------__ . _____ -.-.--.----- .----___ .. ___________ . 
Primary di.agno~is not I 0.6 0.7 I 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.7 
:~;::~(~~~l~~-~~~-=-~-~~------~-·~ -~~- ~~--------
;~~ error-- __ ~~}-----~-r-H-----t6~I:-------- -~~j-~------ -~~~-~-------
1-~.!.:0::::u~::::a~:.....;e-r(-1--:O-r-6)----t- 69~06---~-~27-l\~~5-------- .--120-·~6-8-- 101. i~ ~~12--
From: Pannarunothai 2002a 
How reliable claims data need to be in order to measure performance is not known. 
Furthermore, when comparing discordant patient data and claims data, there is the 
problem of deciding which one is correct. Patient follow-up might be required in 
order to investigate the accuracy of the medical record data and claims data. In 
general, the reliability of claims data has been assessed by comparing claims data 
against medical records. For example, Humphries et a1. (2000) compared co-
morbidity from claims data and medical records in Canada. They found that reliability 
(Kappa) ranged between 0.31 and 0.83 (Humphries et a1. 2000). Kappa values of 
more than 0.75 were assumed as representing excellent agreement, while Kappa 
values of less than 0.4 represented poor agreement (Kirkwood and Stem 2003). Using 
Thai data, the NHSO investigated claims data in comparison with patient notes in 909 
hospitals in 2006. The number of cases analysed was 57,828. The data showed that 
reliability of claims data had a Kappa value of 0.75, as shown in Table 6.2. This 
means that the Thai claims data may be suitably representative of data from patient 
notes. 
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Table 6.2 Reliability from summary notes and coding data in 2006 
Patient notes Codin2 
Correct Incorrect Total 
Correct 27,253 6,073 33,326 
Incorrect 1,147 23,355 24,502 
Total 28,400 29,428 57,828 
Kappa=0.75 
From: Bureau of claims audit and quahty audit, NHSO 2004 
6.3 Methodology 
The methodology used for this study can be divided into two parts: LOS and 
readmission. The analyses of LOS and readmission used two diagnosis groups, 
Insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus (IDDM) and Non-Insulin Dependent Diabetes 
MeIlitus (NIDDM) which were separated into three conditions: acute, chronic, and no 
complications. There were two rationales behind this. First, different patient 
conditions might influence provider behaviour. Second, factors associated with LOS 
and readmission might differ according to diagnosis. The three conditions 
demonstrate differing degree of urgency of patient treatment. 
To identify the independent variables for the model, since there were few Thai studies 
of factors relating to LOS and readmission, both Thai and intemationalliterature were 
reviewed. As mentioned in chapter 4, this study employed three components of Lave 
and Frank's framework of LOS including patient characteristics, hospital 
characteristics, and payment structure. Factors affecting LOS included disease, 
condition, and context of study site. However, because of availability of information 
from claims data, the factors included in the study were age, sex, severity of disease, 
hospital type, and insurance status. For readmission, there is evidence that longer LOS 
can affect readmission (Bloomberg et al. 2003, Heggestad T. 2002) so this study 
included LOS in analysis of early readmission. Normally, in terms of patient 
characteristics, the elderly have a higher chance of getting severe conditions which 
might lead to longer LOS. Providers might be influenced by different characteristics 
of insurance such as the payment system to reduce the LOS of patients. Different 
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levels of hospital might also have different policies on treating patients. Teaching 
hospitals might take more time on investigations which might increase LOS. 
In the LOS analysis, this study uses the count data model which was presented in 
chapter 5. The dependent variable is length of stay. Since LOS distribution is usually 
skewed, so Poisson or negative binomial regression models are suitable for the 
analysis. Independent variables used in this study are composed of patient factors and 
clinical factors. Patient related independent variables are age, sex, and insurance 
status, while clinical characteristics are severity of disease, and hospital type. Severity 
in the claims data came from DRG grouper software which calculates severity by 
using co-morbidity and complications when patients are admitted. It can be 
categorized into five levels: 0 is no co-morbidity and a complication, 1 is minor, 2 is 
moderate, 3 is severe, and 4 is very severe co-morbidity and complication (National 
Health Security Office 2007b). 
For readmission, since readmission is a binary variable, so logistic regression was 
used for the analysis as this is a binary variable. The details of the model were given 
in chapter 5. 
6.4 Length of stay in Diabetes Mellitus patients between health 
insurance schemes 
DM patients were divided into acute complications, chronic complications, and 
admission without complications. The diagnosis of patients in the study used the 
International Classification of Disease 10th revision (ICD-I0) code El. The details of 
the retrieval coding are shown in Table 6.3. Acute complications were composed of 
EIOO, EIOI, El10, and EII1. Without complications were composed of EI09 and 
E119. The other codes were DM chronic complications. 
Table 6.3 Details of coding used in the analysis 
Code Details of di8J[Doses 
EIOO Insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with coma 
EIOI Insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with ketoacidosis 
EI02 Insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with renal complications 
EI03 Insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with ophthalmic complications 
EI04 Insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with neurological complications 
EIOS Insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with peripheral circulatory complications 
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Code Details of dia2Doses 
EI09 Insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, without complications 
EllO Non-insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with coma 
EIll Non-insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with ketoacidosis 
EIl2 Non-insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with renal complications 
E1l3 Non-insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with ophthalmic complications 
E1l4 Non-insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with neurological complications 
EllS Non-insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, with peripheral circulatory complications 
E1l9 Non-insulin-dependent Diabetes Mellitus, without complications 
Truncated data 
Distribution of data on LOS was skewed to the right. The range of LOS was between 
o to 441 days. However, this maximum range might come from coding errors or 
human error. To truncate the outliers, several methods can be used, depending on the 
user objective (Lee et al. 1998). This study used right-side truncation at mean+3 SO. 
However, the left side was not truncated because an admission of zero days was 
possible: for example, a patient admitted one day and discharged before noon the next 
day would be counted as zero days. The average LOS of claims data was 5.73 with 
SO 10.88, so the cut point was 38 days. The truncation removed data on 972 cases 
from 69,708 (leaving 68,736): 67 with acute complications, 762 with chronic 
complications, and 143 without complications. 
Furthennore, with regard to the age of the patient, ages ranged from 0 to 123 which 
was likely to be due to human--error in coding. To truncate the error, two sides 3 SD 
from the average were used to remove errors. The new age range was 20 to 101 years. 
Data were removed in 804 cases from 68,736: 329 with acute complications, 29 with 
chronic complications, and 446 without complications. The remaining data numbered 
67,932 cases. 
Table 6.4 shows the number of observations in this study. Most of the cases were DM 
without complications, with 37,104 cases. The cases of acute complications and 
chronic complications were nearly equal, at 15,289 and 15,539 respectively. The data 
showed that between the schemes, the VC scheme had the highest number of cases 
(78%) while the number of cases in SSS was the lowest (3%). CSMBS cases were 
about 19% of the total. 
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Table 6.4 Number of observations (admissions) in the length of stay and 
readmission study 
Diagnosis Insurance 
CSMBS SSS UC Number of 
N(%) N(%) N(%) Admission N (°le) 
Acute complications 2,520 445 12,324 15,289 
(ElOO-EI0l,EI10-EI11) (16) (3) (81) (100) 
Chronic complications 2,622 431 12,486 15,539 
(E102-EI05,El12-E115) (17) (3) (80) (100) 
No complications 8,035 1,075 27,994 37,104 
(EI09,EI19) (22) (3) (76) (100) 
Total 13,177 1,951 52,804 67,932 (19) (3) (78) (lOO) 
Source: Claims data 2005 
The characteristics of patients are shown in Table 6.5. Two-thirds of patients were 
female. 96% of cases were from public hospitals. 58% came from community 
hospitals. Most of the patients were elderly. More than 50% were older than sixty 
years. 
Comparing the three schemes, SSS patients were mainly male, while CSMBS and DC 
scheme patients were predominately female. All CSMBS patients used public 
hospitals while most SSS patients used private hospitals (57.4%). DC scheme patients 
also received services mainly from public hospitals, with only 2.4% of DC scheme 
patient data being from private hospitals. CSMBS and DC scheme patients were older 
than SSS patients. Most patients in the CSMBS and DC schemes were more than -60 
years old (69.8% and 52.5% respectively), while SSS patients were mainly in the 41-
60 year age group (61.8%). 
Table 6.5 Different characteristics of those admitted by insurance scheme 
Characteristics CSMBS(%) SSS(%) UCi%) Overall 
N 13,177 1,951 52,804 67,932 
Age 
0-40 1.4 28.8 6.5 6.1 
41-60 28.8 61.8 41.0 39.2 
>60 69.8 9.5 52.5 54.7 
Sex 
Male 37.9 55.8 30.2 32.4 
Female 62.2 44.2 69.8 67.6 
Severity· 
0 64.0 66.4 59.1 60.3 
2 IS.8 lS.7 20.6 20.2 
3 14.2 13.3 16.5 16.0 
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Characteristics 
4 
Hospital type 
Community 
General 
Regional 
University 
Private 
Military 
. 
* No cases of seventy level 1 
Source: Claims data 2005 
CSMBS(%) SSS(%) 
3.1 1.5 
46.4 2.0 
27.8 19.7 
15.9 17.1 
2.9 2.1 
-
57.4 
7.0 1.7 
6.4.1 Length of stay of Diabetes Mellitus patients 
UC(%) Overall 
3.9 3.6 
64.0 58.8 
20.4 21.8 
11.7 12.7 
1.0 1.4 
2.4 3.5 
0.5 1.8 
Average length of stay by schemes is shown in Table 6.6. Overall, CSMBS patients 
had longer LOS compared to SSS and VC scheme patients. LOS of CSMBS patient 
was on average 5.9 days, compared with 4.9 for both SSS and UC patients . 
Table 6.6 Length of stay between schemes for different patient types 
Admission 
complication type 
Acute x 
SD 
N 
Chronic x 
SD 
N 
Without x 
SD 
N 
Overall x 
SD 
N 
* Kruskal Walhs test 
Source: Claims data 2005 
CSMBS 
5.3 
5.0 
2,520 
9.0 
8.2 
2,622 
4.9 
4.9 
8,035 
5.8 
5.9 
13,177 
6.4.2 Factors explaining length of stay 
SSS UC Total 
3.8 3.8 4.0 
3.5 3.7 4.0 
445 12,324 15,289 
7.2 7.3 7.6 
7.2 7.2 7.4 
431 12,486 15,539 
3.5 3.6 3.9 
3.7 3.5 3.9 
1,075 27,994 37,104 
4.4 4.6 4.8 
4.9 4.9 5.2 
1,951 52,804 67,932 
P-value* 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
The summary of independent and dependent variables is presented in Appendix 2. A 
description and sununary of admission conditions is shown in Table A2.2, Table 
A2.3, and Table A2A. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution pattern of LOS. The range of 
LOS was between 0 and 38 days. 
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Figure 6.1 Length of stay distribution of Diabetes Mellitus patients 
o 10 20 30 40 LOS 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LOS 67,932 4.8 5.2 o 38 
Table 6.7 shows the association of different characteristics with the levels of 
complications. The main age group for all conditions was >60 years, which was about 
50-56%. Females were predoJ?inant in all three conditions. Ratio of cases by 
insurance corresponded to the percentage coverage of health insurance, for example, 
the VC scheme covered 75-80% of cases. Regarding severity status, most of the cases 
had no co-morbidity. The main providers were community hospitals and general 
hospitals. For LOS, those with acute complications were mainly in the 4-7 day group, 
while those with chronic complications mainly had LOS >7 days. In the group 
without complications, most bad LOS of 4-7 days. 
Table 6.7 Different characteristics in different complication conditions 
Com plications 
Variables Acute (%) Chronic (%) Without (%) P-value* 
N 15,289 15,539 37,104 
Age group <0.001 
0-40 7.7 5.1 5.9 
41-60 34.6 44.7 38.8 
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Complications 
Variables Acute (%) Chronic (%) Without (%) P-value* 
>60 57.7 50.2 55.3 
Sex <0.001 
Male 32.1 36.6 30.8 
Female 67.9 63.4 69.2 
Insurance <0.001 
CSMBS 16.5 16.9 21.7 
SSS 2.9 2.8 2.9 
UC 80.6 80.4 75.5 
Severity <0.001 
0 58.6 51.4 64.7 
2 19.7 23.3 19.1 
3 16.9 18.6 14.5 
4 4.8 6.8 1.8 
Hospital type 
Community 55.6 47.8 64.8 
General 23.2 22.7 20.8 
Regional 13.4 20.9 9.0 
University 2.1 2.7 0.5 
Private 3.2 4.3 3.3 
Military 2.7 1.6 1.6 
LOS <0.001 
0-3 59.9 35.4 61.2 
4-7 28.8 30.9 28.1 
>7 11.3 33.7 10.7 
* chl square test 
Source: Claims data 2005 
Model selection 
To select between Poisson and negative binomial regression models, a dispersion test 
had to be done. There was significant evidence of overdispersion (acute 
complications: chibar = 1.4xl04, p-value<O.OOl, chronic complications: chibar 
=5.0xl04, p-value<O.OOl, without complications: chibar = 3.1xlO\ p-value<O.OOl). 
Therefore, the analysis used a negative· binomial regression model instead of a 
Poisson model. 
Selection of independent variables 
Table 6.8 shows the bivariate analysis between individual independent variables and 
LOS for acute, chronic, and without complications patients. Selection of independent 
variables was done using the criteria of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), i.e. variables 
·with a p-value of less than 0.25; if too Iowa p-value is used, important variables 
might be missed. Using these criteria, the variables added into the model were age 
group, sex, insurance status, severity status, and hospital type. 
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Table 6.8 Bivariate analysis of variables in the negative binomial regression models and length of stay 
Acute complications 
Cod- p- 9S%CI 
Variables ficient value LL@ UL@@ 
Age group 
0-40 1.00 
41-60 -0.16 <0.001 '-0.21 -0.11 
>60 -0.13 <0.001 -0.18 -0.08 
Sex 
Male 1.00 
Female -0.11 <0.001 -0.13 -0.08 
Insurance 
CSMBS 1.00 
SSS -0.34 <0.001 -0.42 -0.26 
UC -0.33 <0.001 -0.37 -0.30 
Severity 
0 1.00 
2 0.19 <0.001 0.15 0.22 
3 0.41 <0.001 0.37 0.44 
4 0.90 <0.001 0.84 0.95 
Hospital 
~ 
Community_ 1.00 
General 0.14 <0.001 0.11 0.17 
Regional 0.32 <0.001 0.29 0.36 
University 0.89 <0.001 0.81 0.97 
Private 0.10 0.007 0.03 0.18 
! Military 0.69 <0.001 0.61 0.76 
- lower level I!YIlY upper level 
Source: Claims data 2005 
LR Prob Cod-
chil >chil Ficient 
1.00 
39.8 <0.001 0.05 
0.03 
1.00 
56.7 <0.001 -0.08 
1.00 
390.6 <0.001 -0.21 
-0.20 
1.00 
1,467.0 <0.001 -0.35 
-0.01 
0.32 
987.4 <0.001 1.00 
0.42 
0.39 
0.63 
0.25 
0.70 
Chronic complications Without complications 
p- 9S%CI LR Prob Coef- p- 9S%CI LR 
value LL UL Chil > chil ficieDt value LL UL chi2 
1.00 
0.141 -0.02 0.11 2.7 0.258 -0.09 <0.001 -0.12 -0.05 113.7 
0.314 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.703 -0.03 0.04 
1.00 
<0.001 -0.11 -0.05 31.0 <0.001 -0.10 <0.001 -0.12 -0.09 132.0 
1.00 
<0.001 
-0.30 -0.13 120.6 <0.001 -0.35 <0.001 -0.41 -0.30 982.8 
<0.001 
-0.24 -0.16 -0.30 <0.001 -0.32 -0.28 
1.00 
<0.001 -0.38 -0.32 637.0 <0.001 0.18 <0.001 0.16 0.20 1,806.3 
0.542 -0.05 0.03 0.39 <0.001 0.37 0.41 
<0.001 0.27 0.38 0.74 <0.001 0.69 0.80 
986.4 <0.001 1.00 855.7 
<0.001 0.39 0.46 0.23 <0.001 0.21 0.25 
<0.001 0.36 0.43 0.19 <0.001 0.16 0.22 
<0.001 0.54 0.71 0.43 <0.001 0.33 0.54 
<0.001 0.19 0.32 -0.04 0.061 -0.09 0.00 
<0.001 0.60 0.81 0.50 <0.001 0.44 0.56 
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Prob 
> chil 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Table 6.9 shows the first run of the negative binomial regression with independent 
variables and the result of Wald's test for joint significance. The results of the joint 
significance test in the three conditions showed that categorical data in the models 
helped to fit the negative binomial model. Therefore, all selected independent 
variables could be included in the models. 
Goodness of fit 
Goodness of fit in the negative binomial regression used Pearson's chi-square of 
expected and observed values. The hypothesis tested was that at least one P was not 
zero (Ho: PI = 0, Ha: Pi ~ 0). 
A likelihood ratio test found that all three analysis models fitted (acute 
complications: LR chi 2,371.2, p-value<O.OOI, chronic complications: LR chi 
1,504.0, p-value<O.OOI, without complications: LR chi 3,382.9, p-value <0.001). 
Therefore, the model of negative binomial regression in the first run could be used as 
the final model to explain the relationship of the independent variables to LOS. 
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Table 6.9 Fint run and results of negative binomial regression of length of stay for the three admission conditions 
! Joint Acute complications Joint Chronic complications Joint Without complications 
silnificance significance significance Variable P-value for 95% Cl P-value for 95% Cl P-value for 95% Cl 
Adjusted Coef- p- Adjusted Coef- p- Adjusted Coef- p-
Wald test ficient value LL@ UL@@ Wald test ficient value LL UL Wald test ticient value LL UL 
iF-statistic) iF-statistic) (F-statistic) 
LRChi 2371.24 1504.01 3382.86 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PseudoR2 0.0322 0.0159 0.0192 
Dependent variable LOS 
N 15J 254 15,455 37,044 
Independent variable 
Age group <0.001 (42.1) 0.046(6.2) <0.00IJ54.5) 
0-40 
41-60 -0.15 <0.001 -0.19 -0.10 0.02 0.584 -0.04 0.08 -0.13 <0.001 -0.17 -0.10 
>60 -0.16 <0.001 -0.21 -0.11 -0.02 0.576 -0.08 0.04 -0.11 <0.001 -0.14 -0.07 
Sex <0.001{l3.0J 0.001(10.2) <0.00 I (96.5) 
Male 
Female -0.05 <0.001 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 <0.001 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 <0.001 -0.10 -0.07 
Insurance <0.001(238.6) <0.001(53.4) <0.001(741.5) I 
CSMBS 
SSS -0.40 <0.001 -0.49 -0.30 -0.26 <0.001 -0.36 -0.16 -0.37 <0.001 -0.43 -0.31 
UC -0.26 <0.001 -0.29 -0.22 -0.12 <0.001 -0.16 -0.09 -0.27 <0.001 -0.29 -0.25 
Severity <0.001(1,IS0.3) <0.00lj472.0t <0.00t(1,726.2J 
0 
2 0.18 <0.001 0.14 0.21 -0.30 <0.001 -0.34 -0.27 0.16 <0.001 0.14 0.19 
i 3 0.36 <0.001 0.33 0.40 -0.02 0.223 -0.06 0.01 0.39 <0.001 0.37 0.41 
4 0.79 <0.001 0.74 0.85 0.25 <0.001 0.20 0.30 0.71 <0.001 0.65 0.76 
Hospital type <0.001(380.5) <0.001(719.0) <0.001(310.9) 
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Joint 
si!llificance Variable P-value for 
Adjusted 
Wald test 
(F -statistic) 
Community 
General 
Reaional 
University 
Private 
Military 
Constant 
Ilnaloha 
Alpha 
lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Claims data 2005 
Acute complications Joint 
sie:nificance 
95% Cl P-value for 
Coef- p- Adjusted 
ticient value LL@ UL@@ Wald test 
(F -statistic) 
0.06 <0.001 0.03 0.09 
0.17 <0.001 0.14 0.21 
0.61 <0.001 0.53 0.68 
0.15 <0.001 0.06 0.23 
0.44 <0.001 0.37 0.51 
1.54 <0.001 1.48 1.60 
-1.11 
0.33 
Chronic complications Joint Without complications 
shmificance 
95% Cl P-value for 95% Cl 
Coef- p- Adjusted Coef- p-
ticient value LL UL Wald test ticient value LL UL 
(F -statistic) 
0.37 <0.001 0.34 0.41 0.15 <0.001 0.13 0.17 
0.34 <0.001 0.31 0.38 0.10 <0.001 0.07 0.13 
0.51 <0.001 0.42 0.59 0.26 <0.001 0.15 0.36 
0.29 <0.001 0.22 0.37 -0.01 0.621 -0.07 0.04 
0.60 <0.001 0.49 0.70 0.28 <0.001 0.22 0.34 
2.00 <0.001 1.92 2.07 1.57 <0.001 1.53 1.61 
-0.56 -1.07 
0.57 0.34 
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Results for LOS using negative binomial regression 
In the acute complications model, after controlling for confounding factors, SSS and 
VC cases had significantly shorter LOS than CSMBS cases. SSS had 49% (lIe-0040) 
shorter LOS and VC scheme had 30% (lIe-0026) shorter LOS than the CSMBS. 
Female gender and age over 40 years were associated with significantly shorter LOS. 
High severity cases had significantly longer LOS compared to low severity cases. 
Very severe conditions had 2.20(eOo79) times longer LOS compared to cases without 
co-morbidity. For hospital types, community hospital had shorter LOS than all other 
hospital types, although the difference for private hospitals was not significant. 
In the chronic complications model, after controlling for confounding factors, VC 
scheme and SSS cases had significantly shorter LOS than CSMBS cases. SSS 
scheme had 30% (lIe-0026) shorter LOS while VC scheme had 13% (lIe-0012) shorter 
LOS compared with the CSMBS. Female gender was also associated with 
significantly shorter LOS. For hospital type, community hospital had significantly 
shorter LOS than regional, general, private hospitals. However, severity status had a 
different result. Cases of moderate severity were significantly more likely to have 
shorter LOS while very severe cases were significantly associated with long LOS. 
Moderate severity had 35% (lIe-0030~ shorter LOS than low severity while very severe 
cases had 28% (eOo2S) longer LOS compared to low severity cases. 
In the without complication model, after controlling for other confounding factors, 
VC scheme and SSS cases had significantly shorter LOS than CSMBS cases. SSS 
cases had 44% (lIe-0037) shorter LOS while VC scheme cases had 31% (lIe-0027) 
shorter LOS compared to CSMBS cases. Female gender and age over 40 years were 
significantly associated with shorter LOS. Regarding severity status, more severe 
cases had significantly longer LOS than those without co-morbidity. 
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6.S Readmission rate in the three health insurance schemes 
This section describes the readmission pattern between the health insurance schemes 
for three conditions: admission of DM patients with acute complications, with 
chronic complications, and without complications. Readmission is defined here as a 
secondary admission for the same diagnosis within 30 days after discharge from the 
previous hospitalization. Since claims data in this study combined all admissions in 
all hospitals participating in the three insurance schemes, readmission could be 
detected despite admission to different hospitals. This section is divided into two 
parts. The first provides the details of readmission by different characteristics. The 
second provides the analysis of factors explaining readmission. Bivariate and 
multivariate analyses are employed in the study. Logistic regression is used to 
analyse the variables explaining readmission. 
6.5.1 Readmission of Diabetes Mellitus patients 
The details of readmission ofDM patients in the three condition groups are shown in 
Table 6.10. DM patients with chronic complications had the highest average 
readmission rate (9.7%) compared to those with acute complications and those 
without complications (both 5.2%). 
Within the category acute complications, there was no significant difference in 
readmission rate according to age group, gender, insurance, and hospital type. Only 
severity level seemed to have a significant association. Cases with higher severity 
status tended to have lower readmission rates than those with lower severity status. 
There were differences in results for chronic complications and acute complications. 
For the chronic complication group, there was no significant difference by age group 
or gender, while insurance, severity, and hospital type showed significant 
differences. For insurance, the UC scheme had the highest readmission rate (10.2%) 
compared to SSS and CSMBS (8.1% and 7.0%). For different hospital types, 
regional hospitals had the highest readmission rate, at 11.6%, two times higher than 
that of military hospitals which had the lowest rate of only 5.3%. 
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For DM without complications, results were the same as for acute complications, 
except that age group was a significant factor in this group, as well as severity. The 
elderly tended to have a lower readmission rate compared to younger people, at 5.4% 
and 6.2% respectively. 
Table 6.10 Readmission rate by different characteristics 
Variables Admission type 
Acute complications Chronic complications Without complications 
Readmission p- Readmission p- Readmission p-
(%) value· (%) value· (%) value· 
Age group 0.256 0.606 0.001 
0-40 5.9 9.0 6.2 
41-60 5.4 10.0 4.7 
>60 5.0 9.6 5.4 
Sex 0.927 0.916 0.272 
Male 5.2 9.8 5.3 
Female 5.2 9.7 5.1 
Insurance 0.259 <0.001 0.139 
CSMBS 4.6 8.1 4.8 
SSS 4.5 7.0 4.6 
UC 5.3 10.2 5.3 
Severity 0.024 <0.001 0.004 
0 5.2 11.0 5.0 
2 6.1 7.9 6.0 
3 4.8 9.0 5.0 
4 3.6 8.3 4.1 
Hospital type 0.512 <0.001 0.024 
Community 5.1 9.3 5.3 
General 5.7 10.4 5.2 
.--
Regional 5.0 11.6 4.2 
University 3.7 4.3 2.5 
Private 4.6 6.7 5.5 
Military 5.2 5.3 3.8 
Total 5.2 9.7 5.1 
N 15,289 15,539 37,104 
*chi-square test 
Source: Claims data 2005 
6.5.2 Factors explaining readmission 
To analyse the factors associated with readmission, three steps of analysis were 
done: selection of independent variables, model analysis, and fitting the model. 
Independent variable selection 
The inclusion criteria for independent variables in the logistic regression model were 
those of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), that independent variable included should 
175 
have a p-value of < 0.25 in the bivariate analysis. For categorical data, Wald's test 
for joint significance was used to prove that those variables helped to improve the 
model fit. 
Table 6.11 shows the results of the bivariate analysis of each independent variable 
with readmission. From the criteria above, independent variables to exclude from the 
acute complication analyses were age group and sex. Variables included in the 
chronic condition analysis were insurance status, severity status, hospital type, and 
LOS of the readmission of the previous admission. Variables included in the without 
complication analysis were age group, sex, insurance status, severity status, hospital 
type, and LOS of the readmission of the previous admission. 
176 
Table 6.11Bivariate analysis of variables in the logistic regression models and readmission in three conditions 
Acute complication Chronic complication Without complication 
p. 95%CI LR Prob> p. 95%CI LR Prob> p. 95%CI LR Prob> 
Variables OR value LL@ UL@l@ Chil chil OR value LL UL Chi2 chi2 OR value LL UL chi2 chi2 
Age group 
0-40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
41-60 0.92 0.525 0.70 1.20 2.68 0.262 1.11 0.413 0.86 1.43 1.01 0.604 0.74 0.002 0.61 0.90 13.57 0.001 
>60 0.83 0.172 0.64 1.08 1.07 0.615 0.83 1.38 0.86 0.103 0.71 1.03 
Sex 
Male 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Female 0.99 0.927 0.85 1.16 0.Q1 0.927 0.99 0.916 0.89 1.11 0.01 0.916 0.95 0.272 0.86 1.04 1.20 0.273 
Insurance J 
CSMBS 1.00 1.00 I 1.00 
SSS 0.98 0.919 0.60 1.58 2.78 0.249 0.85 0.439 0.57 1.27 15.70 <0.001 0.95 0.763 0.70 1.29 4.02 0.134 
UC 1.17 0.134 0.95 1.43 1.29 <0.001 1.11 1.51 1.11 0.075 0.99 1.25 
Severity 
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 1.19 0.054 1.00 1.42 9.75 0.021 0.70 <0.001 0.60 0.80 32.77 <0.001 1.22 0.001 1.09 1.37 12.81 0.005 
3 0.93 0.483 0.76 1.14 0.80 0.002 0.69 0.92 1.01 0.858 0.88 1.16 
4 0.68 0.059 0.45 1.02 0.73 0.008 0.58 0.92 0.83 0.336 0.57 1.22 
Hospital 
type 
Community_ 1.00 4.37 0.498 1.00 46.89 <0.001 1.00 14.23 0.014 
General 1.14 0.147 0.96 1.35 1.13 0.073 0.99 1.29 0.98 0.757 0.88 1.10 
Regional 0.99 0.939 0.80 1.24 1.28 <0.001 1.12 1.46 0.78 0.007 0.65 0.93 
University 0.72 0.266 0.40 1.29 0.44 <0.001 0.27 0.71 0.46 0.084 0.19 1.11 
Private 0.89 0.605 0.57 1.38 0.70 0.026 0.51 0.96 1.03 0.799 0.80 1.33 
Military 1.02 0.929 0.65 1.60 0.54 0.034 0.31 0.96 0.70 0.102 0.45 1.07 
LOS 
I 0-3 1.00 7.16 0.028 1.00 70.69 <0.001 ~O~ L-. ____ 44.7L <0.001 
--
_ .. _.-
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Variables OR 
4-7 1.18 
>7 1.29 
,.. 
lower level 
@@ upper level 
P-
value 
0.047 
0.022 
Source: Claims data 2005 
Acute complication 
9SO/.CI LR Prob> 
LL® UL®® Chil chil OR 
1.00 1.38 1.08 
1.04 1.60 1.65 
Chronic compjication Without complication 
p. 95%CI LR Prob> p. 95%CI LR Prob> 
value LL UL Chil chi2 OR value LL UL chil· chi2 
0.307 0.94 1.24 1.34 0.000 1.21 1.48 
<0.001 1.45 1.87 1.45 0.000 1.26 1.67 
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Admission with acute complications 
For the acute complications model, Wald's test for joint significance showed that age 
group, insurance, and hospital type did not help to improve model fit. However, since 
this study needed to explore the effect of insurance on LOS, insurance scheme 
needed to be included in the model. The details are shown in Table 6.12. 
The final model of admission with acute complications included the independent 
variables insurance, severity, and LOS of previous admission. To fit the model, the 
Hosmer and Lemshow goodness of fit test was employed. The results showed that 
this model fitted according to the Hosmer-Lemeshow criteria, chi2(6) = 2.41, prob > 
che = 0.8784 (Ho: model is fitted, Ha: model is not fitted). 
The results show that after controlling for confounding factors, different insurance 
status did not have an effect on the readmission rate. However, a longer LOS of 
previous admission was positively and significantly associated with readmission. The 
4-7 day group had a 22% higher chance of readmission compared to the 0-3 day 
group, while a LOS of previous admission more than 7 days meant a 45% higher 
chance of readmission. For severity status, very severe conditions had a 68% (1/0.60) 
lower chance of readmission than cases without co-morbidity. 
Table 6.12 Joint significance with first run and fmal result of readmission 
logistic regression model for Diabetes Mellitus with acute 
complications 
First run acute complications Final result acute complications 
LRChi 31.32 24.85 
Prob> chi2 0.008 0.0008 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.004 
Dependent variable Readmission-l 
N 15,254 15,254 
P-value for 95% Cl 95% Cl 
Adjusted OR P- OR P-Variable Wald test Value LL@ UL@@ value LL UL 
(F-statistic) 
Independent variable 
Age group 0.345(2.1} 
0-40 1.00 
41-60 0.92 0.567 0.70 1.22 - - - -
>60 0.84 0.226 0.64 1.11 - - - -
Sex 
Male 1.00 
Female 1.01 0.855 0.87 1.19 - - - -
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Insurance 
CSMBS 
SSS 
UC 
Severity 
0 
2 
3 
4 
Hospital type 
Community 
General 
Regional 
University 
Private 
Military 
LOS 
0-3 
4-7 
>7 
(gl lower level 
@@ upper level 
0.193(3.3) 
<0.05(11.8) 
0.502(4.3) 
<0.01(12.2) 
Source: Claims data 2005 
1.00 
0.96 
1.20 
1.00 
1.16 
0.87 
0.60 
1.00 
1.15 
1.02 
0.73 
0.95 
1.02 
1.00 
1.21 
1.45 
Admission with chronic complications 
0.897 
0.097 
0.109 
0.198 
0.016 
0.107 
0.880 
0.291 
0.837 
0.937 
0.020 
0.002 
1.00 
0.54 1.72 1.00 0.996 0.62 
0.97 1.49 1.23 0.050 1.00 
1.00 
0.97 1.38 1.16 0.105 0.97 
0.71 1.07 0.87 0.189 0.71 
0.40 0.91 0.60 0.014 0.39 
0.97 1.37 - - -
0.81 1.27 
- - -
0.40 1.32 
- - -
0.57 1.59 
- - -
0.63 1.65 
- - -
1.00 
1.03 1.43 1.22 0.018 1.03 
1.15 1.83 1.45 <0.001 1.16 
From Table 6.13, Wald's test for joint significance shows that age group did not help 
to improve the fit of the logistic model; therefore, age group was removed from the 
model. Furthermore, the goodness of fit of the frrst run model shows that the model 
was not fitted by the Hosmer-Lemeshow criteria che(8) =16.15, prob>chi2=O.0403 
(Ho=model fitted, Hn= model not fitted). To diagnose the model, analyses of 
standardized residuals and leverage levels were explored to fmd the outliers. Figures 
6.2 and 6.3 show that standardized residuals at a level more than 3 SD and less than -
3 SD had a high leverage level. This means those observations have an influential 
effect on the fit of the model. Therefore, outlier observations were removed at a level 
of standardized residuals of more than 2.57SD and less than -2.57SD (99% Cl). The 
result after trimming outlier observations showed that the model fitted according to 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test, chi2(8) =10.4, prob>chi2=0.2382. The model was checked 
for interaction effects and no evidence of this was found. 503 cases were removed, 
characterized by VC scheme with no co-morbidity, and equal number of males and 
females. 
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1.63 
1.50 
1.38 
1.07 
0.90 
-
-
-
-
-
1.43 
1.82 
Figure 6.2 Scatter plot of standardized residuals with probability for 
readmission in Diabetes Mellitus chronic complications 
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.05 .1 
PJ{aS) 
.15 .2 
Figure 6.3 Distribution of standardized residuals with leverage level for 
readmission in Diabetes Mellitus chronic complications 
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• 
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The results of the model are shown in Table 6.13. After controlling for confounding 
factors, VC scheme status had a significant effect on the probability of being 
readmitted, while SSS did not have a significant effect. VC scheme cases had a 32% 
higher chance of readmission compared to CSMBS cases. Furthermore, longer LOS 
was a significant predictor of readmission compared to shorter LOS. The over 7 day 
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group had a 58% higher chance of readmission compared to the 0-3 day group. Cases 
with higher severity status were significantly less likely to be readmitted. There was 
a 20-50% lower chance of readmission with moderate to very severe cases compared 
to cases without co-morbidity. University hospitals were 2.7 times less likely to have 
readmissions compared to community hospitals. 
Table 6.13 Joint significance with first run and final result of readmission 
logistic regression model for chronic complications 
First run chronic complication Final result chronic complication 
LRChi 
Prob> chi2 
Pseudo R2 
Dependent variable 
N 
P-value for 
Variable 
Adjusted 
Wald test 
(F-statistic) 
Independent variable 
Age group 0.702(0.7) 
0-40 
41-60 
>60 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
Insurance <0.001(14.9) 
CSMBS 
SSS 
UC 
Severity <0.001(28.3) 
0 
2 
3 
4 
Hospital type <0.001(35.8) 
Community 
General 
Regional 
University 
Private 
Military 
WS <0.001(65.7) 
0-3 
4-7 
>7 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Claims data 2005 
164.18 
<0.001 
0.0167 
Readmission-l 
15,455 
Odds P-
ratios value 
1.00 
1.12 0.408 
UI 0.416 
1.00 
1.00 0.966 
1.00 
1.04 0.868 
1.35 <0.001 
1.00 
0.74 <0.001 
0.79 0.002 
0.66 <0.001 
1.00 
1.08 0.286 
1.23 0.003 
0.37 <0.001 
0.73 0.077 
0.54 0.035 
1.00 
1.08 0.310 
1.64 <0.001 
144.25 
<0.001 
0.0153 
14,952 
95% Cl 95% Cl 
Odds P-
LL@ UL@@ Ratios Value LL UL 
0.86 1.44 
- - - -
0.86 1.44 
- - - -
0.89 1.12 
- - - -
1.00 
0.67 1.61 1.01 0.967 0.65 1.56 
1.15 1.58 1.32 <0.001 1.13 1.55 
1.00 
0.64 0.86 0.75 <0.001 0.65 0.87 
0.69 0.92 0.81 0.005 0.70 0.94 
0.53 0.84 0.68 0.001 0.54 0.86 
1.00 
0.94 1.24 1.07 0.373 0.93 1.23 
1.07 1.41 1.25 0.002 1.08 1.43 
0.22 0.62 0.37 <0.001 0.22 0.62 
0.52 1.03 0.74 0.090 0.53 1.05 
0.31 0.96 0.55 0.039 0.31 0.97 
1.00 
0.93 1.24 1.07 0.361 0.93 1.23 
1.44 1.87 1.58 <0.001 1.38 1.82 
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Conditions without complication 
Table 6.14 shows the results of Wald's test for joint significance and the first run of 
the logistic model. The first run shows that the sex variable had a p-value of more 
than 0.25; likewise insurance status would not help to improve the fit of the model. 
However, since the study needed to explore the insurance scheme effect on 
readmission, insurance was included in the model. The first run model was not fitted 
by Hosmer-Lemeshow criteria, Chi2(8), 16.48, prob>chi2 = 0.036 (Ho=rnodel fitted, 
Hn= model not fitted). Therefore a residuals diagnosis was done and the interaction 
of independent variables was tested. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the evidence on 
outliers and high leverage. Figure 6.5 shows very high leverage in the very high 
outlier zone (>2.57 SD). These groups of data were 18 cases .of males in the SSS 
group aged over 60 with no co-morbidity, treated in private hospitals with LOS of 
less than 3 days. Remo ing these data improved the fit of the logistic regression. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit of the final run of the logistic regression was 
chi2(8) = 13.21, prob>chi2 = 0.105 which showed that the model fitted. 
Figure 6.4 Scatter plot of tandardized residuals with probability for 
readmis ion in Diabete Mellitus without complications 
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Figure 6.5 Distribution of standardized residuals with leverage level for 
readmission in Diabetes Mellitus without complications 
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In the details of the results, after controlling for confounding factors, DC scheme 
cases were more likely to be readmitted than CSMBS cases, while there was no 
difference in probability between SSS and CSMBS. Members of the DC scheme 
were 13% more likely to be readmitted compared to CSMBS members. Regarding 
severity status, only moderate status had a significant effect on the probability of 
readmission, with a 19% higher chance of readmission than cases without co-
morbidity. Regarding hospital type, regional hospitals were significantly less likely 
to have readmissions. They had a 29% (1/0.77) lower chance of readmission 
compared to community hospitals, while other types of hospital were not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 6.14 Joint significance with first run and final result of readmission 
logistic regression model for without complications 
LRChi 
Prob> chi2 
Pseudo R2 
Dependent variable 
N 
Variable 
Independent variable 
Age group 
0-40 
41-60 
>60 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
Insurance 
CSMBS 
SSS 
UC 
Severity 
0 
2 
3 
4 
Hospital type 
Community 
General 
Regional 
University 
Private 
Military 
LOS 
0-3 
4-7 
>7 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
P-value for 
Adjusted 
Wald test 
(F -statistic) 
<0.001(13.4) 
0.077(5.13) 
<0.01(13.1) 
0.0 13( 14.5) 
<0.001(49.2) 
Source: Claims data 2005 
First run without complication 
94.18 
0.000 
0.0063 
Readmission = 1 
37,044 
95% Cl 
Odds P-
ratios Value LL@ UL@@ 
1.00 
0.75 0.004 0.62 0.91 
0.88 0.170 0.72 1.06 
1.00 
0.96 0.384 0.87 1.06 
1.00 
0.96 0.844 0.67 1.38 
1.14 0.037 1.01 1.28 
1.00 
1.18 0.005 1.05 1.32 
0.94 0.374 0.82 1.08 
0.75 0.138 0.51 1.10 
1.00 
0.96 0.449 0.85 1.07 
0.77 0.004 0.64 0.92 
0.45 0.075 0.18 1.09 
1.12 0.441 0.84 1.51 
0.70 0.105 0.45 1.08 
1.00 
1.35 <0.001 1.22 1.50 
1.52 <0.001 1.31 1.76 
Final result without complication 
95.12 
0.000 
0.0064 
37,026 
95% Cl 
Odds P 
ratios -value LL UL 
0.74 0.002 0.61 0.90 
0.85 0.099 0.71 1.03 
- - - -
1.00 
0.88 0.491 0.60 1.28 
1.13 0.041 1.00 1.28 
1.00 
1.19 0.004 1.06 1.33 
0.94 0.404 0.82 1.08 
0.75 0.143 0.51 1.10 
0.96 0.478 0.85 1.08 
0.77 0.005 0.64 0.92 
0.45 0.078 0.18 1.09 
1.07 0.646 0.79 1.45 
0.70 0.109 0.45 1.08 
1.00 
1.36 <0.001 1.23 1.51 
1.53 <0.001 1.32 1.77 
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6.6 Discussion 
This study sought to illustrate the effect of different insurance schemes and other 
factors on LOS and readmission for DM cases in Thailand. LOS is a common 
indicator for efficiency use of resource in hospitalized patient while early 
readmission can be used as an indicator for quality. The results of the study suggest 
that the influence of insurance differs with the severity of DM admission. 
Bivariate analysis 
Admissions rate of DM patients differed by insurance scheme, however these 
differences at least in part reflected differences in demographic characteristics of 
beneficiaries in the three schemes. VC scheme and CSMBS patients were mainly 
elderly while SSS patients were of a younger age. Differences in providers also 
corresponded to the regulations of each insurance scheme. CSMBS allowed 
beneficiaries to go to any providers in the public sector. The VC scheme set CUPs as 
its main contractor, which in rural areas meant the community hospital was the initial 
place of admission, with referral needed to access higher levels. SSS included public 
and private hospitals of more than 100 beds as its main contractors. 
In the analysis of LOS, DM patients with chronic conditions had longer LOS than 
those with acute conditions and without complications. By scheme, CSMBS had 
longer LOS than the VC scheme or SSS. However, readmissions within 30 days after 
discharge were not different by scheme except in the case of chronic conditions. 
Multivariate analysis 
The analysis found that there were scheme effects on LOS and readmission. This 
study separated analysis of LOS and readmission into three groups according to 
complications of DM: acute, chronic, and without complications. The rationale 
behind this approach came from two concerns. First, treatment needs differ in these 
three conditions. Second, insurance scheme reimbursement mechanisms can 
influence provider behaviour; therefore providers may respond to patients 
differently. Some argue that providers are more concerned about payment received 
from different insurance scheme than people's need for urgent treatment. From the 
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results of the study, overall, there seemed to be little difference between the 
insurance schemes in LOS and readmission between the three conditions. 
In the LOS analysis, the VC scheme and SSS had shorter LOS for all admission 
conditions. The reason might come from provider behaviour in response to the 
scheme's reimbursement mechanism. The VC scheme paid hospitals by capitation 
for OP and preventive and promotive care, and by prospective payment for 
admissions by using DRGs within a global budget set at the national level. DRG 
payment was applied to all levels of hospital (National Health Security Office 
2007b). The SSS paid hospitals by capitation payments, while CSMBS paid by FFS. 
Providers may have stronger incentives to control costs under capitation and 
prospective payment, while FFS payment tends to encourage longer LOS. These 
findings correspond to several studies on the effect of payment type on LOS (Sepehri 
et al. 2006, Chan et al. 1997, Lave and Frank 1990, Vip et al. 2001). Furthermore, 
the CSMBS regulation by which patients pay nothing when admitted might influence 
patients to request longer stays in hospital (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2003). 
Regarding other demographic factors, after controlling for clinical and insurance 
factors, the elderly had significantly shorter LOS. This fmding did not support the 
hypothesis that the elderly had higher probability of longer LOS. The reason for this 
might be cultural issues whereby the families take care of their elderly at home. 
On gender, this study found that females had a significantly higher probability of 
shorter LOS. This may be the result of biological factors or it might be other factors 
not included in the study, such as higher tobacco and alcohol use amongst males. 
lbis fmding corresponds to a study of VS Diabetes admission which found that 
hospitalized male DM patients were more likely to have other complication 
conditions than females (Aubert et al. 1995). This might relate to less physical 
activity in males (Steyn et al. 2007). Furthermore, there is evidence that women tend 
to leave hospital early because of child care (Sepehri et al. 2006). Some studies 
found that females knew about health matters than men so they were more likely to 
have better health (Omachonu et al. 2004). 
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Severity status was the strongest indicator of LOS. ~~ more severe conditions had 
significantly longer LOS. This finding corresponds with other studies showing that 
longer LOS relates to severity status (Brasel et al. 2007, Stoskopf and Horn 1992). 
Regarding the different types of hospital, after controlling for other factors, all types 
of hospital were more likely to have longer LOS compared to community hospitals, 
except for private hospitals for acute complications and DM without complications. 
This might be due to two factors. First, patients in higher-level facilities normally 
had been referred there from lower-level hospitals such as community hospitals, so 
they were more severe cases than at lower level. Second, providers in higher-level 
hospitals might need more investigations to review patients. 
In the analysis of readmission, VC scheme patients had a higher probability of 
readmission than SSS and CSMBS patients after controlling for other factors. This 
might imply the effect of payment mechanism, especially the prospective payment 
by DRGs with global budget in the VC scheme. The SSS seemed to be efficient in 
tenns of readmission. SSS patients had a probability of shorter LOS but no 
difference in readmission rates compared to CSMBS patients. This appears to reflect 
efficient use of hospital resources. 
There were, however, other factors affecting readmission in different conditions. In 
the acute complications group, factors explaining readmission were severity and LOS 
of previous admission, while for chronic complications and those without 
complications factors were age, insurance status, severity, hospital type, and LOS of 
previous admission. This might imply that patients who were 'admitted with acute 
complications received the same standard service across all insurance schemes 
because acute complications condition was urgent and the provider had limited 
choice of treatment. In contrast, for chronic conditions and those without 
complications, providers might have more options to treat the patient since the 
condition was not urgent and life threatening. 
Regarding severity status, there were differences between each severity level. In very 
severe cases, there was a significantly lower chance of being readmitted than non 
severe cases in acute and chronic cOmplications cases. This might be because this 
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group of patients needed longer time in hospital; they received more treatment until 
all co-morbidity had improved, which reduced their chances of being readmitted. 
Alternatively, it might be the preference of patients to stay at home when the 
prognosis of disease was poor. 
Controlling for severity, longer LOS of previous admission was a significant 
predictor of readmission compared to shorter LOS. For example, LOS of more than 7 
days meant a 46-62% higher chance of being readmitted compared to a 0-3 day LOS. 
This may be because patients who needed longer LOS might be in the severe group 
and have several co-morbidities inadequately controlled for in the analysis, which 
increased the chance of readmission after discharge. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the effect of health insurance and other characteristics on 
LOS and readmission of DM patients in three conditions: acute complications, 
chronic complications, and no complications. The findings suggest that health 
insurance scheme affected LOS and readmission of DM patients. This finding helped 
to prove the hypothesis that there were differences in LOS and early readmission 
between the three public health insurance schemes. In terms of LOS, the VC scheme 
and the SSS had a higher chance of shorter LOS than the CSMBS. However, only the 
VC scheme had a higher chance of readmission than the CSMBS and SSS, while the 
CSMBS and SSS showed no difference in early readmission. SSS patients seemed to 
have received more efficient care with acceptable quality than UC scheme and 
CSMBS patients. 
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CHAPTER 7: VARIATION OF QUALITY OF CARE IN NON 
INSULIN DEPENDENT DIABETES MELLITUS PATIENTS IN 
DIFFERENT INSURANCE SCHEMES 
7.1 Background 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine variations in service provision and practice 
for Non-Insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus (NIDDM) patients under the three 
major health insurance schemes - Universal Coverage (VC), Social Security Scheme 
(SSS), and Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) - in Samutsakhon 
province. NIDDM was chosen as a tracer for several reasons. First, it has a definite 
diagnosis by laboratory criteria; second, a standard clinical practice guideline has 
been developed for DM and is generally accepted by physicians; and third, DM is a 
chronic condition which needs continuity of care, so that sampled patients can be 
regularly followed-up. The standard guidelines for DM in Thailand were used as the 
gold standard to assess the process of care of individual patients. Moreover, as 
quality of care might be affected by inaccessibility to appropriate care, this also was 
examined. 
The methodology adopted in this study is explained in the next section. Then, results 
from the analysis are presented by insurance scheme in terms of accessibility, quality 
of process of care, and outcome of care in DM patients. Discussion and conclusions 
are presented at the end. 
7.2 Methodology 
Secondary data study 
The aim of the secondary data analysis was to explore diagnosis of DM and the use 
of services by DM patients under different insurance schemes. The 2004 Health 
Examination Survey surveyed the Thai population health using a multi stage 
sampling frame. DM was diagnosed based on clinical examination and laboratory 
test. Diabetes was defined as FPG ~ 7.0 mmol/l, use of medication (oral glycemic 
agents or insulin) for the treatment ofDM during the previous two weeks, or a report 
of a previous diagnosis of diabetes by a medical doctor (Aekplakom et al. 2007). A 
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database from the 2004 Health Examination Survey containing 39,290 people was 
employed to analyse diagnosis and measure use of services. 3,410 records met the 
criteria of having Diabetes Mellitus. 80% of them were VC members, 17% were 
CSMBS members and 3% were SSS members. 
Table 7.1 shows the characteristics of DM patients by scheme in the Health 
Examination Survey. CSMBS and VC scheme members were mainly in higher age 
groups (>60) while SSS members were mainly in younger age groups (31-45). The 
most common educational level in the three schemes was elementary education. 
However, the share of no education was higher for VC scheme members compared to 
SSS and CSMBS members. 
Table 7.1 Characteristics of health examination survey sample 
Variables CSMBS(%) SSS(%) UC scheme(%) 
N 3,410 572(17.0) 112(8.0) 2,726(80.0) 
Region BKK 45(7.9) 14(12.5) 162(5.9) 
Central 198(34.6) 61(54.5) 1,023(37.6) 
Northeast 152(26.6) 13(11.6) 657(24.1) 
North 101(17.7) 13(11.6) 571(21.0) 
South 76(13.3) 11(9.8) 313(11.5) 
Sex Male 254(44.4) 63(56.3) 1, 144(42.0) 
Female 318(55.6) 49(43.8) 1,582(58.0) 
Age group 15-30 1(0.2) 11(9.8) 42(1.5) 
31-45 16(2.8) 42(37.5) . 261(9.6) 
46-50 70(12.2) 33(29.5) 637(23.4) 
>60 485(84.5) 26(23.2) 1,786(65.5) 
Area Rural 158(27.6) 37(33.0) 1,253(46.0) 
Urban 414{72.4) 75(67.0) 1,473(54.0) 
Education No fonnal education 43(7.6) 3(2.7) 335(12.3) 
Elementary education 360(63.5) 61(54.5) 2.089(76.9) 
Secondary/vocational 106(18.7) 35(31.3) 242(8.9) 
University 58(10.2) 13(11.6) 520.9) 
Source: Health Exammatlon Survey 2004 
Primary research study 
The aim of the primary research study was to explore the effect of the insurance 
schemes on quality of care. Data collected from five hospitals (3 public and 2 private 
hospitals) in Samutsakhon province were analysed. The numbers of patients in the 
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study were 1,939. Data were collected from medical records and patient interviews. 
Process of care and outcome of care are two major dimensions measured in this 
study. Compliance with the standard clinical guidelines for DM is used as an 
indicator of the quality of the process of care. For outcome of care, achieving the 
target of care and hospitalization are employed as indicators. 
Model and dependent variables 
Logistic regression modelling was used in the multivariate analysis. The dependent 
variables were achieving the standard of process of care in the six indicators (FPG 
test, BP test, urine protein test, HbA I C, lipid profile, eye examination). Achieving 
each target was set as 1 while not achieving each target was O. All six indicators were 
analysed separately in the analysis. The logistic regression equation used in this 
study is shown below. 
Equation I 
where 1t represents the probability of a patient receiving the set standard of care for 
each lab test. Xi (i= 1,2 ... ,i) represents independent variables hypothesized to affect 
target achieved of the standard treatment. 
Standard process and intermediate outcome measured from the standard practice 
guidelines, as mentioned in chapter 4, were employed as the measure of quality. 
Good quality in this study was defined as having met the minimum standard 
guidelines and achieving the outcome targets. 
The study employed all six-process indicators and five selected outcome indicators 
(mean FPG, HbAIC, fasting triglyceride, total cholesterol, and BP). The study used 
total cholesterol as representing cholesterol status. The details of the outcome 
indicators are shown in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2 Process of care indicators of Diabetes Mellitus 
Indicators Formula Explanation 
Receiving test(process of 
care) 
FPG test Number of FPG tests ~ 4 times per year = achieved 
received within one year <4 times per year= not achieved 
BP test Number of BP tests received ~ 4 times per year = achieved 
within one year <4 times per year= not achieved 
Urine protein test Number of urine protein tests ~l time per year= achieved 
received within one year < 1 time per year= not achieved 
HbAIC test Number of HbAIC tests ~ 1 time per year= achieved 
received within one year <1 time per year= not achieved 
Lipid profile test Number of lipid profile tests ~ 1 time per year= achieved 
received within one year <1 time per year= not achieved 
Eye examination test Number of eye examination ~ 1 time per year= achieved 
tests received within one year <1 time per year= not achieved 
Intennediate outcome 
indicator (q uality of care) 
MeanFPG Mean result of FPG within <130 mg/dl = achieved 
one year ~130 mg/dl = not achieved 
Mean HbAIC Mean result of HbAIC <7% = achieve 
within one year ~7% = not achieve 
Mean fasting triglyceride Mean result of total <150 mg/dl = achieve 
triglyceride within one year ~150 mg/dl = not achieve 
Mean total cholesterol Mean result of total <200 mg/dl = achieve 
cholesterol within one year ~OO mg/dl = not achieve 
Mean BP Mean result of BP within on <130/80 = achieve 
year ~ 130180 = not achieve 
Independent variables 
Variables used in this study were based on the literature review in section 2.5, and a 
conceptual framework adapted from Pringle et al. 1993 and Alberti et al. 2007., 
Choice of variables was justified in section 4.5.1. Since there were few Thai studies 
on factors associated with DM quality of care, this study mainly drew from 
international experience. 
Three sets of factors were considered to be associated with process and intennediate 
outcomes of DM care. The first was patient factors which were age, sex, marital 
status, education, living area, income, duration of having DM, smoking, and co-
morbidity. The second was provider factors which was hospital. The study did not 
use physician specialist type because hospitals had a lot ofDM patients and could 
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not allocate a specific doctor for each patient. The third was system factors which 
was insurance status. This study aimed to explore the association of insurance 
scheme with services received from providers.ln the analysis of these hospital data, 
some may argue that this data structure has hierarchical characteristics which makes 
it possible to use multi level analysis instead of ordinary logistic regression. To 
explore the result of an analysis with this different methodology, multilevel analyses 
of these data were done and are presented in Appendix 3. 
7.3 Diagnosis and use of care (data from the Health Examination 
Survey) 
Data from the 2004 Health Examination Survey indicated that diagnosis of DM and 
use of DM care varied between health insurance schemes, as shown in Table 7.4. 
Many people having DM had not been diagnosed (43%). SSS had the lowest uptake 
of DM screening between the three insurance schemes (59.8%), For quality of DM 
care, only 46.7% of DM patients receiving treatment were well controlled. Well 
controlled meant that patients had been previously diagnosed and had FPG lower 
than 7.8 mmollL (Aekplakom et aI. 2007). A greater proportion of CSMBS and DC 
patients receiving treatment were well controlled compared to SSS patients; 46.4 and 
47.2% respectively compared with only 29.5% ofSSS patients (p <0.001). 
Table 7.3 Thai people with Diabetes Mellitus by insurance scheme from the 
2004 health examination survey 
Scheme Chi-
square 
CSMBS SSS VC Total p-value 
N 572 112 2,726 3,410 
Not diagnosed (%) 30.4 59.8 45.3 43.3 <0.001 
Diagnosed not treated (%) 3.7 0.9 2.2 2.4 
Diagnosed and treated (%) 65.9 39.3 52.5 54.3 <0.001 
-poor controlled (% ) (53.6) (70.5) (52.8) (53.3) <0.001 
-well controlled (% ) (46.4) (29.5) (47.2) (46.7) <0.001 
Source: health exammatlon survey 2004 
7.3.1 Factors associated with uncontrolled Diabetes Mellitus 
Table 7.5 illustrates the characteristics of patients with well and poorly controlled 
DM. There was a greater proportion of uncontrolled DM amongst SSS patients than 
amongst VC and CSMBS patients. Those residing in Bangkok also had a greater 
proportion of uncontrolled DM compared with those living in other regions. The 
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elderly group had a greater proportion of well-controlled DM than the younger age 
groups but this disparity was not observed by gender. 
Table 7.4 Control of Diabetes Mellitus by different characteristics 
N Controlled(% ) U ncontrolled(%) P-value* 
Insurance 
CSMBS 377 46.4 53.6 <0.001 
SSS 44 29.5 70.5 
UC 1,431 47.2 52.8 
Region 
Central 714 47.3 52.7 0.005 
Northeast 399 41.9 58.1 
North 378 53.4 46.6 
South 231 46.8 53.2 
Bangkok 130 37.7 62.3 
Sex 
Male 706 45.0 55.0 0.276 
Female 1,146 47.6 52.4 
Age group 
15-30 5 40.0 60.0 <0.001 
31-45 100 25.0 75.0 
46-50 393 40.5 59.5 
>60 1,354 50.1 49.9 
Area 
Rural 724 47.2 52.8 0.686 
Urban 1,128 46.3 53.7 
Education level 
No fonnal education· 207 52.2 47.8 0.015 
Elementary education 1,397 47.2 52.8 
Secondary/vocational 171 39.8 60.2 
University 68 33.8 66.2 
. 
• Chl-square test 
Source: Health Examination Survey 2004 
The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 7.6. Comparing between 
insurance schemes, after controlling for demographic confounding factors, the 
CSMBS had significantly more uncontrolled DM compared to the UC scheme. The 
rate of uncontrolled DM was 47% more than for the UC scheme group. 
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Table 7.5 Insurance scheme explaining uncontrolled Diabetes Mellitus 
Factor Odds Ratio· P-value 
Dependent variable Uncontrolled DM = I 
N 2,323 
Independent variables 
Insurance 
UC 1.00 
CSMBS 1.47 0.027 
SSS l.10 0.849 
• Adjusted by region, sex, age group, area, and educatIOn level 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Health Examination Survey 2004 
95%CI 
LL@ UL@@ 
1.04 2.07 
0.40 3.04 
7.4 Description of Diabetes Mellitus patients in Samutsakhon 
province 
The details of data collected from medical records and patient interviews are shown 
in Table 7.7. The number of samples is nearly equal in the three schemes. VC and 
CSMBS data are from only public hospitals while SSS data are from both public and 
private hospitals. Since NIDDM was employed as a tracer, so the major age group of 
samples was older than 41 years. Most of the patients, 65%, were female. The 
majority of them were educated between primary level and bachelor degree, and 23% 
of them did not have an occupation. Most patients, 58%, had been diagnosed for less 
than five years. 76% had at least one co-morbidity. 
For characteristics by insurance scheme, there were a greater proportion of women 
amongst VC scheme patients compared with SSS and CSMBS. SSS patients were 
relatively younger and had a shorter period with DM. 75% of them were between 41 
and 60 years while more than 50% of UC scheme and CSMBS patients were aged 
over 60 years. CSMBS patients had a higher educational level than SSS and UC 
patients. For income status, more than 90% of SSS patients had an income greater 
than 2,000 Baht per month, while 70% of CSMBS patients did. Only 45% of UC 
scheme patients had an income greater than 2,000 baht per month. A greater 
proportion of UC patients resided in rural areas in contrast to SSS and CSMBS 
patients. Only 14 percent of DM patients had been hospitalized in the previous year; 
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SSS patients had fewer admissions than VC and CSMBS patients while a greater 
proportion of CSMBS patients had co-morbidity. 
Table 7.6 Diabetes Mellitus patient characteristics by insurance scheme 
Different characteristics 
Percentage of P-value* 
UC SSS CSMBS Total 
N 664 643 632 1,939 
Hospital % % % % 
Samutsakhon (public) 46.1 31.4 48.9 42.1 <0.001 
Kratumban (public) 36.3 7.2 38.5 27.3 
Banpaw (public) 17.6 2.2 12.7 10.9 
Srivichai3 (private) - 20.8 - 6.9 
Mahachai2 (private) - 38.4 - 12.7 
Age 
<40 2.6 17.9 1.7 7.4 <0.001 
41-60 48.2 74.7 30.4 51.2 
>60 49.3 7.5 67.9 41.5 
Sex 
Male 28.0 38.9 37.5 34.7 <0.001 
Female 72.0 61.1 62.5 65.3 
Marital status 
Single 8.0 to.l 4.1 7.4 <0.001 
Married 92.0 89.9 95.9 92.6 
Education 
Without education 19.4 3.3 10.0 11.0 <0.001 
primary-bachelor 79.2 92.4 76.0 82.5 
>bachelor 1.4 4.4 14.1 6.5 
Occupation 
Without occupation 26.5 7.8 33.9 22.7 <0.001 
Merchandise 20.5 7.6 7.6 12.0 
Private 16.0 80.1 2.7 32.9 
Government/State enterprise 0.5 0.9 31.7 10.8 
Other 36.6 3.6 24.2 21.6 
Income 
No income 37.7 6.8 20.9 22.0 <0.001 
B 1-2,000 18.5 2.8 10.3 10.6 
B 2,001-10,000 38.7 73.9 39.9 50.8 
B >10.000 5.1 16.5 29.0 16.7 
Area 
Urban 52.3 43.9 44.8 47.0 0.004 
Rural 47.7 56.1 55.2 53.0 
Duration ofDM 
ss years 52.9 76.1 46.4 58.4 <0.001 
> 5 years 47.1 24.0 53.6 41.6 
Admission 
No admission 84.0 90.2 84.5 86.2 0.002 
Admission 16.0 9.8 15.5 13.8 
Co-morbidity 
No 30.1 29.4 12.3 24.1 <0.001 
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Different characteristics 
Percentage of 
P-value* VC 1 sss I CSMBS I Total 
Yes 69.9 170.6 187.7 175.9 
*Chi-square test 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
7.5 Process of care 
From the number of tests per year, FPG and blood pressure were common tests when 
patients came for follow up, while less than 50% received tests for HbAIC, urine 
protein, or had an eye examination at least once a year. Figures 7.1 to 7.6 show the 
distribution of number of lab tests per year for several standard tests. Figures 7.1 and 
7.6 show that most of the patients received FPG and BP tests six times a year. None 
of the targets for the other standard tests were achieved. The majority of DM patients 
were not tested for HbA 1 C, urine protein, and eye examination. Only a small 
percentage of them received eye examinations and 30-40% was not tested for lipid 
profile. 
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Figure 7.1 Fasting Plasma Glucose checks per year 
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Figure 7.2 HbA1C checks per year 
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Figure 7.3 Urine protein checks per year 
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Figure 7.4 Eye examination checks per year 
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Figure 7.5 Lipid profile checks per year 
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Figure 7.6 Blood pressure checks per year 
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The details of mean number of laboratory tests for different insurance schemes are 
shown in Table 7.8. Overall, SSS patients received more laboratory tests per year 
than VC scheme and CSMBS patients. For example, SSS patients received an eye 
examination 0.2 times per year while VC and CSMBS members were only tested 
0.06 and 0.09 times per year respectively. However, SSS members were less likely to 
receive a urine protein check than VC and CSMBS members. 
Table 7.7 Mean number of laboratory tests per year in Diabetes Mellitus 
patients by insurance scheme. 
Test UC SSS CSMBS P-value* 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
FPG 6.97 2.77 7.62 2.78 6.40 2.50 <0.001 
HbAlc 0.15 0.42 0.33 0.64 0.32 0.63 <0.001 
Urine protein 0.37 0.77 0.12 0.49 0.48 0.82 <0.001 
Eye examination 0.06 0.41 0.20 0.46 0.09 0.40 <0.001 
Lipid profile 0.71 0.77 1.12 0.91 0.98 0.95 <0.001 
Blood pressure 7.07 2.84 7.85 2.80 6.63 2.75 <0.001 
*Kruskal Walhs test 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
To compare services between schemes, Table 7.9 shows that there were significant 
differences in the quality of services between health insurance schemes. Achieving 
the target of process of care differed by type of laboratory test and by insurance 
scheme. Overall, FPG and BP checks were the tests that most achieved their service 
targets. More than 90% of patients across all insurance schemes received FPG and 
BP checks more than four times a year. Eye examination was the least achieved 
target. Only 8.9% received eye examinations at least once a year. However, SSS 
patients had a higher rate of eye examinations compared to the UC scheme and 
CSMBS. 17.1 % of SSS patients received eye examinations while only 3.8% of DC 
scheme and 6.0% of CSMBS received eye examinations at least once a year. 
Table 7.8 Quality of care process provided to Diabetes Mellitus patients by 
insurance scheme 
UC(%) SSS(%) CSMBS(%) Overall P-value (Chi-square) 
FPG 
<4 6.3 4.8 8.7 6.6 0.019 
~4 93.7 95.2 91.3 93.4 
HbAIC 
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UC(%) 888(%) C8MB8(%) Overall P-value (Chi-square) 
0 86.8 73.6 75.5 78.7 <0.001 /----
13.2 24.4 24.5 21.3 ~l 
1----. . t--_Ur:!!!~rotem 
-
0 74.0 93.5 66.5 77.7 <0.001 
1--- ----
>1 26.0 7.5 33.5 22.3 
Eye examination 
0 96.2 82.9 94.0 91.1 <0.001 
-- --
>1 3.8 17.1 6.0 8.9 
rr::ipid profile 
---
0 45.5 26.0 32.1 34.7 <0.001 1--
~1 55.5 74.0 67.9 65.3 
Blood ~ressure 
<4 6.2 4.4 7.8 6.1 0.040 
~4 93.8 95.6 92.2 93.9 
~-
Total 664 643 632 1,939 
Source: MedIcal record and DM patient data 
7.6 Association between insurance schemes and targets measuring 
process of care of Diabetes Mellitus 
This section aims to explain the relationship between insurance scheme and process 
of care. Details of dependent and independent variables are shown in Table 7.7. 
Dependent variables consist of the six clinical tests shown in Table 7.8. The result of 
target achievement is a dichotomous outcome, meeting the target or not. Logistic 
regression was employed in the analysis. Achieving the target was set as 1 while not 
meeting the target was set as O. Results of the analysis are shown in six regressions 
which are FPG, HbAl C, urine protein, eye examination, lipid profile, and blood 
pressure. 
Bivariate analysis between different characteristics of independent variables and 
achieving the test targets was conducted to identify significant confounding factors. 
The results are shown in Table A4.1 (Appendix 4). Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) 
suggested that an independent variable with a p-value of more than 0.25 should be 
included in the model. However, the results showed that each independent variable 
had a different effect on achievement of test targets. Therefore, to control for 
confounding factors by statistical criteria, according to the literature review, all 
factors were included in all models. Confounding factors were age, sex, marital 
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status, education, living area, income, duration of DM, smoking, co-morbidity, and 
hospital. 
Results of the multivariate analysis are shown in Tables 7.10-7.15. The logistic 
models were tested for goodness of fit using the Hosmer & Lemeshow method. All 
test target models fitted with the independent variables. The details of goodness of fit 
tests are shown in Table 7.10. 
Table 7.9 Goodness of fit of multivariate analysis of the six clinical tests 
FPG HbAle Urine Eye Lipid BP 
examination examination Profile 
N 1,939 1,939 1,162 1,728 1,939 1,939 
Group 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 5.12 11.04 Chi-square 
11.05 10.66 8.72 12.63 
Prob>Chi-square 0.745 0.199 0.199 0.222 0.366 0.125 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
Table 7.11 shows the results of the logistic regression for the six test targets. The 
data show the adjusted and unadjusted odds ratios. The details of the full model are 
shown in Table A4.2. For FPG tests, after ~ntrolling for confounding factors, 
insurance scheme did not affect achievement of the target. 
For HbAIC test, the results show that CSMBS had a significantly higher probability 
of achieving the test target compared to the UC scheme. CSMBS had a 91 % higher 
chance of meeting the target than UC scheme. However, the adjusted odds ratio after 
controlling for confounding factors was lower than the unadjusted odds ratio. There 
was no significant difference between SSS and the UC scheme in achieving the test 
target. 
For urine protein examination, the SSS had a significantly lower probability of 
achieving the examination target than the UC scheme, while the CSMBS was 
significantly more likely to achieve the target compared to the UC scheme. After 
controlling for other confounding factors, the achievement rate of the UC scheme 
was 3.3 times higher than that of the SSS, while achievement by the CSMBS was 
1.36 times higher than the UC scheme. 
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For eye examination, there was no significant difference in meeting the target 
between the SSS and CSMBS compared to the UC scheme. Although the unadjusted 
odds ratio of SSS showed significantly higher probability of achieving the eye 
examination target than the UC scheme, there was no significance after controlling 
for confounding factors. 
For the lipid profile test, the SSS and CSMBS had a significantly higher probability 
of achieving the target compared to the UC scheme. The SSS was 2.95 times, and the 
CSMBS 1.47 times, more likely to achieve the standard target compared to the UC 
scheme. 
For the BP test, both the SSS and CSMBS were not significantly different to the UC 
scheme after adjusting for confounding factors, 
In summary, the CSMBS scored more highly in the HbAIC test, the lipid profile test, 
and the urine examination, while the SSS was higher in the lipid profile test but 
lower in urine examination. 
Table 7.10 Logistic regression results of achieving laboratory tests 
Unadjusted Adjusted· 
Laboratory test Odds p- LL® UL®® Odds p- LL 
ratios value Ratios Value UL 
Dependent Achieving standard target - 1 
FPG (N=1,939) 
VC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 1.33 0.238 0.83 2.15 1.49 0.262 0.74 2.99 
CSMBS 0.71 0.105 0.47 1.08 0.68 0.124 0.42 1.11 
HbAIC(N=1,939) 
VC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 2.35 <0.001 1.77 3.l3 0.79 0.316 0.49 1.26 
CSMBS 2.13 <0.001 1.59 2.84 1.91 <0.001 1.37 2.66 
Urine examination(N=I, 162) 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 0.23 <0.001 0.16 0.32 0.29 <0.001 0.18 0.47 
CSMBS 1.43 0.003 1.13 1.82 1.63 0.006 1.15 2.32 
Eye examination(N= 1 ,728) 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 5.28 <0.001 3.37 8.27 1.85 0.165 0.78 4.41 
CSMBS 1.64 0.062 0.98 2.74 1.43 0.245 0.78 2.60 
Lipid profile(N=1 ,939) 
VC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 2.38 <0.001 1.88 3.00 2.95 <0.001 2.03 4.27 
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Unadjusted Adjusted* 
Laboratory test Odds p- LL@ UL@@ Odds P- LL UL 
ratios value Ratios Value 
<0.001 1.41 2.21 1.47 0.003 1.14 1.90 CSMBS 1.76 
._- -_._._-- ------- '---
--- --
--
BP(N=1,939) 
--,---"---'- .-.. -.-... - .----- ---,--'---r---_ .. _-
VC 1.00 
---_.-
1.00 
--
-~ ... ---... 
--1-----f------ ---
SSS 1.45 0.143 0.88 2.37 1.26 0.520 0.62 2.56 _. __ ._ .. _ .. -
---_.-
---
--
CSMBS 0.78 0.265 0.51 1.20 0.73 0.210 0.45 1.19 
*controlled for: age, sex, mantal status, education, hvmg area, Income, duratIOn of DM, 
smoking, co-morbidity, hospital 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
7.7 Association between insurance scheme and intermediate 
outcomes 
To explore the effects of insurance scheme on intermediate outcomes, five laboratory 
indicators were studied to indicate whether they are controlled or uncontrolled: FPG 
«130 mg/dl and ~ 130 mg/dl); HbAIC «7% and ~7%); total triglyceride «150 
mg/dl and ~150 mg/dl); total cholesterol «200 mg/dl and ~200 mg/dl); and BP 
«130/80 and ~130/80). Table 7.12 shows the percentage of uncontrolled DM status 
by insurance scheme. 
Overall, 71 % of patients were classified as having uncontrolled DM if the level of 
FPG was considered, but only 53% if the level of HbAIC was considered. SSS 
patients had greater proportions of uncontrolled DM than VC and CSMBS patients. 
However, when HbAIC level was taken into account, SSS patients had a greater 
proportion of controlled DM than VC and CSMBS patients. For lipid profile, 
uncontrolled triglyceride and cholesterol rate were reduced to only 48.9% and 
41.1 %, respectively. There was no difference in triglyceride level between schemes 
while CSMBS patients seemed to be better controlled in total cholesterol level than 
SSS and VC scheme patients. 
Table 7.11 Diabetes Mellitus intermediate outcome indicators in different 
insurance schemes. 
vc SSS CSMBS Overall P-value* 
Outcome N % N % N 0/0 N % 
FPG 
Controlled 219 33.0 141 21.9 208 33.1 567 29.3 <0.001 
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UC SSS CSMBS Overall P-value* 
Outcome N % N 0/0 N % N % 
Uncontrolled 445 67.0 502 78.1 421 66.9 1,369 70.7 
N 664 643 629 1,936 
HbAIC 
Controlled 36 40.9 97 57.1 63 40.7 196 47.5 0.005 
Uncontrolled 52 59.1 73 42.9 92 59.4 217 52.5 
N 88 170 155 413 
Fasting triglyceride 
Controlled 182 50.3 253 53.2 212 49.4 647 51.1 0.500 
Uncontrolled 180 49.7 223 46.9 217 50.6 620 48.9 
N 362 476 429 1,267 
Total cholesterol 
Controlled 201 56.2 267 56.2 276 64.3 745 59.0 0.020 
Uncontrolled 157 43.9 208 43.8 153 35.7 519 41.1 
N 358 475 429 1,262 
BP 
Controlled 380 57.5 416 64.7 369 58.4 1,165 60.2 0.016 
Uncontrolled 281 42.5 227 35.3 263 41.6 771 39.8 
N 661 643 632 1,936 
.Chl-square test 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
Independent variable selection 
Bivariate analyses between independent variables and intennediate outcomes are 
shown in Table A4.3. All independent variables were included in the model, in 
accordance with statistical criteria suggested by Hosmer & Lemeshow, as mentioned 
in chapter 5 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). To confinn that the independent 
variables in all models can explain the intennediate outcomes, the goodness of fit 
was tested by the Hosmer-Lemeshow chi square method, as shown in Table 7.13. 
The results showed that the models fitted to explain the intennediate outcomes. 
Table 7.12 Goodness of fit of intermediate outcome model 
Total 
FPG HbAIC Total TG cholesterol BP 
N 1,936 404 1,267 1,262 1,936 
Group 10 10 10 10 10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-square 14.49 12.46 7.04 4.86 9.00 
Prob>Chi-sQuare 0.070 0.132 0.532 0.772 0.343 
Source: Medical record and DM pattent data 
Table 7.14 demonstrates factors associated with uncontrolled DM. Before adjusting 
for confounders, SSS had a significantly higher probability of having DM 
uncontrolled for FPG compared to UC scheme, while a lower probability of DM 
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uncontrolled for HbAIC and BP compared to DC scheme. CSMBS had a 
significantly lower probability of DM uncontrolled for total cholesterol in the 
unadjusted model compared to VC scheme. The full details of the analysis are shown 
in Table A4.4. However, after adjusting for confounders, there was no significant 
difference in the results of DM care between health insurance schemes. CSMBS and 
SSS had no significant difference in the result of care in the adjusted model 
compared to the VC scheme. 
In summary, insurance scheme did not have a significant effect on the intennediate 
outcomes of DM care. 
Table 7.13 Result of logistic regression of the association between insurance 
scheme and intermediate outcome 
Unadjusted Adjusted· 
Variable Odds P-value LL@ UL@@ Odds P-value LL 
ratios ratios 
Dependent variable Uncontrolled = 1 
FPG(N=1,936) 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 1.75 <0.001 1.37 2.24 1.44 0.061 0.98 
CSMBS 1.00 0.974 0.79 1.26 1.17 0.249 0.90 
HbAIC(N=4I3) 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 0.52 0.014 0.31 0.88 1.17 0.733 0.47 
CSMBS 1.01 0.968 0.59 1.72 1.19 0.606 0.61 
Total triglyceride(N=1,267) 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 0.89 0.409 0.68 1.17 0.96 0.842 0.64 
CSMBS 1.03 0.810 0.78 1.37 0.93 0.669 0.68 
Total Cholesterol(N=1,262} 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 1.00 0.985 0.76 1.31 0.69 0.074 0.45 
CSMBS 0.71 0.019 0.53 0.95 0.74 0.063 0.53 
BP(N=1,936) 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 0.74 0.008 0.59 0.92 0.86 0.402 0.61 
CSMBS 0.96 0.744 0.77 1.20 0.80 0.087 0.62 
UL 
2.11 
1.53 
2.95 
2.30 
1.44 
1.28 
1.04 
1.02 
1.22 
1.03 
.. 
• adjusted by: age, sex, marital status, education, hvmg area, mcome, duration ofhavmg DM, 
smoking, co-morbidity, and hospital. 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
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7.8 Association between insurance scheme and admission of 
Diabetes Mellitus patients 
For further analysis of quality of care, the study collected data on hospital admissions 
from national claims data for the studied patients, partly because these e data 
allowedthe tracking of patients admitted to different hospitals. The study collected 
data on admissions with diagnoses related to DM complications such as 
hypoglycaemia, hyperglycaemia, cardiovascular complications, and cellulites. 
Admissions not directly related to DM were excluded, such as car accidents and 
trauma fractures. It was found that there were different rates of admission by sex, 
age group, insurance, income, duration of DM, and co-morbidity, as shown in Table 
7.15. 
Table 7.14 Different factors in admission in Diabetes Mellitus patients 
Variable No No of Admissions Admission(%) P-value* 
N 1,703 236 12.17 
Hospital 
Samutsakhon (public) 709 108 13.2 <0.001 
Kraturnban (public) 444 86 16.2 
Banpaw (public) 187 24 11.4 
Srivichai3 (private) 119 15 11.2 
Mahachai2 (private) 244 3 1.2 
Age group 
0-40 134 9 6.3 <0.001 
41-60 921 71 7.2 
>60 648 156 19.4 
Sex 
Male 605 68 10.1 0.042 
Female 1,098 168 13.3 
Marital status 
Single 131 13 9.0 0.230 
Married 1,572 223 12.4 
Education 
Without education 182 31 14.6 0.372 
Primary-Bachelor 1,407 193 12.1 
>Bachelor 114 12 9.5 
Area 
Urban 790 122 13.4 0.126 
Rural 913 114 11.1 
Insurance 
UC 568 96 14.5 <0.001 
SSS 604 39 6.1 
CSMBS 531 101 16.0 
Income 
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Variable No No of Admissions Admission(%) P-value* 
No income 348 78 18.3 <0.001 
--
B<2,OOO 163 43 20.9 
- ---
_. __ ._--_. 
B 2,000-10,000 894 90 9.2 
B>10,000 298 25 7.7 
-- --
Duration of DM 
sS years 1,040 93 8.2 <0.001 
> 5 years 663 143 17.7 '''_M ______ ._. 
Smoking 
No 1,565 222 12.4 0.245 
--- -
Yes 138 14 9.2 
--
Co-morbidity 
_. 
No 428 39 8.4 0.004 
Yes 1,275 197 13.4 
• Chi-square test 
Source: Medical record and OM patient data 
Independent variables were selected by the same criteria as mentioned above. The 
details of bivariate analysis between different characteristics and admission are 
shown in Table A4.S. To test model fit, the study used the Hosmer & Lemeshow 
goodness of fit test. The result of this test showed that the model fitted to explain the 
admission of OM patients (Hosmer-Lemeshow chi square=5.17, p-value=0.740). 
Table 7.16 shows results from the multivariate analysis of factors affecting 
admissions of OM patients. Before adjusting for confounders, SSS had a 
significantly lower probability of having admissions compared to the VC scheme, 
while for CSMBS there was no significant difference. The details of the full results 
of independent variables and admissions are shown in Table A4.6. After adjusting 
for confounding factors, SSS and CSMBS admission rates were not significantly 
different to the VC scheme. 
In summary, insurance scheme did not have a significant effect on admission of OM 
patients. 
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Table 7.15Factors affecting admission of Diabetes Mellitus patients 
Unadjusted Adiusted· 
Odds ratios P-value LL@ UL@@ Odds ratios P-value LL UL 
Dependent Admission = I 
N=I,939 
UC 1.00 1.00 
SSS 0.38 <0.001 0.26 0.56 1.11 0.716 0.63 
CSMBS 1.13 0.445 0.83 1.52 1.08 0.680 0.76 
• confoundmg factor: age, sex, marital status, education, area, Income, duration of DM, 
smoking, co-morbidity, hospital 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
7.9 Effect of type of hospital on use of laboratory tests, 
intermediate outcomes, and hospitalization of Diabetes 
Mellitus patients 
Because patients were recruited from both public and private hospitals, this section 
will explore the effect of hospital type on quality of DM care. The section begins 
with presenting descriptive data on different characteristics of patients by hospital. 
Then, the results of multivariate analysis on achievement of laboratory test targets, 
intennediate outcomes, and hospitalization are presented. 
Table 7.17 shows patient characteristics by hospital type. Overall, private hospital 
patients were of lower average age than public hospital patients. Most of them had 
DM for less than five years. Public hospitals had more patients of low income than 
private hospitals. 
Table 7.16Different characteristics in different hospitals 
Kratumban 
1.96 
1.52 
Samutsakhon Banpaw Srivichai3 Mahachail 
Different (public) (public) (public) (private) (private) P-value 
characteristic 
·w.) (0/.) (%,) (%) (%) (Chi-square) 
N 817 530 211 134 247 
Age group 
<40 6 4 3 14 18 <0.001 
41-60 47 43 40 81 74 
>60 46 53 56 5 8 
Sex 
Male 30 36 32 36 48 <0.001 
Female 70 64 68 64 52 
Marital status 
Single 6 6 11 11 12 <0.001 
210 
Different 
Samutsakhon Kratumban Banpaw Srivichai3 Mahachai2 P-value (public) (public) (public) (private) (private) 
characteristic (%) (%) (010) (0/0) (%) (Chi-square) 
Married 94 94 89 89 88 
Education 
Without education 13 12 17 3 1 <0.001 
primary-bachelor 81 78 78 94 94 
>bachelor 6 9 5 3 5 
Income 
No income 35 8 35 9 6 <0.001 
B 1-2,000 9 18 13 5 1 
B 2,001-10,000 44 53 38 66 70 
B >10,000 12 21 14 19 23 
Duration ofDM 
:s:5 years 53 61 43 72 76 <0.001 
> 5 years 47 39 57 28 24 
Co-morbidity 
No 21 28 24 28 25 0.052 
Yes 79 72 76 72 75 
Source: Medical record and OM patient data 
Table 7.18 shows the adjusted and unadjusted achievement of test targets by 
hospitals. For FPG, there were no significant differences between hospitals in 
achieving the FPG test after controlling for confounding factors. In contrast, the 
results show that after controlling for confounding factors Srivichai3 hospital and 
Mahachai2 hospital had a significantly higher probability of achieving the HbA I C 
test target compared to Samutsakhon hospital. Srivichai3 had a 100% higher chance 
of achieving the HbA 1 C target compared to Samutsakhon hospital while Mahachai2 
had a 200% higher chance of achieving HbAIC target compared to Samusakhon 
hospital. However, within public hospitals, Kratumban and Banpaw hospital had a 
lower probability of achieving the HbAIC test target compared to Samutsakhon 
hospital. 
Both private hospitals had a significantly lower probability of achieving the standard 
for urine examination compared to Samutsakhon hospital. Srivichai3 hospital had a 
12.6 (110.08) times lower probability of achieving the urine examination target 
compared to Samutsakhon hospital while Mahachai2 hospital had a 13.74 (110.07) 
times lower probability of achieving the target. 
The results for urine examination were markedly different to those for eye 
examination. After controlling for confounding factors, private hospitals had a very 
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high probability of performing eye examinations. After adjusting for confounding 
factors, Mahachai2 hospital was 82 times more likely to perform eye examination 
compared to Samutsakhon hospital while Srivichai3 hospital was 7.5 times more 
likely to perform eye examinations compared to Samusakhon hospital. Furthermore, 
Kratumban hospital also had a significantly higher probability of performing eye 
examinations compared to Samutsakhon hospital. It was 20 times more likely to 
perform eye examinations than Samutsakhon hospital, after adjusting for 
confounding factors. 
For the lipid profile test, private hospitals had both lower and higher chances of 
achieving the standard for lipid profile tests. Srivichai2 hospital had a significantly 
lower probability of carrying out the lipid profile test, while Mahachai2 hospital had 
a significantly higher probability compared to Samutsakhon hospital. After adjusting 
for confounding factors, Mahachai2 hospital had a 90% higher chance of performing 
the lipid profile test compared to Samutsakhon hospital, while Srivichai3 hospital 
had a 200% lower chance compared to Samutsakhon hospital. Furthermore, 
Kratumban hospital had a significantly higher probability (47% higher) of achieving 
the lipid profile test compared to Samutsakhon hospital. 
Table 7.17 Results of logistic regression of association between hospitals and 
laboratory test targets 
Un ad usted Adjusted* 
Test target Odds p- LL® UL®@ Odds p-
ratios value ratios value LL UL 
Dependent Achieving standard target - 1 
FPG(N=l,939) 
Samutsakhon(public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 0.65 0.044 0.43 0.99 0.79 0.315 0.50 1.25 
Banpaw (public) 0.99 0.982 0.53 1.86 1.10 0.771 0.57 2.13 
Srivichai 3 (private) 1.18 0.686 0.52 2.67 1.06. 0.912 0.41 2.73 
Mahachai 2 (private) 1.54 0.220 0.77 3.09 1.52 0.339 0.64 3.59 
HbA 1 C(N= 1,939) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 0.53 <0.001 0.39 0.70 0.47 <0.001 0.34 0.65 
Banpaw (public) 0.14 <0.001 0.07 0.28 0.14 <0.001 0.07 0.27 
Srivichai 3 (private) 1.26 0.263 0.84 1.90 2.05 0.007 1.21 3.47 
Mahachai 2 (private) 2.03 <0.001 1.50 2.74 3.28 <0.001 2.08 5.15 
Urine examination"(N=I,162) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00. 
Srivichai 3 (private) 0.10 <0.001 0.06 0.17 0.08 <0.001 0.05 0.13 
Mahachai 2 (private) 0.02 <0.001 0.01 0.07 0.07 <0.001 0.02 0.24 
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Unad'usted Adjusted· 
Test target Odds p- LL@ UL@@ Odds p- LL UL 
ratios value ratios value 
Eye examination * *(N= 1,728) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 16.18 <0.001 7.36 35.57 20.03 <0.001 8.81 45.54 
Srivichai 3 (private) 7.35 <0.001 2.62 20.61 7.51 0.001 2.26 25.03 
Mahachai 2 (private) 69.88 <0.001 31.80 153.54 81.94 <0.001 29.65 226.42 
Lipid profile(N= 1,939) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 1.32 0.020 1.04 1.66 1.47 0.004 1.13 1.91 
Banpaw (public) 0.96 0.785 0.70 1.31 U8 0.334 0.85 1.63 
Srivichai 3 (private) 0.55 0.001 0.38 0.80 0.27 <0.001 0.17 0.43 
Mahachai 2 (private) 3.76 <0.001 2.56 5.52 1.89 0.008 U8 3.03 
BP(N=1,939) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 0.86 0.504 0.56 1.33 1.01 0.976 0.62 1.63 
Banpaw (public) 0.87 0.647 0.48 1.58 0.98 0.947 0.52 1.83 
Srivichai 3 (private) 1.42 0.427 0.60 3.38 1.28 0.627 0.47 3.47 
Mahachai 2 (private) 1.99 0.076 0.93 4.25 1.94 0.156 0.78 4.83 
.. 
*adjusted by: age, sex, marital status, educatton, hVIng area, Income, duratton of having DM, 
smoking, co-morbidity, and insurance status. 
**Note: Kratumban, Banpaw successes completely detennined 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Medical record and OM patient data 
Table 7.19 shows the results of the logistic regression of hospitals and intermediate 
outcomes including achieving control of FPG, HbAIC, total triglyceride, total 
cholesterol, and average BP. 
In achieving control of FPG, only Kraturnban hospital had a significantly lower 
probability of achieving FPG control than Samutsakhon hospital. Kratumban hospital 
had a 71% (1-110.58) lower chance of achieving FPG control compared to 
Samutsakhon hospital. For private hospitals, there was no difference in achieving 
FPG control compared to Samutsakhon hospital, after adjusting for confounding 
factors. 
In achieving HbA 1 C control, Mahachai2 hospital had a significantly lower 
probability of achieving HbAIC control compared to Samutsakhon hospital. . 
Mahachai2 hospital had 4.78 (110.21) times lower probability for achieving HbAIC 
control compared to Samutsakhon hospital. For other hospitals, there was no 
significant difference with Samutsakhon hospital. 
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In achieving total triglyceride control, Banpaw hospital had a significantly higher 
probability of achieving total triglyceride control compared to Samutsakhon hospital. 
Banpaw hospital had a 2.66 times higher chance of achieving total triglyceride 
control than Samutsakhon hospital while other hospitals had no significant difference 
compared to Samutsakhon hospital. 
In achieving total cholesterol control, Banpaw, Srivichai3, and Mahachai2 hospital 
had a significantly higher probability of achieving total cholesterol control compared 
to Samutsakhon hospital. After adjusting for confounding factors, Banpaw, 
Srivichai3, and Mahachai2 hospital were 2.2, 4.5, and 1.6 times more likely to 
achieve total cholesterol control than Samutsakhon hospital. 
All other hospitals had a significantly lower probability of achieving average BP 
control compared to Samutsakhon hospital. Katumban and Banpaw hospitals had 
between 1.4 and 2.9 times a higher chance of achieving average BP control than 
Saumutsakhon hospital, while Mahachai2 and Srivichai3 hospitals had a 2.0 to 2.4 
times higher chance of achieving average BP control compared to Samutsakhon 
hospital. 
Table 7.18 Result of logistic regression of association between hospitals and 
intermediate outcomes 
Unadjusted Adjusted· 
Intermediate outcome Odds ratios P-value LL@ UL®@ Odds ratios P-value LL 
Dependent Achieving standard target - I 
FPG(N=1,936) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 0.57 <0.001 0.46 0.73 0.58 <0.001 0.45 
Banpaw (public) 1.06 0.740 0.75 1.50 1.05 0.781 0.73 
Srivichai 3 (private) 0.98 0.922 0.65 1.47 0.64 0.073 0.39 
Mahachai 2 (private) 1.63 0.007 1.14 2.33 1.11 0.649 0.71 
HbAI C"(N=404) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 0.80 0.426 0.47 1.38 0.79 0.436 0.43 
Srivichai 3 (public) 0.92 0.809 0.45 1.85 0.77 0.609 0.28 
Mahachai 2 (private) 0.27 <0.001 0.16 0.46 0.21 0.001 0.09 
Total triglyceride(N-1 ,267) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 1.10 0.474 0.84 1.45 1.12 0.442 0.83 
Banpaw (public) 2.59 <0.001 1.72 3.90 2.66 <0.001 1.73 
Srivichai 3 (private) 1.34 0.271 0.79 2.27 1.41 0.247 0.79 
214 
UL 
0.76 
1.51 
1.04 
1.75 
1.44 
2.11 
0.51 
1.52 
4.10 
2.53 
Intermediate outcome 
Unadjusted Adjusted* 
Odds ratios P-value LL@ UL@@ Odds ratios P-value LL 
Dependent Achieving standard target = 1 
Mahachai 2 (private) 1.13 0.451 0.82 1.56 1.19 0.416 0.79 
Total Cholesterol(N= I ,262) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 1.24 0.129 0.94 1.65 1.15 0.374 0.84 
Banpaw (public) 2.24 <0.001 1.50 3.33 2.17 <0.001 1.42 
Srivichai 3 (private) 4.52 <0.001 2.52 8.08 4.47 <0.001 2.36 
Mahachai 2 (private) 1.61 0.004 1.16 2.22 1.59 0.029 1.05 
BP(N= 1,936) 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 0.69 0.001 0.56 0.87 0.71 0.007 0.55 
Banpaw (public) 0.38 <0.001 0.27 0.53 0,35 <0.001 0.24 
Srivichai 3 (private) 0.43 <0.001 0.29 0.64 0.43 <0.001 0.27 
Mahachai 2 (private) 0.52 <0.001 0.38 0.70 0.50 <0.001 0.34 
.. 
*adjusted by: age, sex, marttal status, education, hvmg area, mcome, duration of having DM, 
smoking, co-morbidity, and insurance status. 
* *Note: Banpaw successes completely determined 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
Table 7.20 shows the results of the logistic regression of hospitals and admissions. In 
the adjusted result, Mahachai2 hospital had significantly lower probability of having 
DM admissions compared to Samutsakhon hospital. There was a 7.12 (1/0.14) times 
lower chance of Mahachai2 hospital having an admission compared to Samutsakhon 
hospital. Kratumban hospital had a significantly higher probability of having DM 
admissions compared to Samutsakhon hospital after adjusting for confounding 
factors. Kratumban hospital was a 52% higher chance of having an admission 
compared to Samutsakhon hospital. 
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UL 
1.79 
1.57 
3.30 
8.44 
2.42 
0.91 
0.50 
0.68 
0.74 
Table 7.19 Result of logistic regression of association between hospitals and 
admission 
Unad'usted Adjusted* 
Odds Odds 
ratios P-value LL@ UL@@ ratios P-value LL 
Dependent Admission = 1 
N 1,939 
Samutsakhon (public) 1.00 1.00 
Kratumban (public) 1.27 0.125 0.94 1.73 1.52 0.020 1.07 
Banpaw (public) 0.84 0.476 0.53 1.35 0.68 0.135 0.42 
Srivichai 3 (private) 0.83 0.518 0.47 1.47 1.46 0.304 0.71 
Mahachai 2 (private) 0.08 0.000 0.03 0.26 0.14 0.002 0.04 
UL 
2.16 
1.12 
3.01 
0.50 
*adjusted by: age, sex, mantal status, educatIon, hvmg area, mcome, duration of having DM, 
smoking, co-morbidity, and insurance status. 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Source: Medical record and DM patient data 
In summary, it seems that there is different probability of an admission to the type of 
hospital. 
7.10 Discussion 
Univariate and bivariate analysis 
Use of care 
Analysis of the 2004 Health Examination Survey demonstrated that there was still 
lack of access to care for DM patients in the community. Uptake of diabetic 
screening remained problematic in spite of having universal health insurance 
coverage, especially amongst UC scheme and SSS members. This finding 
corresponds to a previous study which found that nearly fifty percent of Diabetes 
Mellitus cases were undiagnosed (Aekplakorn et al. 2003). Furthermore, quality of 
care was also problematic since more than half of those being treated were 
uncontrolled. The findings confirm that differences in the use of diabetic care exist 
between health insurance schemes. SSS patients had the most undiagnosed DM 
between insurance schemes. The reasons explaining low uptake of Diabetes Mellitus 
screening might come from both the patient and the provider's sides. SSS members 
might be less concerned about checking for DM because most of them were in the 
working age group. This is similar to a developed country such as the U.K. which 
found that only 35% of people older than 45 years old were willing to undergo 
screening (Lawrence et al. 2001). For the provider side, they might be less concerned 
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to find new cases of DM amongst VC and SSS members. At the time of data 
collection (2003), although there was a budget for prevention and promotion from 
the VC scheme covering the total population, there was no requirement to find new 
cases ofDM. 
Process of care 
According to demographic characteristics, most SSS patients were in the 41-60 year 
age group, while most VC and CSMBS patients were in the over-60 year age group. 
The relative youth of SSS patients meant they had DM for a shorter duration and had 
correspondingly less co-morbidity. 
Regarding laboratory tests, FPG and BP were commonly checked when patients 
came to a hospital. More than 90% of patients received these laboratory tests more 
than four times a year in each insurance scheme. In contrast, only 3.8% of VC 
scheme patients received an eye examination at least once a year, and 17% of SSS 
patients received one. The reason is likely to be that there are relatively few 
ophthalmologists in the public sector in Thailand compared to the number of 
patients. Furthermore, the rate of urine protein checking was also quite low in all 
three insurance schemes and lower than the lipid profile test. This might be because 
physicians tended to do other laboratory tests instead such as blood urea· nitrogen 
(BUN) or blood creatinine (Cr). Data from Samutsakhon hospital showed that 39% 
of patients had a BUN test while 62% received a Cr test, as shown in Table 7.21. 
However, SSS members still received less of these tests than VC scheme and 
CSMBS members. This result might confirm the result of a lower chance of 
receiving a urine examination in the SSS. 
Table 7.20 Percentage of BUN and er investigations in Samutsakhon 
hospital 
Scheme BUN Cr N 
UC 43% 70% 313 
SSS 17% 26% 212 
CSMBS 48% 78% 332 
Total 39% 62% 857 
Multivariate analysis 
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Factors associated with uncontrolled DM 
From the Health Examination Survey 2004, after controlling for confounding factors, 
CSMBS patients were significantly more likely to have uncontrolled DM than VC 
scheme patients. This might be for two reasons. Firstly, CSMBS patients can get care 
from any public hospital so they might lack continuity of treatment. They might seek 
different drugs from different hospitals. Secondly, at the time of the survey, CSMBS 
patients had to pay in advance for outpatient care and some patients might not have 
had enough money so this might have affected continuity of care in this group. 
Association of insurance scheme and achieving laboratory test targets 
This study showed that insurance scheme affected the achievement of the targets for 
different laboratory tests. The analysis indicated that FPG and BP were the most 
common laboratory tests for patients to receive. More than 90% of patients received 
both FPG and BP tests when they were followed up. Furthermore, the multivariate 
analysis proved that there was no significance difference in achieving these targets 
between insurance schemes. In eye examinations, there were also no significant 
differences in achieving the target between insurance schemes but the reason for this 
was not that it was a common test. On the contrary, it seemed to be due to a lack of 
personnel, especially ophthalmologists. Although the standard practice guideline did 
not mention that all patients needed to receive an eye examination from an 
ophthalmologist, hospitals normally refer patients to an ophthalmologist for 
examination. 
The CSMBS scheme was found to achieve laboratory targets more than the VC 
scheme and the SSS. The CSMBS was more likely to meet the target in HbAIC, 
lipid profile, and urine examination tests, while SSS had a significantly higher 
probability of achieving the target for lipid profile but a lower probability of 
achieving the target of urine examination than the VC scheme. The reasons for this 
might be two-fold. On the one hand, CSMBS patients might request more 
investigations than patients in other schemes because they know that providers tend 
to respond to such requests. On the other hand, providers might be indirectly 
motivated by the scheme payment method. CSMBS used FFS as its main payment 
method to hospitals. This might affect provider behaviour in responding to patient 
requests more easily than for the SSS scheme patients and the VC patients, which 
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were paid by capitation and capitation with prospective payment respectively. This 
finding corresponds to study of Riewpaiboon et al. (2009) that CSMBS patients 
received services more than SSS patients and VC scheme patients. 
In the SSS, the reasons for patients receiving fewer urine examinations might be due 
to either patient concern or provider behaviour. Doctors might not order urine protein 
tests for patients, but they might use an alternative test such as the BUN or Cr test. 
However, the higher achievement of the lipid profile test might be because the SSS 
had an arrangement for additional payments for hospitals that provided services for 
25 chronic diseases". The SSO used three indicators to calculate additional payments 
including number of registered patients, newly diagnosed patients, and accurate 
records in software provided by SSO. 
Association of insurance scheme and intermediate outcomes 
Several studies show that insurance status is associated with glycaemic control 
(Benoit et al. 2005, Roubideaux et al. 2004). This study used five intermediate 
outcomes of DM as indicators including mean FPG, mean HbAIC, mean total 
triglyceride, mean total cholesterol, and mean BP. Results of the analysis showed 
that there were no significant difference between UC scheme, SSS, and CSMBS 
patients in achieving the outcome target for five indicators. These results seem not to 
be related to the achievement of the process of care targets in the different insurance 
schemes. For example, SSS and CSMBS patients had a higher probability of having 
the lipid profile test but average results for total triglyceride, and total cholesterol 
levels were not difIereilt to thos~ of the UC scheme. There are two probable reasons 
for this. The first concerns compliance with the process of care. Some laboratories 
tests showed low compliance, e.g. only 20% of patients received the HbAIC test. 
However, it could not be concluded that the process of care did not directly affect the 
result of care. Second, to specify the reason for this finding is not easy given that 
there are multiple factors that affect the outcome of care such as patient behaviour, 
patient beliefs, provider behaviour etcetera. Patients' behaviour might in turn be 
17 SSO have begun a risk adjustment project for chronic disease since 2001. The 25 chronic diseases 
include DM, HT, Chronic hepatitis, CHF, CV A, Malignancy, AIDS, Emphysema, Chronic renal 
failure, parkinson's disease, Myasthenia gravis, Diabetes insipidus, Multiple scherosis, Dyslipidemia, 
Rheumatoid arthritis, Glaucoma, Nephrotic syndrome, SLE, Aplastic anemia, Thalassemia, 
Hemophilia, Psoriasis, Chronic vesiculobullous disease, ITP, Thyrotoxicosis. 
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influenced by their environment. For example, most SSS patients worked In a 
factory, so they could not easily control their food or exercise. 
Association of insurance scheme with admission of DM patients 
There was no significant difference between the schemes in the probability of 
admission. This might imply that hospitalization of patients with DM was not 
affected by the particular insurance scheme. 
Association between hospital and process of care 
The study included both private and public hospitals in Samutsakhon province. The 
effect of hospital on process of care was interesting to examine. 
The study found that some laboratory tests showed an effect and some did not. FPG 
and BP were the two indicators which were not affected by hospital while the 
HbAl C test, the urine examination, the eye examination, and the lipid profile test 
were. Comparing between hospital types, it seemed to be that private hospitals had a 
significantly higher chance of achieving the standard number of laboratory tests for 
the HbA 1 C, the lipid profile test, and the eye examination. This might reflect private 
hospital policy in DM management. For example, for the HbAIC test and the eye 
examinations, a private hospital might increase the number of tests done by sending 
HbAIC tests to a private lab or by employing a part time ophthalmologist to help the 
full time doctors perform eye examinations. 
However, it was clear that private hospitals had a significantly lower probability of 
undertaking urine examinations. This might be the result of doctor behaviour. As 
mentioned above, most doctors in private hospitals tended to use other tests to 
monitor kidney function instead of urine protein examination, such as BUN or Cr. 
Public hospitals did not show any significant difference between them. This might be 
due to cost concerns of doctors in public hospitals. 
Association of hospital type with intermediate outcomes and hospitalization 
This study showed that there were differences in intermediate outcomes between 
hospitals. Patients in different hospitals had different achievement levels for 
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intermediate outcomes, For example Kratumban patients had a higher chance of 
achieving the total cholesterol level than patients in Samutsakhon hospital while they 
had a lower chance for achieving the target FPG. This result might be due to both 
patient and provider behaviour. Patients in different hospitals might have different 
eating habits. However, this study did not include patient behaviour in the model, so 
some of the uncontrolled results may be due to patient behaviour. Provider behaviour 
may also be a factor here. Some physicians might tend to have tighter controls while 
others may be more relaxed. 
Regarding hospitalization of DM patients, there were also different results from 
different hospitals. The results showed that one private hospital had a significantly 
lower chance of having admissions for DM compared to public hospitals. This might 
be due to good follow up by the hospital. Patients of this private hospital might have 
more regular follow up, so they can detect any minor complications before admission 
is required due to complications. 
7.11 Conclusion 
This study found that there were differences in use of hospital care between 
insurance schemes. The SSS group had the most undiagnosed DM compared to the 
VC scheme and CSMBS. However, CSMBS patients were significantly more likely 
to have uncontrolled DM. 
Regarding the effect of the insurance schemes on quality of care, this study 
confirmed that the process of care received by hospital patients of different schemes 
was different. CSMBS patients were more likely to receive the set of standard of care 
than those with the SSS or the UC scheme. CSMBS seemed to affect provider 
behaviour, presumably because of its payment system. The UC scheme seemed to 
have the lowest quality process of care in terms of achieving the set standards of 
care. 
For intermediate outcomes, there were no effects of the insurance scheme on 
laboratory test outcomes. The findings did not correspond to process of care result 
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where CSMBS patients had a higher chance of receiving standard laboratory tests. 
There might be other factors affecting the results of care that are not included in the 
study such as BM!. F'lrthermore, it might because of the low level of compliance 
with guidelines in all insurance schemes, for instance only 25% of CSMBS patients 
achieve the HbA 1 C test target. 
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CHAPTER 8: PROVIDER AND PATIENT PERSPECTIVES ON 
QUALITY OF CARE IN NON INSULIN DEPENDENT 
DIABETES MELLITUS PATIENTS IN DIFFERENT 
INSURANCE SCHEMES 
8.1 Introduction 
To understand quality of care and its relationship to insurance schemes, it is 
important to understand that it could be affected by both providers and patients. In 
general, treatment of DM is influenced by various factors including the patient 
provider, the environment they work in, hospital policy etc. This chapter aims to 
understand quality of service as perceived by NIDDM patients and to explore the 
perception, behaviour, and motivation of providers regarding quality of DM 
treatment in different schemes. It begins with a brief methodology, followed by 
results of the study. The results are presented in two parts; patients' and providers' 
views on quality of care in tenns of use of care, process of care, and quality of care. 
This is followed by a discussion and a conclusion. 
8.2 Methodology 
Qualitative approaches, both in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, were 
used to understand providers' practices and patient perceptions of quality of DM 
care in different insw:ance schemes. 
Data collection 
An open-ended list of questions was used as the guide for the in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions. Details of the questions are shown in appendix 5. The focus 
group discussions were facilitated by the researcher and two assistants (one assistant 
had some qualitative research experience; and the second was a nurse practitioner). 
In-depth interviews were conducted by the researcher and one assistant. The 
researcher facilitated the sessions with an introduction explaining the objective of the 
research and clarifying the researcher's role to participants. The focus groups lasted 
between 160 and 180 minutes with a break of about 15 minutes. At the end of both 
the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, a debriefing and discussion 
session was conducted between the researcher and the assistants. 
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Selection process and oasic information 
Providers and NIDDM patients in Samutsakhon province were sampled for this 
study. The details of hospitals were outlined in chapter 4. DM patients of all study 
hospitals who were included in primary data collection were invited to participate in 
a focus group discussion. Two focus groups of SSS patients were conducted, one 
from private hospitals and the other from public hospitals. They were separated 
because these different groups selected their own hospital which may affect their 
attitude and experience of the care they received. The other two focus groups were 
done for UC and CSMBS patients. The number of participants in each focus group 
ranged from 5 to 9 participants, as shown in Table 8.1. Twenty-seven patients 
participated in focus group discussions. Focus group discussions were conducted 
between September 2007 and January 2008 in a hotel in Muang district, 
Samutsakhon. 
Table 8.1 Number of Diabetes Mellitus participants in each focus group 
discussion. 
DM patients Srivicbai3 Mabacbai2 Katumban Banpaw Samutsakhon 
SSS private 3 3 
SSS public 2 1 2 
UC 2 2 2 
CSMBS , 3 3 3 
Characteristics of participants are shown in Table 8.2. Females were predominant 
and the average age of CSMBS and UC members was relatively higher than that of 
SSS patients. Most patients were still working, with an average income of between 
2,000 and 40,000 Baht / month. They had a history of 1-18 years of OM, with UC 
and CSMBS members having the longest period of illness. Time "treated in hospital 
corresponded with duration of diagnosed DM. CSMBS participants had a relatively 
high educational level compared with the other two schemes. 
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Table 8.2 Characteristics of Diabetes Mellitus participants in focus group 
discussions 
SSS (private) SSS(public) DC scheme CSMBS 
Patients 6 5 6 9 
Age (years) 33-52 41-49 43-59 48-68 
Sex 
. Male 2 2 2 5 
. Female 4 3 4 4 
Occupation 
. Full time 6 5 4 5 
. None - - 2 4 
Time since diagnosis 
(years) 1 to 6 1 to 10 2 to 18 2 to 12 
Time treated in this 
hospital(years) 1 to 5 1 to 10 2 to 12 2 to 12 
Primary- Primary- Primary-
Education Secondary Secondary Primary Bachelor 
Salary(bJlht) 5,000-20,000 5,000-8,000 3,000-15,000 2,000-40,000 
Hospital staff who were involved in providing care to DM patients were purposively 
selected for the in-depth interviews and focus group discussion. The in-depth 
interview participar::.ts were directors of each hospital, physicians who were 
responsible for managing DM patients, the head of the insurance unit, and DM clinic 
teams. Details of the number of in-depth interviews and focus groups are shown in 
Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Summary of number of participants in in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions from provider side 
Status Position Planned Done Method 
Patient DM patient 4 4 Focus group 
Manager Director of hospital 5 4 In-depth interview 
Head of insurance 5 5 In-depth interview 
Providers Physicians 5 9 In-depth interview 
DM clinics team 5 5 Focus group 
N 24 27 
Conceptual framework and analysis 
Figure 8.1 shows the conceptual framework of the effect of insurance scheme on 
stakeholders. Different characteristics of an insurance scheme affect hospitals, 
providers, and patients. A hospital might respond to different scheme characteristics 
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by setting a different policy for each scheme. To implement these policies, hospitals 
use providers, including doctors, nurses and other staff. Furthermore, different 
schemes might affect a provider's behaviour directly. Providers are aware of scheme 
regulations, so they might provide services to patients differently in accordance with 
this. The provider is a key person providing services, especially doctors providing 
services to patients. One provider can provide services to patients in different 
schemes. 
Scheme regulations might create obstacles to patients' use of services. For example, 
if an insurance scheme contracts with a large hospital, this might create geographic 
constraints for patients to access services. Patients can also be constrained by the 
policy regulations of a hospital. 
The outcome of service is hard to measure from only the provider's viewpoint. This 
study uses indirect indicators including satisfaction or perception of drug quality 
from the patient side. 
Figure 8.1 Conceptual framework for qualitative analysis 
Service to patient 
(process of care) 
r-----::~-.,....-..., Perception of r-------, 
Satisfaction 1 Outcome of care u;:;,;=,.,==':::J.J Drug quality '--____ ....J 
The interviews and discussions were audiotaped and fully transcribed (in Thai). Data 
were analysed on a sentence basis using the Atlas.ti 4.2 software and Microsoft Word 
2003. Three main issues were explored from the in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions: use of care, process of care, and perception of outcome of care. The 
analytical framework used in the study is shown in Table 8.4. 
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Table 8.4 Details of framework for qualitative analysis 
Provider Patient 
Elements UC SSS CSMBS UC SSS CSMBS 
scheme scheme 
Use of care 
Process of care 
Perception of 
outcome of care 
The results of the study are presented based on two groups of stakeholders: providers 
and patients. The provider section consists of perceptions, behaviour, and 
motivations regarding use of care and process of care. The patient section consists of 
perceptions of use of care, process of care, and outcome of care. 
8.3 Provider Views 
8.3.1 Use of care 
Most providers agrepd that the differences between insurance schemes affect the 
services provided to patients. Hospital behaviour was different regarding the 
detection of new cases in the community, separation of services, and referral of 
patients to health services near their home. 
Effect o(schemes on finding new cases and referral o(patients to services near to 
ll!l!!l!. 
Detecting new cases in the community is an important policy. It is worth balancing 
expenditure on detection of cases and resources needed to treat newly detected cases 
(Engelgau et al. 2000). It is better to diagnose DM earlier to prevent complications 
(Statements ADA 2008). Currently, DM tends to be diagnosed before the patient has 
symptoms of complications. 
Finding new cases 
The different insurance schemes affect hospital policy on detecting new cases in the 
community. NHSO has set an incentive budget for hospitals to find new cases in the 
community. This budget covers all three insurance schemes. However, most of this 
budget is passed through public providers. Thus, private hospitals rarely gain access 
to this budget to find new case . Furthermore, public hospitals have outreach teams 
to detect new cases of DM. This was also the MOPH policy and incentives were 
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provided by the UC scheme with additional money for hospitals to find new cases of 
DM. 
H We use preventive and promotive teams to screen DM in community of 
VC scheme two times a year. " 
(Head of insurance, public hospital) 
H ... After NHSO provide an additional budget for finding new cases of HT 
and DM, we cooperated with the elderly club to set a team to screen new 
cases in the community andfactory ... Overall, there is about 10% increase of 
new cases coming to the hospital" 
(Head of insurance, public hospital) 
In respect of the SSS, the SSO now makes additional payments to hospitals, which 
diagnose new cases of 25 chronic diseases, including DM. However, the calculation 
criteria do not include new cases in the community. In this study private hospitals do 
not have a policy actively to detect new cases in the community. Nonetheless, they 
had an annual screening programme to check employees in registered factories. 
H We have a plan to check up on employees' health in the factory every 
year. If we find whoever has a high blood sugar level, we can refer them to 
our hospital" 
(Head of insurance, public hospital) 
" ... We report new cases of DM to SSO every month ... We will check the new 
case form. If some data are missing, we will send this data to the doctor to 
complete again. " 
(Head of insurance, private hospital) 
Referral of patients to health services near home 
Because most of the general hospitals in this study had several specialists, there were 
few DM patients in need of referral to higher-1evel hospitals. It is important to know 
whether hospitals referred patients to lower levels of care such as clinics, health 
centre, or PCU. Given the geographic characteristics of Sarnutsakhon Province, 
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providers considered few problems in transportation or patients' transport cost. 
Moreover, some providers believed that most patients preferred to be treated in 
hospital, because of more convenient transport and preference for specialist care. 
" There are no geographical constraints in this area. There are lots of 
ways to come to hospital such as car, bus, or boat. " 
(DM clinic nurse, public hospital) 
" ... Transportation in this area is good Some UC patients can come together 
within one car. Some CSMBS patients have their own car ..... " 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
However, in the UC scheme, public hospitals in this study have a policy to refer 
patients back to a health centre close to patient's home, which did not seem to be 
effective. 
" We have a policy of referring patient back to a PCU or health centre 
near the patients' home, but it depends on the patient as well. " 
(Director, public hospital) 
" ... After their blood sugar is stable, most of them do not want to go back to 
the PCU or health centre. They would like to be treated by a specialist. " 
(DM clinic nurse, public hospital) 
SSS staff in private hospitals in this study did not have a policy to refer patients back 
to services close to their home. Furthermore, the private hospitals had a policy to 
reduce the numbers of subcontractor clinics in order to reduce costs. In SS8, the 
hospital is the main contractor with 880. If they set other health facilities as their 
subcontractors, they have to pay for services in those subcontractors. Furthermore, 
the private hospitals believed that patients preferred hospital to clinics. 
" ... next year, we 'Will re'duce the numbers of subcontractor clinics from 150 
to 100 because of the cost problem. Furthermore, some clinics don't want to 
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receive chronic cases because these patients use more resources than acute 
care. " 
(Head of insurance, private hospital) 
Separated service between schemes 
Most of the hospitals in this study set different tracks for different types of patient. 
The main separation was of SSS patients from other schemes. The two private 
hospitals had separate service sections for SSS patients and out-of-pocket patients, 
especially for OPD and registration. However, some parts including doctor or 
pharmacy could not be totally separated, because they would like to ensure a 
premium service for out-of-pocket patients. 
We separate OPD for SSS from out of pocket patients because some 
patients who pay by themselves don't want to wail for the doctor at the same 
area with SSS patients. " 
(Director, private hospital) 
In public hospitals in this study, they also separated SSS from VC and CSMBS 
patients but for different reasons than in private hospitals. All contracted public 
hospitals for SSS members were requested by the SSO to set a separate OPD area 
and inpatient ward for shortening the queue. The marketing strategy was another 
reason for the service separation, because of competition between public hospitals 
and private hospitals in attracting SSS members. 
" ... We do not separate UC and foreigners but we have to add more doctors 
for SSS because they are about six to seven hundred patients per day in this 
group. " 
(Director, public hospital) 
" ... We separated services between schemes because of the marketing strategy 
especially sss. We would like them to choose our hospital next year. 
Furthermore, the leam responsible was also separated for SSS patients from 
the others. " 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
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8.3.2 Process of care 
Insurance scheme affected five aspects of the process of care: 1) the hospital 
management process and method of payment to doctors; 2) doctors' practice in 
following the standard practice guidelines; 3) the prescription of laboratory tests; 4) 
doctors' drug prescription patterns; and 5) the follow up of patients. 
Effect of scheme on payment of doctors 
The different schemes had different effects on physician income. In SSS, one public 
hospital paid physicians by fee with a maximum limit related to the capitation budget 
received from SSS. The private hospitals paid physicians a reduced fee for providing 
care to SSS members, but a full fee for out-of-pocket patients. 
" ... We pay doctors corresponding to the payments we receive, for example, 
we pay our specialists by doctor fee but have maximum payment for each 
month for vc and SSS patients. After that we reduce the fee to 10% of 
normal. " 
(Director, public hospital) 
" ... Doctor fees for providing care to SSS patients are less than the normal 
fee ... We have to freeze it because the capitation has been stable for two or 
three years while hospital expenses on employees have increased every year. 
This situation makes it hard for the hospital to plan the yearly budget. 
However, doctors can charge more doctor fees for private patients. " 
(Director, private hospital) 
Since the VC scheme and CSMBS use only public hospitals, doctors are paid by 
salary from the government. However, one hospital had an incentive for doctors who 
treated CSMBS patients. 
" ... We had sixty doctors as a government agency and twenty doctors we 
hired with hospital money. These groups of doctors provide services mainly 
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for vc and CSMBS patients. Furthermore, we had part-time doctors to help 
provide services for SSS patients. " 
(Director, public hospital) 
" ... The hospital adds a doctor fee Jor me when I treat a CSMBS patient. " 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
There was no evidence of a direct effect of this regulation on physician behaviour. 
However, physicians in one private hospital had limited the number of SSS patients 
seen to have more time for patients paying out of pocket. 
Effect of scheme on adherence to standard practice guidelines 
In DM management, adherence to the standard practice guidelines can improve the 
outcome of DM care (Knight et al. 2005). A study from Australia has shown that the 
important barriers of adherence to guidelines from the provider side are too heavy 
workload, guidelines being too rigid, and no financial incentive (Grol and Wensing 
2004). In Thailand, standard practice guidelines have been set up by The Endocrine 
Society of Thailand. The question was whether providers know and follow the 
guidelines or not. Another question was whether patients with different insurance 
schemes receive treatment of the same standard or not. 
The interviews revealed that most doctors in this study knew the standard guidelines. 
They accepted the importance of guidelines but they did not strictly follow them. 
Most physicians used their own experience to manage patients. Furthermore, sticking 
to guidelines depended on the patient's status and availability of services in the 
hospital. 
" We have a meeting ahout the guidelines hut we don't use them for all 
patients ... However, style of treatment of the doctor might be different ... We 
cannot control all activities of the doctors but we try to manage patients not 
lower than the standard" 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
" ... We do not adhere strictly to the standard guidelines. We set up our own 
guidelines suitable for our hospital .... Our guidelines are not complicated 
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The major part is about when to order special lab tests, when to refer to 
ophthalmologist. " 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
" ... I used my experience to treat DM patients... This hospital has almost 
every laboratory test I need. Now, the problem is only that we have a 
shortage of ophthalmologists. " 
(Doctor, private hospital) 
Effect ofscheme on prescriotion oUaboratorv tests 
Insurance scheme affected the prescribing of laboratory tests to a certain degree. In 
general, hospitals did not limit routine laboratory tests for OM patients. However, in 
the SSS and the UC scheme, for the high-cost tests or the ones required to be done at 
a private laboratory, the hospital may have instructed doctors to order those only for 
specific cases. In addition, some doctors helped the hospitals by using a lower-cost 
blood test. Furthermore, some hospitals had a policy of limiting a screening test to 
patients with OM symptoms. 
" ... We don't have a policy to limit lab tests .... It depends on the doctor. " 
(Director, public hospital) 
" ... f know that the doctor can check more lab tests for patients ... I may ask 
the doctor whether it is needed for all patients or not .... If it is needed for only 
specific cases then there is no need to checkfor all patients. " 
(Director, private hospital) 
"... If we find patients without any DM symptoms and want to check their 
FPG, we will tell them that they have to pay for lab tests if the result shows 
normal. 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
" ... We found that it cost the hospital too much and some investigations are 
not essential at that time, for example HbAl C is not essential for all patients. 
So, now we try to point to only the uncontrolled group" 
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(Doctor, public hospital) 
For SSS patients in private hospitals in this study, physicians might use higher-cost 
lab tests to give more information. For instance, instead of prescribing a urine protein 
tests, some doctors ordered BUN and Cr, because it could provide more information 
on kidney function. 
" ... I usually check BUN and er more than urine protein because I think I 
can know more about kidney function than from urine protein. " 
(Doctor, private hospital) 
In the CSMBS in this study, doctors tended to prescribe laboratory tests on patients' 
request. 
" ... If a UC patient requests more tests, I will discuss with them whether it is 
essential or not. But for CSMBS patients, I know that they can reimburse 
100%; so I might order as they request. " 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
Effect of scheme on drug prescriotion 
There were some differences in drug use for patients in the different insurance 
schemes. In the SSS and the VC scheme in this study, public hospitals tried to set a 
single hospital drug list which used only one generic drug for one indication. 
"... We control overuse of drugs by iz'miting the number of drugs in the 
hospital drug list and using only one drugfor one indication ... We have 550 
items of drugs for UC patients. If doctors need to use more than those, they 
have to report the reason for using that drug. " 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
Hospitals used various methods to control drug use for VC scheme patients. For 
example, doctors might negotiate with VC scheme patients on whether they could 
pay the additional costs of expensive drugs. One hospital had a policy of monitoring 
drug prescribing. If use of high cost drugs was increasing, they would discuss this in 
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the executive meeting. However, drug prescription mainly relied on doctors' 
behaviour. Physicians in public hospitals in this study were concerned about 
prescribing drugs, which were not on the hospital drug list for UC scheme and SSS 
patients. Physicians tried to help hospitals to control cost by limiting the use of high 
cost drugs for UC scheme and SSS patients. 
" ... We have a policy that some drugs are not allowed to be prescribed by a 
GP. They have to refer the patients to see a specialist if those patients need 
those drugs. " 
(Director, public hospital) 
" ... I will ask UC scheme patients whether they can help to pay somethingfor 
this drug or not. " 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
" ... our doctors know that if they need to prescribe a drug not on the drug list, 
they have to tell the patient to buy it. " 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
" ... If the drugs prescribed by our doctors affect the costs of service, we will 
bring this issue to the executive meeting. " 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
For the SSS, public hospitals in this study required an approval process for 
prescribing high cost drugs. 
H.. For high cost drugs, when doctors prescribe, they .need to have the 
signature of the specialist or deputy director... But cases of this are very 
rare. " 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
H •• I have an example of one patient who was using a high cost drug from 
another hospital and asked our doctor to prescribe it. We had to negotiate 
with the patient to change to a cheaper drug since we did not have that drug 
in our hospital. " 
(Head of insurance unit, public hospital) 
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Sometimes, the DM clinic team would help to negotiate with patients to pay an 
additional charge for high cost drugs. In private hospitals, doctors knew that 
prescribing high cost drugs might affect the hospital's financial status. They 
considered this in prescribing. 
.. Yes I know that if I prescribe high cost drugs for SSS patients, it may 
affect the hospital's financial status. " 
(Doctor, private hospital) 
A doctor might negotiate with a patient to make additional payments for a high cost 
drug. 
" ... Some SSS patients received drugs from another hospital that we don't 
have, we have to tell them to pay for this item. " 
(Doctor, private hospital) 
In respect of the CSMBS group, some doctors felt comfortable in prescribing for 
CSMBS patients. Patients who requested more drugs or a branded drug, might have 
received them more easily than under the other schemes. 
" ... I know that we tend to spoil CSMBS patients by using expensive drugs in 
this group. For me, I try to set my own standard of drug use for any 
insurance status... DM disease is a disease where much of the outcome of 
care depends substantially on patient behaviour" 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
" .. .1 am more comfortable to sign for buying high cost drugs for CSMBS 
patients because I know that the hospital can reimburse all the costs of these 
drugs. For the UC scheme, 1 try to persuade them to help the hospital by 
paying for these drugs ... if they cannot afford this, 1 may change to a cheaper 
drug ... But in essential cases, 1 used to order Avandia for free. " 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
" .. , CSMBS patients may receive the original drug item. " 
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(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
Effect of scheme on treatment follow up 
Post-treatment follow up of patients in different schemes differed in vanous 
hospitals. A hospital might have a set system for monitoring and follow-up of the 
outcomes of treatment. In the UC scheme and CSMBS groups, follow up of the 
outcomes oftreatment was the duty of the DM clinic team and the doctors. 
" We help doctors to screen patients by checking the results of care. 
Patients who cannot control their blood sugar to fewer than 200, we will 
arrange to consult a specialist. We are also responsible for making 
appointments with the ophthalmologist for patients who have not been 
checked this year, but we have to prioritise cases because our 
ophthalmologist limits the numbers of patient to only 10 cases per day . .. 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
" ... My aim is to control DM for each patient. In uncontrolled cases, I will 
spend more time on these patients and if they still cannot be controlled, I will 
invite their close relatives to discuss how to control DM in the patients . .. 
(Doctor, public hospital) 
Furthermore, there were some activities which a nurse was able to conduct. Some 
public hospitals assigned those duties to the DM clinic team. 
"... We will check the foot of a patient. If they have even small ulcer, we will 
check and report to the doctor .... Now, we request more personnel to help us 
in checking foot status . .. 
(DM clinic team, public hospital) 
In the SSS group, different systems were used in public and private hospitals. Private 
hospitals typically arranged for the education and marketing team to interview every 
patient after they were seen by the doctor. This team would provide information for 
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the patient and follow up the result of care by interviewing the patient and writing up 
the results to help the doctor. 
" ... Our hospital had a team to interview patients after they meet the doctor. 
AI/ patients have to meet our team. Our team will ask them about the result of 
DM and educate them about the disease. Furthermore, our team also gives 
them information about the SSS and asks about the service they receive. 
(DM clinic tearn, private hospital) 
In public hospitals, DM clinic teams also have a duty to help doctors to monitor the 
result of DM care and to educate patients in the same way as mentioned above. 
8.4 Patient Views 
Patients in the different insurance schemes had differing experiences of services. 
There were three categories of experience in this study: use of care, process of care, 
and perception on quality of DM care. 
8.4.1 Use of care 
Patient views on use of care can be divided into five sub-categories: geographic 
constraints, awareness of patient rights, new DM case finding, patient choice, and the 
separation of services between health insurance schemes. 
Geographic constraints to service use 
In general, participants in the focus group discussions did not feel that travelling to 
hospital was a constraint to use of care. However, this study interviewed patients 
who received services from a hospital, which may introduce bias into the study. 
Among CSMBS participants, the geographic constraint was less of a concern 
compared with the lack of confidence in services provided by health services near to 
their home. Participants felt that distance and cost of transportation were not 
obstacles to access to hospital care. They did not trust the local health centre or PCU, 
because these had few staff and no permanent doctors. They trusted the hospital 
more than the PCU and health centre. 
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We are not sure that the health centre can manage our disease. We 
choose to come to hospital because it is a one-stop service. If we go to the 
health centre, finally they have to refer us for tests at the hospital. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
In SSS participants, there were few problems about geographic constraints for two 
reasons. First, SSS participants selected their hospital, which was usually near their 
house or their factory. Second, they believed in hospital treatment more than 
treatment from clinics or health centres. 
" ... go to hospital is the best for me. I live near a clinic but I am not sure 
whether it has good quality care like the hospital or not.. .. Transportation 
cost is not a problem. The hospital is not too far from my house. " 
(SSS patient, public hospital) 
II ••• This hospital is near my house and factory. It is easy to come to 
hospital ... . Actually; both private hospitals are not far, the transportation to 
both hospitals is good. " 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
For VC scheme participants, in general, they were assigned to a hospital in the 
district they lived, so the distance between the hospital and their home was not a 
constraint. Furthermore, they were aware of the limited capability of the health 
centre to do all the laboratory tests for DM patients. Therefore, finally, they had to go 
to a hospital. Furthermore, Samutsakhon had no regulation for patients to go to a 
health centre or PCU so patients could go to their assigned hospital directly. 
" ... There is not enough staff in the health centre; there is no blood sugar 
investigation... I don't trust the health centre ... coming to the hospital is 
better. " 
(UC scheme patient, public hospital) 
Awareness of patient rights 
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Level of awareness of the rights of patients differed between members of the 
different health insurance schemes. CSMBS participants knew that hospitals received 
full reimbursement from the government so they could request more in terms of 
prescriptions or investigations. SSS participants knew and understood their rights 
because they had contributed to SSS every month. VC scheme participants seemed 
less aware of their rights compared to CSMBS and SSS patients. 
" ... We have full reimbursement so we can have more expensive services. . .. 
We can request more investigations. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
" ... ] dare to comment on the services of the hospital because I have paid for 
them every month... This is my right. " 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
" ... ] know that with my gold card I don't have to pay anything when I come 
to hospital .... ] know from TV advertising. " 
(VC patient, public hospital) 
Patient choice 
The regulations of each insurance scheme promote patient choice in different ways. 
The SSS allow its beneficiaries to choose their own hospital on an annual basis. VC 
scheme beneficiaries are assigned to a main contractor which is the hospital in the 
same district as the beneficiary. CSMBS patients have free choice to go to any public 
health facility from health centre or PCU to hospital. There are two main parts to 
patient choice: choice of hospital and choice of doctor. 
Choice 0/ hospital 
As mentioned above, SSS members can change their main contractor every year. 
SSS participants registered with a private hospital felt that as it was their right to 
choose their main hospital, they chose the hospital that gave them a good service and 
was not far from their home. 
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" ... My criteria for choosing a hospital are that it has good service and is not 
far from my house. " 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
" ... I choose this hospital because it is not far from my house. " 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
However, some SSS participants in public hospitals believed that a private hospital 
might charge them additional fees if they had a very severe illness. 
" ... I choose the public hospital because I am afraid that when I have a high 
cost disease, I have to pay additional fees for drugs or laboratory tests where 
there is no problem in public hospitals. " 
(SSS patient, public hospital) 
In the CSMBS group in this study, since they could go to any public hospital, so their 
choice was informed by the reputation of the doctor or hospital. 
" ... I went to Banpaw hospital because the hospital is famous; although, I had 
to wait for a longer time. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
Choice of doctor 
Every hospital in this study allowed patients to choose their preferred doctor. 
However, few patients had experience of changing doctor. 
VC participants tried to select the doctor who was recommended by their 
community, but this option was not strictly followed. Patients knew that the hospital 
would not be able to provide the same doctor for every patient visit. 
"... We can choose our doctor if we want. ... My friend recommends this 
doctor, so I told a nurse that I would like to see this doctor.... However, we 
cannot fIX to see this doctor every time we com~ since we do not know 
whether this doctor will come or not next month" 
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(UC patient, public hospital) 
SSS participants accepted the various doctors who they met at the time of their 
follow up; they did not have much time to wait for only one particular doctor. 
" ... I needed to go home early... I have two or three doctors in my mind. If 
those doctors do not come, I can choose other doctors. " 
(SSS patient, public hospital) 
In the CSMBS, many patients put their faith in the hospital's services, so they did not 
need to choose a specific doctor. They believed that all the doctors had a standard 
qualification to provide good service. 
" ... I do not choose any doctors; I think every doctor has equal knowledge .... 
I trust every doctor. The hospital can provide any doctors for me. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
Separation o(services between schemes 
Most of the participants accepted the separation of services between the different 
schemes. VC patients knew that SSS patients had a shorter waiting time and could 
come to hospital on Saturday or Sunday. They also accepted that SSS patients spent 
less time in hospital because they had to go to work. 
VC scheme participants felt that SSS participants were more privileged in their 
service provision. However, they still believed that they received the same drugs in 
all schemes. 
" ... We don't know why the hospital has separate sections for services 
provided to SSS and UC patients. They separate services but use the same 
place for drug collection ... we think that they give the same drugs. " 
(UC patient, public hospital) 
SSS participants felt that they received a special service from their hospital. The 
hospitals provided this special service because they needed to be selected in the next 
year. Furthermore, SSS participants felt that hospitals provided a special track for 
them because the hospitals knew that they needed t~ go back to work. 
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" We know that they separate our scheme because they need us to select 
the hospital in the next year. " 
(SSS patient, public hospital) 
"We need a more rapid service, so we can go back to work ... ! ask the doctor 
to make my appointment on Sunday because it may affect my bonus if ! am 
regularly absentfrom work" 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
CSMBS participants accepted the service separation. They thought that it related to 
the SSS contribution. However, they felt that it might discriminate against other 
schemes. 
" I understand the reason why they have a separate service section for SSS 
patients. They have to pay a contribution every month from their salary so 
when they are sick it is fair to give them special service ... " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
"Sometimes, I wonder whether this separation discriminates against other 
patients or not. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
However, some participants did not understand the reason for separating services 
between schemes. They suggested that hospitals should not separate the DM clinics 
but should merge all patients of all the schemes in the same clinic so that the hospital 
can provide education about DM to patients in one whole group. 
" ... I disagree with separating service by schemes. I suggest setting the DM 
clinic for all schemes. Hospital staff can educate and explain about DM to all 
patients at the same time. Furthermore, patients can exchange their 
experience of management of DM with each other. Now, I do not feel that this 
is the special clinic for DM patients. 
(SSS patient, public hospital) 
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8.4.2 Process of care 
There are two important aspects of the process of care amongst patients: expectation 
of process of care, and knowledge of care. 
Expectation of process of care 
Providing services to meet the expectations of patients can encourage a good patient-
provider relationship (Abdulhadi et al. 2007). Most participants were concerned 
about hospital 'hotel' services and waiting times when they were asked about their 
expectations of care. 
CSMBS participants demanded a more rapid service from hospitals. They also 
demanded good quality of services in both process and outcome. They expected the 
hospital to control the process of management, for example, one patient reported that 
the hospital mixed up his results with those of another patient. 
We need the hospital to provide services more rapidly especially in the 
pharmacy unit ... We understand about the number of patients but we think 
that hospitals can shorten some processes to improve their service. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
"I want the hospital to control the quality of the blood sugar result .... I had 
an experience where the lab unit mixed my blood sugar result with another 
patient's. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
Although most of the CSMBS participants did not pay fees when they went to 
hospital, some of them expected that the hospital should show the details of service 
charges to them. 
" ... I would like to know how much does the drug cost even though I don't 
pay anything. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
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VC participants expected to have more DM clinic days because of the congestion of 
patients. They had experience of long waiting times for laboratory results, and in the 
process of care. 
H ••• ! want the hospital to provide DM clinics every day. There are too many 
patients in a DM clinic per day ... ! wait so long in that day. " 
(VC scheme patient, public hospital) 
H We hope that lab personnel come earlier. I wait more than 3 hours for lab 
results every time. " 
(VC scheme patient, public hospital) 
However, SSS participants in private hospitals had fewer problems about waiting for 
service. This was because of the competition between hospitals to attract 
beneficiaries. 
"Now, we receive better service not having to wait like in the past because 
the hospital had to compete on service otherwise we will not select this 
hospital next year. 
(SSS scheme patient, private hospital) 
SSS and CSMBS participants expressed expectations about the outcome of care. 
Most of them knew that DM was a chronic disease and needed continuous care. 
" ... I need to know my sugar level and the result of treatment. I do not mind 
about other services ... I know that the result comes from my behaviour. " 
(CSMBS patient, SSS patient, public hospital) 
" ... ! expect that my disease can be cured although I know that DM is a 
chronic disease and needs to be followed up to monitor blood sugar. " 
(SSS patient, public hospital, private hospital) 
245 
8.4.3 Perceptions on quality of DM care 
From the patients' viewpoint, it was not easy for them to understand the result of 
care. Quality in the view of patients might come from indirect indicators such as drug 
quality. Furthennore, patient satisfaction with care received is a commonly used 
indicator of quality of care. Therefore, this study explored drug quality and patient 
satisfaction. 
Drug quality 
Patients in different insurance schemes had different attitudes to drug quality. 
VC scheme participants believed that they received lower quality drugs compared to 
SSS patients. 
HI saw SSS patients receiving drugs earlier than us .... I believe that they got 
better drugs than 1 " 
(VC patient, public hospital) 
CSMBS participants believed that expensive drugs were high quality drugs. They 
also believed that doctors prescribed different drugs to patients from different 
insurance schemes. 
H.. We have to pay for a good quality drug. It is expensive; we have to buy it 
outside the hospital. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
" ... 1 believe that the doctor prescribes different drugs to patients of different 
insurance schemes. " 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
However, SSS participants believed that they received good quality drugs. They 
trusted the doctor's suggestions about drug use, for example, they stopped using 
herbs when the doctor suggested that they might damage their kidneys. 
" ... I believe that the drugs we received from the hospital are good quality. " 
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(SSS patient, public hospital) 
" ... I used to change treatment to one of herbs but after I had consulted my 
doctor, he suggested that I stop this because it could damage my kidneys. So, 
I did not take it again. .. 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
Satisfaction 
Two issues involved In satisfaction are the complaints system, and servIce 
satisfaction. 
Regarding complaints, SSS participants had experience of complaining about the 
hospital service. Public hospitals had less formal complaints systems than private 
hospitals. They had a survey on patient satisfaction, but patients did not perceive any 
changes resulting from the surveys. Private hospitals were more concerned about the 
complaints system. Patients felt that it was easy to complain about services in private 
hospitals. 
" ... I used to do the hospital's satisfaction survey, but I do not know whether 
they adopted my recommendations. " 
(SSS patient, public hospital) 
" .. , I will complain if I am not satisfied about the service I received ... It is 
easy to complain about the service. We can complain to the information 
unit. " 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
uc scheme participants felt that their hospital did not provide a good system for 
complaining. They felt that it was hard to complain about services because 
complainants needed to sign their real name. 
" .. , It is not easy to complain in this hospital, I used to complain about the 
service but nothing has happened If we want to complain about anything, we 
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need to sign our name. Otherwise, the director will not do anything about our 
complaints. 
(VC scheme patient, public hospital) 
CSMBS participants did not have any experience of complaining and said they did 
not know the system for making a complaint in the hospital. However, they tried to 
accept the service received from the hospital. 
H ••• I did not know how to complain ... I understand that there are a lot of 
patients here. 
(VC and CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
Patients' satisfaction with services differed by scheme, as did their perception of 
satisfactory service. VC scheme participants seemed to be less satisfied with the 
services they received. They still complained about provider behaviour. 
H We need doctors who do a physical examination, not just look at the 
... 
OPD card or computer data." 
(UC patien~ public hospital) 
CSMBS participants seemed to be more accepting of the service they received at 
hospital compared to VC scheme patients. They were optimistic about the hospital 
service. They felt that the services they received now were better than in the past. 
H •• Now, hospitals improve their services which are much better than those of 
ten years ago. At that time we called the hospital a slaughterhouse. 
(CSMBS patient, public hospital) 
SSS participants accepted the service they received. They realized that doctor and 
hospital tried to provide a good service for them. 
H ••• I am happy with the process of hospital care. Although I have to wait, I 
understand the process and know that the doctor tries to do his best. " 
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(SSS patient, public hospital) 
The image of public hospitals is worse than that of private hospitals. 
They have a lot of patients, so the queue is very long. " 
(SSS patient, private hospital) 
Discussion 
8.4.4 Providers 
Summary of findings 
The main findings of how the providers in the study responded to insurance schemes 
are shown in Table 8.5. The study results show that the insurance schemes did have 
an influence on hospital policy and provider behaviour. Insurance scheme affected 
hospital policy in three areas: detecting new cases in the community, separating 
services between schemes, and payment to doctors. However, the process of care was 
mainly influenced by individual providers, i.e. physicians and nurses. Provider 
behaviour included such issues as referral of patients to receive services near their 
home, following the standard practice guidelines, prescription of laboratory tests, 
drug prescription, and treatment follow up. 
Table 8.5 Summary of hospital policy and provider views on treatment of 
Diabetes Mellitus patients in different schemes 
Hospital Public Private 
Insurance UC SSS CSMBS SSS 
Use of service 
Finding new cases Have outreach teams and additional incentive to find new No policy to fmd 
cases in community cases in 
community 
Refer patient to Have policy to No clear policy to refer patient back to Have policy to 
service near home refer to health health service near patients' home reduce use of 
centre, but not subcontractors 
effective 
Separated OPD Regular track Set a track Regular track Seta track 
separated from separated from 
UCandCSMBS OOP patients 
Process of care 
Doctor fee Salary Doctor fee with Salary+ Doctor fee but 
limit maximum additional doctor lower rate than 
fee( one hospital) OOP 
Standard practice All physicians know about guidelines but adapt to their own experiences 
lnlidelines 
Laboratory tests Limit high cost laboratory tests No clear policy to Limit high cost 
limit laboratory tests 
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-_H3vestigations 
---
Drug use Strictly limi~imil 10 hospital More common 10 Limit to hospital 
hospital drug list drug list ~se high cost drug list 
_ I drugs 
._------
Treatment follow Doctor follows results and DM clinic team help to monitor Have responsible 
up but not cover all cases unit to follow 
result of 
treatment in every 
case 
Hospital policy 
The study showed that scheme regulations influenced hospital policy on the early 
detection of DM cases. Data from an international review of pay for perfonnance 
demonstrated that pay for perfonnance as a financial incentive to providers, provider 
groups, and the health system can improve quality of care (Petersen et al. 2006). In 
the current study, a good example was the incentive from the SSO and NHSO which 
aimed at early detection of DM cases in different groups. The NHSO aimed to 
improve case finding in the community while the SSO aimed to improve case 
detection in hospitals and factories. Hospital responded to scheme policy depended 
on the scheme regulations; for example, a hospital that received funding to find new 
cases of DM in the community set up a team to do this job specifically. This finding 
confirmed the effect of insurance scheme design on motivation of providers. 
Regarding the issue of patient referral to receive services near to home, evidence had 
shown that providing health services near to home could improve the outcome of 
DM patients (Strauss et al. 2006). Continuity of care had been found to improve the 
process and quality of DM care (LI et al. 2008). Currently, in Thailand, the number 
of DM cases increases every year. A cohort study of a Bangkok power plant of the 
Electric Generation Authority of Thailand showed that incidence of NIDDM was 
13.5% (Aekplakorn et al. 2006). Treatment of patients near to home could reduce 
congestion in large hospitals. However, this study found that hospitals had no policy 
to refer patients for treatment near their home. This might be due to various 
characteristics of the insurance schemes. CSMBS patients can go to any public 
hospital. In SSS, hospitals were the main contractor. Referral of patients in this 
scheme to a subcontractor might reduce hospital income. Referring UC scheme 
patients to services near to home could reduce the burden of the cost of hospital care. 
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However, most patients did not want to go back to receive treatment from their 
health centre or peu after they had come to the hospital. 
The most striking evidence of different policies by scheme in the use of care was the 
separation of services by insurance scheme in this study. SSS patients had a clearly 
separated OPD in both public and private hospitals. Private hospitals also separated 
the facilities between SSS and out of pocket (OOP) patients. In the past, the objective 
of this policy was to promote special treatment for the SSS group since the hospital 
could make more profit when they had more registered employees even if they were 
paid by capitation from SSS (Sriratanaban 1998). More recently this seems to have 
changed; they have needed to improve the hospital image for oop patients since 
their profit margin from SSS patients has decreased. Public hospitals provided a 
separate track of services for SSS patients. SSS received fast-track treatment while 
CSMBS and VC scheme used the regular system. Hospitals perceived that SSS 
patients brought additional income to the hospitals. To encourage the SSS group to 
choose the hospital in the following year, public hospitals had to create an image of 
special care for this group. 
Provider behaviour 
Doctors were the main group in the implementation of policy. Policy related to 
process included payment to doctors, following standard practice guidelines, 
laboratory tests, and prescription of drugs. Hospitals set different payment methods 
for physicians according to the different schemes. For example, the private hospitals 
paid doctors by doctor fee related to capitation for providing services for SSS 
patients. However, this was not evidence of a direct effect of capitation on physician 
behaviour but rather an indication that payment method to the hospital led the 
hospital to adapt their payment of physicians and to seek to influence physician 
behaviour. For example, in private hospitals physicians in this study helped the 
hospital to control costs by limiting the use of expensive drugs for SSS patients. 
Regarding standard practice guidelines, all interviewed doctors knew that there are 
standard practice guidelines for DM patients, but they did not totally follow these 
guidelines. This finding corresponded with research by Brown et al (2002) in Canada 
about the interaction between physicians, patients, and the system. The finding was 
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that physicians supported using clinical practice guidelines but need to adapt them 
for individual patients. Systemic factors which affect use of the clinical practice 
guidelines included economic, administrative, and educational factors (Brown et a1. 
2002). 
The use of different practices for different insurance schemes was evident in 
laboratory tests such as HbA 1 C. In the UC scheme and SSS, hospitals had a policy to 
limit this test to only cases with high FPG, not for all patients. This might be because 
hospitals saw this lab test as an expensive test and not essential as a baseline test for 
all DM patients. Furthermore, doctors realized that they had to help the hospitals in 
limiting their orders for this test. Thus, the insurance system did affect doctor 
behaviour, although this was not directly related to doctor income. 
For drug prescriptions, hospitals in this study had a policy to control drug costs by 
using one generic drug, but the degree of control on the usage of drugs was different 
for different schemes. Doctors could more easily prescribe expensive drugs for 
CSMBS patients than for VC scheme patients. This finding corresponds to study of 
Limwatananon et al. (2004) which found that some hospitals restricted drug use in 
the UC scheme and SSS while they allowed physician to use them more freely in the 
CSMBS. Physicians also tended to use lower-priced drugs for SSS and UC scheme 
patients. The reasons for this might be due to influences on physician behaviour such 
as hospital policy, patient requests, and the payment system of the insurance scheme. 
Several factors have been found to affect physician prescription of DM drugs, such 
as clinical status and medication cost (Grant et al. 2007). The findings in this study 
supports the argument that drug prescription by physicians is influenced by insurance 
scheme. On the patient side, CSMBS patients might receive more expensive drugs 
than the other schemes because these patients know their rights and know that the 
hospitals will receive full reimbursement of the drug costs. 
In the area of treatment follow up, hospital policy establishes how patients should be 
followed up regarding the outcome of care. Private hospitals with SSS patients in this 
study have set up a system to meet every patient after treatment by a doctor to 
monitor the service provided by the hospital. This implies that private hospitals treat 
patients like customers and have a strong policy to keep those customers. Private 
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hospitals might have more chance to do this than public hospitals because they have 
fewer patients than public hospitals. 
8.4.5 Patients 
Patient views in relation to insurance schemes are shown in Table 8.6. Regarding 
access to care, there were no geographic constraints on travel to hospitals for patients 
in Samutsakhon. Since Samutsakhon is a small province near Bangkok, there are 
several ways to get to the hospital such as bus, boat etc. Furthermore, patients trusted 
the hospital and its doctor more than the health centre and PCU. There is evidence 
from international experience to show that a short distance to health services is 
associated with better glycaemic control (Strauss et al. 2006, Littenberg et a1. 2006). 
Furthermore, the regulations of the SSS and CSMBS schemes enabled patients to use 
hospital care. SSS patients can choose any hospital as their main contractor while 
CSMBS patients can go to any public health service. Only UC patients are required 
to use services within the CUP (a PCU, health centre, or community hospital) before 
referral to higher level hospitals. 
Table 8.6 Summary of patient focus group discussions on insurance schemes 
Hospital Public Private 
Insurance UC SSS CSMBS SSS 
Use of care 
Geographic No geographic constraint to come to hospital 
constraint Patients know Patients can choose Patients can go to Patients can 
about limited their preferred any public provider choose their 
capacity of health hospital every year. without any referral preferred hospital 
centre. system every year. 
They trust hospital 
They needed to more than health They trust the They trust 
bypass to access centre or PCU hospital and hospital more 
hospital. transportation is not than health centre 
a constraint orPCU 
Realized right Less aware of A ware of their right Know they can go to Aware of their 
their rights since to receive good any public hospital. right to receive 
they did not make services good service 
any contributions 
Patient choice Choose doctor by Choose their own Choose their hospital Choose their 
suggestions from hospital and doctor and doctor by hospital and 
neighbours! by regulation reputation of doctor 
acquaintances hospital and doctor. 
Good service and Good service and 
near house or near house or 
factory factory 
Choose public 
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Hospital Public Private 
Insurance VC SSS CSMBS SSS 
because of cost 
concerns when 
suffer severe 
disease. 
Separated service Feel that SSS Think that hospital Accept separate Need special 
patients have can provide more service for SSS track for 
more special rapid service to patients treatment so they 
service them can go back to 
work Need to 
Think that drugs Separate track for Feel that there might make 
provided are marketing reasons be discriminating appointment on 
similar to SSS between SSS and weekend 
others. 
Process of care 
Expectation of Need more hotel services such as reduced waiting time, good manners of doctor and 
care nurse. 
Need moreDM Expect to be cured Some need to know Expect to be 
clinic days result of disease cured 
Expect hospital to 
control process 
management 
Perception on 
quality of care 
Drug quality Some believe that Believe that they Some believe that Believe that they 
other schemes receive good quality expensive drug receive good 
receive better drugs means better quality quality drugs 
Quality drugs 
Satisfaction No strong complaints system Strong 
complaints 
system and 
feedback to 
patients 
Doctor provides Accept service even Satisfied with Good service 
less time for though service service from hospital compared to 
examination image is lower than public hospital 
private hospital 
On awareness of patient rights, the level of knowledge differed between members of 
different schemes. SSS patients seemed to be more concerned about their rights than 
patients in the UC scheme and CSMBS. The contributions to SSS made its members 
mindful of their right to good service when they were sick. For CSMBS members, 
most were civil servants, and they knew the regulations well. They realized that they 
could go to any public health service so most of them went to a big hospital. 
However, UC patients seemed to accept the different regulations. They did not make 
a connection betweenthe taxes they paid to the government and their rights to care, 
so they were less likely to asset their rights compared to SSS and CSMBS members. 
254 
The awareness of their rights resulted in higher expectations of SSS and CSMBS 
patients. For example, SSS patients in private hospitals in this study expected to have 
a more convenient service and rapid treatment, while SSS patients chose a public 
hospital if they were concerned about cost when they had very severe illness. SSS 
members in both public and private hospitals in this study felt that the hospital could 
make a profit from their choice so they had the right to receive good quality service. 
This finding differed from the past when patients lacked knowledge about social 
insurance (Tangcharoensathien et al. 1999b). 
CSMBS participants were particularly concerned about the doctor they saw. They 
might wait for the doctor they wanted to see even if this took longer. UC participants 
preferred to be treated at hospital rather than at a health centre or PCU. This seemed 
to be for a similar reason to the CSMBS patients, i.e. trust in the doctor and hospital. 
Furthermore, their neighbours might influence their decision regarding choice of 
doctor in the hospital. 
Separation of services by scheme brought positive and negative views from patients. 
For example, some CSMBS participants felt that they were discriminated against 
compared with SSS patients, while some participants accepted this system because 
they felt that SSS patients paid more than the others. Some participants suggested 
that the hospitals should set up DM clinics for all schemes together, and not separate 
services. Setting up a DM clinic would enable a hospital to manage cases more easily 
but could create constraints for patients in utilization. 
For expectation of care, all of the patients paid most attention to the 'hotel' aspects of 
service. This implied that patients were more concerned about convenience than the 
result of care. It also implied that the minimum requirements in the convenience of 
services were still not achieved. For example, UC scheme participants would like the 
hospital to expand the DM clinic to open every day. This finding contrasts to a study 
in the US where patients had higher expectations about the result of care than about 
hotel services (Dawn et al. 2003). However, CSMBS participants were more 
concerned about the result of care; they expected to know more about the results of 
laboratory investigations. The relatively high education of CSMBS members might 
explain this. SSS patients had higher expectations regarding curing the disease. This 
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might be because SSS patients are young working people and most are the income 
earner of the family so being cured of a disease is particularly important to them. 
Regarding patient perceptions of quality, there are two important issues covered 
here: drug quality, and patient satisfaction. For drug quality, there are different ideas 
about quality of drugs. Some UC participants believed that patients in other 
insurance schemes received better quality drugs than they received. This might be 
explained by the separation of services, greater congestion of patients and attitudes 
about the UC scheme, which some people perceived was for the poor. CSMBS 
participants believed that their drugs were as good as those for SSS patient and that 
expensive drugs were good quality drugs. They might request expensive drugs from 
their doctor since they know that the hospital will be reimbursed fully from the 
government. SSS participants were less likely than UC scheme and CSMBS to 
complain about DM drugs. One reason might be that SSS patients usually controlled 
their blood sugar better than patients in the other two insurance schemes because 
they were still young. 
On satisfaction, this can be divided into the complaints system of a hospital and 
satisfaction with services provided. On the former, it seemed that private hospitals 
were concerned more about the complaints system than public hospitals. In public 
hospitals, patient had to sign their real name and use their real handwriting, while 
private hospital patients were only required to complete a complaints form. 
Furthermore, improvements resulting from complaints made indicated that the 
private hospitals took on board the comments to improve hospital activities. 
UC scheme participants wanted doctors to have more time for patients. SSS 
participants in public hospitals accepted the services of the hospital, although they 
knew that public hospitals are perceived as poorer than private hospitals. One reason 
for this is that the number of patients in private hospitals is less than in public 
hospitals so providers have more time to check on progression of the disease. 
However, SSS patients in public hospitals want to make sure that they would not be 
charged when they had very severe illness. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter employed qualitative methods to explore scheme effect on quality of 
DM care from patient and provider perspectives in specific hospitals. This study 
confined the scope of analysis to three parts: use of services, process of care, and 
result of care as perceived by patients. Each part of the analysis compared results 
between the three public insurance schemes - UC scheme, CSMBS, and SSS. 
The study found that these schemes influenced both provider and patient behaviour 
in the study hospitals. On the provider side, insurance scheme affected hospital 
policy and provider behaviour. Some policies affected patient use of care such as 
separated services, finding new cases in the community or drug policy. Other 
policies had effects on physician behaviour, such as different payment methods to 
hospitals which then affected hospital policy on physician payment for treating 
patients from different schemes. 
Providers adapted their behaviour to comply with the regulations and incentives of 
the insurance schemes. There were differences between schemes in several areas 
such as policy on drug use and laboratory tests. 
Patients perceived that different schemes gave their members privileges in different 
ways. SSS patients seemed to receive a privileged service through the fast track 
provided by hospitals, while CSMBS patients were privileged in their ability to 
request high cost drugs and laboratory tests. Patient satisfaction differed between 
schemes on both the complaints system and satisfaction with services received. 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
9.1 Introduction 
The thesis set out to explore the effect of insurance scheme on both overall indicator 
and OM specific indicators. The overall indicator was utilization of services while 
OM specific indicators consisted of LOS and early readmission within 30 days, as 
well as quality of service indicator. 
The conceptual framework for the study was developed from a combination of 
Kutzin's insurance function (1998), Figueras et al.'s (2005) health system 
performance framework, and Carrin and James' (2005) achieving universal coverage 
framework. The utilization analysis used the Andersen Behavioural model (1995) to 
assess the role of insurance schemes and other factors in explaining overall 
utilization of ambulatory and hospitalization care. Kutzin (1998) and Figueras et al. 
(2005) were adopted to assess the effect of insurance scheme on LOS and early 
readmission within 30 days, and quality of services. The discussion in this chapter is 
in three parts consisting of methodological and data issues, summary of findings, and 
discussion of key findings from the study. 
9.2 Strengths and weaknesses of performance indicators used in 
the study 
The conceptual framework of this study used three selected areas of performance to 
explore variation amongst insurance schemes, namely overall utilization, efficiency 
of OM care, and quality of care (Figure 4.1). This study was able to shed light on 
variation using these 3 areas. Overall utilization could shed light on the different 
access of people belonging to different insurance schemes in terms of ambulatory 
care and hospitalization. The study also found that LOS and early readmission, as 
proxies for efficiency, could identify differences between insurance schemes. Finally 
process of care and intermediate outcome of OM care explored the effect of scheme 
on quality of care. The study also demonstrated the value of a qualitative approach in 
confinning and exploring findings of the quantitative study. Furthermore, using DM 
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as a tracer in studying the association between insurance scheme and efficiency and 
quality of care proved useful. The strengths and weaknesses of the chosen 
approaches are discussed further below. 
In terms of utilization, this study explored overall utilization with the help of 
Andersen's 1995 model. To explain health care utilization, there are two major 
categories of approaches (Joseph and Phillips 1984). The first emphasizes the 
geographical context, arguing that location of physician has a close relation to 
utilization. Several studies have shown that physician location is related to patient 
utilization (Guagliardo 2004, Cooper et al. 2003, Nemet and Bailey 2000). The 
second focuses on behaviour namely the need of and decision to use services by 
patients. There are at least five models related to this approach, the Rosenstock 
model, the Suchman model, the Anderson model, the Gross model, and the Aday and 
Andersen model (Joseph and Phillips 1984). 
This study used the Andersen model because it was easy to understand and apply to 
explain service utilization. However, there were some weaknesses in the study. First, 
this study used overall utilization which might not show a strong effect of behaviour 
on the decision of patients to use specific services. Second, the Andersen model 
might not explain well the sequence from need to decision to use health care 
services. Third, there might be other factors not included in the model such as 
genetic factors. 
In terms of efficiency of DM care, LOS and early readmission were chosen as the 
indicators. There were some strengths of the LOS analysis. First, LOS was easy to 
understand because it had a clear definition. Other analyses of efficiency are more 
complex and difficult to interpret such as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Second, 
from an economics viewpoint, LOS could be a proxy for cost of care and can be 
compared in different dimensions such as by individual, hospital, and over time 
(Lindvqvist 2005). However there were some weaknesses in the LOS indicator. First, 
while a shorter LOS might control cost in the hospital, it might also shift cost from 
hospital to community, increasing the total cost of disease care. Second, while there 
is little evidence to show that shorter LOS is related to outcomes such as mortality, 
some literature suggests that there are variations of outcome with duration of stay 
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(Clarke 1996). Third, a shorter LOS might increase the total cost of care because 
providers might increase service intensity through use of high cost technology 
(Clarke 1996). Furthennore, shorter LOS might come with inappropriate care 
(Clarke and Rosen 2001). 
This study used LOS to measure efficiency of resource use primarily because there 
was a clear definition and understanding of its significance. Furthennore, the claims 
data in Thailand were reliable enough to use for analysis and could demonstrate the 
national picture of efficiency of use of resources. However, LOS could only reflect 
inpatient care, it does not shed light on other areas of resource use such as prevention 
and promotion care, ambulatory care, or rehabilitation care. Moreover, using DM as 
a tracer might reflect only chronic disease conditions. Therefore, to make any 
generalizations on the efficient use of resources in the whole system, additional 
indicators would be needed to give a health system picture. 
Another indicator in this part was early readmission within 30 days after discharge. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, readmission which might be related to efficiency can be 
considered as an avoidable readmission. To explore avoidable readmission by using 
only claims data was not easy because of the lack of detail of discharge plans. The 
better way would be to have reviewed medical records. This study did not review 
such medical records because of the time and burden of the data collection process. 
However, OM is a disease with few planned readmissions so it is likely that patients 
who were readmitted within 30 days with the same diagnosis were avoidable 
readmissions. 
In tenns of quality of care, the empirical study of OM quality of care used the 
framework from Donabedien of structure, process, and outcome. This framework is 
commonly used to study quality of care. There might be two methods of studying 
quality using this approach. First is the implicit method where there is no prior 
standard or agreement about what is good or bad quality (Brook et al. 1996). Second 
is the explicit method which compares expected process or outcome with practice. 
However, there might be four considerations when using this approach to assess 
quality. First, what is the relevant outcome to be measured, for example, survival rate 
might be too broad to use as an indicator. Second, using a relevant outcome as a 
260 
criterion for quality of care is not straightforward because there are other factors that 
affect outcome (Donabedian 1966). Third there might be other factors not included in 
the framework such as patient acceptability (Donabedian 1968). Fourth, there is a 
debate about strengths and weaknesses of each element such as process and outcome, 
structure and process etc. 
This study used Donabedian's approach because it is easy to understand and widely 
used to assess quality of care. The method used the explicit approach by drawing on 
standard guidelines for DM care in Thailand which specified standard processes and 
intermediate outcomes, and obtaining data on actual practice by using medical record 
review. Although the study used one province as the site of the study, it might be 
generalized to identify problems of variation of performance between schemes since 
the context of other provinces might not differ much from Samutsakhon province, 
but this requires further exploration. 
9.3 Methodological and data issues 
As stated in chapter 4, the aim of this thesis was to evaluate the three public health 
insurance schemes in Thailand in terms of performance in selected areas. To fulfil 
the objectives, a mixture of studies including qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies was used. First, the HWS was analysed to explore the overall 
utilization under different schemes. This explored care seeking behaviour, factors 
affecting ambulatory care and hospitalization of beneficiaries in each scheme. 
Second, claims data providing LOS and early readmission within 30 days for OM 
patients were analysed. These data covered all hospitalizations of DM patients in 
2005. This analysis can indicate the efficiency of resource use in hospitals and 
quality of treatment ofDM patients as indicated by early readmission within 30 days 
of a previous discharge. 
Third, Health Examination Survey 2004 data was analysed to explored diagnosis of 
DM and the controlled level of OM in DM patients of different insurance schemes. 
This analysis could explore the extent of undiagnosed and uncontrolled OM amongst 
members of different schemes in the community. 
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Fourth, the medical records and patient interviews of DM patients in public and 
private hospitals of Samutsakhon province were analysed. A sample of patients was 
interviewed to obtain socioeconomic data while their medical records were used to 
track process and result of care. This methodology analysed process of care and 
intermediate outcomes of DM treatment. It provided indicators of quality of services 
in hospitals provided to DM patients. 
Fifth, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with patients and providers 
were conducted to explore perceptions of quality of treatment in DM. On the 
provider side, the objective of the interviews was to explore the effect of insurance 
scheme through hospital policy and physician behaviour. 
9.3.1 Methodological issues: Health and Welfare Survey 
There is some strength in the HWS. First, it provides accurate data on individuals 
and households across the country. This is because of the wide scope of the survey, 
the random selection of households and individuals, and the reliability of data 
provided by interviewed respondents (Patcharanarumol 2005). Second, the HWS is 
conducted by the NSO which has long experience of survey data collection; 
therefore, data could contain few errors (National Statistics Office 2003) because 
NSO uses well trained interviewers every year which leads to a lower rate of non 
response (Rattanalangkam 2001). Third, the coding process was also less prone to 
error because they use special software and experienced personnel for coding 
(National Statistics Office 2003). 
However, there are also concerns about the household survey. The survey was not 
designed to compare services by the three insurance schemes; therefore, the data 
might not be fully suitable for this analysis. For example, some people have multiple 
insurance cover which would not have been clarified in depth by interviewers on 
whether they were eligible for which insurance and the reason for having multiple 
insurance. This might affect the use of data on insurance status of people in this 
study. 
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In the analysis of HWS data, this study found two issues related to the goodness of fit 
analysis of the model, influential outliers and interaction effects of variables. 
Influential outliers was outlier data with a large effect on the estimation of 
parameters (Long 1997). This study found that there was a problem of outliers in 
fitting the regression model. Analysis of residuals found that there were influential 
outlier data which affected the goodness of fit of the model. To remove influential 
outliers, since there was no specific rule for this process (Long and Freese 2006), this 
study used the 9~1o confidence interval of the distribution of the standardized 
residuals as a cut point for evaluation. Furthermore, it was not easy to find the cause 
of outliers from outlier data. Long and Freese (2006) suggested that most outliers 
could not be explained by exploring the details of data because the model of analysis 
was not linear, unlike linear regression which can explore outliers by exploration a 
scatter plot. Therefore, in this study a trial of removing influential outliers and 
rerunning the model was the method used to check for influential outliers. In terms 
of interaction effects, normally interaction effects might be found by reviewing other 
studies and adding multiplication of interaction variables in the model 
(Jongsuwiwatwong 2002). However, there was no previous study of interaction 
effects in utilization in Thailand. Therefore, this study explored interaction effects of 
variable by analysed each variable. 
Another issue of data analysis was that there was no specific command or 
programme for diagnosis of residuals of the logistic regression in the survey data 
because data were weighted to represent population data. However, this study used 
diagnosis without weights as suggested by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) to perform 
diagnosis and residual analysis. 
9.3.2 Methodologi(:al issues: Claims data 
Claims data or administrative data, recently, have been used to assess performance 
of health insurance in developed countries such as the V.S. (MacLean et al. 2006). It 
has also been a tool for quality improvement. Claims data were a good resource for 
secondary data analysis related to quality of care, efficiency etc. There were several 
strengths of the claims data analysis in this study. First, the database has rich 
infonnation on the hospitalization of patients in all schemes since each insurance 
scheme needs this data for reimbursement or adjusted capitation. NHSO, for 
263 
example, has set up a unit for controlling quality of data by random checks of claims 
data against medical records; therefore, it is considered that the accuracy of data is 
improved every year (Pongpirul and Wongkanaratanakul 2008). Second, it was low 
cost in the collecting data process because all schemes used a computerized system 
for receiving hospitalization data. Furthermore, data were double checked with 
different schemes when patients might use different hospitals in case of emergency 
hospitalization. 
However, claims data may have weaknesses. First, the aim of claims data was for 
reimbursement; therefore, data might not suitable for measuring other indicators. For 
example, socioeconomic information is not included in the data because it is not 
related to the reimbursement calculation. Another difficulty is that hospitals might 
ignore data which does not affect reimbursement such as minor co-morbidity. 
Second, coding accuracy might still be a problem especially for diagnosis and 
procedures provided to the patients. Normally, hospitals use non-medical staff (i.e. 
not physicians) in the coding process; they might not confirm codes with the 
physician when they have questions about patient data (Pongpirul and 
Wongkanaratanakul 2008). Third, the structure of claims data was different in each 
insurance scheme, resulting in problems in making comparisons between schemes. 
For example, the CSMBS had additional details of charges of each department in the 
data because they reimbursed based on FFS, while NHSO did not require data on 
charges because they reimbursed by global budget with DRGs and capitation. SSS 
had a special structure in the details of referral from the main contractor to other 
hospitals because they needed details of the cost of the hospital and the pattern of 
referral. SSS had more details on the expenses of hospitals while CSMBS had more 
details on drug prescription. This led to problems of combining data for three 
insurance schemes. However, diagnosis and procedures coding were still the same 
across schemes. Fourth, in analysis of early readmission, claims data could not 
identify avoidable conditions or unavoidable readmissions. However, this study 
focused only on a chronic disease, which normally had no planned readmission. 
The claims data from 2005 had two problems of outliers in LOS and age that may 
come from input errors such as LOS at 400 days or age of 130 years. Therefore, this 
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study truncated data by using the 99% confidence interval as suggested by Lee et a1. 
(1998). 
The claims data of 2005 also had a problem of influential outliers. Therefore, this 
study used the same adjustment as in the HWS analysis. 
9.3.3 Primary data collection on Diabetes Mellitus patients 
The primary data collection in this study used medical records and patient interviews 
from public and private hospitals in Samutsakhon province. Medical records lacked 
some important data such as socioeconomic status of patient, time of OM diagnosis, 
income etcetera; therefore, this study used patient interviews to ge.t additional 
information. Nevertheless, patients might have been hospitalized with additional 
admissions outside Samutsakhon during the period of data collection, which could 
not be picked up from the medical records in the study hospitals. To minimize failure 
of detection of hospitalization outside Samutsakhon, this study used claims data 
which included hospitalization in outside provinces to track admissions in the year of 
data collection. 
There were some strengths of this primary data collection. First, medical records 
information was more accurate than the past because four of the five hospitals in this 
study had a computerized system in parallel with paper records. This made it easier 
to track and review data (Yatum et al. 2008). Second, using face-to-face interviews 
could ensure a high response rate. Interviewers could clarify any ambiguous 
information during interviews. 
However, there were some weaknesses of the approach to primary data collection. 
First, samples were included consecutively during the period of data collection. 
Although consecutive sampling seemed to be suitable for chronic disease patients 
who had to follow up with physicians regularly (Jongsuwiwatwong 2002), there 
might be bias in who physicians request to be seen frequently and which patients 
come. Second, some hospitals might have intervention projects to improve patient 
care such as training courses or special projects for OM patients; therefore, patients 
in some hospitals might have more knowledge than in other hospitals. This might 
affect the result of care of patients in different hospitals. For example, Kratumban 
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hospital has a project of special training courses for patients and provides special 
nurse teams to take care of patients who have FPG more than 200 mg% while other 
hospitals have only education during the intervals when patients are waiting to see 
physicians. Third, although there was a computerized system for collecting data in 
four of five hospitals, the quality of the medical records still depended ori the 
completeness of physician notes. The study found that some medical records had 
problems of completeness. To reduce this error, this study asked physicians or nurses 
to clarify ambiguous records. Fourth, the result of care in DM was not only affected 
by the structure or process of care provided by hospitals. It might be influenced by 
patient behaviour, or other factors, beyond the hospital's control. 
To check the analytical method, the study tested the use of multilevel analysis as 
shown in Appendix 3. The multi level analysis produced different results for process 
of care in relation to HbAIC test and eye examination, and outcome result in 
HbA 1 C. These can be explained by the effect of clustering within hospitals in those 
indicators. Such an effect can be explained by the intraclass correlation (ICC) 
concept, which represented the extent of total variance that was accounted for by 
variance between groups (Roberts 2004). An ICe value more than 0.15 is considered 
a high cluster effect (Hox 2002), indicating that multilevel analysis should be 
considered. In this analysis, the Ice were between 0.00 and 0.78 and were high only 
for three indicators; achieving HbA 1 C test, eye examination test, and achieving the 
result of HbA 1 e test. So, it was considered appropriate not to use multilevel 
modeling as the main analysis technique. 
9.3.4 Qualitative data on provider and patient views on quality of Diabetes 
Mellitus care 
A qualitative approach can help to explore more detailed information such as how 
hospital policy affected physician treatment behaviour, which is not possible by 
conducting quantitative research alone. 
The qualitative approach provides flexibility in exploring informants' views: for 
instance, focus group discussions with patients of each insurance scheme. This study 
conducted focus group discussions with some patients from the samples of each 
hospital. Furthermore, to cover all insurance schemes, the study set up focus group 
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discussions with patients in the four groups namely the DC scheme, CSMBS, SSS in 
public hospitals, and SSS in private hospitals. To reduce the influence of other 
schemes, each focus group included patients from the same insurance scheme. In 
addition, since the study set up four focus group discussions, results from one could 
provide further questions for the other groups. Concerns on quality of care might not 
be the same depending on the expectations and perceptions of patients; the group 
process could help patients express their own perceptions and experiences of care 
from the hospitals. 
To explore the provider views, this study undertook in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions with the director, physicians, DM clinic team, and the head of 
health insurance unit in each hospital. These data shed light on comparative 
perceptions and behaviours of each provider regarding quality of care in DM 
management. This qualitative data could reflect practice and included comments on 
hospital policy with respect to treatment of patients covered by different insurance 
schemes. Furthermore, the provider views were important to reflect how they 
adapted their practice in response to hospital policy. On physician views, this study 
included more than the target number because some hospitals had more than one 
physician responsible for DM management. 
There might be some weaknesses of qualitative data collection in this study. First, 
there might be false negative findings, as for example if patients told the interviewer 
that they were satisfied with the service when they were not, because it is normal in 
Thai culture not to express negative views to other people. However, to explore the 
negative attitudes of patients, the researcher tried to set up hypothetical example 
cases in the focus group discussions rather than asking about the direct experience of 
patients. For example, the researcher asked respondents about their suggestions for 
the hospital to improve DM services by discussing cases of the best and the worst 
hospital in their view. Second, use of semi structured questions might obstruct 
interesting topics emerging in the focus group discussions or in-depth interviews. 
However, because of the time constraint, the researcher sometimes had to steer 
informants towards relevant answers or intervene to get them back to the topic. 
Third, the position of the researcher as a doctor and working at the NHSO might bias 
the data collection and affect the responses of patients. To reduce this effect, the 
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researcher used assistants with experience of qualitative research as a partner to 
moderate the focus group meetings. Furthermore, for the patient groups, all focus 
group discussions took place outside the hospitals to relieve the pressure of the 
environment for patients. 
9.3.5 Broader methodological issues 
This study collected data from both secondary and primary sources. In primary data 
collection, this study was conducted in one province, which made it possible to go 
into depth on scheme performance. In addition, using DM as a tracer enabled the 
study to focus on selected performance indicators; overall utilization, LOS and early 
readmission, and quality of care in DM management. 
Employing a mixture of methods made it possible to cross check between sources of 
information (triangulation). For example, evidence on the decreased number of 
private hospitals participating in the SSS since 2004 corresponded with evidence 
from in-depth interviews with private hospital directors who explained the reason: 
the slow growth of the capitation rate and conflict between private hospitals and the 
SSO. 
There were also some weaknesses of this study. First, assessing utilization from the 
HWS provided an aggregate picture but may have lost some important detail. It 
might be argued that utilization for specific conditions might be different by scheme. 
Second, the study used HWS and claims data for only one year; it might be argued 
that it could not explore changes over time. Third, the changing policies of the 
insurance schemes rapidly led to unstable policy in hospitals and changing provider 
behaviour. Most providers complained about too short a period of preparation for 
new regulations from insurance schemes such as the UC scheme which has changed 
policy every year. This change might affect the results found in the study. Lastly, 
there was limited existing evidence to which this study can be compared in terms of 
perfonnance amongst schemes. Little research has compared the performance of 
health insurance schemes in Thailand after the coming of universal coverage. 
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9.4 Summary of findings 
The three public insurance schemes have different characteristics such as funding 
source, method of allocation to provider, service provider, benefit package etc. The 
VC scheme is funded by tax and covers about 75% of the population. In some area, 
beneficiaries must go to the primary care unit (PCU) or health centre near their 
home. They would be referred if the PCU and health centre considered they need 
service from a higher level such as a community hospital or a provincial hospital. 
Providers are paid by capitation for prevention & promotion and ambulatory care, 
and prospective case based payment for hospitalization within a global budget 
capped at the national level. Contracting units are mainly public network and a small 
number of private hospitals because they could not assemble the necessary network. 
The CSMBS is also funded by tax with FFS payment to provider. Coverage is about 
7% of the population. Beneficiaries can go to· any public provider, from health centre 
to hospital. The SSS is funded by a tripartite arrangement of government, employer, 
and employee. It covers about 14% of the population. Beneficiaries choose their 
main contractor and can change every year. The main contractors are hospitals with 
more than 100 beds of which about 50% are private hospitals. Payment to providers 
is capitation for both ambulatory and inpatient care. 
The results from chapters 4-8 are summarized in this section, beginning with the 
overall utilization of people under different insurance schemes. These findings reflect· 
the different utilization patterns in ambulatory care and hospitalization between 
schemes. The second part explains findings on LOS and early readmission within 30 
days of DM patients from claims data. These data provide information of how 
insurance scheme affects the resource use of hospitals in terms of LOS and quality of 
care in early readmission. The third part provides information on quality of service 
by explore the compliance in process of care to standard guidelines, and intermediate 
outcomes of DM patients. The fourth part provides in depth information on quality of 
service from patient and provider perspectives. This reflects perceiVed quality of care 
from patient views and the response of providers to insurance scheme and hospital 
policy on quality of treatment for DM. 
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9.4.1 Scheme effect on overall utilization from Health and Welfare Survey 
2005 
Care seeking behaviour 
The VC scheme covers poor people and children more than the other schemes. The 
SSS mainly covers those in the working age group while the CSMBS has a high 
percentage of the elderly. Most people sought health services when they were ill and 
self-prescribed drugs were about 20%. The pattern of care seeking depended on the 
insurance scheme regulations. For example, SSS patients mainly went to private 
hospitals since most of the beneficiaries registered with private hospitals. CSMBS 
can go to any public hospital, while VC scheme members have to go to a primary 
care facility within the local CVP network. 
Some beneficiaries did not exercise their right when they were sick. For example, 
31 % of CSMBS members, 21 % of SSS members, and 24% of VC member did not 
exercise their insurance when they went to hospital. Data showed that amongst these 
groups,44% used self-prescribed drugs and 32% used private clinics. 
Illness and service utilization 
The HWS found that VC scheme and CSMBS members were more likely to be ill 
and to utilize health facilities, both ambulatory care and hospitalization. This might 
reflect insurance effects or other factors such as demographic characteristics of these 
groups. To check for this, multivariate analyses were done for factors affecting 
utilization, dividing utilization into four groups: ambulatory care use, frequent use of 
ambulatory care, hospitalization, and frequent use of hospitalization. 
The study found that insurance scheme affected utilization, both ambulatory care and 
hospitalization. For ambulatory care, after controlling for other factors, SSS members 
had a higher probability of using care and more frequent use compared to CSMBS 
members while UC scheme members had no different use of services compared to 
CSMBS members but had more frequent use than CSMBS members. Data from 
focus group discussions showed that SSS respondents sought care earlier because 
they realized that if they had severe illness it would affect their job and their income. 
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In tenus of health need, UC scheme members seemed to require more frequent 
services when they were ill compared to CSMBS members. 
Regarding hospitalization, CSMBS members had a higher chance of admission and 
more frequent admission than UC scheme and SSS members. However, despite no 
difference in probability of hospitalization between SSS and VC scheme members, 
UC scheme members had a higher probability of frequent admission than SSS 
members. 
9.4.2 Scheme effect on length of stay and readmission for Diabetes Mellitus 
patients 
This study explored efficiency in use of resources by analysing LOS in DM and 
quality of service from early readmission to cross check for too early discharge from 
hospitals. Furthenuore, to answer the question about whether providers could 
manipulate LOS, three conditions were compared including acute conditions, chronic 
conditions, and without complication conditions. In overall, data showed that the 
CSMBS had longer average LOS compared to the UC scheme and SSS. To explore 
factors affecting LOS, muItivariate analyses were done by using three groups of 
explanatory factors including demographic, illness, and enabling factors. 
The study found that, on demographic factors, females and the age group more than 
forty had a higher chance of shorter LOS. On illness factors, high severity had a 
higher chance of longer LOS. In enabling factors, admission in general, regional, and 
university hospitals had a higher chance of longer LOS compared to community 
hospitals. Insurance status also affected LOS. This study found that SSS and VC 
scheme patients had a higher chance of shorter LOS after controlling for other 
factors. 
For early readmission, in chronic and without complication conditions, the VC 
scheme had a higher chance of early readmission within 30 days. However, this 
study also showed that for acute complications, there was no difference in 
readmission by the scheme. 
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9.4.3 Scheme effect on Quality of Diabetes MeIlitus treatment 
The effect of insurance scheme on quality of care was investigated through both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in this study. The aim was to identify scheme 
effect on quality of care. 
In the quantitative study, this study explored the degree of diagnosis and controlled 
level of DM in the population and quality of care in terms of achieving standard 
guideline of DM within hospitals. Three sources of data were used: the Health 
Examination Survey 2004, primary data collection from medical records and patient 
interviews in Samutsakhon province, and claims data of those DM patients. 
Processes of care were measured by standard service guidelines including achieving 
target number of services in FPG test, HbA 1 C test, urine examination, eye 
examination, lipid profile test, and blood pressure test, while results of care were 
measured by intermediate outcomes including mean results of FPG, HbAIC, fasting 
triglyceride, total cholesterol, and BP, and admission from acute complications. 
Health Examination Survey data provided information that the SSS was the least 
likely to diagnosis DM compared to the VC scheme and CSMBS, while CSMBS was 
the most likely to have uncontrolled DM. 
Data from medical records and patient interviews in DM demonstrated the results of 
process of care and intermediate outcomes. In summary, this study found that 
insurance scheme was associated with differences in the process of care but this was 
not associated with intermediate outcomes. CSMBS members had a higher chance 
than VC scheme members of receiving standard guideline care for HbAIC, lipid 
profile and urine examination, while SSS had higher achievement on lipid profile 
than the VC scheme. 
In terms of intermediate outcomes, after controlling for other factors, there were no 
different results between schemes. This seemed not to relate to results in the process 
of care analysis. 
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In the qualitative study, this study showed patient perceptions and provider 
behaviour in DM services. Provider behaviour could be investigated throughtwo 
indicators, use of services and process of care, while patient perceptions could 
explored via three issues, use of services, process of care, and perceptions on quality 
of care. In terms of provider behaviour, this study found that hospitals set policies 
differently according to insurance scheme, for example, hospitals encouraged the 
finding of new cases of DM depending on the financial incentives that applied. 
Hospitals set a special track for SSS members to attract them to register with the 
hospital. 
In terms of physician behaviour, this study found that payment to the hospital had 
more effect on physician behaviour than payment to the physician directly. Private 
hospitals set payments for physicians according to the rules of the insurance 
scheme. For example in the SSS the private hospitals paid physicians by doctor's fee 
with a cap, but there were no views expressed that this affected physician behaviour. 
In contrast, physicians provided more or less services corresponding to the payments 
received by the hospital: for example, physicians tended to provide more services for 
CSMBS patients who were paid by FFS. 
As far as patient perceptions were concerned, SSS and CSMBS patients seemed to be 
more satisfied with services than VC scheme patients. Furthermore, VC scheme 
patients believed that they received a lower quality of care than CSMBS and SSS 
patients, especially regarding drug quality. In terms of service use, VC scheme and 
CSMBS members knew that hospitals separated services to provide special services 
for the SSS scheme, and felt that this might discriminate against them. SSS members 
felt that they were the owners of their scheme. They perceived that they had the right 
to choose the hospital, and expected good quality care from that hospital. 
9.5 Discussion of key findings from the study 
This section discusses the findings of the studies presented in the previous section on 
performance by scheme. Following a general discussion, there are four subsections, 
each focusing on an insurance scheme. The details of the discussion try to explain 
how the different scheme characteristics affect performance. The analysis is based on 
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the framework of Kutzin for the insurance function, Andersen's behavioural model, 
and Donabedien's quality of care framework. 
Analysis of health service utilization in this study used the behavioural model of 
Andersen (1995) to understand scheme effect. Three main groups of factors were 
proposed as explanatory variables including predisposing factors (Age, Sex, Marital 
status), Enabling factors (income, insurance status), and illness factors. Findings 
from the study showed that insurance status affected utilisation. In addition, those 
who were females, elderly, and had chronic disease had a higher chance of using 
ambulatory care and hospitalization. This reflected the health needs of these groups 
of people. However, females' higher need for utilization might come from obstetric 
and gynaecologic problems (Nandi et al. 2008). 
In care seeking behaviour, one issue was the confidence in use of services; some UC 
and CSMBS members were reluctant to use community hospitals or health centres, 
so they sought services from other sources such as private clinics or big hospitals. 
SSS members had appeared to have fewer problems in this issue because they choose 
main hospitals by themselves. 
For LOS and early readmission to hospital, how long should LOS be is a problem 
between efficiency and quality of care. Too long a LOS might reflect inefficiency in 
use of resources, while too short a LOS might be a sign of low quality and problem 
of morale (Clarke and Rosen 2001). Several factors that affect LOS have been 
studied, for example, socioeconomic factors, insurance status (Gazmararian and 
Koplan 1996), financial incentives (Chaix-Couturier et al. 2000, Lutjens and Louette 
1994), illness condition (Ottenbacher et al. 2004), hospital type (Mawajdeh et al. 
1997). However, which factors have positive or negative effects on LOS depended 
on the diseases studied and the context of each country. For example, the study of de 
long et al. (2004) found that under different insurance status, shorter or longer LOS 
depended on the condition and disease of the patient. For emergency cases, several 
studies have shown that there were no differences in LOS by insurance status (de 
long et al. 2004). 
274 
This study found that insurance status affected LOS. Other factors explaining longer 
LOS were greater severity of condition and admission to a higher-level hospital, such 
as a regional hospital, and factors explaining shorter LOS were females and patient 
age more than 40. The reasons why more severe condition and admission to higher-
level hospital affected LOS might be bound up with the health status of patients who 
needed more services. Furthermore, higher-level hospitals normally have more high 
technology facilities, such as special labs. This might mean that patients stay longer 
in hospital for more investigations. Females and patients more than 40 years old had 
shorter LOS, which might be explained by gender specific aspects of DM or other 
factors not included in the study such as cultural factors as mentioned in the 
discussion of chapter 6. 
Early readmission within 30 days after a previous admission is broadly used as a 
quality indicator (Ashton and Wray 1996). This study found that factors associated 
with high early readmission were patient with age between 40 and 60, severity level 
2, and high LOS of previous readmission, and the factor associated with low early 
readmission was being admitted in regional hospital. This finding may reflect quality 
of care effects of shorter LOS in the previous paragraph. For example, a patient more 
than 40 years old might be discharged too early, giving a higher chance of early 
readmission. In contrast, regional hospitals which had longer LOS might have 
provided more special services which lead to a lower chance of early readmission. 
For quality of care, good outcomes of DM care depend on several factors such as 
tight control of DM (Edelman et al. 2003), adherence to guidelines (Chin et al. 2000, 
Saaddine et al. 2002), type of physician (Suwattee et al. 2003), deprivation 
(Hippisley-Cox et al. 2004), co-morbidity (Niefeld et al. 2003), and having insurance 
(Benoit et al. 2005) etc. This study finding confirms the effect of insurance scheme 
on quality of care in DM. 
Findings from the Health Examination Survey 2004 that SSS members were more 
likely to have undiagnosed DM were confirmed by in-depth interviews with directors 
of hospitals, who said that there was no policy to find new cases in the community 
for SSS scheme member. For uncontrolled DM in the CSMBS, this might reflect 
patient concerns and provider behaviour. CSMBS patients can go to any public 
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hospital without limitation; therefore, this might result in irregular treatment from 
various hospitals. Most of them sought specialists for treatment as confirmed by 
focus group discussions which revealed that they preferred to go to hospitals more 
than the health centre or PCU. Furthermore, the hospitals also have no penalties for 
patients who do not come on an appointment date, as in the UC scheme. Data from 
in-depth interviews with DM clinic teams in one public hospital showed that the 
hospital had a policy to penalize UC patients if they missed an appointment. 
Typically, UC patients with no proper appointment have to wait until all patients 
with an appointment have seen the doctors, while CSMBS patients can see doctors at 
anytime without any penalties. 
9.5.1 Effect of Universal Coverage scheme on performance 
Utilization data showed that UC scheme members had a lower probability of using 
ambulatory care and hospitalization compared to other schemes after controlling for 
other factors. This might imply a problem of access in this scheme. The VC scheme 
required patients to go to providers near their home and required referral to other 
services. This might be a barrier of access in this group because some patients might 
not feel confident to use services from the health centre or PCU. Qualitative data 
showed that some UC patients wanted to bypass the lower level to receive services 
from the community hospital to provincial hospital. 
However, the frequency of use of services in the UC scheme was high in ambulatory 
care once services were accessed compared to CSMBS. In high frequent ambulatory 
use, this finding seemed to show that despite lower probability in use of ambulatory 
care, VC scheme members made more frequent use when they were sick. This might 
imply greater severity of UC scheme beneficiaries compared to other schemes. 
Furthermore, most UC scheme members received services near home. They might 
easily go to the health centre or PCU more frequently than CSMBS members. Few 
instrument in PCU and health centre limited use of service in CSMBS. This might 
also be the result of investment in primary health care infrastructure in Thailand for 
more than twenty years because adequate supply of services provided high 
opportunity to access care (Gulliford et al. 2002). 
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Regarding hospitalization, the UC scheme had lower hospitalization and less 
frequent hospitalization compared to the CSMBS. This might be an effect of the 
payment mechanisms of the UC scheme and CSMBS. Several empirical studies 
show that under FFS payment providers tend to provide more services due to the 
linkage between provider income and service volume (Liu and Mills 2007). 
The UC scheme uses capitation payment in ambulatory care and prevention & 
promotion, and prospective payment by DRGs within a global budget for 
hospitalization. This aims to increase efficiency in use of resource and control the 
long-term costs of services (National Health Security Office 2001). The result of this 
study showed a sign of efficient use by shorter LOS compared to CSMBS patients 
while it was not different from SSS patients. This could be the effect of the payment 
system in the UC scheme and SSS. This result corresponded to the findings of the 
study of Puenpatom and Rosenman (2008) which found that general hospitals had 
increased efficiency after VC implementation (puenpatom and Rosenman 2008). 
Developed countries have also found the same result, for example, a study in Taiwan 
showed that changing FFS reimbursement to prospective payment had the effect of 
decreasing LOS (Tsai et al. 2005). 
However, shorter LOS might come from too early discharge of patients. This study 
also measured early readmission within 30 days for DM patients. Readmission 
related to poor quality of care is unplanned early readmission (Ashton et al. 1995). 
This study found evidence that the UC scheme was discharging DM patients too 
early. This might be a stronger effect of insurance on provider behaviour than in the 
other two insurance schemes. The reason behind too early discharge, other than 
payment mechanism, might be the large number of patients in the UC scheme and 
limited beds in the general wards when UC patients are admitted, in contrast to 
CSMBS patients who can be admitted in a special room, which normally has a lower 
occupancy rate than general beds. Furthermore, in-depth interviews with providers 
revealed that hospital policy for the CSMBS scheme encouraged physicians to 
provide more services for the CSMBS patients. For example, one public hospital 
allowed physicians to prescribe expensive drugs with less control than for VC 
scheme patients, which corresponded to study of Limwatananon et al. (2004). 
However, for emergency conditions, it was evident that there was no difference by 
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scheme in early readmission of DM. This suggests that the patient's condition more 
strongly affected provider behaviour than insurance scheme. 
UC scheme members were less likely to receive care according to standard 
guidelines requiring a HbA 1 C test and lipid profile test. These tests are more 
expensive compared to the FPG test and BP test. This finding implies a problem of 
quality of care in the standard process of service in the UC scheme. One reason 
might be that the UC scheme expanded from the low-income scheme and health card 
scheme. A previous study before UC scheme found that low-income card holders 
, which was VC scheme without co-payment after UC implementation, had a lower 
chance of experiencing standard guideline care (Santayakorn 2004). This finding also 
was confirmed by interview with physicians that they did not follow standard 
practice guideline. This brought about variation of laboratory prescription of 
physicians. A study from the US also showed that Medicaid, which is a scheme for 
poor people, had the problem of quality of DM care (Zhang et a1. 2008). 
Furthermore, a study in Thailand and the US showed that physicians incorporated 
patient insurance status into clinical decision making (Meyers et a1. 2006, 
Sritharnrongsawat and Lapying 2003). Providers might not change the pattern of 
treatment in these patient groups after UC implementation. Another explanation 
might come from payment to provider. Data from the qualitative study confirmed 
that the different payment arrangements of insurance schemes affected physician 
decisions on matters such as laboratory tests and drug prescription. For example, one 
public hospital had a policy to limit drug use by setting the drug list for the hospital. 
This was applied strictly in the UC scheme and less strictly in the CSMBS. 
9.5.2 Effect of Civil Senant Medical Benefit Scheme on performance 
CSMBS beneficiaries had lower use of ambulatory care and lower frequency use of 
service compared to the UC scheme. This can be explained by preference of CSMBS 
patients and regulations of the scheme. CSMBS patients preferred receiving services 
from big hospitals which had many patients. This could limit choice of health 
facilities and discourage frequent use of services. This finding was confirmed by 
focus group discussions of CSMBS members which showed that they preferred to 
receive service from general hospitals or regional hospitals to health centres or PCUs 
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despite longer transportation time. Some patients responded that they were willing to 
wait to be seen by doctors, instead of non-MDs at health centres or PCVs. 
For hospitalization, CSMBS had higher hospitalization after controlling for other 
factors. This is likely to reflect the payment of FFS in CSMBS for hospitalization. 
Riewpaiboon et al. (2009) demonstrated that CSMBS patients received more services 
than patients of other insurance schemes (Riewpaiboon et a1. 2009). This was also 
confirmed by interviews with physicians who felt that they could provide more 
services for CSMBS patients because the hospital could be reimbursed full expenses 
from the government. Furthermore, it might be the request of patients to be admitted 
because in the year of study they had to pay in advance and claim reimbursement for 
drugs and services when they used the OPD whereas they did not pay anything when 
they were admitted·'. 
In terms of efficient use of resources and quality of services in DM care by using 
LOS and early readmission as indicators, this study found that CSMBS patients had 
longer LOS than SSS and VC patients. This might be the effect of the FFS payment 
of the CSMBS on provider behaviour. This result corresponded to the study of 
Pongchareonsuk et al. (2008) who found that DM patients in the CSMBS received 
higher cost treatment and investigations when hospitalized than SSS or VC scheme 
patients that might need longer LOS (Pongchareonsuk: et a1. 2008). This might also 
come from the response of provider to the patient being willing to be admitted in the 
CSMBS. The patients normally needed to be admitted more days because they do not 
have to pay any expenses when they admitted and physicians usually provide service 
as per their requests. 
In tenns of readmission, CSMBS had a lower chance of early readmission compared 
to the VC scheme and no difference compared to SSS. This implied acceptable 
quality of CSMBS and SSS patients and seemed to indicate higher quality compared 
to the VC scheme. This corresponded with focus group discussions with SSS and 
CSMBS DM patients who felt that they received a good service from hospitals, while 
VC scheme patients felt that they receive lower quality of services. 
IS This regulation has changed since 2007 and CSMBS patients with chronic disease and registered 
with a hospital do not have to pay in advance for OPD services. 
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In following process guidelines, this study found that CSMBS beneficiaries had a 
higher chance of achieving guideline care for HbAIC test and lipid profile test 
compared to the VC scheme. This could be a result of influence on both the provider 
and patient side. First, data from in-depth interviews showed that CSMBS status 
influenced physicians to provide more investigations. Hospitals had fewer 
restrictions on prescribing investigations in this group. Second, focus group 
discussions with CSMBS patients revealed that they felt they could request more 
investigations from physicians. This also was the effect of the payment mechanism 
of this scheme. This result was the same as developed country experience that, in a 
DM and HT study, physicians have different prescription drugs for different types of 
patient and insurance status (Huttin 2007). 
9.5.3 Effect of Social Security Scheme on performance 
SSS patients had a higher chance of ambulatory use and greater frequency of use 
compared to the VC scheme and CSMBS. This might be the result of SSS members 
asserting their rights under the scheme. Since the beginning of the SSS in 1991, 
members of the scheme have increasingly had more information about their rights in 
choosing hospital, their benefit package etc. From focus group interviews with SSS 
members, choosing their own hospital was a strong incentive to utilize services when 
they were sick corresponding to study of Vip et al. (1998). They realized that they 
had to claim their right because they have to contribute to the SSS every month. 
Furthermore, most hospitals in SSS system normally set a special track for SSS 
patients. Data from in-depth interviews with hospital directors showed that this was 
the marketing strategy to attract SSS patients. They also contracted private clinics to 
provide services out of working hours for SSS patients. 
Regarding hospitalization, SSS patients had a lower chance of hospitalization 
compared to VC scheme and CSMBS patients after controlling for other factors. This 
might relate to payment by capitation of this scheme that led hospitals to adapt to 
control the cost of services (Yip et al. 2001). Qualitative data confirmed that private 
hospitals passed on the incentive built-in to the capitation payment method by 
applying capitation to physician payments. However, there was no strong evidence of 
the effect of physician payment on over provision of services. In contrast, for 
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hospital payment, qualitative data showed an association between over provision of 
services and hospital payment, especially for FFS in the CSMBS. 
In terms of efficient use of resources in LOS and early readmission in DM, SSS 
patients were more likely to have shorter LOS than CSMBS after controlling for 
other factors. SSS patients were less likely to be readmitted compared to the DC 
scheme while there was no difference compared to CSMBS patients. This seems to 
be the strong effect of the payment scheme of the SSS in encouraging efficiency in 
use of resources but still with acceptable quality. This might be also the result of the 
contracting arrangement of the SSS, which includes contracts with many private 
hospitals. There was evidence that private hospitals tended to have more flexibility in 
responding to the external environment than public hospitals (Sriratanaban 1998). 
This might also be the indirect effect of payment to physicians especially in private 
hospitals, where hospitals applied the payment method from SSO to physicians, so 
physician were concerned about hospital income from the SSS. 
In terms of quality of DM services, SSS patients had a higher chance of receiving 
lipid profile test compared to the DC scheme. This might be the effect of the 
regulations of the SSS because it had an additional budget for hospitals which 
provided services for DM patients by using the criteria of case finding and improving 
the completeness of data on services provided. Data from interviews with physicians 
showed that they would help the hospital by avoiding high cost drugs for SSS 
patients. Furthermore, physicians realized that the hospital could have an additional 
budget from the SSO if they complete DM patient data and treat DM patients 
according to required standards, for example checking FPG for the high risk group. 
This could lead to increase in quality of services for DM patients. This is a good 
example of performance related pay which aims to increase the effort of health care 
providers in achieving specific outcomes (Langenbrunner and Liu 2004). 
Furthermore, it might be the indirect effect of concerns of SSS patients. Data from 
focus group discussions with SSS patients showed that they appreciated complete 
physical and laboratory checks from physicians. SSS patients can change doctors if 
they are not satisfied with services they receive, especially in private hospitals. In 
regard to eye examinations, although there was no difference between insurance 
scheme, private hospitals were more likely to provide this service to SSS patients 
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than public hospitals. This finding supported the explanation about the influence of 
the incentive payments and regulations of the SSS for specific diseases. Although 
general practitioners can provide eye examinations, this study found that most of the 
hospitals used ophthalmologists to provide services to DM patients. Interview data 
found private hospitals had more flexibility in internal management to increase 
physician payments and used part time ophthalmologists to provide services for DM 
patients, thus getting round the shortage of ophthalmologists faced by public 
hospitals. Furthermore, having an ophthalmologist in a private hospital might be win-
win strategy because the hospital can attract other patients especially out of pocket 
groups to use this service and the ophthalmologist can gain income from both out of 
pocket and SSS patients. 
9.5.4 Finding of no different results between insurance schemes 
Although this study found that there was different performance from different 
insurance schemes for some selected indicators, there were some issues where 
quality did not differ. This study found that there were no differences in achieving 
standard guideline care for DM with respect to FPG test and BP test. One reason was 
probably that this was the basic monitor of all DM patients and the cost of 
investigation was low. Eye examination test performance also did not differ between 
schemes. This might be the result of the ophthalmologist shortage. Data from 
qualitative interviews showed that physicians usually refer patients for an eye 
examination with an ophthalmologist although the guideline suggests this can be 
done by a GP if there are no ophthalmologists. Furthermore, this study also found 
that intermediate outcomes were not different between schemes. There were two 
possible explanations of this finding. First, the prescription and effect of drugs was 
not different between expensive drugs and low price drugs. Huttin (2007) proposed 
that physicians normally have relatively little room for differentiating prescription of 
DM drugs because the implications of complications are severe relative to drug costs 
(Huttin 2007). Second, there might be factors other than process of care not included 
in this study which could affect outcome such as patient behaviour. Data from in-
depth interviews revealed that physicians believed that changing the behaviour of 
patients was equally effective in controlling the outcome of care. 
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A summary of study results across insurance schemes is shown in table 9.1. There 
are various results on different performance between schemes, from no difference to 
very different. This shows the complexity of behaviour, and challenges of analysis of 
the relationship of insurance design to performance. 
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Table 9.1 Summary results of performance comparing between schemes. 
Performance Indicators Comparin2 between scheme 
Utilization Ambulatory visits UC = CSMBS < SSS 
No. of ambulatory visits UC = SSS > CSMBS 
Hospitalization UC = SSS < CSMBS 
No. of hospitalization SSS < UC < CSMBS 
Efficiency Length of stay in DM UC<CSMBS 
SSS<CSMBS 
Quality of service Early readmission in DM CSMBS = SSS < UC 
Process of care in DM 
Achieving process of care 
in laboratory tests FPGtest No difference 
HbAIC test UC = SSS < CSMBS 
Urine examination UC = CSMBS > SSS 
Eye examination No difference 
Lipid profile test UC<SSS 
UC<CSMBS 
BP test No difference 
Quality of OM care 
Uncontrolled DM UC = SSS < CSMBS 
Intennediate outcome No difference 
Admission No difference 
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9.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has described and explained the strengths and weaknesses of the study, 
and the results relating to the aims and objectives in terms of public health insurance 
and performance in Thailand. 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches were employed in the study enabling cross 
checking between methods. Selecting the study site in one province also gave 
strength in depth of understanding of the context and process of the scheme effects 
on providers and patients. Samutsakhon is a province which can be representative of 
urban and rural areas because it is located near Bangkok and has some areas of 
agriculture. 
Universal coverage was successfully implemented in terms of coverage of people in 
Thailand but because of the specific characteristics of having three different public 
insurance schemes with different characteristics, it raises questions about 
performance between schemes. Three public insurance schemes (CSMBS, SSS, UC 
scheme) differed in payment, benefit package, supporting organization, management 
organization, socioeconomic status of beneficiaries, and these brought about different 
responses in hospital policy and provider behaviour. 
From the results of this study, two conclusions can be drawn as follows. First, effect 
of insurance design is transmitted through hospital policy, physician behaviour, and 
patient behaviour. For example, CSMBS members had a higher chance of 
hospitalization compared to UC scheme and SSS members while there were no 
differences between the UC scheme and SSS. This can be explained from three sides, 
direct effect of payment to hospitals, physician behaviour, and demand of services 
from patients. In CSMBS, FFS payment created an incentive for hospitals to apply 
less control of drugs or laboratory prescriptions. Physicians tended to provide more 
services in this group and prescribe drugs or laboratory tests in response to patient 
requests. Patients tended to request more services since they knew that the hospital 
could be reimbursed for all expenses by the government. Another piece of evidence 
comes from the analysis of the efficient use of resources and quality of care in DM 
by examining LOS and early readmission within 30 days after discharge from a 
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previous admission. This study showed that SSS was relatively efficient in use of 
resources with a shorter LOS with acceptable quality, while the VC scheme had 
efficient use of resources but relatively low quality compared to SSS and CSMBS. 
This is likely to be due to the effect of capitation payment and public/private mix of 
services in SSS. Capitation payment pressures hospitals to reduce cost but in the 
situation with high competition between public and private hospitals can encourage 
hospitals to improve quality of care. This can show a picture of balancing between 
efficient use of resources and quality of services. 
Furthermore, scheme regulation can affect patient behaviour, for example, 
ambulatory utilisations were high amongst SSS members compared to VC scheme 
and CSMBS members. This can be explained from insurance design which allows 
SSS members to choose their main contractor while the VC scheme provides the 
PCV and health centre as primary care facilities and CSMBS members can go to any 
public facilities. There is evidence that SSS members choose their main contractor 
deliberately to facilitate use. 
Second, independent of scheme design other factors affect performance. For 
example, CSMBS patients seem to be more knowledgeable than SSS and VC scheme 
patients. Data from focus group discussions showed that they knew the standard 
laboratory tests for DM and they usually request these from physicians. 
In terms of outcome of care, this can be measured by various steps, for example the 
structure, process and outcome approach (McGlynn 2007). This study showed that it 
could be explored for DM in terms of process of care and outcome of care. 
Furthermore, this study also found that good process could not guarantee good 
outcomes. There were multiple factors that explained outcomes, although patients 
received good care in terms of process. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter aims to demonstrate whether the study's objectives have been met, 
provide policy recommendations, and identify future research needs. There are four 
parts to the conclusions presented here. The first section summarizes the overall 
conclusions from the findings relating to study objectives. The second section 
outlines the contribution of knowledge related to health insurance performance. The 
third section discusses implications of the study for policy makers which can be 
divided into recommendations for Thai policy makers and general recommendations 
for other developing countries. The fourth section identifies areas for further 
research. 
10.1 Conclusions of findings 
This study explored the variation of selected aspects of performance between the 
three public health insurance schemes. After universal coverage was implemented, 
public health insurance in Thailand comprised three major schemes. At first, the 
National Health Insurance Act had one article to merge all three health insurance 
schemes into one management unit. But there was resistance from the two other 
insurance schemes and the law opened the option to postpone this article by 
infonning government and informing the people of the reason for delay (National 
Health Security Office 2002). One important reason for the unmerged management 
of health insurance came from the lack of confidence of the new management unit 
(NHSO) to manage all funding sources to achieve good quality services. 
Furthermore, opposition of other schemes protected the position of the CSMBS and 
SSS by raising the problems of culture and organizational structure as an obstacle to 
merging management with NHSO (Sriratanaban 2005). Currently, there is only the 
prevention and promotion budget that NHSO manages for all the population 
(Tangchareonsathien and Jongudomsuk 2005). 
There were different rationales behind the set up of each insurance scheme. CSMBS 
aimed to be a fringe benefit of government officers and their dependants to 
compensate for the low salary of civil servants. The important characteristics of this 
scheme were to pay hospitals by FFS and there were few limits on use of drugs and 
investigations. SSS aimed to help employees in seven areas including sickness, 
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maternity, invalidity, death, child allowance, pension, and unemployment (Social 
Security Office 2007). The main characteristic of this scheme was that it had 
contributions from three parties including government, employer, and employee, and 
paid hospitals by capitation for both ambulatory and inpatient care. Furthermore, this 
scheme contracted hospitals with at least 100 beds and about 50% of its hospitals 
were private hospitals. The VC scheme was set up by expanding coverage of 
insurance into the uninsured. This group was composed of both the poor who 
previously had limited access and the rich uninsured group. The major characteristic 
of the VC population was that it had the biggest market share of insured people, and 
paid the hospital by capitation for preventive and promotive care, and ambulatory 
care, and by DRG within a global budget for hospitalization. 
Each public health insurance scheme had different weaknesses that might affect the 
benefit gap between different insurance schemes. CSMBS had a problem of high 
growth of expenditure and seemed to have a strong effect on hospital policy and 
provider behaviour since CSMBS patient brought substantial income to the hospital. 
SSS offered limited treatment, and only a hospital setting. The VC had weak points 
in that it had less funding per capita and increased utilization levels had put pressure 
on health personnel especially in public hospitals. 
These different insurance characteristics were thought likely to lead to variation in 
scheme performance. Three dimensions of performance were selected to evaluate the 
variation of scheme performance between these three public insurance schemes; 
overall utilization of care, LOS and early readmission in DM patients, and quality of 
DM care. The results of these approaches are as follows. 
The analysis of overall utilization indicated that insurance scheme affected the 
chance of using ambulatory and hospitalization services after controlling for other 
factors. SSS patients had a higher chance of using ambulatory services compared to 
VC scheme while CSMBS patients had a higher chance of hospitalization than VC 
scheme and SSS patients. This might be the awareness by SSS beneficiaries of their 
rights and deliberate use of services from a hospital they chose. CSMBS 
hospitalization might be affected by providers who sought additional income through 
providing more services to CSMBS patients. Data from in-depth interviews of 
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providers showed that they were comfortable to prescribe expensive drugs and more 
investigations in CSMBS patients because they knew that hospitals could be 
reimbursed for all expenses of CSMBS patients. This also implied more frequent 
admissions of CSMBS patients. 
Length of stay and early readmission in OM patients were indicators of the efficient 
use of resources. This study separated admissions into three conditions, acute, 
chronic, and without complication, to explore whether providers had manipulated 
LOS especially in chronic conditions or for OM patients without complications. The 
result from the national claims data showed that SSS and VC had significantly 
shorter LOS compared to CSMBS. This might be the pressure of cost containment 
for these two schemes. Furthermore, early readmission in the SSS did not differ from 
that in the CSMBS. This implied efficiency of resource use with good quality care in 
the SSS scheme. However, VC scheme patients with chronic and without 
complication conditions had a higher chance of early readmission while readmission 
for acute complication conditions did not differ from the CSMBS. This result implied 
too early discharge for non-emergency conditions for VC patients. This also 
confirmed that for emergency conditions, the quality of care offered by providers to 
OM patients was the same between schemes. 
Analysis of the degree of diagnosis and level of controlled OM using data from the 
Health Examination Survey indicated that SSS had the most undiagnosed OM cases 
while CSMBS had the most uncontrolled patients. This finding might be related to 
SSS design which covered only hospital care and no preventive and promotive care 
in the community. The quality of care study using DM as a tracer in medical records 
and patient interviews showed that CSMBS patients received standard guideline care 
more than VC and SSS patients. This result confirmed the effect of CSMBS 
regulations especially the payment mechanism as supported by data from in-depth 
interviews that providers seemed to provide more services and be more responsive to 
the requests for services from beneficiaries in this scheme. However, this study 
found that there were no differences of intermediate outcome between insurance 
schemes. This finding implied that there were many.factors in addition to process of 
care affecting outcome of care such as patient compliance and environmental factors. 
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10.2 Contribution to knowledge 
In spite of some limitations as mentioned above, this study contributes to the 
literature on variation of health insurance scheme performance in a number of ways. 
First, studies comparing health insurance scheme performance have been mainly 
conducted in developed countries where there were different insurance scheme. Only 
a few studies relating to variation of insurance scheme performance in developing 
countries could be identified in the international literature (Mills et al. 2005, 
Ngorsuraches and Sornlertlumvanich 2006, Somkotra and Detsomboonrat 2009, 
Sepehri et at. 2006). This study was the first to explore variation of insurance scheme 
performance after universal coverage was introduced in Thailand in 2001. Thailand 
is the leading country amongst lower and middle-income countries in implementing 
universal coverage, especially in a period of economic downturn. Therefore, this 
study would add understanding on the role of insurance in affecting utilization, LOS, 
early readmission in DM patient, and quality of care in DM patient in a less 
developed country context. 
The study revealed that there was still inequitable access to care in terms of 
utilization of people in different health insurance schemes. Furthermore, this study 
also revealed improvement of access to care of underprivileged groups such as poor 
people, elderly, and those in rural areas compared to the earlier study of 
Srithamronsawat (2005). 
This study also revealed that SSS seemed to be the middle way of efficiency and 
quality compared to the UC scheme and CSMBS. The capitation payment in the SSS 
encouraged efficient use of resources apparently without detrimental effect on DM 
care quality. Although CSMBS seemed to be more likely to achieve standard process 
care in OM, the SSS performance seemed to be better than the UC scheme. One 
important strategy of the SSS is to use a public/private mix of service providers. Data 
from the qualitative study confirmed that this created competition between providers 
in terms of efficiency and quality of service. 
The study provides information for suggestions on the issue of harmonization of the 
performance of insurance schemes by setting scheme performance as a target for 
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system design and management. In Thailand and other developing countries, income 
inequity is still a main problem of the government, and universal coverage is one 
way to reduce the gap of income in the country. However, this policy needs support 
from broader policies to achieve equity of care. 
10.3 Implications of the study for policy makers 
This section proposes policy implications related to scheme performance and 
management. Policy recommendations specific to the Thai context are considered 
first and general recommendations for other developing countries are proposed in the 
next subsection. 
10.3.1 Recommendations for Thai policy makers 
The multiple health insurance system in Thailand provides a good example of 
achieving universal coverage by expanding public insurance to cover all people. 
There are three recommendations for Thai policy from this study. 
First, results of this study confirmed that there weres differences in performance 
between the three health insurance schemes. To aim at reducing inequity of access to 
care, protect people from the cost of very severe illness, and provide good service 
quality, this might lead to discussion as to whether the government should harmonize 
or how to harmonize the status of the different characteristics of the three insurance 
schemes. The most important issue is how to harmonize performance, and there are 
four important points for policymakers to consider. First, the benefit package of all 
insurance schemes should not differ because this study showed that different benefits 
affected provider and patient behaviour. The three insurance schemes can currently 
set the standard benefit package for their own beneficiaries. Second, the payment to 
providers should be harmonized to reduce the difference in reimbursement methods. 
Currently, there are three payment options in use: FFS, capitation, and capitation for 
ambulatory care and prospective case payment and global budget for hospitalization. 
Third, providers should not have a policy to separate the patients in different 
schemes during treatment. This might be the effect of the different payment 
mechanisms and benefit packages of the different schemes. If the government can 
harmonize these issues, providers might not need to separate patients. Fourth, 
beneficiaries should be made aware of their rights and encouraged to feel a sense of 
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ownership of the insurance scheme. This study found that the SSS is a good example 
of beneficiaries who protect their rights by complaints and suggestions for improving 
quality of service. 
Second, to monitor performance between schemes, the government should have a 
clear policy and implementation plan for the future. Currently, there is no 
organization responsible for monitoring the different performance of the schemes. 
although each insurance scheme has a unit to monitor their own performance. 
Furthermore, information on performance should be distributed to the public to 
inform people of the existence of different performance. 
Third, from this study, although the intermediate outcomes of DM care were not 
different by scheme, the UC scheme patients seemed to receive less standard 
guideline care compared to the CSMBS and SSS. Furthermore, the LOS of UC 
scheme patients seemed to be shorter than CSMBS and the same as SSS patients, but 
VC patients had a higher early readmission than CSMBS and SSS. These problems 
correspond with a popular image for the VC scheme of unattained quality of care. 
The government has to set a policy to improve quality especially in the process of 
care at least to achieve standard guideline care in all schemes. 
10.3.2 Recommendations for other developing countries 
Developing countries have tended to move toward universal coverage through 
several routes. One possible means is to expand public health insurance into 
uninsured groups. However, each country usually has some forms of insurance in 
their countries. Universal coverage implementation with several insurance schemes 
could be one of the most feasible approaches to achieve universal coverage. 
Achieving universal coverage with multiple insurance systems is the first step to 
improve the overall performance of the health system. This study has some lesson for 
other developing countries as follows. 
First, it was clear that different characteristics of health insurance schemes affected 
health system performance. This study showed that overall utilization, LOS and early 
readmission in DM patients, and quality of care in DM patients, were affected by 
insurance scheme. Thailand is a good example of using multiple health insurance 
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which has different sources of funds. Developing countries with multiple insurances 
should accept that multiple insurance might increase the feasibility of universal 
coverage and minimize early opposition, but it still raises problems of unequal access 
and benefit packages persisting over time, and provides no straightforward solution 
to hannonization. Therefore, it needs to be considered how to harmonize 
performance between schemes. 
Second, in terms of quality of care, it was not easy to link: the process of care and 
outcome of care. The quality approach of structure, process, and outcome might not 
reflect a direct sequence of results (Donabedian and Bashshur 2003). This study 
showed that good process of care for DM did not mean good outcomes.This finding 
confirmed the suggestion of Donabedian and Bashshur (2003) that the link between 
structure to process, process to outcome was a probability, which had to be well 
established but was largely presumed. 
Third, despite the problem of different payment methods, Thai experience with 
payment methods which ensure cost control has been remarkably successful, even it 
can stiIl be improved. 
10.4 Areas for further research 
This study has explored and assessed the performance of three public insurance 
schemes under universal coverage in Thailand. The main emphases are on overall 
utilization of services, LOS and early readmission in DM patients, and quality of care 
in DM patients. However, there are research questions that this study could not 
provide answers to and there is room for further research. 
First, there are likely to be other issues of health care performance influenced by 
scheme such as the cost of care etc. Results from LOS might imply the efficiency of 
resource use but the direct cost of care under different insurance schemes still needs 
to be assessed. 
Second, since this study focused mainly on DM patients; therefore, further research 
should explore scheme performance for other conditions. For example in very severe 
illness and costly conditions, this will respond to the aim of health insurance to 
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protect families from excessive expenses for illness. There is evidence from a study 
in the UK that specialist care was pro-rich while general care was more equitable 
(Dixon et al. 2007). 
Third, the quality of care in terms of other outcomes still needs more research such 
as quality of life. mortality etc. Although the study showed that outcome of care 
might come from factors rather than insurance itself, it is important to explore the 
effect of health insurance on other outcomes. 
Fourth, the best path to harmonization of insurance schemes is another issue that 
needs further study. There remain questions on whether Thailand can hannonize 
some issues such as benefit package, payment system or management. Quantitative 
and qualitative studies on preferences of stakeholders such as policy makers, 
academicians, and the people in terms of harmonization should be undertaken. Some 
developed countries, for example. Canada, had dialogues of stakeholders to propose 
the direction of policy in health care (Maxwell 2003). The U.K. has experience of 
using conjoint analysis to elicit preferences for health care issues (Ryan and Farrar 
2000). 
10.S Conclusions 
Universal coverage in Thailand has been relatively successful in terms of achieving 
insurance for aJl the people. However, because there remain three main public health 
insurance schemes. variation in scheme performance is an unavoidable issue. 
Different scheme characteristics could affect the performance of health insurance 
such as payment mechanism. benefit package, contracting unit etc. This study 
confinned the di fTerent performance for some selected indicators, which are overall 
utilization. LOS and early readmission in DM, and quality of care in DM. This 
finding can help policy makers in Thailand and other developing countries to think 
about how to harmonize the performance of different insurance schemes. This has 
created more questions about other aspects of perfonnance that should be evaluated 
and issues of harmonization of insurance schemes in terms of common 
characteristics. 
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APPENDIX 1: Service utilization 
Table At. 1 Illness and ambulatory visit by regions 
0/0 of those Mean Illness Facility % ill in ill using 
one month facility in episode in episode! visit/person/ 
one month one month person/year year 
Region 
._- ---_._-
._---+--Bangkok 12.6 62.5 1.48 2.23 1.40 
Central 15.6 72.7 1.82 3.41 I 2.48 
North 27.3 76.0 2.09 6.84 5.20 
Northeast 22.1 78.1 1.89 4.99 3.90 
South 17.2 78.0 1.63 3.38 2.63 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
Table At. 2 Hospitalization by regions 
%hospitalized Mean of hospitalization Mean number of Hospitalizations 
in 12 months per year hospitalizations! episode !person/year 
Region 
-
Bangkok 4.0 1.20 1.1 0.054 
Central 5.8 1.43 1.2 0.102 
North 8.0 1.40 1.3 0.142 
Northeast 7.5 1.24 1.1 0.108 
South 6.7 1.57 1.2 0.129 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
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Table At. 3 Factors explaining illness 
Dependent variable 
N 
Prob> F 
. Independent variable 
Sex 
Male· 
Female 
Income quintile 
I· 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Age 
0-20· 
21-40 
41-60 
>60 
Marital status 
Unmarried· 
Married 
Insurance 
VC scheme· 
SSS 
CSMBS 
Education 
Primary school· 
None 
Primary<Bachelor 
~ Bachelor 
Chronic disease 
No chronic disease· 
Chronic disease 
Region 
Central· 
Bangkok 
North 
Northeast 
South 
Area 
Urban· 
Rural 
~ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Illness =1 
48,721 
<0.001 
Odds ratios 
----_. 
1.28 
0.92 
0.90 
0.77 
0.80 
0.98 
1.27 
1.79 
1.00 
1.30 
1.01 
1.01 
0.80 
0.80 
6.29 
0.94 
1.80 
1.48 
1.26 
1.19 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
---
P-value LL@ I UL@@ - _._-
--
<0.001 1.20 1.38 
--
0.268 0.80 1.06 
0.229 0.76 1.07 
0.003 0.65 0.91 
0.024 0.66 0.97 
0.847 0.81 1.19 
0.038 1.01 1.59 
<0.001 1.42 2.27 
0.941 0.90 1.11 
<0.001 1.12 1.51 
0.872 0.88 1.17 
0.886 0.86 1.19 
<0.001 0.69 0.91 
0.044 0.65 0.99 
<0.001 5.69 6.96 
0.691 0.71 1.25 
<0.001 1.48 2.20 
<0.001 1.26 1.74 
0.011 1.06 1.50 
0.005 1.05 1.35 
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Table Al. 4 Insurance status by region 2005 
Ban~kok Central North Northeast South Total 
No insurance 12.6 6.3 3.3 2.3 3.9 4.9 
------ 1----- -
UC without 7.4 19.1 35.9 37.2 29.3 28.1 
~~men_~_ 
--_._--_._-- _ .. _._--_._._---
_._ .. _ .. _-_.-
-
I 
_._--_.--+--..------
UC with 36.6 41.6 42.7 47.8 48.4 I 44.1 
co-payment 
----
SSS 24.3 21.0 6.5 3.8 5.5 III 
rsMBS 
---------
14.4 10.1 9.4 7.7 11.1 9.8 
Private 3.1 1.2 0.7 0.2 0.8 1.0 
insurance 
-- --
Employer's 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Welfare 
----
Others 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 
---
Not know 0.1 0.1 - - - 0.0 
N 4,014 21,609 14,218 16,222 11,752 67,815 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
Table AI. 5 Health seeking by region 2005 
Region (%) 
Banl!kok Central North Northeast South Total 
No treatment 5.1 2.6 6.1 4.8 4.0 4.6 
Traditional treatment 0.0 1.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.9 
Traditional doctor 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.3 
Self-prescribed drugs 32.8 23.2 17.8 17.9 16.9 19.9 
Health centre 4.5 16.0 28.1 31.3 18.1 24.1 
Community hospital 0.0 13.9 18.4 22.5 20.9 17.9 
Regional hospital 0.2 10.1 7.1 6.6 8.9 7.1 
University hospital 4.6 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 
Other public hospital 13.6 2.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.9 
Private clinics 16.7 18.6 13.5 11.9 24.8 15.4 
Private hospital 22.3 8.8 3.6 0.7 1.8 4.8 
Other 0.2 1.3 3.2 1.9 1.4 1.9 
N 524 3,639 3,602 3,619 1,898 13,282 
Source: Health Welfare Survey 2005 
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APPENDIX 2: Length of stay and readmission detailed results 
Table A2, 1 Data structure of claims data after combining all three schemes. 
Variable Name Description 
Hcode Hospital code 
--- --
hJl"oup Hospital type 1 =pubJic hospital, 2=private hospital 
--=- I Region 1 =Bangkok, 2=Central, 3=Northeast, 4=East, 5=North, rgeo 
6=South,7=West 
---:,-----
pcode Province 76 Provinces 
. --
hmam Main hospital 
pidpat ID ID number of patient 
hn Hospital number 
an Admission number 
dob Date of Birth 
age Age Year 
sex Sex I =male, 2=female 
dateadm Admission date 
datedsc Discharge date 
dischs Discharge status I =complete recovery, 2=Improved, 3=Not improved, 
4=Normal delivery, 5=Undelivery of pregnant woman, 
6=Normal child discharged with mother, 
7=Normal child discharged separately, 8=Stillbirth, 9=Dead 
discht Discharge type I-with approval, 2=Against advice, 3=Escaped, 
4=By transfer, 5=Other, 6=Dead autopsy, 7=Dead no autopsy 
los Length of stay 
drg Diagnostic related group 
rw Relative weight 
adjrw Adjusted relative weight 
pdx Primary diagnosis 
sdxl-12 Secondary diagnosis 1-12 
procl-12 Procedure 1-12 
insurance Insurance Insurance status 
Source: Claims Data 2005 
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Table A2, 2 Dependent and independent variables for analysis of LOS in acute 
r f d" comp Ica Ions a miSSions 
Acute complications admissions 
Variable Observation Mean of variable Std. Dev. I Min Max 
r-u5S 15,289 4.03 4.00 0 38 
t-------~~~~J>------- ------------
0-40 1,172 
___ .M. _______ 
+----
--------
-------
--
41-60 5,296 0.34 0.47 0 1 
>60 ____ 8,82L 0.57 0.50 0 1 \------ -
Sex 
---
Male· 4,913 
Female 10,376 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Insurance 
CSMBS· 2,520 
SSS 445 0.03 0.17 0 1 
i-=----- 12,324 0.81 0.40 0 1 UC scheme 
Severity 
O· 8,939 
2 3,001 0.20 0040 0 I 
3 2,582 0.17 0.37 0 1 
4 732 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Hospital type 
Community 8,495 
General 3,540 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Regional 2,042 0.13 0.34 0 1 
University 324 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Private 483 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Military 405 0.03 0.16 0 1 
LOS 
0-3 9,151 
4-7 4,405 0.28 0.45 0 1 
>7 1,733 0.11 0.32 0 1 
• reference group 
Source: Claims Data 2005 
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Table A2, 3 Dependent and independent variables for analysis of LOS in 
h' r f d·' c rODlc compllca Ions a miSSions 
Chronic complications admissions 
Variable Observation 
f----
LOS 15,539 r-----------
r--=-:--~~!~~ ------. 
0-40 797 f--------------- --
41-60 6,947 
~-------
>60 7,795 
--_._----
Sex 
Male· 5,692 
Female 9,847 
Insurance 
CSMBS· 2,622 
SSS 431 
UC scheme 12,486 
Severity 
O· 7,941 
2 3,593 
3 2,870 
4 1,051 
Hospital type 
Community 7,427 
General 3,533 
Regional 3,245 
University 418 
Private 670 
Military 246 
LOS 
0-3 5,499 
4-7 4,804 
>7 5.236 
• reference group 
Source: Claim Data 2005 
Mean of variable Std. Dev. 
7.62 7.38 
--.-------
._-_. 
---'---' 
_._._. 
0.44 0.50 
0.50 0.50 
.. --
0.63 0.48 
0.03 0.16 
0.80 0.40 
0.23 0.42 
0.19 0.39 
0.08 0.27 
0.23 0.42 
0.22 0.41 
0.03 0.17 
0.04 0.20 
0.18 0.13 
0.31 0.46 
0.34 0.47 
Min 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max 
38 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Table A2, 4 Dependent and independent variables for analysis of LOS in 
'h r f d" Wit out compllca Ions a missions 
Without complications admissions 
Variable Observation Mean of variable Std. Dev. Min Max 
-
LOS 37,104 3.92 3.87 0 38 
1--____ ~_&~~l!J> _ . _. __ .. 
---_._--- f--.-..... -.-.... ------------ . .. _---
0-40 ____ 2,198 
-. 
41-60 14,393 0.39 0.49 0 -~ t-----:--:---- ------- --------
>60 20,513 0.55 0.50 0 1 
_._-~------- _._ .. _------
Sex 
Male· 11,416 
-
Female 25,688 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Insurance 
CSMBS· 8,035 
SSS 1,075 0.03 0.17 0 1 
._-
UC scheme 27,994 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Severity 
o· 23,950 
-
2 7,064 0.19 0.39 0 1 
3 5,353 0.14 0.35 0 1 
4 677 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Hospital type 
Community 24,029 
General 7,732 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Regional 3,328 0.09 0.29 0 1 
University 201 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Private 1,228 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Military 586 0.02 0.12 0 1 
LOS 
0-3 22,720 
4-7 10,434 0.28 0.45 0 1 
>7 3,950 0.11 0.31 0 1 
• reference group 
Source: Claims Data 2005 
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APPENDIX 3: Multilevel analysis of Diabetes Mellitus data 
A3.1 Introduction 
This appendix analyses the data of chapter 7 using a different methodology. Since 
the data has a hierarchical structure, patients nested within hospitals, hierarchical or 
multi level analysis might be appropriated to this analysis. 
The aims of this appendix are to explain hierarchical analysis and compare the results 
of the hierarchical method and the standard method reported in chapter 7. 
This appendix begins with basic concepts, followed by the methodology of the study 
using hierarchical or multi level analysis. Then, the results of the analysis are 
compared between ordinary multivariate regression and multi level analysis. 
A3.2 Basic concepts 
a. What is multilevel analysis? 
Multilevel modelling is defined as a model involving variables measured at more 
than one level of a hierarchy (Diez Roux 2002). Multilevel modelling can be used 
with a nested data structure which can be nested by subgroup or time. The example 
of a nested group structure is patients within a hospital or students within a school 
etc, while a nested time structure example is blood pressure in two periods of time. 
There are different tenninologies in multilevel modelling such as hierarchical 
models, mixed models, random effects models, random coefficient models, 
covariance component models, or variance component models (Houchens et al. 
2007). In this study, the tenn multilevel and hierarchical models are used 
interchangeably. 
b. When to use multilevel analysis? 
Multilevel analysis is considered in hierarchical structures which have group effects. 
The reasons for using multilevel modelling are several. 
I. To correct inferences because ordinary analysis might overstate statistical 
significance. 
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2. The researcher is interested in group effects. Research questions might extend 
to group effects on individual outcomes. 
3. The researcher is interested in variability and heterogeneity in the population 
more than average values. 
4. The researcher is interested in estimating level specific effects e.g. hospital 
effect (Rasbash 2006, Houchens et als 2007). 
Ignoring the hierarchical structure has three implications. First, it might under 
estimate standard errors because of lacking the effect of between group variations. 
Second, multi level techniques are statistically efficient compared to other methods. 
For example, to analyze patients from 100 hospitals, using multilevel techniques, we 
need not run a regression by each hospital to control the effect of hospital. Third, it is 
possible to perfonn multiple types of analysis such as ANOV A, mUltiple regression, 
logistic regression etc (Roberts 2004). 
c. Data structure 
There are three data structures in multilevel models, hierarchy, cross-classification, 
and multiple memberships (Houchens et al. 2007). 
Hierarchical structure means that lower levels are nested in a higher-level structure. 
The example of this structure is patients might have one physician and go to only one 
hospital as shown in figure A 1.1. 
Table AJ. 1 Hierarchical structure 
Level 3-Hospital 
Level2-Physicilll 
Level 1- Patient 
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Cross classification structure is a structure where the higher level may not be nested 
within another higher level. The example is that patients might have one physician 
but physicians might work in more than one hospital as shown in figure AI.2. 
Table M. 2 Cross classification structure. 
level 3-Hospital 
level 1- Patient 
Level2-Physician 
Multiple memberships are the structure where level 1 may have more than one higher 
level. The example is one patient can go to more than one physician but the 
physician works in only one hospital as shown in figure Al.3. 
Table A3. 3 Multiple membership data structure. 
level 3-Hospital 
Level 2-Pbysician 
level 1- Patient 
d. Intraclass correlation 
In multivariate analysis, we try to explain outcome variables by independent 
variables. Out come of linear regression from a hierarchical structure come from the 
average values and variances of each level. For example, in the study of factors 
explaining the fasting plasma glucose (FPG) of patients in a hierarchical structure 
where level 1 is patient, and level 2 is hospital, the equation of the FPG of each 
patient can be present below. 
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FPGj is the FPG value of each patient. FPG is the average FPG of patients. Ep is 
patient residual while Eh is hospital residual. 
The variance of FPG patients is equal to the variance from the patients and from the 
hospitals. The detail of total variance is shown below. 
To explore the importance of variation of level structure, hospital in this example, we 
calculate intraclass correlation (ICC) by : 
V h is upper level variance which is hospital level in this example. V p is variance of 
level 1 which is patient level in this example. 
Since the variance is a positive number, ICe will have a value between 0 and 1. ICe 
equal to 1 means that all patients have the same FPG in each hospital while ICe 
equal to 0 means that all hospitals have the same average FPG. High ICe value 
implies the important of the upper level in understanding individual differences while 
zero ICe implies it is unsuitable to perform multilevel analysis (Merlo et a1. 2005a). 
For the size of the IeC value, Hox (2002) suggested values of 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 as 
small, medium and large values (Hox 2002). However, there is no rule of how much 
cluster related to affect result of model. Kreft and Y oon (1994) illustrated that some 
study using ordinary method had similar result with multilevel model with ICe 0.2 
(Kreft and Yoon 1994). 
However, in multilevel logistic regression, the scale of Vh and Vp is not the same 
because Vh is on a logistic scale while Vp is on a probability scale (=~) so the 
1-7l' 
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ICC of multi level logistic regression can be calculated as shown below (MerJo et al 
2005b): 
e. Method of analysis 
There are four models of multilevel analysis: random intercept( empty model or 
variance components model), random intercept fixed slopes, random intercept 
random slopes, and intercept and slope as outcome (Houchens et al. 2007). The 
exploration of each model below assumes a two level model with a hierarchical 
structure. 
Empty model is the model with only an intercept variable without other independent 
variables. This model aims to quantify the cluster effect in a multilevel model (Merlo 
et al. 2005a). A random intercept with fixed slope model expands to include 
independent variables into the model but fix as the slope of the model. A random 
intercept with random slope model allows a random slope. An intercept and slope as 
outcome model is similar to random intercept with fixed slope but allows the 
intercept as the function of level 2 variables. The graphical figures of each model are 
shown in figure AI.4. Graph (a) is the empty model. Graph (b) is random intercept 
with fixed slope while graph (c) and (d) are random intercept with random slope. 
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Table A3. 4 Graphical figure of each multilevel model 
(01 (c) 
(d) 
In the analysis process, there are five steps of analysis suggested by Hox (1995) as 
shown below: 
1. Analyze a model with no explanatory variables. This will give an estimate of 
the intraclass correlation. 
2. Analyze a model with all independent variables of the 1st level. This is the 
same as the ordinary method of analysis. 
3. Assess each independent variable for whether any of the slopes has a 
significant variance component between groups. 
4. Analyze a model by adding higher level variables into the model. 
5. Add cross-level interaction of higher level variables and lower level variables 
that had significant slope variation in step 3. 
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A3.3 Analysis of chapter7 data using multilevel analysis 
This section compares the ordinary and multilevel results using the random intercept 
model as multi level model. The details of indicators are mentioned in chapter 7. 
The model used in multivariate analysis is hierarchical logistic regression. Since the 
data come from different hospitals and different physicians, so the regression 
represents 2-levels of hierarchy. The equation is shown below: 
From: Houchens et al. 2007 
Since the aim of this study is to compare the results of the multilevel method with the 
ordinary method, so we employ a random intercept model for the study. We focus on 
the influence of insurance scheme as the outcome of the analysis. 
Hierarchical structure used in this study 
In this study, since we selected different patients from different hospitals, so we used 
a two level hierarchical structure, first level was patient, and second level was 
hospital. The diagram of hierarchical structure can be shown below. 
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Table AJ. 5 Data structure of hierarchical analysis 
Level2=Hospital 
Level I = Patient 
A3.4 Results of the study 
Process of care 
The results of logistic regression of process of care using both ordinary and 
multi level analysis are shown in table A3.I. The comparison includes six indicators: 
FPG, HbAle, urine protein, eye examination, lipid profile, BP. 
In FPG achievement, the ICe of model was zero, meanmg that there was no 
difference between ordinary method and multilevel method. The odds ratios and p-
values are similar in both methods. 
For HbA I e, the ICC of the model was 0.26. There were different results for age, 
insurance, and co-morbidity of patients. The odds ratio for SSS is not significant in 
the multi level model while it is significant in the ordinary model. This implies the 
significance of hospital type in the analysis. 
For urine protein examination, since the ICC is 0.78, there was a strong effect of the 
cluster group in the model. The results which differ from ordinary analysis are area, 
income, and smoking. Although ICe in this model is high, the effect of clustering 
comes from other factors not from insurance status. 
For eye examination, the ICe is 0.59, There were different results in the multilevel 
model for sex, insurance, and income. This model is similar to HbAIC in finding, 
Insurance was significant in the ordinary model but not significant in the multilevel 
model. 
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For lipid profile examination, the ICC is 0.11. Factors which differ from the ordinary 
model are gender, and income. This result is the same as for urine protein 
examination where insurance status effect is not different. 
For BP, the ICC is zero, so there is no difference between the models. 
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-Dependent 
Variable 
N 
Independent 
Variable 
Agcgroup 
0-40 
Table A3. 6 Result of analysing process of DM care by ordinary and multilevel methods 
FPG HbAIC Urine protein Eye examination 
Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Muldlevel Ordinary Multilenl Ordinary 
Odds I P-
ratios Value 
Odds I P-
ratios Value 
Oddi I P-
ratios value 
Oddi P-
ratios value 
Odd. P- I Odds I P-
ratios value rados Value 
Oddi P- Oddi P-
rados value rados value 
Achieving standard - I 
Lipid profile 
Multilevel Ordinary 
Odds P- Odds P-
rados value ratios value 
i 
I 
i 
BP 
Multilenl Ordinary 
Odds I P- I Odds I P-
ratiol value ratios Value 
I 
-_ .. ---r---i---+---j 
41-60 I 1.32 I 0.437 I 1.32 I 0.437 I 1.64 I <0.05 1.1.56 I 0.067 I 1.61 I 0205 I 1.17 I 0.638 I 0.86 I 0.613 I 0.92 I 0.775 I 1.37 I 0.137 '1.28 0.217 1.19' 0.661 , 1.19 I 0.661 
>60 I 221 I 0.056 I 221 I 0.056 I 1.59 I 0.104 I 1.47 I 0.162 I 1.36 I 0.449 I 0.85 I 0.647 I 1.18 I 0.668 I 1.45 I 0289 I 1.51 I 0.085 I 1.48 I 0.089 I 1.49 I 0.366 I 1.49 I 0.366 
Sex 
Male I 
Female 1.70 0.011 1.70 I 0.011 0.93 0.563 0.91 0.450 126 0.180 1.18 0.235 1.78 I <0.01 1.41 0.077 1.29 I <0.05 1.24 0.055 1.59 0.030 I 1.59 I 0.030 
Marital status 
Single 
Married 0.93 0.851 0.93 0.851 1.07 0.765 1.09 0.692 0.98 0.943 1.06 0.824 1.73 0.133 1.48 0.240 Ll8 
I -------=-=--r i 
0.378 I 1.18 0.389 I 1.34 I 0.395 1.34 I 0.395 
Without j' ,r- 1 -I I I 
education I I I I == 0.72 0.379 0.72 0.379 1.41 0.127 1.51 0.061 1.41 0.112 1.30 0.161 1.24 0.576 1.49 0.275 I 1.18 0.295 I 1.18 I 0.298 I 0.97 0.927 I 0.97 0.927 
>Bachelor I 0.60 I 0.311 0.60 I 0.311 I 2.01 I <0.05 I 2.01 I <0.05 I 2.34 I <0.05 I 2.03 I <0.05 I 1.97 I 0.204 I 1.92 I 0.196 I 1.69 I 0.068 I 1.70 0.064 0.77 I o.s9il 0.77 I 0.591 I -
Area I 
~ - ·I~ 
Rural 1.29 0.171 1.29 0.171 0.99 0.952 1.03 0.802 1.11 0.476 1.79 <0.001 1.07 0.715 0.74 0.068 0.93 0.491. __ O.8? I 0.21_t-_ 
~ ~ 
UC -l----.--i 
SSS 1.92 O.OIS 1.92 O.OlS 0.S4 0.479 2.39 <0.001 0.29 <0.001 0.29 <0.001 2.01 0.107 5.39 <0.001 2.84 <0.001 2.14 1 <0.001 I 1.67 0.072 
CSMBS 0.68 0.123 0.68 0.123 1.91 <0.001 1.95 <0.001 1.63 <0.01 1.61 <0.01 1.43 0.243 1.24 0.445 - 1.47 <0.01 J 1.43 I <o~ollo.72 0.19~ 
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FPG HbAIC Urine protein Eye examination Lipid profile BP 
Multllevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Multllevel Ordinary Multllevel Ordinary 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
ratios Value ratios value ratios Value ratios value ratios value ratios Value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios Value 
Inc:ome ! i 
Nomamx ! ! i -L-----~, __ __ 
<2,000 0.59 0.127 0.59 0.127 0.99 0.958 0.80 0.331 0.89 0.656 0.35 <0.001 0.75 0.497 1.69 0.171 0.97 0.887 i 1.09 : 0.635 i 0.79 _+-o.so~L 0.79 I 0.501_ 
2,000-10,000 0.85 0.574 0.85 0.574 0.94 0.737 0.78 0.124 0.85 0.376 0.36 <0.001 0.76 0.399 1.85 <0.05 1.21 0.181 1.39 <0.05 i 1.11 I 0.711! 1.11 ' 0.711 
>10,000 0.86 0.669 0.86 0.669 0.88 0.576 0.80 0.287 0.61 0.098 0.24 <0.001 0.64 0.259 2.04 <0.05 1.32 0.157 1.50 <0.05, 1.10 0.784 1.10 0.784 
Duration . ~~ I 
~S~ I 
>5~ 1.10 0.638 1.10 0.638 0.90 0.395 0.92 0.519 1.53 <0.01 1.65 <0.001 1.29 0.191 1.06 0.758 0.87 0.190 0.84 0.088 1.17 0.451 I 1.17 0.451 
Smotmg I I 
No ! I 
Yes 0.71 0.248 0.71 0.248 1.06 0.798 1.08 0.705 2.12 <0.05 1.47 0.107 0.88 0.716 0.94 0.856 1.46 0.072 1.43 I 0.080 I 0.82 0.545 0.82 0.545 
Comorbidity ,! i I 
No I! I i I 
Yes 1.17 0.474 1.17 0.474 1.27 0.111 1.40 <0.05 1.68 <0.01 1.88 <0.001 1.20 I 0.421 1.25 0.280 1.47 <0.01! 1.41 I <0.01 1.29 0.252 1.29 0.252 
T I I ' ICC 0.00 _ .. ____ L __ ._ _ _0_.2_6 0.78 0.59 0.11! i 0.00 I I 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
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Intermediate outcome 
The details of results comparing the ordinary model and multilevel model are shown 
in table A3. 7. 
For average FPG target achievement, the ICC is 0.02. There is no difference between 
multi level and ordinary models. 
For HbAIC result, the ICC is 0.21. The differences in results are for gender, age, and 
insurance status. This result corresponds with the process of care analysis where SSS 
is not a significant factor in the multilevel model while it is significant in the 
ordinary model. 
For total triglyceride, the ICe is 0.03. There IS no difference result between 
multilevel and ordinary model result. 
For total cholesterol, the IeC is 0.06. The difference of results in ordinary and 
multilevel model is for the area factor. However, there is no difference for the 
insurance factor in this model. 
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Table A3. 7 Results of intermediate outcome analysis between ordinary and multilevel models. 
FPG "bAle Total triglyceride Total cholesterol 
Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary 
Odds I P- Odds I P- Odds I P- Odds I P- Odds I P- Odds I P- Odds I P- Odds I P-
ratios I Value ratios value I Ratios I value I ratios I value I ratios I value I ratios I value I ratios I value I ratios I value 
Dependent variable Achieving standard target = 1 
N 
Independent variable I \---I Age group 
0-40 I I 
41-60 0.471 1.03 0.894 jl.03-+I---0.-88-2-11 
Sex 
>60 I 0.46 I <0.01 I 0.43 I <0.01 I 0.33 I <0.05 I 0041 I 0.078 0.86 I 0.585 I 0.86 I 0.567 0.72 I 0.233 0.71 I 0.213 
! ''----
Male 
Female <0.05 1.00 1.23 I 0.137 I 
. I I Marlta status .1 
Single 
L Married 1.09 0.657 1.07 0.727 1.95 0.137 1.82 0.159 1.41 0.134 1.30 0.243 I 1.01 I 0.9571 0.94 0.773 
Education I ! I 
Without education I I I I 
I Primary-Bachelor 1.23 0.212 1.23 0.211 1.35 0.487 1.28 I 0.560 0.81 0.299 0.80 0.261 I 1.15 i 0:514 I 1.16 I 0.491 
>Bachelor 1.55 0.137 1.53 0.144 1.63 0.430 1.69 0.387 0.85 0.599 0.79 0.462 1.36 I 0.346 1.24 0.504 
I Area i I Urban I i ---
Rural 0.77 <0.05 0.79 <0.05 1.07 0.769 U8 0.433 0.96 I 0.728 0.89 0.303 0.88 I 0.301 1 0.79 i <0.05 
-.-- I 
Insurance I ........l---1 .. _---1.. .. __ .. 1 I I uc . i! I i 
SSS 1.47 <0.05 1.65 <0.001 0.89 0.813 0.42' <0.01 I 0.93 0.689 _~~_0.562 TO.74tO.134~ 0 ... -10.436 
I CSMBS 1.17 0.255 1.17 0.235 1.06 0.864 0.88 .0.695 0.93 0.644 0.91 0.537 I 0.74 I 0.064 ~.73 I. 0.051 
Income I 
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FPG HbAIC Total triglyceride Total cholesterol I 
Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary Multilevel Ordinary I 
Odds p- Odds p- Odds p- Odds p- Odds p- Odds p. Odds p- Odds p. 
ratios Value ratios value Ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value 
No income : 
<2,000 1.31 0.174 1.09 0.638 1.21 0.666 1.22 0.642 0.92 0.730 0.93 I I I 0.758 I 1.42 I 0.143 11.45 I 0.108 _ 
2,000-10,000 0.97 0.854 0.83 0.201 1.55 0.172 1.56 0.154 0.85 0.339 0.85 0.310 ~627 1.0~ 0.647 
>10,000 0.96 0.844 0.81 0.294 1.30 0.525 1.23 0.602 1.15 0.546 1.16 0.495 I 1.24 0.362 I 1.27 I 0.279 
Duration ofDM I I ~ I 
<= 5 years I I - I 
> 5 years 1.59 <0.001 1.66 <0.001 1.74 <0.05 1.68 <0.05 0.98 0.890 1.00 0.980 0.91 0.4~ 0.94 I 0.644 
Smoking 
, I C-----t-----
No I i I 
I I 
Yes 1.44 0.092 1.42 0.105 1.26 0.554 1.26 ! 0.548 1.31 0.217 I 1.30 0.233 I 0.77 I 0.248 I 0.78 0.278 
Comorbidity I I 
No ! ! I I I 0.643 1.38 I <0.05 I Yes 0.72 <0.05 0.76 <0.05 1.17 0.567 1.13 1.63 <0.001 1.62 <0.001 1.40 I <0.05 
ICC 0.02 0.21 0.03 I I 0.06 ! I I ! 
---
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
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Admission 
The ICC of the multilevel analysis for the admission model is 0.12. There are only 
co-morbidity factors which differ between ordinary and multilevel models. Insurance 
status is not different between multilevel and ordinary models. 
Table A3. 8 Results of analysis of admission between ordinary and multilevel 
models 
Admission( m ultilevel) Admission 
Odds ratios P-value Odds ratios P-value 
- -.--f---------
Dependent variable Admission = 1 
N 1,939 1,939 
-.- . 
Independent variable 
Age group 
_. 
0-40 
41-60 0.74 0.442 0.79 0.541 
>60 1.48 0.338 1.60 0.246 _____ .M __ f----
Sex 
Male 
Female 1.15 0.433 1.20 0.298 
Marital status 
Single 
-
Married 1.11 0.750 1.17 0.610 
Education 
Without education 
Primary-Bachelor 1.31 0.227 1.32 0.216 
>Bachelor 1.27 0.579 1.36 0.473 
Area 
Urban 
Rural 0.76 0.073 0.81 0.152 
Insurance 
UC 
SSS 1.03 0.928 0.74 0.206 
CSMBS 1.08 0.670 1.08 0.663 
----f--
Income 
No income 
<2,000 0.99 0.966 1.18 0.446 
2,000-10,000 0.57 <0.01 0.67 <0.05 
>10,000 0.44 <0.01 0.50 <0.05 
Duration of DM 
<= 5 years 
> 5 years 1.84 <0.001 1.74 <0.001 
Smoking 
No 
Yes 1.04 0.909 1.07 0.826 
Co-morbidity 
No 
Yes 1.55 <0.05 1.45 0.058 
ICC 0.12 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
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A3.5 Conclusion 
The analysis has found that there is some difference in the results of analysis when 
using ordinary and multi level models. The lee was used to judge whether there 
were important differences. Different effects relating to insurance status were found 
for HbA 1 e in process and intermediate outcomes, and eye examination in process of 
care. However, it is difficult to say when ordinary models of analysis should be 
rejected in favour of multi level method. Since results of analysis were not very 
different between ordinary and multilevel method, this study chose to present 
standard analyses instead of using the multilevel method. 
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APPENDIX 4: Quality of service in Diabetes Mellitus detailed results 
Table A4. 1 Bivariate analysis of different characteristics and process indicators 
FPGtHt HbAICtHt Urine Protein examination Eye eumlnation Lipid profile test BP measurement 
Variable Odds 
p. 
9S%CI Odds P- 95% Cl Odds P- 95-/_ Cl Odds p- 95-/_ Cl Odds p. 95-/_ Cl Odds p. 95-/_ Cl 
ratios value ratios Value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value 
LLIit UL- LL UL LL UL LL UL LL UL LL UL 
Agegroup 
0-40 
41-60 1.08 0.817 0.56 2.09 1.42 0.134 0.90 2.24 2.55 0.003 1.38 4.71 0.64 0.089 0.39 1.07 1.03 0.867 0.71 l.S0 1.04 0.909 0.51 2.15 
>60 1.37 0.363 0.69 2.72 1.16 0.523 0.73 1.85 4.45 <0.001 2.42 8.20 0.41 <0.001 0.24 0.70 0.86 0.424 0.59 1.25 1.03 0.927 0.50 2.16 
Sex 
Male 
Female 1.91 <0.001 1.33 2.74 0.80 0.053 0.64 1.00 1.33 0.015 1.06 1.68 1.12 0.499 0.80 l.S7 0.97 0.745 0.79 1.18 1.64 0.010 1.13 2.38 
Marital 
status 
Single 
Married 0.94 0.860 0.47 1.89 1.13 0.572 0.74 1.74 l.S6 0.059 0.98 2.47 1.20 0.575 0.64 2.27 1.11 0.574 0.78 1.57 1.30 0.419 0.68 2.49 
Education 
Without 
education 
Primary- 0.63 0.191 0.31 1.26 1.84 0.004 1.22 2.79 0.84 0.291 0.60 1.17 2.36 0.014 1.19 4.70 1.49 0.007 1.11 1.99 0.96 0.888 0.52 1.78 I Bachelor 
>Bachelor 0.35 0.019 0.15 0.84 2.64 <0.001 1.52 4.60 1.07 0.789 0.65 1.77 2.61 0.033 1.08 6.29 2.38 <0.001 1.46 3.87 0.57 0.182 0.25 1.30 
Area 
Urban 
Rural 1.30 0.154 0.91 1.86 1.08 0.487 0.87 1.34 1.60 <0.001 1.28 1.99 0.82 0.224 0.60 1.13 0.96 0.697 0.80 1.16 1.26 0.217 0.87 1.84 
Insurance 
I UC 
I SSS 1.33 0.238 0.83 2.15 2.35 <0.001 1.77 3.13 C.23 <0.001 0.16 0.32 5.28 <0.001 3.37 8.27 2.38 <0.001 1.88 3.00 1.45 0.143 0.88 2.37 
- ----
--- ~~ 
--------- --
~ --
--
--
--
-----_._----
--
350 
FPGtat 
Variable Odds P-
ratios value 
CSMBS 0.71 0.105 
Income 
No income 
<2,000 0.62 0.158 
2,000- 0.78 0351 10000 
>10,000 0.51 0.021 
Duration 
of OM 
s 5 years 
> S years 1.08 0.682 
Smoking 
No 
Yes 0.53 0.020 
Comorbidity 
No 
Yes 1.15 0.498 
Hospital 
Samutsakhon 
Kratumban 0.65 0.044 
Banpaw 0.99 0.982 
Srivichai3 1.18 0.686 
Mahac:hail l.S4 0220 
lower level 
@@ upper level 
95% Cl 
LL~ ULN 
0.47 1.08 
0.31 1.21 
0.47 1.31 
0.28 0.90 
0.75 1.S6 
0.31 0.90 
0.77 1.73 
0.43 0.99 
0.53 1.86 
0.52 2.67 
0.77 3.09 
HbAICtest 
Odds p- 9!W.Cl 
ratios Value 
LL UL 
2.13 <0.001 1.59 2.84 
0.79 0.299 0.51 1.23 
1.10 0.528 0.83 1.45 
1.39 0.063 0.98 1.96 
0.88 0.276 0.71 1.10 
1.30 0.173 0.89 1.91 
1.53 0.002 1.16 2.01 
0.53 <0.001 0.39 0.70 
0.14 <0.001 0.07 0.28 
1.26 0.263 0.84 1.90 
2.03 <0.001 1.50 2.74 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
Urine Protein examination 
Odds P- 95·1. Cl 
ratios value 
LL UL 
1.43 0.003 1.13 1.82 
0.39 <0.001 0.26 0.57 
029 <0.001 022 0.37 
0.32 <0.001 0.23 0.46 
2.20 <0.001 1.77 2.73 
1.04 0.830 0.70 1.55 
2.20 <0.001 1.64 2.95 
0.10 <0.001 0.06 0.17 
0.02 <0.001 0.01 0.07 
-
<0.001 
- -
Eye examination Lipid profile test BP measurement 
Odds p- 9S·I. Cl Odds P- 9S%Cl Odds p- 95°/. Cl 
ratios value ratios value ratios value 
LL UL LL UL LL UL 
1.64 0.062 0.98 2.74 1.76 <0.001 1.41 2.21 0.78 0.265 0.51 1.20 
1.62 0.202 0.71 3.40 1.06 0.734 0.76 1.48 0.79 0.495 0.41 1.54 
3.03 <0.001 1.79 5.11 1.69 <0.001 1.34 2.14 1.10 0.716 0.67 1.79 
2.74 <0.001 1.50 5.01 2.01 <0.001 1.47 2.73 0.74 0.311 0.42 1.32 
0.77 0.110 0.55 1.06 0.78 0.010 0.65 0.94 1.08 0.693 0.74 1.58 
1.04 0.897 0.59 1.84 1.48 0.039 1.02 2.14 0.67 0.188 0.37 1.22 
1.10 0.619 0.76 1.60 1.44 <0.001 1.16 1.79 1.24 0.310 0.82 1.88 
16.18 <0.001 7.36 35.57 1.32 0.020 1.04 1.66 0.86 0.504 0.56 1.33 
0.96 0.785 0.70 1.31 0.87 0.647 0.48 1.58 
7.35 <0.001 2.62 20.61 0.55 <0.001 0.38 0.80 1.42 0.427 0.60 3.38 
69.88 <0.001 31.80 153.54 3.76 <0.001 2.56 5.52 1.99 0.076 0.93 4.25 
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Table A4. 2 Results of factor associated with standard measuring target of DM 
FPG test HhAle test Urine Protein examination Eye examination Lipid profile test BP measurement 
(N-I,939) (N-1939) (N"'l,161) (N-1728) (N== 1 939) (N"1939) 
Variable Odds p- 95% Cl Odds p- 95·/. Cl Odds P- 95-;. Cl Odds p- 95-/. Cl Odds p- 95% Cl Odds p- 95-;0 Cl 
ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios Value ratios value 
LL@l ULN LL UL LL UL LL UL LL UL LL UL 
Age group 
-40 1.00 
1-60 1.34 0.420 0.66 2.72 1.64 0.047 1.01 2.68 1.61 0.20S 0.77 3.38 0.8S 0.604 0.47 US 1.38 0.129 0.91 2.09 1.18 0.68\ 0.S4 2.S4 
60 2.27 0.049 1.00 S.14 I.S9 0.103 0.91 2.78 1.36 0.447 0.62 3.00 1.17 0.672 0.56 2.46 1.52 0.082 0.95 2.43 1.47 0.385 0.61 3.53 
Sex 
lale 1.00 
emale 1.72 0.009 1.14 2.S8 0.93 0.566 0.71 1.20 1.26 0.180 0.90 1.76 1.79 0.007 1.17 2.72 1.29 0.028 1.03 1.62 1.62 0.025 1.06 2.46 
larital status 
ingle 1.00 
lanied 0.96 0.912 0.47 1.98 1.07 0.769 0.68 1.69 0.98 0.946 053 1.79 1.73 0.132 0.8S 3.54 1.19 0.378 0.81 1.73 1.35 0.377 0.69 2.64 
Education 
rithout 1.00 lucation 
rimary- 0.72 0.364 O.3S 1.48 1.41 0.132 0.90 2.19 1.41 0.112 0.92 2.16 1.23 0.S97 0.S7 2.63 1.18 0.294 0.87 1.61 0.96 0.899 0.50 1.83 
achelor 
Bachelor 0.61 0.321 0.23 1.63 2.01 0.034 LOS 3.84 2.3S 0.040 1.04 S.30 1.95 0.210 0.69 5.56 1.69 0.069 0.96 2.98 0.78 0.606 0.29 2.04 
Area 
rban 1.00 
W'Ill 1.32 0.155 0.90 1.92 0.99 0.951 0.78 1.26 1.11 0.482 0.83 1.50 1.07 0.709 0.75 1.53 0.93 0.503 0.76 1.14 1.26 0.256 0.85 1.86 
Insurance 
C 1.00 
;S 1.49 0.262 0.74 2.99 0.79 0.316 0.49 1.26 0.29 0.000 0.18 0.47 1.85 0.165 0.78 4.41 2.95 <0.001 2.03 4.27 1.26 0.520 0.62 2.56 
5MBS 0.68 0.124 0.42 1.11 1.91 0.000 1.37 2.66 1.63 0.006 1.15 2.32 1.43 0.245 0.78 2.60 1.47 0.003 1.14 1.90 0.73 0.210 0.45 1.19 
Income 
o income 1.00 
"-- , .. --- - -- - ----- --- --------
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FPGtest 
IN=1939) 
Variable Odds P- 95'Yo Cl 
ratios value 
<2,000 0.64 0.220 
2,000-10,000 0.93 0.812 
>10,000 0.93 0.841 
Duration 
ofDM 
~ 5 years 1.00 
> 5 years 1.06 0.755 
Smoking 
No 1.00 
Yes 0.71 0.259 
Co-morbidity 
No 1.00 
Yes 1.13 0.583 
Hospital 
Samutsakhon 1.00 
Kratumban 0.79 0.315 
Banpaw 1.10 0.771 
Srivichai3 1.06 0.912 
Mahachai2 1.52 0.339 
(ill lower level 
@@ upper level 
LL@l ULN 
0.32 1.30 
0.53 1.65 
0.45 1.91 
0.72 1.58 
0.39 1.29 
0.73 1.75 
0.50 1.25 
0.57 2.13 
0.41 2.73 
0.64 3.59 
HbAICtest 
IN=l,939) 
Odds P- 95% Cl 
ratios value 
LL UL 
0.99 0.977 0.62 !.S8 
0.95 0.766 0.67 1.34 
0.88 0.575 0.56 1.38 
0.90 0.390 0.70 Ll5 
1.06 0.804 0.69 1.62 
1.27 0.119 0.94 1.70 
0.47 <0.001 0.34 0.65 
0.14 <0.001 0.07 0.27 
2.05 0.007 1.21 3.47 
3.28 <0.001 2.08 5.15 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
Urine Protein examination 
(N=1,162) 
Odds P- 95% Cl 
ratios value 
LL UL 
0.89 0.665 0.54 1.49 
0.85 0.386 0.58 1.23 
0.62 0.101 0.34 LlO 
1.53 0.006 1.13 2.06 
2.13 0.015 1.16 3.91 
1.68 0.007 1.16 2.44 
0.08 <0.001 0.05 0.13 
0.07 <0.001 0.02 0.24 
-
<0.001 
- -
Eye examination Lipid profile test BP measurement I (N=I728) (N= 1,939) (N=1939) 
Odds P- 95% Cl Odds P- 95"10 Cl Odds P- 95% Cl ratios value ratios Value ratios value 
LL UL LL UL LL UL 
0.72 0.447 0.31 1.67 0.97 0.872 0.68 1.39 0.79 0.511 0.40 1.58 
0.74 0.348 0.39 1.39 1.20 0.199 0.91 1.59 1.11 0.711 0.64 1.94 
0.62 0.226 0.29 1.34 1.32 0.162 0.89 1.95 1.07 0.858 0.52 2.22 
1.29 0.180 0.89 1.89 0.87 0.198 0.71 1.07 1.17 0.453 0.78 1.76 
0.88 0.715 0.44 1.74 1.46 0.071 0.97 2.22 0.81 0.537 0.42 1.57 
1.20 0.422 0.77 1.85 1.47 <0.001 1.16 1.86 1.27 0.291 0.82 1.97 
20.03 <0.001 8.81 45.54 1.47 0.004 1.13 1.91 1.01 0.976 0.62 1.63 
1.18 0.334 0.85 1.63 0.98 0.947 0.52 1.83 
7.51 <0.001 2.26 25.03 0.27 <0.001 0.17 0.43 1.28 0.627 0.47 3.47 
81.94 <0.001 29.65 226.42 1.89 0.008 Ll8 3.03 1.94 0.156 0.78 4.83 
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Table A4. 3 Bivariate analysis of different characteristics and achieving intermediate outcomes 
Controlled FPG Controlled HbAIC Controlled total triglyceride Controlled total Cholesterol Controlled average BP 
Variable Odds 
p. 
95% Cl Odds p- 95-/_ Cl Odds p. 95% Cl Odds p- 95% Cl Odds P- 95% Cl 
ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value 
LL@ UL@@ LL UL LL UL LL UL LL UL 
Age group 
0-40 
41-60 0.67 0.079 0.43 1.05 0.67 0.355 0.29 1.56 1.02 0.923 0.66 1.57 1.14 0.567 0.74 1.75 1.85 0.002 1.25 2.73 
>60 0.38 <0.001 0.24 0.60 0.81 0.622 0.34 1.90 1.14 0.564 0.73 1.76 0.75 0.212 0.48 1.18 1.99 <0.001 1.34 2.96 
Sex 
Male 
Female 1.18 0.113 0.% 1.45 1.51 0.042 1.01 2.25 0.89 0.333 0.71 1.12 1.22 0.103 0.96 1.54 0.90 0.267 0.74 1.09 
Marital status 
Single 
Manied 0.89 0.537 0.61 1.30 1.78 0.150 0.81 3.90 1.30 0.230 0.85 2.00 0.82 0.384 0.53 1.27 0.98 0.908 0.69 1.39 
Education 
Without education 
Primary-Bachelor 1.40 0.028 1.04 1.89 1.09 0.827 0.50 2.35 0.78 0.201 0.53 1.14 1.16 0.449 0.79 1.73 0.90 0.453 0.67 1.20 
>Bachelor 1.72 0.032 1.05 2.81 1.40 0.507 0.52 3.78 0.94 0.823 0.55 1.61 1.26 0.412 0.73 2.19 0.87 0.543 0.55 1.36 
Area 
Urban 
Rural 0.80 0.028 0.66 0.98 1.30 0.180 0.88 1.92 0.89 0.290 0.71 1.11 0.82 0.075 0.65 1.02 1.09 0.333 0.91 1.31 
Insurance 
UC 
SSS 1.75 0.000 1.37 2.24 0.52 0.014 0.31 0.88 0.89 0.409 0.68 1.17 1.00 0.985 0.76 1.31 0.74 0.008 0.59 0.92 
CSMBS 1.00 0.974 0.79 1.26 1.01 0.968 0.59 1.72 1.03 0.810 0.78 1.37 0.71 0.019 0.53 0.95 0.96 0.744 0.77 1.20 
Income 
No income 
<2,000 1.02 0.918 0.71 1.46 1.13 0.771 0.51 2.51 0.92 0.710 0.59 1.43 1.40 0.139 0.90 2.19 0.88 0.474 0.63 1.24 
2,000-10,000 1.13 0.349._. 0.88 1.44 1.01 0.983 . ___ O.~ 1.67 0.80 0.137 0.60 1.07 1.17 0.307 0.86 1.59 0.81 0.067 0.64 1.02 
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• 
Variable Odds 
ratios 
»0,000 1.1) 
Duration of OM 
SSyears 
> S years 1.30 
Smoking 
No 
Yes 1.4) 
Comorbidity 
No 
Yes 0.69 
Hospital 
Samutsakhon 
Kratumban 0.57 
Banpaw 1.06 
Srivichai3 0.98 
Mahachai2 1.63 
lower level 
@@ upper level 
Controlled FPG 
P- 95". Cl Odds 
value ratios 
LLti ULM 
0.S34 0.81 1.52 0.87 
0.010 1.07 1.60 1.77 
0.085 0.95 2.09 1.06 
0.002 0.54 0.88 1.29 
<0.001 0.46 0.73 0.80 
0.740 0.75 LSO -
0.922 0.65 1.47 0.92 
0.007 1.14 2.33 0.27 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
Controlled HbAIC 
P- 95·/. Cl 
value 
LL UL 
0.646 0.47 1.59 
O.OOS 1.19 2.65 
0.864 0.55 2.05 
0.318 0.78 2.12 
0.426 0.47 1.38 
- -
0.809 0.45 1.85 
<0.001 0.16 0.46 
Controlled total triglyceride Controlled total Cholesterol Controlled average BP 
Odds P- 95·/. Cl Odds p- 95% Cl Odds P- 95% Cl 
ratios value ratios value ratios value 
LL UL LL UL LL UL 
1.10 0.600 0.77 1.58 1.26 0.214 0.87 1.83 0.88 0.403 0.66 1.18 
1.09 0.467 0.87 1.36 0.86 0.190 0.68 1.08 0.93 0.419 0.77 1.11 
1.36 0.128 0.92 2.01 0.76 0.186 051 1.l4 0.61 0.008 0.43 0.88 
1.62 0.00) 1.23 2.12 1.19 0.209 0.91 1.57 2.78 <0.001 2.19 3.52 
1.10 0.474 0.84 1.45 1.24 0.129 0.94 1.65 0.69 <0.001 056 0.87 
2.59 <0.001 1.72 3.90 2.24 <0.001 1.50 3.33 0.38 <0.001 0.27 0.53 
1.34 0.271 0.79 2.27 4.52 <0.001 2.52 8.08 0.43 <0.001 0.29 0.64 
1.13 0.451 0.82 1.56 1.61 0.004 1.16 2.22 052 <0.001 0.38 0.70 
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Table A4. 4 Results of facton associated with uncontrolled DM in intermediate outcome 
Controlled FPG Controlled HbA 1 C Controlled total triglyceride Controlled total cholesterol Controlled average BP 
<N-1939) (N-404) (N-l,267) (N=1262) (N-l,936) 
Variable Odds P- 95% Cl Odds P- 95°/. Cl Odds P- 95% Cl Odds P- 95% Cl Odds p- 95% Cl 
ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value ratios value 
LL@ UL@@ LL UL LL UL LL UL LL UL 
Age group 
0-40 
41-60 0.81 0.369 0.50 1.29 0.48 0.129 0.19 1.24 0.85 0.489 0.54 1.34 1.03 0.897 0.65 1.64 1.36 0.155 0.89 2.08 
>60 0.47 0.004 0.28 0.79 0.31 0.031 0.11 0.90 0.87 0.599 0.51 1.47 0.73 0.242 0.42 1.24 1.25 0.354 0.78 2.01 
Sex 
Male 
Female 1.32 0.019 1.05 1.66 1.63 0.051 1.00 2.65 1.00 0.985 0.77 1.31 1.21 0.165 0.92 1.60 0.76 0.012 0.61 0.94 
Marital status 
Single 
Married 1.10 0.633 0.74 1.64 1.94 0.146 0.79 4.76 1.45 0.111 0.92 2.28 1.02 0.934 0.65 1.61 0.82 0.281 0.56 1.18 
Education 
Without education 
Primary-Bachelor 1.23 0.213 0.89 1.69 1.34 0.500 0.57 3.16 0.81 0.319 0.54 1.22 1.14 0.533 0.75 1.74 0.94 0.705 0.69 1.29 
>Bachelor 1.55 0.134 0.87 2.75 1.58 0.466 0.46 5.39 0.86 0.640 0.46 1.61 1.37 0.333 0.72 2.60 0.85 0.540 0.50 1.44 
Area 
Urban 
Rural 0.77 0.016 0.63 0.95 1.07 0.758 0.69 1.66 0.97 0.829 0.77 1.23 0.89 0.351 0.70 1.14 0.93 0.452 0.76 1.13 
Insurance 
. SSS 1.44 0.061 0.98 2.11 1.17 0.733 0.47 2.95 0.96 0.842 0.64 1.44 0.69 0.074 0.45 1.04 0.86 0.402 0.61 1.22 
CSMBS 1.17 0.249 0.90 1.53 1.19 0.606 0.61 2.30 0.93 0.669 0.68 1.28 0.74 0.063 0.53 1.02 0.80 0.087 0.62 1.03 
Income 
No income 
<2,000 1.35 0.126 0.92 1.98 1.14 0.780 0.46 2.78 0.93 0.752 0.58 1.48 1.44 0.134 0.89 2.31 0.92 0.671 0.64 1.33 
2,000-10,000 1.00 0.996 0.75 ~~- 1.~ 0.215 0.79 2.83 0.86 0.367 0.61 1.20 1.10 0.579 0.78 1.56 0.94 0.653 0.71 1.24 
----- -----
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Variable Odds 
ratios 
>10,000 0.99 
Hospital 
Samutsakhon 
Kratumban 0.58 
Banpaw 1.05 
Srivichai3 0.64 
Mahachai2 1.11 
lower level 
@@ upper level 
Controlled FPG 
(l'!-1939) 
p. 
95"1. Cl 
value 
LL@ UL@l@ 
0.949 0.66 1.47 
<0.001 0.45 0.76 
0.781 0.73 1.51 
0.073 0.39 1.04 
0.649 0.71 1.75 
Controlled HbAIC 
jN-40-ft 
Odds P- 95% Cl 
ratios value 
LL UL 
1.27 0.573 0.55 2.04 
0.79 0.436 0.43 1.44 
0.77 0.609 0.28 2.11 
0.21 <0.001 0.09 0.51 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
Controlled total triglyceride Controlled total cholesterol Controlled average BP 
I (N=1,267) (N=1262) (N=1,936) 
Odds p- 95% Cl Odds 
p-
95% Cl Odds 
p-
95% Cl 
ratios value ratios value ratios value 
LL UL LL UL LL UL 
1.64 <0.001 1.23 2.19 1.36 0.040 1.01 1.83 2.90 <0.001 2.25 3.73 
1.l2 0.442 0.83 1.52 1.l5 0.374 0.84 1.57 0.71 0.007 0.55 0.91 
2.66 <0.001 1.73 4.10 2.17 <0.001 1.42 3.30 0.35 <0.001 0.24 0.50 
1.41 0.247 0.79 2.53 4.47 <0.001 2.36 8.44 0.43 <0.001 0.27 0.68 
1.19 0.416 0.79 1.79 1.59 0.029 1.05 2.42 0.50 <0.001 0.34 0.74 
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Table A4. 5 Bivariate analysis of different characteristics and probability of 
admission 
Variable Odds ratios P-value 95% Cl 
LL@ UL@@ 
Age group 
0-40 
41-60 
>60 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
Marital status 
Single 
Married 
Education 
Without education 
Primary-Bachelor 
>Bachelor 
Area 
Urban 
Rural 
Insurance 
UC 
SSS 
CSMBS 
Income 
No income 
<2,000 
2000-10,000 
>10,000 
Duration of OM 
~ 5 years 
> 5 years 
Smoking 
No 
Yes 
Co-morbidity 
No 
Yes 
Hospital 
Samutsakhon 
Kratumban 
Banpaw 
Srivichai3 
Mahachai2 
-@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
1.15 
3.58 
1.36 
1.43 
0.81 
0.62 
0.81 
0.38 
1.13 
1.18 
0.45 
0.37 
2.41 
0.72 
1.70 
1.27 
0.84 
0.83 
0.08 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
0.706 0.56 2.35 
<0.001 1.78 7.20 
0.043 1.01 1.84 
0.233 0.79 2.57 
0.300 0.53 1.21 
0.182 0.30 1.25 
0.126 0.62 1.06 
<0.001 0.26 0.56 
0.445 0.83 1.52 
0.443 0.78 1.78 
<0.001 0.32 0.62 
<0.001 0.23 0.60 
<0.001 1.83 3.19 
0.247 0.41 1.26 
0.004 1.18 2.43 
0.125 0.94 1.73 
0.476 0.53 1.35 
0.518 0.47 1.47 
<0.001 0.03 0.26 
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Table A4. 6 Results of factors associated with probability of admission 
-
Variable 
-~- ------- -------
._ ....... _!<~~ V~u.P ___ . _____ 
0-40 
-_.-_._- -"-_.-
41-60 
.. _--_ .. _._----------
>60 
---------------------
Sex 
.. 
Male 
Female 
Marital status 
Single 
Married 
Education 
Without education 
Primary-Bachelor 
>Bachelor 
Area 
Urban 
Rural 
Insurance 
UC 
SSS 
CSMBS 
Income 
No income 
<2,000 
2,000-10,000 
>10,000 
Duration ofDM 
~ 5 years 
> 5 years 
Smoking 
No 
Yes 
Co-morbidity 
No 
Yes 
Hospital 
Samutsakhon 
Kratumban 
Banpaw 
Srivichai3 
Mahachai2 
@ lower level 
@@ upper level 
Odds ratios 
._.-_.,----
f----... -.--.. --.--.. --.. - .... --.. ---.-
f--. 
------
0.74 1-------
1.47 
---
1.14 
1.10 
1.31 
1.25 
-
0.76 
1.11 
1.08 
0.98 
0.57 
0.44 
1.84 
1.04 
1.56 
1.52 
0.68 
1.46 
0.14 
Source: Medical records and DM patient data 
P-value 
95% Cl 
LL@ UL@@ 
.. _-_._._--------
--------
--_._-,-.. __ ... '-'-'-' --_._----_ .. _-- -_._--_ ... _-_.-
'---_. __ ._-
-------_._---
--"-"--
0.432 0.34 1.58 
-
=F 0.348 0_66 3.32 .--- -
I 
.-
0.465 0.81 1.60 
--
--
0.769 0.59 2.04 
0.225 0.85 2.02 
0.596 0.54 2.89 
--
0.061 0.56 1.01 
0.716 0.63 1.96 
0.680 0.76 1.52 
0.921 0.62 1.53 
0.005 0.39 0.84 
0.007 0.24 0.80 
<0.001 1.36 2.49 
0.907 0.55 1.96 
0.024 1.06 2.30 
0.020 1.07 2.16 
0.135 0.42 1.12 
0.304 0.71 3.01 
0.002 0.04 0.50 
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APPENDIX 5: Qualitative data analysis 
T hi AS 1 Q t" ~ " d th" t a e 
" 
ues lonnalre or 10- ep 10 ervlewan d~ ocus ~roup 
Questions for DM patient Questions for provider 
Accessibility • Does the distance to hospital • How hospital provides services 
affect access to care? How? for patients in different schemes 
• How hospital regulations and (special pathway, special 
services affect utilization? clinics)? 
• What is the policy of employer • How special additional payment 
on employee with DM? affects hospital in providing 
• What and how regulations from services e.g. additional pay from 
SSO affect utilization of SSS for chronic disease? 
service? • What is the role of interviewees 
• Does hospital has home care in the process of DM care? 
service and how about the 
service? 
• Does anyone have experience of 
changing hospital and what are 
the reasons for changing? 
Process of • What are your expectations of • What is hospital policy on DM 
care care from hospital? patients in different schemes ego 
• How do you improve your Guideline, drug? 
knowledge of your DM? • How clinical guidelines affect 
• What are the processes of care physician practice? 
you receive when you come to • How doctor fee affect process or 
hospital? result of care in different 
• What are your ideas about schemes? (may set interview with 
special track for SSS patients doctor who get salary and doctor 
when you come to OPD? fee) 
• What are your ideas about • Compared to CPG, which process 
special clinics for DM? of care is done over guideline and 
• Please explain the services you which one under guideline? 
receive from other departments • Data from health examination 
such as lab, OPD, and physician. survey show that DM patient in 
• Do you have an experience of SSS more than 70% did not know 
service from other hospitals, if they were DM. What do you 
you have, can you compare the think of them? 
difference in process of care? 
Result of • Do you have any ideas about the • What is good quality service in 
quality of drugs you receive from hospital? your view? 
care • Compared to other schemes, do • How do you follow up the quality 
you have any ideas about drug of care to DM patients? 
quality? • What is the process of response 
• Are you satisfied with the to satisfaction or complaints from 
services from the hospital and in patients? 
what aspects? 
• What are the characteristics of a 
good quality hospital in your 
view? 
• What are your suggestions to 
improve quality of care in your 
selected hospital? 
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APPENDIX 6: Questionnaire and medical record data collection 
form 
Patient data 
1. Hospital. ............................................................................................... . 
2. Patient naJ1le: ....................................................................................... . 
3. Date of birth 
4. Sex 
o Male o Female 
5. Address ...................................................................................... . 
................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................ 
..................................................................... 
6. Birth province ....................................................................................... . 
7. Time living at recent address .................................................................. . 
8. Living area 
Din-municipality 
9. Marital status 
o Single 
o Married 
o Widow 
o Divorced 
o Separated 
10. Education 
o No education 
o Primary school 
o Secondary school 
o Bachelor degree 
o > Master degree 
11. Religion 
o out of municipality 
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o Buddhist 0 Christian o Islam 0 No religion 0 Other .............. . 
12. ID number 
13. Hospital Number .................................................................................. . 
14. Insurance 
o VC scheme 
o Social security scheme 
o Civil servant medical benefit scheme 
15. Occupation 
o No occupation o Merchandise 
o Employer o Entrepreneur 
o Private employee o Government officer 
o State enterprise employee o Other 
specify .................................................... . 
16. Average income ........................................ {Baht} .................... . 
17. Average family income .................................. (Baht} ................... . 
18. First diagnosis Diabetes Mellitus ...................... year ....................... month 
19. Time receiving service in this hospital.. ......................... year ........................ month 
20. Admission within last 6 months 
o No admission 
o Number of admission ................ times 
Admission Hospital Disease 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
21. Co-morbidity 
o No co-morbidity 
ICDlO Length of stay 
o hyperlipidemia 
Received hyperlipidemia drug 
Time diagnosis ............. year .............. month 
o receive o not receive 
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o hypertension 
Received hypertension drug 
Time diagnosis ............. year .............. month 
o receive 0 not receive 
o Coronary heart disease Time diagnosis ............. year ............... month 
Received coronary heart disease drug 
o receive o not receive 
o Gout Time diagnosis ............. year .............. month 
Receive Gout drug 
o receive o not receive 
o Cataract Time diagnosis ............. year .............. month 
22. Family history 
o Diabetes Mellitus 
o Hypertension 
o Cardiovascular accident 
o Heart disease 
o None of these diseases 
o Do not know 
23. Treatment 
o Diet control 
o Oral drug name: 
I. ................................................... . 
11. ................................................... . 
Ill. 
IV. 
o insulin injection 
o oral drug + insulin injection 
24. Smoking 
o Not smoking 
o Former smoker, now stop smoking ........................ years since smoked 
o Smoking ................................................ cigarettes/day 
o Period of smoking ................................................ years 
25. Alcohol drinking (within a month) 
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o No alcohol drinking 
o Alcohol drinking 
Number of drinks per day ....................... day/month 
Drinking volume per day .......................... mL 
Brand ......................................... . 
26. Date of recording data ............................................................................... . 
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Hospital data 
27. Services received (check with medical records of hospital) 
Process Unit Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Date of service 
BW K~ 
Height CM 
FastingpJasmaglucose (PPG) MWOI 
Blood pressure (BP) test mmHG 
Urine analysis (UA) for 
microalbuminuria 0-4+ 
HbA 1 C measurement Mg«'/o 
Lipid profile 
-Triglyceride MglDl 
-Total cholesterol Mg/DI 
-HDL-cholesterol Mg/Dl 
Eye examination 
Appointment date 
Physician name 
Physician's age 
Specialty 
Working time(year) 
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28. Admission 
Admission Hospital Disease reDIO Length of stay 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
366 
APPENDIX 7 Summary of articles on effect of payment on provider behaviour 
Author, Year Topic Research question intervention Methodology Target group Result 
of stud v 
Ray et a1. Mortality following The mortality of hip Prospective Observation 2130 patient with hip LOS decrease 24% but mortality 
1990 hip fracture before and fracture change after payment before and fracture before and did not change 
after implementation implementation system after 2238 patient after PPS, 
of the prospective prospective payment (PPS) and implementation US payment system system FFS of PPS 
Palmer et a1. The impact of the The quality of care PPS and Observation 190 pre and 196 post LOS decrease 24%, post op 
1989 prospective payment may deteriorate after FFS before and implementation complication reduced, other 
system on the implementation of PPS after patients from private complication increased 
treatment of hip in 1984 implementation and non-profit teaching fractures in the elderly of PPS hospital, US 
Fitzgerald et Changing patterns of Are there any different PPS and Observation 284 patient of LOS decrease 38%, increase in 
a1. 1987 hip fracture care before in manner and FFS before and university-affiliated long term nursing home. Quality of 
and after outcome treatment of after municipal teaching care may be deteriorated. implementation of the hip fracture after implementation hospital, US 
! prospective payment implementation of PPS of PPS 
system 
Coleman et at A comparison of Outcome between Capitation Prospective 196 fee-for-service and There are no different with four 
2000 functional outcomes capitation and fee-for- andFFS cohort study 140 capitation patient outcome.(recovery of daily activity, 
after hip fracture in service payment are with acute hip fracture, improvement in ambulation, return 
group!staffHMOs and different or not US to community living, mortality fee-for-servicesystems 
Mushlin et a1. Quality of care during To investigate the PPS and observation Data from 9 hospital in There are no different in quality of 
1988 a community-wide access to care and FFS prospective Rochester, NY, US three tracers that are ischemic heart 
experiment in quality of care in experiment disease, Perinatal care, Abdominal 
prospective payment to prospective payment condition. ho~itals 
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Author, Year Topic Research question intervention Methodology Target group Result 
of study 
Kahn et a1. Comparing outcomes To evaluate quality PPS and Observation 6856 and 7156 patients LOS reduced 24%. Overall 
1990 of care before and after outcome in five FFS before and pre and post mortality decreased in-hospital but 
implementation of the diseases before and after implementation of PPS not different in 180 days post 
DRG-based after implementation implementation in five disease that are admission. 
prospective payment ofDRG of PPS CHF,AMI, 
system Pneumonia, CV A, hip 
fracture, 
Brizioli et a1. Hospital payment To evaluate quality PPS and Observation 1987 patient with CHF LOS was shorter from 13.57 to 
1996 system based on outcome of CHF in FFS before and in four hospital in 11.69. The readmission rate 
diagnosis related DRG system in Italy after central Italy increased from 7.73 to 8.90 
groups in Italy: early implementation 
effects on elderly of PPS 
patients with heart 
failure 
Soumerai et Timeliness and quality To compare the quality FFS and Observation 2304 elderly patients No different in timeliness of both 
a1. 1999 of care for elderly of emergency care for Capitation before and admitted with AMI in patients in HMO and fee-for-
patients with acute elderly in HMO and after 20 community service. However, use of 
myocardial infarction fee-for-service patients implementation hospitals, US transportation and aspirin were 
under health of PPS higher in patient HMO group. 
maintenance 
organization vs. fee-
for-service insurance 
Erickson et a1. The relationship To compare the ratio FFS and retrospective 59902 patients were Patients with managed care or 
2000 between managed care of undergo CABG Capitation cohort study hospitalized for CABG. private managed care were less 
insurance and use of operation between US likely to use CABG compare to 
lower-mortality patient in fee-for- patient with fee-for-service 
hospitals for CABG service, managed care, 
surgery and private managed 
care 
- - -
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Author, Year Topic Research question intervention Methodology Target group Result 
of study 
Seddon et al. Quality of ambulatory To evaluation of Fee-for- Observation, 520 and 520 patients in Patients in both groups were no 
2001 care after myocardial rehabilitation and service and survey HMO and fee-for- different in medication. But, among 
infarction among medication after HMO service group, US fee-for-service patient, there were 
Medicare patients by myocardial infarction increase use of rehabilitation more 
type of insurance and compare between than HMO group. 
region HMO and fee-for-
service 
Silcox 2003 Quality of care by To compare quality FFS and observation 154 patients VOfith There is no different in result of 
insurance plan. A fee- outcome of patient Capitation case control primary diagnosis is quality between two groups. 
for-service versus with CHF between fee- CHF, US 
health maintenance for-service and HMO 
organization group 
comparison 
Manton et al. Use of Medicare To evaluate the case- PPS and Observation 55000 patient form LOS and admission rate were 
1993 services before and mix adjusted pattern FFS before and Medicare file decrease after PPS. However, 
after introduction of before and after after mortality did not increase. Home 
the prospective implementation of PPS implementation health care was increase among 
payment system system of PPS unmarried and disable population. 
Lave et a!. The early effects of To explore the quality PPS and prospective 202,680 psychiatric The LOS was decrease in PPS 
1988 Medicare's prospective result, LOS and FFS cohort study patients discharge data period. In hospital without 
payment system on readmission rate, of in 1984, US psychiatric ward decrease 23.2%, 
psychiatry PPS payment in with psychiatric ward fell by 
psychiatric patient 20.4%. There are no different in 
readmission rate in psychiatric 
patient. The decrease of LOS was 
not accompanied by deterioration in 
quality 
Retchin and The quality of To study the HMO FFS and Quasi- 1.590 outpatients 777 Patient in HMO were higher 
Brown 1990 ambulatory care in patient compare to fee- Capitation experimental, FFS and 813 HMO, US performance in preventive activities 
Medicare health for-service in term of non- than fee-for-service patient. 
maintenance preventive care randomized 
organizations controlled trial 
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Author, Year Topic Research question intervention Methodology Target group Result 
of study 
Vemon et at. Medical outcomes of To compare the FFS and Prospective 425 patients diagnosis There are no different in stage of 
1995 care for breast cancer outcome of breast Capitation cohort study of breast cancer diagnosis, survival rate within two 
among health cancer between patient group treated by the same provider. 
maintenance in HMO and fee-for-
organization and fee- service 
for-service patients 
Tsai et a1. The effect of changing To examine the effect PPS and Observation 23,638 insurance claim LOS was decreased by 0.59 days, 
2005 reimbursement policies of changing payment FFS before and the required services increased by 
on quality of in-patient fromFFS to after 2.19 to 4.24 items, the optional 
care, from fee-for- prospective payment implementation service item decrease 0.32 items 
service to prospective by using of PPS and drug prescription decreased by 
payment hemorrhoidectomy 0.58 to 0.99 items. 
insurance claim as a 
tracer. 
Wells et al. Quality of care for To evaluate the quality PPS and Observation 2,746 elderly depressed The intensities of care had 
1994 depressed elderly pre- of care in elderly FFS before and patient hospitalized in expanded after PPS was 
post prospective depressed patient after 297 hospitals, the US. implemented. 
payment system: before and after implementation 
differences in response implementation of of PPS 
across treatment prospective payment 
settings system 
Ljunggren and Patient reported quality To evaluate the effects PPS and Prospective 70 patient in each of From the perception of patient, the 
Sjoden2001 of care before vs. after of PPS in quality of global longitudinal two hospitals, Sweden quality of care had decreased after 
the implementation of care in patient view in budget design implementation of PPS payment 
a diagnosis related Sweden. system. 
groups (ORG) 
classification and 
payment system in one 
Swedish county 
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Author, Year Topic Research question intervention Methodology Target group Result 
of study 
Kangarloo et Effect of conversion To assess the effect of Capitation Observation 670 patients, US Conversion of payment can leads to 
a1. 1996 from a fee-for-service capitation in andFFS before and improved quality 
plan to a capitation outpatient radiology after 
reimbursement system implementation 
on a circumscribed of capitation 
outpatient radiology 
practice of20,000 
persons 
U dyarhelyi et Comparison of the To determine whether PPS and Retrospective 246 patients with The quality ofRM 0 are was equal i 
a1. 1991 quality of ambulatory the quality of care in FFS cohort study chronic uncomplication to or better 
care for fee-for-service ambulatory condition and 250 women 
and prepaid patients without chronic 
disease, US 
Safran et a1. Primary care To explore the PPS and longitudinal 2,546 patients with 303 Within three type of health care 
1994 performance in fee-for- different in quality of FFS study physicians offices, US system FFS, PPS, IPA, the results 
service and prepaid primary care between of each has strength and weakness 
health care systems. FFS and PPS payment. in seven indicators of primary care 
Results from the quality should be considered to set 
Medical Outcomes strategies for implementation. 
Study 
Kerr et al. Primary care To evaluate Capitation Cross sectional 910 primary care The primary care physicians I 
1997 physicians' satisfaction satisfaction of primary and FFS survey physician in 89 groups, reported lower satisfaction with 
with quality of care in care physician in US capitated patients and lower 
California capitated capitated payment to satisfied with quality to capitated 
medical groups quality of care for their patient. 
patient in California. 
Fleetcroft and Do the incentive To explore the fee-for- FFS and Observatory 8 indicators of point There were no relations between 
Cookson 2006 payments in the new service payment for capitation system workloads, UK pay and health gain across the eight 
NHS contract for wide range activities interventions. This fmding suggest 
primary care reflect with population health the danger of reward activities 
likely population gain in UK relatively low benefits to 
health gains? ~opulation health 
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Author, Year Topic Research question intervention Methodology Target group Result 
of study 
Balkrishnan et Capitation payment, To test hypothesis that Capitation Cross-sectional 46,320 ambulatory Capitated patient receive time with 
a1. 2002 length of visit, and capitation payment andFFS analysis visit, US physician 5.6% less than non 
preventive services: reduces the time of capitated patient but receive 3% 
evidence from a patient and physician more in preventive service. 
national sample of and increase use of 
outpatient physicians prevention service. 
Ellisand Hospital response to To examine the change PPS and Analysis claim Four types of hospital The overall reduction of LOS is 4.5 
McGuire 1996 prospective payment: of hospital treatment FFS data between in New Hampshire, US day attributable to payment reform. 
moral hazard, resulting from July 1,1987 The author suggests that -1.8 days 
selection, and practice- prospective payment and June is from moral hazard, -3.0 days 
style effects 30,1992 from practice style effect and 
overall population slightly sicker 
for +0.3 days LOS. 
Gosden et a1. Paying doctors by To evaluate the impact Salary and Observation 10 GP from 46 salaried GP in salaried practice spent less 
2003 salary: a controlled of salary contract to capitation before and pilot sites, UK time in practice but working more 
study of general GP in behaviour and after on out of hours. List size is smaller 
practitioner behaviour quality of care in UK implementation and trend to provide shorter 
in England of salary consultation. For quality, there is no 
contract statistically significance compare 
between salaried contract and 
standard contract. 
Akashi et a1. User fees at a public To assess the user fee User Fee Observatory National Maternal and In quality of care after 
2004 hospital in Cambodia: program in National and data before and Child Health Centre in implementation of user fee, the 
effects on hospital Maternal and Child unofficial after Cambodia patient utilization was increase. 
performance and Health Centre in payment implementation Evaluation of care from patient 
--
provider attitudes Cambodia from patient of user fee view was improved. 
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Author, Year Topic Research question intervention Methodology Target group Result 
of study 
Broyles 1990 Efficiency, costs, and To compare the effect Per diem Observatory 26 hospital in New Comparing between DRG and Per 
quality: the New Jersey of payment between and PPS cross sectional Jersey, US diem, how to minimize cost of 
experience revisited per diem and PPS in study DRG is minimize cost per case and 
term of cost and minimize cost per day for per diem. , 
quality of care In quality of care, the evidence on 
this issue is less conclusive. The 
report shows that LOS, daily use of 
radiological procedure per patient, 
and the volume of radiological 
procedure per patient reduce. 
Shaughessy et Home health care To assess the quality FFS and RCT 9 HMO-owned, 15 FFS Visit intensity was in FFS patient, 
a1. 1994 outcomes under or effectiveness of capitation , 14 Mixed HMO and relative to HMO.ln particular, 
capitated and fee-for- home health care FFS agencies in 18 moderate outcome was better in 
service payment through payment states were included in mixed HMO and FFS than pured 
system between FFS the study, US FFS.The result showed that higher 
andHMO. number of visit associated with 
better outcome especially among 
HMO patient. 
Chawlaand The impact of To assess the impact of User fee and RCT 3 District in Niger that The formal visiting is increase in 
Ellis 2000 fmancing and quality an experiment health indirect implemented the new the district that has a user fee 
changes on health care care cost recovery, payment model of user fee. intervention compare to control 
demand in Niger accompanied by Using household district. The possibly reason is that 
quality improvement survey to be the tool for it hospital has improved the facility 
in three district in baseline and follow up., to improve the quality. 
Niger Niger 
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